Governance and City Regions by Zimmermann, Karsten & Feiertag, Patricia

City-regions are areas where the daily journeys for work, shopping and 
leisure frequently cross administrative boundaries. They are seen as engines 
of the national economy, but are also facing congestion and disparities. 
Thus, all over the world, governments attempt to increase problem-solving 
capacities in city-regions by institutional reform and a shift of functions.
This book analyses the recent reforms and changes in the governance 
of city-regions in France, Germany and Italy. It covers themes such as 
the impact of austerity measures, territorial development, planning and 
state modernisation. The authors provide a systematic cross-country 
perspective on two levels, between six city-regions and between the national 
policy frameworks in these three countries. They use a solid comparative 
framework, which refers to the four dimensions functions, institutions and 
governance, ideas and space. They describe the course of the reforms, the 
motivations and the results, and consequently, they question the widespread 
metropolitan fever or resurgence of city-regions and provide a better 
understanding of recent changes in city-regional governance in Europe.
The primary readership will be researchers and master students in planning, 
urban studies, urban geography, political science and governance studies, 
especially those interested in metropolitan regions and / or decentralisation. 
Due to the uniqueness of the work, the book will be of particular interest 
to scholars working on the comparative European dimension of territorial 
governance and planning.
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1.1  The rise of territorial reforms in Europe’s city-regions?
City-regions and their governance is a persistent topic in the planning sci-
ences, urban geography and local government studies and it’s no surprise 
that the reconfiguration of city-regional governance is seen as an ongoing 
process, sometimes as an element of national reform agendas, sometimes 
being a more local project of transformation of cross-jurisdictional rela-
tions (Keil et al. 2017a; Zimmermann et al. 2020; Tomás 2020). Often city-
regions are considered to be the hubs of the globalised knowledge economy 
and, at least in some cases, this prompted the support of national govern-
ments in various ways (Moisio and Jonas 2018; Lang and Török 2017; see 
also Katz and Bradley 2013). The following quotes illustrate the conven-
tional wisdom in the scholarly literature with regard to the narrative of 
competitiveness and city-regions:
Large urban agglomerations in the Global North in particular are 
often understood as sites of globalization. These cities are understood 
through their functions and substances and the degree of integration 
into the purportedly “global” economy.
(Moisio et al. 2018, 137)
Hence it
has become commonplace not only for urbanists, consultant compa-
nies, globalization boosters and businesses firms (which also construct 
and finance urban infrastructures) but also for nation-state policymak-
ers and politicians to argue that the strategic role of cities and city-
regions has grown fundamentally during the past two or three decades. 
In such a geopolitical imaginary, the growth of major cities and city-
regions is conceived of as an inevitable global phenomenon orchestrated 
by market forces, one which proceeds beyond politics, political regu-
lation and the territorial state. Policy analyst Parag Khanna’s (2016) 
Connectography is one among the many attempts to tell a story about 
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the contemporary de-territorializing global processes and the related 
ways in which the future is being shaped less by states than by connec-
tivities of urban hubs and flows.
(Moisio et al. 2018, 137)
City-regions, due to their role and function as “national champions” in 
economic development (Crouch and LeGalès 2012) are the target of ter-
ritorialised national policies and, seen from the perspective of national 
governments, their governance is highly relevant in order to prevent fail-
ures in many public policies (such as transport, environmental protection, 
innovation, see Kübler and Lefèvre 2017; Gross, Gualini and Ye 2019; Keil 
et al. 2017b). Indeed, higher education and research institutes as well as 
private knowledge-based service providers are concentrated in city-regions 
and generate competitive advantages on an international scale. Against this 
background, some European states such as Germany and France as well as 
Poland have partially redefined the function of city-regions in their spatial 
development policies and have given more relevance to competitiveness and 
innovation – or defined city-regions for the first time at all in planning and 
policy documents (Moisio et al. 2018; Krukowska and Lackowska 2017; 
Geppert 2009; Blotevogel and Schmitt 2006).
However, the assumption that the growth and rising relevance of city-
regions is mainly driven by economic globalisation is questionable and has 
ostensibly produced some all too schematic and even flawed theoretical 
insights (a position shared by Gualini and Gross 2019, 7). National reforms 
in France and Italy taking place in the years 2010–2015 and presented in 
detail in this book indicate that there is a new interest in city-regions that 
emerged in a period when these two states (as well as others) were facing 
the long-term effects of the financial crisis of 2008–2009. It seems that these 
conditions changed the way city-regions were seen by state governments. 
The assumption of the dominance of competition-oriented metropolitan 
policy seems to be somewhat biased. City-regions are still strategic projects 
of state-spatial restructuring but there are indications that the financial cri-
sis of 2008 shifted the focus and brought metropolitan reform back to the 
agenda, but with a stronger focus on austerity, efficiency and cohesion pol-
icy. There is a stronger emphasis on the relevance city-regions have for the 
modernisation of the public sector and the coordination of public services. 
In addition, there is a stronger recognition of a pronounced and ongoing 
process of metropolitanisation and the effects this process has for effec-
tive and efficient public policies (Sellers et al. 2013; Balducci et al. 2017; 
Siedentop and Fina 2012; Dembski et al. 2019; Cardoso and Meijers 2021).
In a narrow sense, metropolitanisation refers to the growth of city-regions 
and respective processes of suburbanisation and post-suburbanisation 
(Dembski et al. 2019; Cardoso and Meijers 2021). In a wider interpreta-
tional frame, metropolitanisation is a multidimensional process referring to 
issues of scale selection, cross-jurisdictional governance and construction 
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of space. This implies a rising relevance of city-regions as social, economic 
or even political entities with many direct and indirect effects (Scott 2001). 
City-regions are the targets of immigration and thus places of diversity and 
more or less successful social integration. They reveal high levels of envi-
ronmental problems and produce new forms of large-scale social inequal-
ity (Sellers et al. 2017; Keil et al. 2017b). This poses a range of challenges 
for public policies and subnational politics, which touches upon questions 
about the territorial organisation of the state (i.e. devolution, decentralisa-
tion, regionalisation). In many cases, city-regions show inadequate forms 
of metropolitan governance, which points to parochialism and fragmented 
local government structures (Scott 2019; Rosan 2016). Coordination defi-
cits in land use planning, infrastructure development, transport planning, 
environmental planning and other public services such as waste disposal, 
energy supply, housing policy or public transport services are the obvious 
result. These deficits have been discussed at greater length in the debate 
on metropolitan governance (Scott 2019; Keil et al. 2017a; Zimmermann, 
Galland and Harrison 2020; Rosan 2016; Heinelt et al. 2011; Sager 2006).
At least in some European countries, metropolitanisation and the quest 
for higher efficiency in the public sector has triggered a renewed debate 
on the social, political and economic significance of city-regions, which 
necessarily also provokes questions of good institutional design and the 
setting of priorities for national spatial development policy (Gross and 
Gualini 2019; Salet and Thornley 2007; Zimmermann and Heinelt 2012; 
Sellers et al. 2013). Territorial reforms usually pursue different objectives 
and move along institutionally determined national paths (Loughlin 2007; 
Lidström 2007; Baldersheim and Rose 2010). This holds true particularly 
for reforms in public administration as well as decentralisation and region-
alisation reforms that took shape across Europe in recent years (Kuhlmann 
and Bouckeart 2016). In the following section we argue that the differentia-
tion of production and social reproduction functions is a helpful heuristic 
for discussing the current changes in the governance of city-regions and this 
helps to answer the question of what drives city-regionalism.
1.1.1  Production or social reproduction?
The supposed one-sidedness in the orientation of the academic debate, 
the so-called neo-liberal plot, was the subject of a controversial debate 
about the question of what drives the agendas of city-regional politics in 
the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (Harding 2007; 
Jonas and Ward 2007; see also Keil et al. 2017b). Is it the production func-
tion or the social reproduction function? These two different functions 
stand for two different sets of policy priorities and ideas of what is at stake 
in city-regions. The production function is primarily supported by measures 
that serve to strengthen the competitiveness and innovation capacity of city-
regions. In Germany, for example, this was part of the national guiding 
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principles and action strategies of spatial development that allocated inno-
vation, gateway and competition functions to a limited number of rather 
large metropolitan regions (BMVBS 2006; MKRO 2013).
The social reproduction function is defined very broadly by Jonas and 
Ward (2007, 174–175) and includes welfare policies such as housing, public 
services and childcare, but also refers to measures that promote quality of 
life, thus addressing open spaces (inner-city and regional parks) and environ-
mental aspects (noise protection, air pollution control, climate adaptation). 
In a similar way, Kantor and Savitch (2005) in their comparative study on 
cities in the international marketplace made a distinction between market-
oriented urban policies and socially oriented urban policies. In part, this 
refers to a distinction made in political science in the 1980s to describe the 
functional shift of urban policies (Hesse 1983; Harvey 1989). While cities 
(i.e. local governments) were responsible in the post-war period for the pro-
vision and implementation of social reproduction functions, it was national 
government that was in charge of innovation policies and economic devel-
opment. In a shift often described as the transformation of the Keynesian 
Welfare State to the Schumpeterian Workfare State, this division of func-
tions was renegotiated and re-scaled (Jessop 2002, 2010). Henceforth, cities 
started initiatives to create business-friendly environments and marketing 
campaigns and made investments in specific types of infrastructure such as 
airports or convention centres. Much of the literature about the re-scaling 
of the state described the impacts of this transition, i.e. the downscaling of 
innovation and competitiveness-oriented policies and the rise of cities and 
city-regions as actors in the globalised economy (Pinson 2020; Keil 1998).
In the view of many observers, the production function currently domi-
nates the discussion on planning and governance in city-regions, while the 
social reproduction function receives less attention (Blotevogel and Schmitt 
2006; Jonas and Ward 2007; Salet and Thornley 2007; Moisio and Jonas 
2018; Wachsmuth 2017). However, according to our observations, the social 
production function is a long-standing theme for city-regions and much 
stronger as a facilitator of city-regional governance than it may seem when 
examining the mentioned literature. Hence, following Keil et al. (2017b), 
we want to find out if a consensus is possible between these diverging goals. 
In addition, we need to consider that there are new concerns potentially not 
covered so far (public health, digitisation, climate adaptation). Whether the 
attribution of new functions has actually replaced older ones as drivers for 
institutional change and institutional variation is empirically questionable, 
specifically when put into the perspective of an international comparison 
(Salet and Thornley 2007; Kuhlmann and Bouckaert 2016; Tosics 2019; 
Keil et al. 2017a).
In this respect, it is not only in Germany that the discussion on city-
regions differs considerably from the discussion of the late 1960s and early 
1970s. The “old” attribution of functions saw city-regions as conurbations 
facing problems of congestion and inner city decay. There was an urgent 
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need for planning interventions and concerted action, not least because of 
a lack of inter-municipal burden-sharing for infrastructures of regional rel-
evance. In particular, the public transport sector was considered to put a 
heavy burden on the budgets of the core cities and justified the demands of 
these cities for the fair sharing of costs. While city-regions were territories 
framed as problematic in the old nomenclature, city-regions have become 
the bearers of hope for a regionalised economy geared towards constant 
innovation, with European or global significance. Sometimes this shift finds 
its expression in new imaginaries such as metropolitan regions, indicating 
higher international relevance, bigness and symbolic power (Fedeli, Harrison 
and Feiertag 2020).1 These city-regions are supposed to develop new forms 
of governance such as voluntary and public–private self-organisation, also 
in anticipation of some form of devolution of statutory tasks or public poli-
cies. Is this interpretative frame still valid? Or are we entering a new period 
of city-regionalism where metropolitanisation and pressures to consolidate 
public budgets determine the agendas?
1.1.2  Effectiveness of city-regional governance?
There is a second anomaly in the debate on city-regions. We are puzzled by 
the discrepancy between the academic work on the rise of city-regions and 
the actual limited success of metropolitan governance arrangements – at 
least in the majority of cases (Scott 2019; Keil et al. 2017a; Rosan 2016; 
Heinelt et al 2011; ESPON 2018). In many states, the role of institutional-
ised city-regions in multi-level governance systems is far from being clear or 
city-regions as institutions have even been abolished. Rhetoric on the rise 
of city-regions and political practice fall apart and, in many cases, what 
seems to be a purposive designed arrangement for metropolitan govern-
ance is more a side effect of wider reforms of the state (Kuhlmann and 
Wollmann 2014; Jessop 2010). Decentralisation, regionalisation, shifts in 
the multi-level architecture of the state (including fiscal federalism or asym-
metric decentralisation) have an impact on city-regions but this effect is not 
necessarily positive. Therefore, putting reforms of city-regional governance 
into context is relevant to avoid traps in the interpretation about the drivers 
of the rise of city-regions.
Without a doubt, due to fragmented and particularistic local govern-
ment structures, most city-regions are in need of better and more coherent 
governance structures. However, for many public policies such as public 
transport, sewage, waste management and regional planning, city-regional 
solutions are in place. In both Germany and France, inter-municipal asso-
ciations are a consistent and indispensable form of provision of services of 
general interest and spatial planning. In France and Italy, consolidated solu-
tions for city-regional governance have been implemented since 2014–2015. 
The neo-liberal plot thus seems to be too simple as an explanatory scheme 
for the recent developments. The reason for this is that, with few exceptions, 
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the debate on city-regions has in recent years hardly taken the aspect of the 
performance of public policies into account but has instead concentrated 
on processes of institution-building and the emergence of regional regimes, 
without full reflection of the role city-regions have in the multi-level system 
of public administration (Heinelt and Zimmermann 2012; Blatter 2005). 
So, the question is: which role do city-regions play in the process of deal-
ing with public problems (Sellers et al. 2013)? Can shifts be identified in 
an international comparison? It is worth mentioning that Fürst, Hesse 
and Richter addressed a similar question in the early 1980s under the title 
“Agglomerations in the process of federal problem processing” in relation 
to Germany (Fürst, Hesse and Richter 1984). One of the results of this study 
was the insight that changes are more likely in the realm of re-distribution of 
financial resources (including temporary side-payments). Territorial reforms 
are much more difficult to render because of vested interests and local iden-
tities (Fürst, Hesse and Richter 1984, 303). The authors also pointed out 
that the solving of distributional conflicts has a strong cognitive dimension 
(ibid. 298).
We feel that the discussion on metropolitan governance and re-scal-
ing of territorial governance in geography and planning has paid little 
attention to the political and administrative science discussion on region-
alisation, decentralisation, inter-municipal cooperation and fiscal rela-
tionships of state levels (Loughlin 2007; Teles 2016; Steen, Teles and 
Torsteinsen 2017; Kübler and Rochat 2018). Indeed, the debate on the 
territorial organisation of the state and the role of local government has 
been ongoing for many years if not decades. Contrary to the assumption 
that globalisation, Europeanisation and internationalisation homogenise 
institutions and policies, we find that the diversity of territorial and func-
tional profiles of local governments in Europe is still high (Denters and 
Rose 2005; Baldersheim and Rose 2010; Kuhlmann and Bouckaert 2016). 
Although the definition of the functions and the territorial dimension of 
local governments as well as inter-municipal arrangements is often seen 
as a question of local political negotiations, national governments have 
a clear interest to intervene. Recent attempts of reterritorialisation of the 
state in France and Italy and initiatives on city-region level in other states 
demonstrate that more effective and more efficient local public policies 
are on the agenda of national and subnational governments (Kuhlmann 
and Bouckaert 2016). We may apply a range of heuristics to analyse these 
reforms:
 • asymmetric decentralisation as a form of decentralisation that gives 
different degrees of autonomy to regions within a nation state 
(OECD 2018)
 • austerity policies as a result of financial and economic instability, result-
ing in amalgamations of local governments for the purpose of cost-effi-
ciency (Kuhlmann and Bouckeart 2016; see Streeck 2017)
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 • the return of the nation state as a result of the financial crisis in 2008 
(Jessop 2010).
Having said this, the well-established categories used in the long and ongo-
ing debate on metropolitan governance in political science seem to be less 
and less appropriate to understand what is currently going on (Kübler and 
Rochat 2018). At least when referring to the distinction of metropolitan 
reform (consolidation), new regionalism (collaboration) and public choice 
(competition) as the three major theoretical positions that are often used 
to distinguish different periods with dominant institutional ideas of how 
best to govern city-regions (Nelles 2012; Tomàs 2020). Periodisation is very 
common in the studies on metropolitan governance but, as has been dem-
onstrated by Galland and Harrison (2020), the temporal dimension is not 
necessarily a sequence of neatly separated phases. Many public tasks can 
be organised in different ways and we have only limited knowledge about 
the effectiveness of different organisational forms such as single-purpose 
associations, inter-municipal cooperation, interventions of upper tier gov-
ernments, contracts and multipurpose organisations. Problems of metropol-
itan development can also be tackled in various institutional environments 
(regionalising states, federalism, unitary states). Scott highlights that,
an approximate template is occasionally detectable in the more success-
ful efforts that have pushed in this direction, namely—and in sharp con-
tradistinction to any unitary arrangement—a conglomerate structure 
made up of loose hierarchical relationships complemented by assorted 
crosscutting organizations wherever these can significantly enhance 
operational effectiveness. There is no compelling reason, moreover, 
why a well-designed structure of this type could not also enhance the 
democratic assets of the city-region.
(Scott 2019, 17)
The empirical chapters of this book will show if these kinds of arrangements 
mentioned by Scott are emerging or not. Quotes like this often suffer from a 
focus on a few successful cases (often Stuttgart, Lyon or Portland). But what 
happens in other medium sized city-regions such as Nantes or Bologna? 
These medium sized city-regions are relevant as socio-economic entities but 
not as large as the global city-regions often referred to. Do they display the 
same patterns of governance and politics (ESPON 2018)?
1.2  Research question and research design
Hence, in our empirical study we start from a more nuanced heuristic. As 
territorial and functional reforms have several dimensions, a cross-national 
comparison needs a selection of criteria and dimensions and this selection 
always depends on the cognitive interest of the research. As we want to 
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address motivations for reforms as well as design options (institutional, 
functional, territorial) we identified the following four dimensions: ideas, 
functions, institutions and space. The functional, territorial and institu-
tional dimensions are widely used in comparative local government studies. 
These studies, for instance, distinguish political, functional and territorial 
profiles of local governments (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, 21–22). We 
add the ideational dimension as we feel that discourse matters, in particular 
when analysing the effects of austerity measures taken as a reaction to the 
fiscal crisis post-2008. Each of these four dimensions, described in more 
detail in the next sections, refers to a specific aspect of metropolitan govern-
ance and allows us to answer the following questions with regard to the 
recent reforms:
 1) Do city-regions increase in relevance as institutional sites of problem-
solving? And, if this is the case, in which dimension can we observe this 
increase in relevance? Do reforms have a functional (more or less func-
tions) or territorial focus (jurisdictions getting bigger) and which ideas 
drive these reforms (economic competitiveness (production), efficiency 
of public administration, social reproduction, cohesion or enhanced 
participation)?
 2) Do we observe convergence, divergence or persistence of the national 
patterns of city-regional politics?
 3) Is there a change in the arguments for reforms, from instrumental-ana-
lytic reflections in public administration (decentralisation, reform of 
the public sector, fiscal federalism) to political disputes about the role 
of city-regions in the context of globalisation and Europeanisation?
Although we are focusing on recent reforms (in particular in France and 
Italy), we see these in the context of longer trajectories of institutional 
change (Lowndes and Lempriere 2018).
1.2.1  Functions
We assume that a change in the allocation of functions between local gov-
ernment, the second tier of local government, city-region or the lower state 
levels is part of every reform of metropolitan governance. Functions refer 
to the tasks that are assigned in whole or in part to municipalities or city-
regions in the multi-level system. As indicated above, we make a funda-
mental distinction between those functions that are more related to social 
reproduction or services of general interest and those that are more related 
to the function of competitiveness. The first group of functions is usually 
part of the functional profile of local government and the second tier of 
local government (i.e. counties, provinces, départements), but is often man-
aged under inter-municipal responsibility. We think of tasks such as waste 
management, sewage treatment, secondary schools, public transport, social 
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housing, spatial planning, planning and provision of all kinds of public 
infrastructure and green spaces for recreation. This dimension found strong 
recognition in studies on decentralisation and reallocation of functions in 
comparative public administration (Kuhlmann and Bouckeart 2016).
The dimension of functions also had significant repercussions in the 
German debate on Metropolitan Regions during the 2000s (Blotevogel and 
Schmitt 2006). In this national debate, emphasis was not on social repro-
duction but on the production function. A fourfold definition of metropoli-
tan functions was used in order to make a distinction between metropolitan 
regions and smaller city-regions (Blotevogel and Schmitt 2006). These four 
functions were innovation, connectivity (or gateway-functions), economic 
development and symbolic power (i.e. creation of new urban imaginar-
ies and lifestyles). Exemplary functions are marketing, tourism, economic 
development and all kinds of support for gateway and innovation policies.
The two-fold distinction of social reproduction functions and production 
function takes up common lines of argumentation from the geographical 
and administrative science discussion on city-regions and inter-municipal 
cooperation (see above, Kantor and Savitch 2005). Furthermore, we assume 
that differences between the states and city-regions under scrutiny exist with 
respect to the relationship of the functional dimension and other dimensions 
such as institutions and spatial relations. Different functions call for differ-
ent spatial scales and governance arrangements which – in turn – may create 
fragmentation.
Our guiding questions are:
 • Which functions are performed at which level?
 • Are there significant shifts upwards or downwards in this respect?
 • Which functional profiles result from this?
 • Which actors claim responsibility for which functions?
1.2.2  Institutions and governance
The dimension of institutions in comparative local government studies and 
comparative planning studies often refers to some well-known formal cat-
egories (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014):
 1) The position of municipalities and the second tier of local self-govern-
ment in the structure of the state (functional profile of municipalities; 
political and fiscal autonomy of municipalities; administrative culture)
 2) The relationship between local, regional and national spatial planning 
(distribution of competences, interdependence).
The reforms in France and Italy changed the formal distributions of functions 
between local government, regional governments (in Italy) and city-regional 
organisations, and introduced new entities (if not institutions). Hence, the 
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comparison of the formal aspects and operational rules in the multi-level 
governance system is highly relevant for our comparative study. However, 
as Lowndes and Lempriere (2018) point out: institutions are more than just 
organisations and formal regulations. They constitute the rules in use that 
may take the form of informal conventions, routinised practices and institu-
tional narratives that guide the behaviour of individual and organisational 
actors. Therefore, we consider also
 3) the formal and informal institutionalisation of the city-region and 
forms of organisation of inter-municipal cooperation according to the 
fields of activity and
 4) institutional legacies and changing narratives of past forms of inter-
municipal collaboration and metropolitan governance (as in all of 
our case-study regions, inter-municipal initiatives existed before the 
reforms).
With regard to institutional ideas, the discussion on metropolitan govern-
ance and territorial reforms is based on a simple dichotomy of two positions. 
One is the distinction between consolidation approaches and public choice 
(competition) (Baldersheim and Rose 2010, 8; Heinelt and Kübler 2005). 
Protagonists of consolidation (or in other words: metropolitan reformers) 
see the creation of a new jurisdiction or amalgamation of existing juris-
dictions as the best solution to create economies of scale. Multi-purpose 
associations are also part of this system of ideas, which not only refers to 
effective problem-solving but also to legitimacy, as we often find a claim for 
the direct election of regional councils (Blatter 2005).
Public choice, in contrast, sees the virtue in keeping the autonomy of small 
units (i.e. local governments). Charles Tiebout and Vincent Ostrom, being 
the principal protagonists of this position, argue for competition between 
jurisdictions in order to create choice options for citizens and firms (Ostrom, 
Tiebout and Warren 1961). Despite being very influential in the debate sur-
rounding metropolitan government and governance, the distinction between 
these two positions has been far too simple to catch the murky reality of 
territorial and functional reforms in city-regions. Collaboration takes place 
in various fields and on different scales, some functions are shared, some are 
sharply separated between the local and the regional level. Organisational 
forms include single-purpose associations, multi-purpose associations, agen-
cies under private law, soft and voluntary associations and contracting. We 
may also find different organisational forms for different policies. Hence, 
when describing the institutional profile of city-regions, in addition to spa-
tial planning, further fields of action will be taken into account. In particu-
lar, housing policy and services of general interest (e.g. water supply and 
waste disposal, energy, public transport) will be considered as these tasks 
contribute significantly to the reproduction function. In addition, munici-
pal and regional economic development (incl. marketing, tourism) is also 
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considered, as it articulates the production function. The main object of 
observation is city-regional institutions created by territorial and functional 
reforms, and a reflection about their role in the multi-level system.
1.2.3  Ideas
In addition to institutional and functional aspects, the ideational dimension 
is of interest as the financial crisis in 2008/2009 caused a window of oppor-
tunity for the re-articulation of a range of ideas for state modernisation and 
the rendering of public policies. Following Hall (1989), we understand ideas 
as catalysts which, in a given institutional framework, enable the formation 
of coalitions of actors that make their claims during the implementation 
of reforms (see also Bèland and Cox 2011). Baldersheim and Rose (2010) 
called this the framing of territorial choice: territorial and functional reforms 
need justification and this is done by referring to a specific set of frames and 
ideas. The dimension of ideas also refers to the different reform discourses 
in the states and takes into account the positions of the actors involved as 
well as the lines of conflict (Lieberman 2003). The notion of ideas captures 
the actors’ beliefs, expectations, assumptions about cause and effects and 
knowledge that actors bring into the world of political reforms, or in other 
words “ideas, after all are a medium by which people can imagine a state of 
affairs other than the status quo and such imaginings might plausibly spur 
them to act to try and make changes” (Lieberman 2003, 698).
With regard to the reform of metropolitan governance, a set of ideas such 
as territorial equity, effectiveness, competitiveness or autonomy of local self-
government is frequently used as a point of reference in academic writings 
and actors’ statements. In the debate on the modernisation of the public sec-
tor it is common to refer to at least three bundles of ideas: (a) cost-efficiency 
(partly influenced by New Public Management); (b) effectiveness of public 
services (simplification, decentralisation, subsidiarity, territorial coherence) 
and (c) democracy (i.e. bringing decisions closer to the citizens, the option 
of referendums, direct elections of regional councils). In the realm of spatial 
planning, effectiveness means the overcoming of local particularism with 
regard to land use decisions. This idea, however, is in conflict with the idea 
and value of the autonomy of local self-government. Other ideas are organ-
ised around generic principles such as territorial cohesion or urban–rural 
partnership. We add competitiveness and austerity since the financial cri-
sis of 2008 caused massive austerity programmes, in particular in southern 
Europe. In addition, Europeanisation may be a frame that is used when 
justifying reforms (often in a narrower definition than the pressures of the 
common market, Fricke 2020).
The analysis of ideas also aims to describe the content of what we call 
metropolitan policy. The term metropolitan policy covers all initiatives of 
a state government that explicitly aim to promote (or prevent) improved 
capacity for action in city-regions. Examples are the initiative of European 
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metropolitan regions in Germany (Zimmermann 2017; Blotevogel and 
Schmitt 2006) or the initiative of the métropoles d’équilibre/décentrali-
sation industrielle of the French spatial development policy of the 1960s 
(Geppert 2009, 253). Metropolitan policy thus refers to all government 
measures, laws and support programmes, but also to guiding principles and 
ideas for action, which in every respect have city-regions as their subject. 
The term metropolitan policy also expresses that metropolitan reforms are 
not only about forms of organisation (metropolitan governance), but also 
the result of political disputes, which essentially revolve around the ques-
tion of what function city-regions should have for the social and economic 
development of a country. As elaborated by Heinelt and Zimmermann, this 
ideational dimension addresses the level of meta-governance (Zimmermann 
and Heinelt 2012, 93). Impulses of the meta-level are understood as action-
guiding orientation and ideas that can influence debates on city-regions. 
This may be accompanied by changes in the institutional system (new com-
petencies or formats) or funding programmes (using Germany as an exam-
ple: Schmitt 2009; Zimmermann 2012).
1.2.4  Spatial relations and territorial profiles
In public administration science, the territorial dimension has found enor-
mous recognition in the literature on reforms of local government (Kuhlmann 
and Wollmann 2014; Baldersheim and Rose 2010). However, space has 
become a contested academic notion, not least in the debate on city-regions 
(Cardoso and Meijers 2021). In planning science and geography, we know 
at least three different conceptual approaches for defining reasonable spaces 
for cooperation in city-regional politics (Tosics 2019, 3):
 • The morphologic area (the continuously urbanised or built-up area);
 • The functional urban region (often defined by commuter sheds or 
labour markets); and
 • The larger economic area (usually vast areas constituted by a system of 
economic hubs and districts as well as transport infrastructures) (see 
OECD 2012; ESPON 2018; Dembski et al. 2019).
A fourth discourse partly takes up these definitions but sees city-space not 
bound to geographical boundaries but constituted by global capitalist rela-
tions or networked spaces (Paasi 2002). This body of work on relational 
space refers, among others, to the spatial theory of Henri Lefebvre. The 
TPSN-framework of Jessop et al. (2008) partly synthesises this discussion 
and distinguishes four categories of space: territory, place, scale and net-
work. While territory describes jurisdictional spaces (government territo-
ries), the other three categories are in use for relational or socio-political 
geographies being much more in a state of flux. The consequence for our 
approach is that we, in addition to the conventional wisdom of the public 
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administration literature on decentralisation and amalgamation of munici-
palities, will also consider soft forms of territorial politics, networked space 
and collaborative governance. It is particularly these practices that show 
that the constitution of metropolitan space is a contested process and juris-
dictional boundaries are often more part of the problem than the solution 
as the construction of space is the result of a diverse set of social, cultural 
and economic practices (Löw 2016). What a reasonable scale of social or 
economic action or policy-intervention would be is far from clear. Hence, 
we also consider the discussion on post-metropolitan territories or the in-
between city (Balducci et al. 2017; Soja 2000). It is not necessary to refer 
to the debate on planetary or endless urbanisation to make clear that sub-
urbanisation, post-suburbanisation and re-urbanisation – sometimes in 
parallel – create a new hierarchy of places in city-regions, even questioning 
in some cases where the city-region starts and where it ends (Dembski et al. 
2019). This dimension does not merely refer to jurisdictional boundaries 
but also the space-constituting relationships between scales (Gualini and 
Gross 2019). A constructivist perspective is needed as actors try to establish 
new spatial scales by questioning others. Still, representative and accounta-
ble (local) governments exist on different levels and the formation of interest 
happens through the reference to (local) jurisdictions with clear boundaries.
In two of the three countries under observation in this book a reconfigu-
ration of spatial levels happened recently and these emerging scales took dif-
ferent institutional shapes. These scales are not clearly related to each other 
in all cases. Rather, there are diffuse demarcations and overlaps. Instead 
of the clear differentiation of spatial levels, perforated and fragmented 
arrangements can also emerge. Table 1.1 summarises the four dimensions 
for the descriptive comparison. 
Table 1.1  Dimensions for comparison
Dimension Criteria 
Functions Production function (marketing, regional development 
agency, gateway function, innovation)
Social reproduction function (Housing policy, public services, 
public transport services, environmental protection)
Institutions Multi-level Governance (local government system, 
planning system)
Metropolitan Governance (forms) 
Ideas Justification of reforms in which the direction of change 
is articulated (welfare state compensation, competitive 
orientation); this becomes apparent in (national) spatial 
mission statements, programmes, declarations, studies, 
statements of networks of cities and regions such as IKM 
in Germany, interviews, possibly newspapers 
Spatial relations Scaling and Re-Scaling, disputes about boundaries, soft 
space, size of jurisdictions, relationship between scales
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1.3  Comparing city-regions and local government systems
The new allocation of functions to city-regions described above takes place 
simultaneously and yet differently in the European states (Zimmermann 
2017; Fürst 2010; Salet et al. 2003; see Chapter 6.1). These developments 
justify the need for a comparative analysis that can build on the ongoing 
discussion on the comparison of local governments and planning systems 
in Europe and beyond (Sellers 2019; Denters and Rose 2005; Nadin and 
Stead 2012). With regard to the state of research, it must be noted that 
despite the quite respectable number of publications on metropolitan gov-
ernance, a systematic comparison at European level has yet not been con-
ducted (Heinelt and Kübler 2005; Salet et al. 2003; Otgaar et al. 2008; Keil 
et al. 2017a; ESPON 2018).
Some elements of comparative local government research have already 
been discussed above (Wollmann 2008; Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014). 
Still, the comparison of cities and local governments risks tapping into some 
pitfalls. In a very basic way, Kantor and Savitch (2005) see the problems of 
comparative urban analysis as follows:
To begin, there is no commonly accepted general theory of urban poli-
tics and policy that can provide direction and testable propositions for 
examining common political phenomena in cities across nations and 
cultures. Without some kind of theoretical construct that highlights 
common properties shared by cities, comparative analysis makes lit-
tle sense. This vacuum leaves those seeking to do comparative urban 
research dependent on what Robert Merton called “theories of the mid-
dle range” to guide inquiry (Merton 1968).
(Kantor and Savitch 2005, 136)
Notwithstanding these problems, comparative urban research has experi-
enced a boom in recent years, raising important methodological questions 
(Robinson 2016; Sellers 2019; Kantor and Savitch 2005). Particular atten-
tion has been paid to the consideration of the explanatory value of local 
contexts (Kantor and Savitch 2005; Sellers 2019). There is, however, a 
difference between cities as objects of comparison and local governments. 
Cities are complex social, spatial and political phenomena and this com-
plexity creates heuristic and theoretical problems when seeing the city as 
the object of comparison (Robinson 2016). With regard to categories and 
principles of comparisons, the situation is more advantageous in the field of 
comparative local government studies. Here it is possible to build on a range 
of pertinent studies and well-tried typologies (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 
2014). But even if comparative local government studies in Europe are 
somewhat more advanced than comparative global urban research, some of 
the fundamental methodological problems are similar (Kantor and Savitch 
2005). These consist of:
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 1) analysing a sizeable number of cities (or city-regions in our case) while 
still providing depth of analysis (scope versus depth)
 2) accounting for different contextual meanings, especially across differ-
ent political and administrative cultures
 3) providing conceptual tools that can accurately address the same prob-
lem in different places (symmetry) and
 4) accessing, retrieving and processing useful data from multiple jurisdic-
tions (Kantor and Savitch 2005, 137).
In this study, we basically follow two strategies when comparing metro-
politan governance in three states: variation-finding comparison (as sug-
gested by Tilly 1984) and multi-level matched comparison as proposed by 
Sellers (2019).
By following what Tilly (1984) called a variational comparison, we want 
to find the gradual variation in the similar patterns of the emergence of city-
regional governance in Germany, France and Italy. Such an international 
comparison usually shows how a comparable set of variables works in dif-
ferent contexts. The variation-finding comparison focusses on the anomalies 
and allows for contrasting observations within a group of systems that share 
some basic elements. In our case, these are three big and long-standing EU 
member states that experienced the post-war emergence of a welfare state 
that is now gradually transforming into something new and different, also 
with regard to territorial welfare policies (Jessop 2002; King and LeGalès 
2017). Territorial re-configuration of regions and cities is one of the ele-
ments of this ongoing transformation. Variation-finding comparison can 
differ with regard to the way the gradual variation of a phenomenon is con-
trolled. A similar systems design in local government studies would usually 
compare similar cases taken from a variety of national contexts (with the 
ultimate goal of finding universal principles). However, given the territorial 
diversity of reforms within and across nation states and the mutual feedback 
between local politics and national reform initiatives, the rigidity of varia-
ble-centred comparisons needs to be rethought. Many national governments 
implicitly or explicitly treat regions and cities asymmetrically when imple-
menting national reforms. They choose pilot regions, give some regions 
more power than others or implement reforms in an incremental way (e.g. 
métropole in France, combined authorities in the UK, German city-regions). 
In addition, reforms are the result of ongoing negotiations between different 
levels of government. Hence, the interactions between local and national 
(or subnational) governments are part of the variation. This prohibits the 
application of national typologies that are part of the conventional wisdom 
in comparative local government studies.2 In these typologies local govern-
ments are largely seen as dependent variables but not as active agents in 
central-local relations. In addition, the groups that are used as an empirical 
reference for these typologies are less and less homogeneous due to several 
asymmetric reforms. Their explanatory value is therefore limited.
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In nested comparisons (Sellers 2019), the definition and use of variation 
in variation-finding comparison (i.e. similarity and difference) is handled 
in a more flexible way. In what Sellers calls multi-level matched compari-
son, variation is observable on both national and subnational levels (Sellers 
2019). Hence, the goal is explicitly to “carry out a controlled examination 
of how both national contexts and subnational politics matter” (96):
Multilevel matched comparison offers a design to address subnational 
politics in countries that differ significantly, but along dimensions that 
offer a tractable basis for comparative analysis.
(Sellers 2019, 96)
This type of research has thus two components:
 1) The combination of differences on local and national levels; and
 2) The interactions of national and local governments.
Nevertheless, comparisons need to follow some of the basic principles defined 
in the literature (Tilly 1984; Sartori 1991; Kantor and Savitch 2005; Sellers 
2019). In regard to what is compared, comparisons need to be discrete (i.e. 
identifying units or objects, dimensions or functions precisely). Comparisons 
also need to take into consideration the principles of symmetry and functional 
equivalence. The research programme (the scope of the study and the portfo-
lio of methods) must be implemented in a similar way in all case studies. This 
sounds self-evident, but in an international comparison with fieldwork across 
different cultures and languages it is a relevant issue. Part of symmetry is 
also what is called functional equivalence in local government studies (Sellers 
2019, 90). Although this depends very much on the interest of the researcher, 
it is common in local government studies to compare units that are similar 
in terms of status or formal responsibilities. Therefore, we excluded capital 
city-regions (Berlin, Rome, Paris) and the German city-states.
The comparison establishes relationships among the dimensions of com-
parison (functions, institutions, ideas, spatial relations) that can describe and 
explain the differences between the most recent developments in Germany, 
France and Italy. Such a multidimensional approach seems to be necessary 
in order to grasp the observable diversity in European city-regions. It also 
makes it possible to capture the trends of convergence and divergence more 
accurately.
Germany, France and Italy were selected as they display several com-
monalities as well as differences that allow for a combination of variations 
across the three states as well the six case studies.
 • As described above, the function of city-regions has been discussed more 
intensively in all three countries in the last 10–15 years than in other 
European states and corresponding programmes are being set up. While 
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in Germany, however, the importance of city-regions for economic and 
social development is being discussed, the current initiative in Italy is 
influenced by the consolidation constraints of a country severely affected 
by the financial crisis. In France, we find both of these arguments pre-
sent. Furthermore, the three countries have different planning systems 
and local government systems, so that different framework conditions 
exist here. In all three states there is more than one or two city-regions 
that are affected by reforms, hence we have a critical mass (14 in Italy, 
22 in France and in Germany about 10).
 • France and Germany have a strong tradition of inter-municipal coopera-
tion but represent different planning and local government systems and 
types of state (decentralised unitary state – federal state). In Italy, the 
regions are increasingly responsible for planning and local government 
(regionalised state). However, the current formation of city-regions is 
based on a national law.
 • In their own way, Germany and France represent “successful models” 
of inter-municipal cooperation with strengths and weaknesses. In both 
countries, the question of linking new competition-oriented strategies 
with the classic inter-municipal institutions delivering services of gen-
eral interest is also currently arising. Since Italy has only a limited tradi-
tion of inter-municipal cooperation and fewer incentives are provided in 
either the planning or the municipal system, the starting conditions here 
are more unfavourable. Nevertheless, a discourse is being conducted on 
the role of city-regions – with an uncertain outcome.
 • France and Italy are often considered as having similar characteristics 
(i.e. they differ from the Northern and Anglo-Saxon models of local 
governments and are members of the so-called Franco or Napoleonic 
Group or represent the southern model), with centralised systems, 
weak local governments and a provincial tier (Hesse and Sharpe 1991, 
Loughlin 2003, Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014). Germany is part of 
the northern continental model with strong local governments. These 
typologies have a heuristic value but a comparison of France and Italy 
with regard to city-regional governance will show significant differences.
 • The choice of the cases also allows us to gain some knowledge about 
the eventual impact of policy transfer and diffusion. Three of our case 
studies are known internationally for their – relative – success of city-
regional policies (Lyon, Stuttgart and Bologna). In particular, Stuttgart 
and Lyon are often referred to as best practice (Fricke 2020). In addi-
tion, France and Italy share a common administrative culture and Italian 
protagonists often refer to the French experience.
 • We selected two city-regions in each country, which allows for a mini-
mum of subnational variation (see Table 1.2). The selection criteria for 
the case study regions were some established patterns of inter-munic-
ipal coordination and metropolitan governance. We also wanted a 
forerunner in each country and one city-region where metropolitan 
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reforms display some implementation problems. The city-regions are 
comparable in terms of population size, territory and economic pros-
perity. However, due to territorial reforms in the 1970s, German city-
regions tend to be bigger than their French and Italian counterparts. 
In addition, each city-region shows some specific features that we con-
sidered relevant for our study, i.e. the pôle métropolitain responsible 
for regional planning in Nantes Saint-Nazaire, the unsolved prob-
lem of regional governance in the piana fiorentina (Firenze-Prato-
Pistoia) and the regional land use plan in the Frankfurt/Rhine-Main 
city-region.
1.4  Short view on cases
1.4.1  France
Since the 1980s, France has undergone various decentralisation reforms, 
and since 2003, France is called a decentralised unitary state in the French 
constitution (Borraz and LeGalès 2005; Kuhlmann 2009). The shifts in 
tasks that have taken place are important for the institutional formation 
of city-regions. They not only strengthened the regions and départements, 
but also forms of inter-municipal cooperation that have existed since the 
1960s (Négrier 2005; Kuhlmann 2009; Geppert 2009). The formats pro-
vided for this purpose, EPCI (Établissements publics de cooperation inter-
communale), addressed different scales and were intended to increase the 
effectiveness of public service provision by forming large units. The rea-
son for this is the high number of small and very small municipalities. The 
EPCI, especially the most integrated types, métropoles and communau-
tés urbaines, perform numerous functions in the fields of urban renewal, 
social housing, spatial planning and economic development, and have their 
own financial resources thanks to revenues from the business tax. Inter-
municipal cooperation was thus primarily a question of the functional and 
territorial profile of the municipalities and the related effectiveness and effi-
ciency of the performance of the public sector and gradual decentralisation. 
In addition, the relationship of Greater Paris to the other city-regions has 
always been a focus of French spatial development policy (Geppert 2009, 
Table 1.2  Case study city-regions
City-Region Size Inhabitants number of 
municipalities 
France Lyon (Métropole) 533.7 km² 1,402,326 59
Nantes (Métropole) 523.4 km² 658,356 24
Germany Stuttgart (VRS) 3,654 km² 2,787,724 179
Frankfurt/Rhine-Main 2,458 km2 2,359,733 80
Italy Bologna (CM) 3,702 km² 1,014,619 55
Florence (CM) 3,514 km² 1,013,260 41
 Introduction 19
252; Négrier 2005). Since the 1990s, the focus, which was primarily on the 
efficient performance of tasks and balancing of territorial disparities, has 
been partially reoriented (Geppert 2009, 256–257; Pinson and Galimberti 
2013). In 2003, the French spatial planning authority DATAR published a 
call for inter-municipal cooperation, which addressed all city-regions out-
side Greater Paris and indicated a new orientation in many respects. Smaller 
urban regions were also able to participate. In terms of content, the key-
word métropole was used to focus more on aspects of growth pole policy 
and competitiveness and less on territorial balance (Verhage et al. 2007, 
88; Geppert 2009, 260). With regard to the forms of organisation, city net-
works such as Caen-Le Havre-Rouen and purely project-related forms of 
cooperation were now also possible alongside municipal associations. Some 
of those soft cooperation spaces continue to exist under the name of pôle 
métropolitain, but national metropolitan policy has shifted again after 2010 
towards a metropolitan reform position. A new episode in French metropol-
itan policy emerged when the creation of métropoles started in 2010–2012 
(Pinson and Galimberti 2013). Métropoles are one of the four types of EPCI 
and take on further tasks in the area of social reproduction and competi-
tion policy. However, contrary to initial plans (and unlike the provinces in 
Italy), the départements were not abolished. Only in the case of Lyon does a 
métropole fulfil the functions of the département on its territory.
1.4.2  Italy
Italy’s local government system is characterised by many small municipali-
ties, which in comparison have a limited functional profile (Bobbio 2005). 
Intercommunal cooperation in the form of special-purpose associations 
does not have the same status as in Germany or France. For some metro-
politan policy initiatives, the provinces as the second tier of local self-gov-
ernment were particularly relevant in city-regions such as Milan, Bologna 
or Florence, as they at least partly represent and refer to a functional city-
region. However, it is only since the 1990s that these provincial govern-
ments have had limited resources and competencies for city-regional policy 
and planning.
A law passed in 1990 with the objective of promoting inter-municipal 
cooperation in metropolitan regions was in line with the European-wide 
trend at the time, but implementation was largely unresponsive. In the wake 
of the financial crisis in 2008 and the resulting consolidation pressures, the 
initiative was taken up again by the national government and reformulated 
as binding law in 2012. The plan was to abolish the provinces and create 
a new type of city-region governance in the biggest agglomerations of the 
country and city-regions on the islands of Sicily and Sardinia (which are 
regions with a special status). The provinces were to be transformed into a 
sort of city-regional government (Città Metropolitana) in those areas, while 
in the rural parts inter-municipal arrangements were expected to take over 
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provincial tasks (d’Albergo 2012; Vinci 2019). The latter did not happen. 
The whole reform process was rather cumbersome but in 2014 the new 
entities came into life, though their functional profile remained in part open 
for interpretation and derogation in the national legislation. The regional 
governments, together with local actors, were called upon to make propos-
als for the structures and competences of the new entity. Still, as many com-
mentators show, the problem of more effective coordination and strategic 
planning remains largely unsolved in most city-regions in Italy, for various 
reasons (Vinci 2019; Fedeli 2017; Tubertini 2015). In contrast to Germany 
and France, there is no comparable range of institutional formats that have 
been successfully tested.
1.4.3  Germany
Germany has a long tradition of inter-municipal cooperation in many areas 
of the public sector (especially spatial planning, services of general interest, 
public transport). Inter-municipal associations have proven to be a consist-
ent solution for the provision of local public services (Lorrain 2005). Other 
solutions such as regional cities and districts have remained much-discussed 
exceptions. Since the 1990s, the repertoire of formats has expanded in the 
course of the governance debate. Associations (Regionalverbände), limited 
liability companies, other voluntary forms of cooperation and networks 
were considered the method of choice and sometimes combinations of them 
are used on various spatial scales. As a result, inter-municipal cooperation 
in city-regions happens in a wide variety of forms and is widely recognised 
as a solution to the problems of agglomerations. Territorial reforms and 
amalgamations were carried out in the 1970s, but are rare today. Only in a 
few cases, such as Stuttgart, Hanover or, to a lesser extent, Rhine-Neckar, 
do the many initiatives result in an integrated metropolitan policy in which a 
high degree of binding coordination of action is implemented and an exten-
sive bundle of public tasks is performed at the city-regional level. In other 
metropolitan regions such as Hamburg, the Ruhr, Munich or Frankfurt/
Rhine-Main, structures remain fragmented or weakly institutionalised and 
thus unstable (Heinelt et al. 2011; Blatter 2005).
The content of inter-municipal cooperation has also changed. In addition 
to traditional tasks of spatial planning and services of general interest, addi-
tional metropolitan governance arrangements involving private actors are 
dedicated to international marketing and economic promotion, cultural pol-
icy, digitisation and innovation policy (Zimmermann 2012; Blatter 2005). 
All these forms of cooperation are usually the result of voluntary coopera-
tion. In the case of the three city-states Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen, met-
ropolitan policy is seeking to overcome state boundaries via contracts with 
the neighbouring states.
National government is less relevant as local government is a domain 
of the states and the states pursue different strategies with regard to the 
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consolidation of city-regions. The struggle for adequate forms and scales of 
metropolitan governance is not a national policy-issue. There is no nation-
wide strategy or discourse except for the so-called European Metropolitan 
Regions. As an element of a metropolitan policy jointly pursued by the fed-
eral government, the states and some cities, initially seven, then 11 European 
metropolitan regions in Germany have received special attention for some 
years now (BMVBS 2006; MKRO 2013). The initiative is intended to high-
light the importance of these metropolitan regions for economic and social 
development, although some observers note a one-sided focus on compet-
itiveness (Blotevogel and Schmitt 2006). In contrast to France, however, 
these metropolitan regions do not receive any subsidies, but are supposed to 
realise synergies and mobilise resources by themselves. 
1.5  Methods
In our study, we applied a comparative case study approach. The case study 
approach is applied at several levels according to the principle of casing 
(Ragin 1992; Gerring 2007). First, two city-regions in each state were con-
sidered as cases (in total six cases). In addition, we considered the three 
nation states as cases as nation states define frameworks and policies for 
city-regions. This allowed us to compare:
 • City-regions in a cross-country perspective;
 • National policy frameworks in a cross-country perspective; and
 • Two city-regions within each nation state, as we expected regional 
differences.
Case study work in the city-regions included the analysis of the institutional 
framework, strategic planning approaches (if present) and policy processes. 
This is done in combination with the preparatory analysis of national met-
ropolitan policy and through document analyses and interviews. The inter-
views allowed for the identification of the evaluation schemes of actors with 
regard to the functions of the city-region and the ideas that motivated the 
reforms. The document analyses are used to identify ideas in national reform 
discourse as well as the different spatial definitions of the city-regions used by 
local actors. In each case study, at least spatial planning, services of general 
interest, public transport and economic development (marketing) have been 
examined with regard to their regional significance. Other fields of action 
have been consulted on a case-by-case basis (e.g. regional parks in Stuttgart 
or digitisation in Frankfurt/Rhein-Main) as well as projects with relevance 
for the city-region (Île de Nantes in Nantes; trade fair, new main station 
Stuttgart 21, IBA 2027 in Stuttgart; Airport, Part-Dieu and Confluence 
in Lyon). Città metropolitane, métropoles and Regionalverbände are the 
institutions that have been closely analysed due to their key importance for 
city-regional governance. However, we observed in part the repartition of 
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Figure 1.1  City-Regions in Italy (Città Metropolitane), France (Métropole) and 
Germany (Metropolregionen and Planungsverbände) 2018 Concept: P. 
Feiertag Cartography: F. Gela
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functions to several institutions (additional special-purpose associations, 
limited liability companies, voluntary networks) and on several spatial scales 
(variable geometry due to functional aspects; superimposition of a city-
regional and a larger metropolitan scale). Thus, these various relevant gov-
ernance arrangements in the six case-study regions were taken into account.
1.5.1  Selection of case studies
On the level of states, France and Italy were chosen because both states 
introduced a new legal framework for city-regions in the years 2012–2015 
(see above). Germany, on the other hand, tends to show a pattern of incre-
mental change and regionalised path dependency.
In each country, we excluded the capital city-regions and the city-states 
in Germany as they have more powers. We selected prosperous city-regions 
with manifest ambitions for city-regional cooperation or regional reforms, 
even when these ambitions partly date back to previous periods (as in the 
case of Bologna). In other words, we were searching for critical and mean-
ingful cases with regard to a positive feature (city-regional governance).
1.5.2  Interviews with experts
The interviews were conducted as qualitative expert interviews, which are 
intended to provide information on the case studies as well as access to the 
cognitive frames of the reforms. The interview guidelines were adapted to the 
respective interviewee and his or her field of activity. Between seven and 11 
persons were interviewed per case study region, in total 50 (see Appendix). 
The duration of the interviews was between 50 and 130 minutes. Most of 
the interviews took place in person during a field visit. Individual supple-
mentary interviews were conducted by telephone or video conference. All 
interviews were recorded.
Different groups of experts were covered in each region:
 • Representatives of regional governments (in particular relevant for Italy 
and France);
 • Representatives of city-regional authorities and / or agencies;
 • Representatives of local government (core city and surrounding munici-
palities), largely of the administration but also mayors;
 • Other actors such as Conseil de Développement of Métropole in France, 
i.e. consultative body with actors from the civil society.
The interview questions covered the following aspects:
 • Competences of the city-regional institution in different fields of action 
such as spatial planning, transport and economic development; sharing 
and repartition of functions with other levels;
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 • Strategic planning processes including inter-municipal land use plan-
ning, regional planning and informal development strategies;
 • Projects with regional relevance including the involvement of different 
actors in the course of implementation;
 • Decision-making processes, in particular the involvement of municipali-
ties at the city-regional level;
 • The evolution of the city-regional institutions as well as ideas justifying 
the strengthening or emergence of institutions;
 • Functional interdependencies in the city-region;
 • Competing spatial definitions of the city-region, shifting boundaries as 
well as the use of the term “metropolitan region”.
In addition, we did expert talks, often with academics of local universities 
who had conducted research regarding planning and governance of their 
city-region.
1.5.3  Document analysis
For an overview of documents with regard to the national debate about 
metropolitan regions, crucial moments had to be determined. In France, 
métropoles have been introduced by the two laws RCT (16 December 2010) 
and MAPTAM (27 January 2014). The document analysis covered the dis-
cussion process from the announcement of the reform by the President 
(October, 2008) to the adoption of the second law in 2014. In Germany, 
the national debate concerns the introduction of Metropolitan regions in 
national spatial visions by the MKRO and subsequent debates about a para-
digm shift in spatial planning. For Italy, the years 2009, 2012 and 2014 
were essential as important laws or bylaws were issued.
The stock of documents reflecting national debates consisted of:
 • National and regional laws and bylaws;
 • Preparatory reports and policy papers;
 • Parliamentary debates and speeches of ministers;
 • Reports of association of cities;
 • Academic publications.
Regarding the six city-regions, the stock of documents consisted of:
 • Statutes, annual reports and budget plans;
 • Strategic plans;
 • Studies commissioned by city-regional institutions;
 • Statements in consultation processes;
 • Self-portrayal on homepages;
 • Newspaper articles;
 • Academic publications.
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Regarding spatial relations and territorial profiles, the use (or absence) of 
maps and descriptions of the city-regions as well as debates about bounda-
ries were of particular relevance. The document analysis revealed whether 
the appropriate spatial dimension was debated or not, how the choice of 
perimeter of metropolitan institutions was justified and whether functional 
and morphological aspects of the city-region were taken into account. 
Regarding the national framework in the three states, the question is whether 
the spatial dimension of city-regions played any role in the reshaping of the 
multi-level system. At the local level, i.e. regarding the six city-regions, we 
identified competing and evolving spatial definitions of the city-region.
For the dimension of ideas, a selected number of documents has been 
coded. In the French case, for example, these were speeches of presidents 
and ministers regarding the two laws RCT and MAPTAM3 as well as the 
report of an expert commission (Comité pour la réforme des collectivités 
locales 2009) and a publication of the Ministry of the Interior explaining the 
reform (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2011). The intention was to show ideas used 
by the government to justify metropolitan reforms. As the laws concern all 
levels of territorial government, a two-step analysis was made, exploring in 
a first step ideas justifying the reform as a whole and in a second step identi-
fying ideas directly related to metropolitan regions and to the creation of the 
métropole. For the German case, documents from the MKRO related to the 
national spatial vision as well as academic articles describing the discussion 
process were analysed. National spatial development reports presented to 
the parliament are also included in the stock of documents as they reveal the 
contemporary interpretation of major challenges to be tackled by national 
policy and the ideas related to metro regions.
In the coding process, we have coded sentences or words that evoke spe-
cific ideas (Saldaña 2016). The categories used for coding have been in part 
Table 1.3  Categories in the dimension of ideas
Category Coding Indications (examplary)
Cohesion Balanced territorial development, benefit for the 
entire country, spill over to rural hinterland
Austerity Financial crisis, debts, cutbacks
Welfare Services of general interest, housing, mobility, 
sustainability 
Democracy and social 
participation
Direct election, democratic legitimacy, 
identification of citizens with territorial entities
Efficiency and functional 
reforms
Modernisation of the state, fragmentation, 
decentralisation
Equal treatment of territories Same treatment of all territorial authorities vs. 
adaptation to the spatial diversity
Local self-organisation Top down vs. bottom up
Economic competitiveness Economic growth, international competition, 
marketing, large-scale projects
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pre-defined on the basis of academic writings and in part added during the 
process of coding (see Table 1.3). As a result, we could interpret which have 
been the dominant ideas driving the national reform discourse.
Notes
1 We continue to use the notion of city-regions, not only to avoid confusion but 
also with regard to our empirical case studies.
2 Usually the Anglo-Saxon type, the Scandinavian type, the southern European or 
Napoleonic type and the continental type (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014).
3 Sarkozy 22.10. 2008 and 5.3.2009; Hortefeux 19.1.2010; Hollande 20.11.2012; 
Lebranchu 10.4.2013 and 29.1.2014.
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2.1  City-regions and their governance in France
The preferred solution for addressing metropolitan issues in France is 
municipal groupings with their own taxation. Their administrative capaci-
ties have been gradually extended since the 1970s. The recent creation of 
métropoles as a specific form of municipal grouping is another step in a 
longer history of territorial reforms (Parnet 2016, 242–243). Départements, 
the second tier of local government, are highly visible for citizens because 
of their responsibility for social welfare funds. However, their function 
has been mainly reduced to the implementation of national social welfare 
policies and the growth of compulsory expenditure limits their possibili-
ties to become active in other policy fields (Négrier and Nicolas 2011, 77; 
Desjardins and Geppert 2020, 124). The régions created in the 1980s have 
become the leading level of government concerning economic development 
and transport, and cover large territories, in particular since their number 
was reduced from 22 to 13 in 2016 (without overseas territories). Due to 
their size, they are less relevant for city-regional governance.
In this section we will give an account of national metropolitan policy by 
focussing on the recent developments, i.e. the establishment of métropoles 
and pôles métropolitains. We will first explain the evolution of metropolitan 
groupings culminating in the creation of métropoles for joint policy-making 
in city-regions (2.1.1) and their extensive functions (2.1.2), and then we will 
discuss the ideas that guided the territorial reforms of the 2010s and that 
led to the creation of métropoles (2.1.3) as well as the spatial dimension of 
métropoles and pôles métropolitains (2.1.4).
2.1.1  Metropolitan institutions: a long history of municipal 
groupings instead of amalgamation
France is the country with the highest number of municipalities in Europe. 
Many of them are small or very small: about three-quarters (i.e. 25,059 
out of 34,841) of the municipalities have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants 
(DGCL 2019). As attempts to amalgamate municipalities failed throughout 







municipal fragmentation (Hertzog 2018, 134; Borraz and Le Galès 2005). 
France has a rich history of inter-municipal cooperation that began in the 19th 
century with contribution-financed single-purpose unions (syndicats), mainly 
in rural areas for public services such as water supply, sewage, waste collec-
tion, electricity and gas. From 1959 onwards, multi-purpose unions as well 
as districts,1 which could levy their own taxes, were set up (Wollmann 2008, 
58). The first wave of communautés urbaines was created by law in the 1960s, 
including Lyon, Lille, Bordeaux and Strasbourg, later followed by Brest in the 
1970s, Nice and Nancy in the 1990s, Nantes and Toulouse in the 2000s and 
Dijon, Saint-Étienne and Clermont-Ferrand only between 2015 and 2017. A 
system of different types of groupings depending on the size of municipality 
was established in 1999 and complemented 11 years later by the métropole.
The creation of enlarged unions with more functions has acceler-
ated throughout recent territorial reforms (see Figure 2.1). Since 2017, 
all2 French municipalities have been engaged in one of the four forms of 
municipal groupings (Etablissement public de coopération intercommunale 
à fiscalité propre, EPCI): communauté de communes (CC), communauté 
d’agglomération (CA), communauté urbaine (CU) or métropole. Those 
municipal groupings have become an important pillar of French subnational 
government (Geppert 2017, 227). The difference between EPCIs and tech-
nical multi-purpose unions for water supply or sewage is that they have 
a number of compulsory functions and fiscal powers. Single-purpose and 
multi-purpose unions have been partly absorbed, but will continue to exist 
both inside and between EPCIs if their perimeters are more pertinent to their 
task than the EPCI (Hertzog 2018, 143). One example is the regional plan-
ning associations (syndicats de SCoT, see 2.2.3 and 2.3.3).
In analogy to rural and peri-urban areas, city-regions are organised as 
municipal groupings instead of merging the municipalities and creating new 
jurisdictions. The laws on reform of local government (RCT, 16 December 
2010) and on modernising public territorial action and consolidating the 
metropoles (MAPTAM, 27 January 2014) created a specific kind of group-
ing called a “métropole” for city-regions. The main difference to the other 
types of EPCI is that métropoles have more compulsory functions and 
accordingly also a higher budget. Lyon is the only one with the status of a 
local authority, exerting the powers of the département over its territory.
Twenty-two métropoles have existed in France since 2018. All of them 
had been organised in some kind of municipal grouping before, meaning 
that there is a path-dependency of inter-municipal cooperation at the local 
level. Their trajectories, however, have been different as can also be seen in 
the two cases of Lyon (see 2.3) and Nantes (see 2.2). The pre-existing place-
specific institutional structures had an impact on the recent metropolitan 
reform and its outcome, most notably in the case of the three métropoles 
with special status: Paris, Aix-Marseille and Lyon (Parnet 2016). The trans-
formation of the former CUs and CAs into a métropole mainly took place 
in 2015, followed by a second wave of métropoles in 2018 (see Table 2.1).
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Métropoles are governed by a council composed of municipal councillors 
(conseil de la métropole), a president elected out of the council (président 
de la métropole) and an executive body formed by the vice-presidents 
(bureau). A conférence métropolitaine formed by the mayors of all member 
municipalities has advisory status and a coordinating function between the 
métropole and its member municipalities. The conseil de développement is 
another body with advisory status. It is composed of members of the civil 
society, organises debates and formulates propositions and statements both 
at the request of the métropole (e.g. within planning processes such as the 
local land use plan) and to self-selected topics.
It is common practice to elect a mayor as president, though national 
law does not prescribe this as a rule. The president is often the mayor of 
the core city (e.g. in Toulouse, Bordeaux, Brest and Montpellier), leading 
to a concentration of power. Each member municipality is represented by 
at least one councillor (or a number of councillors corresponding to the 
demographic weight of the municipality), but the number of vice-presidents 
is restricted to 20. It is noteworthy that the variation in the number of 
member municipalities is huge, ranging from eight to 131 municipalities 
(median of 35; see Table 2.1). Very large groupings are more challenging to 
manage, because governance is based on finding consensus. As councillors 
represent the interests of their municipality and mayors play a significant 
role as local leaders, finding consensus may be difficult. Four métropoles 
have more than 70 member municipalities: Métropole Rouen Normandie, 
Métropole Européenne de Lille, Métropole d’Aix-Marseille-Provence and 
Grand Paris.
Whereas the inter-municipal cooperation in the form of the métropoles 
is adopting the model of a hard, powerful institution, the urban–rural 
cooperation with their hinterland is either not institutionalised or happens 
through soft, flexible agreements (contrat de réciprocité) or light institutions 
dedicated to running the cooperation (syndicat mixte, association, pôle 
métropolitain; support of agences d‘urbanisme). In 2018, 21 métropoles3 
indicated in a survey 173 partnerships with surrounding territories, i.e. an 
average of 8.2 each, including both multi-thematic and single topic coop-
eration (43% single topic) as well as different degrees of institutionalisation 
(CGET 2019). This illustrates well that cooperation beyond the borders of 
the métropoles follows the logic of flexible geographies, with many differ-
ent, overlapping perimeters of cooperation, depending on the topic. The 
pôle métropolitains are a case in point.
2.1.1.2  Pôles métropolitains
Pôles métropolitains are a soft form of voluntary inter-territorial coop-
eration introduced at the same time as the métropole by the RCT law in 
2010. The legal definition is much more open in terms of members, spatial 
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delimitation and competencies, leading to large diversity (Bariol-Mathais 
2017). They are made up of municipal groupings, but can also involve the 
région and the département in a vertical cooperation, as well as other part-
ners such as universities, port companies, economic development agencies, 
tourist offices, chambers of commerce and industry or agences d’urbanisme. 
In terms of spatial relationships they either cover a continuous area or form 
a network of cities (see Figure 2.2). One EPCI can be member of several 
pôles. The pôles métropolitains accomplish self-defined tasks in the common 
interest of the members. These common interests defined by the members 
differ from case to case, but mostly cover economic development, research 
and innovation policies, tourism, culture, mobility and in a few cases also 
regional planning4 (Bariol-Mathais 2017, 36; Hertzog 2018, 145). These 
tasks are partly delegated by the members without transferring them com-
pletely to the pôle and partly additional tasks for larger-scale coordination. 
However, the pôles métropolitains do not have their own source of income, 
Figure 2.2  Pôles métropolitains in 2017 © FNAU, Source: Bariol-Mathais 2017, 39
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but are financed by membership fees and project-related funding from upper 
level government. They therefore depend on the commitment of their mem-
bers, in particular the presidents of the largest EPCI.
On first sight, pôle métropolitains and métropoles may seem to be con-
current forms of metropolitan governance. In fact, after a phase of experi-
mentation with soft metropolitan networks such as the pôles (call for 
cooperation issued by DATAR in 2004, see Motte 2007; Demazière and 
Sykes 2021; Megerle 2008, 26), the state favoured the model of métropoles, 
which became obligatory in 2014 (loi MAPTAM). However, the municipal-
ities often sympathised with the more flexible model of the pôle métropoli-
tain and established it in numerous city-regions. Between 2011 and 2013, 
only one métropole was created, Nice, but 11 pôles. Since 2014, the métro-
poles have dominated the national discourse, but numerous new pôles have 
emerged in areas with smaller urban centres. Measured in terms of incentives 
granted by the state, resources and attention, the métropoles can be consid-
ered as winners in the competition between the two models (Vanier 2017). 
Measured in terms of the number of pôles created, however, they have also 
been able to establish themselves. Since many large cities (Lyon, Nantes, 
Rouen, Strasbourg, Rennes, Saint-Étienne, Clermont-Ferrand, Nancy, Metz 
and Brest; and in a preliminary stage also Toulouse and Grenoble) are today 
part of both a métropole and a pôle métropolitain, both can be interpreted 
as complementary forms rather than competing models for the organisation 
of metropolitan spaces. In terms of administrative power, the métropole is 
much more relevant.
2.1.2  Functions: redistributing responsibilities within 
the emerging multilayer system
Throughout the history of inter-municipal cooperation in France, a grad-
ual shift of municipal responsibilities to the inter-municipal level has taken 
place (Borraz and Le Galès 2005). Municipal groupings only have powers in 
matters that are explicitly listed in their statutes, whereas municipalities can 
act in any matter of municipal interest. However, today the responsibilities 
of the EPCIs are more important than the powers left to the municipalities. 
Hertzog (2018, 146) even anticipates, that they will in the long run become 
“the consistent municipal level, the old communes staying like the parishes 
in England.” Out of the different types of municipal groupings in France, 
métropoles have the broadest portfolio of functions. Compared to inter-
municipal cooperation in other countries, even communautés de communes 
“have an important list of compulsory competences and are incited to pro-
gressively absorb the technical unions” (Hertzog 2018, 148); this statement 
applies even more to the métropoles (see Table 2.2).
As a general rule, inter-municipal cooperation is more intense in urban 
areas than in rural ones, reflected by the functional profile of CCs, CAs, 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































municipalities of each municipal grouping can delegate additional func-
tions to the inter-municipal level, depending on local consensus and the 
willingness to pursue inter-municipal integration. Or, on the contrary, they 
can choose a type of municipal grouping with fewer compulsory functions 
if they do not wish to adopt them, e.g. a CA instead of a CU or a CC instead 
of a CA. Brest is an example of a city-region with a higher degree of inte-
gration despite the relatively small size of the city-region (Geppert 2017, 
236). Whether the transformation into a métropole induces significantly 
enlarged competencies or not depends on prior integration. Changes in the 
functional profile were significant in the case of the former CAs such as 
Rennes or Grenoble and only minor in some former CUs (see section 2.2.1 
and Table 2.1).
The redistribution of responsibilities within the multilayer system did 
not only apply to the municipalities and municipal groupings, but to all 
levels of territorial government. A key aim of recent French territorial 
reforms was to redefine the functions of each layer and reduce the overlap 
of powers (Parnet 2016, 241). The régions and the municipal groupings 
have been strengthened whereas départements and municipalities have lost 
functions, in particular in urban areas. The métropoles have acquired some 
former departmental functions. An entire delegation of functions of the 
département to the métropole within its territory has so far only happened 
in Lyon, where the transfer came about due to an alliance of the mayor of 
Lyon and the president of the Département Rhône (Geppert 2017, 237; 
see 2.3.1). The French government sympathises with the idea of expand-
ing this model to all métropoles, but has met local opposition both from 
presidents of several métropoles (e.g. Nantes, see 2.2.1) and départements. 
So far, a mandatory transfer of responsibilities concerns only departmen-
tal roads and some minor tasks, whereas the départements keep their role 
concerning school education and social policy. Each métropole had to sign 
an agreement with its département about at least three responsibilities out 
of a list of eight to be transferred in January 2017. The most popular have 
been funds for housing and youth care. The same law (NOTR 2015) also 
abolished the general clause of competence for départements and régions. 
Previously, each level of government had the power to intervene in any 
policy field concerning its territory, without a hierarchy between them. The 
reform was supposed to clarify roles and define the main responsible level 
of government (Desjardins and Geppert 2020, 125). Regions have the lead-
ing role for economic development and intermodal transport, départements 
for social policies such as minimum income, job placement and social ser-
vices for elderly people and youth care (Négrier and Nicolas 2011). There 
are still policy fields shared by all levels such as culture, sport, tourism, 
education and environment.
Régions and métropoles have overlapping responsibilities in the field of 
economic development and environmental protection. In the field of plan-
ning, a hierarchy of comprehensive plans developed at different levels of 
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government below the state was introduced in 2015. The régions had to 
adopt a legally binding strategic plan until 2019, the SRADDET (schéma 
régional d’aménagement, de développement durable et d’égalité des terri-
toires). The SRADDET replaces a range of sectoral plans and is binding for 
the lower scale regional plan SCoT (schéma de cohérence territoriale) devel-
oped by the municipal groupings. The SCoT was introduced in the year 
2000 (law SRU), leading to a first generation of plans in the mid-2000s. This 
was an attempt to reintroduce a strategic dimension to spatial planning and 
to link land use, transport and housing (Verhage et al. 2007, 83; Wollmann 
2008, 186). Inter-municipal cooperation was deepened by this joint task 
of developing a future vision for the territory and staff for spatial plan-
ning tasks was increased (Kuhlmann et al. 2011, 162). The subordination 
of the already existing SCoT to the SRADDET can lead to conflicts, because 
the métropoles have much more experience, know-how and manpower in 
the field of spatial planning whereas régions have in the past concentrated 
on regional economic development and the distribution of regional funds. 
Despite decentralisation, France continues to be a unitary state and régions 
remain rather weak in terms of budgets and decision-making power as they 
cannot formulate laws (Beyer 2017, 40). Due to the power of the métro-
poles, régions are tempted to focus their efforts on the compensation of 
non-metropolitan areas, while their competencies – innovation, regional 
rail transport, etc. – relate strongly to large agglomerations (Desjardins and 
Geppert 2020, 130).
2.1.3  Ideas behind territorial reforms: efficiency in the public sector
The simplification of the territorial organisation of the French state and 
the clarification of power relations between governmental levels were the 
main preoccupation of the territorial reforms of the years 2010 and 2014/15 
(Geppert 2017, 234; Vanier 2017, 18; Négrier and Nicolas 2011). Terms 
such as “excessive number of levels”, “confusion”, “dysfunction and redun-
dancies” used by president Sarkozy (2008) underline the need to intervene 
and to rationalise the distribution of responsibilities. In the speeches of 
presidents and ministers related to the RCT and MAPTAM laws, only lim-
ited parts concern the métropoles introduced by those laws. Pôles métro-
politains are for the most not mentioned at all. This illustrates well that the 
reforms concerned the entire system of public administration and territorial 
representation, not just the metropolitan regions.
Although the main driver in terms of ideas is efficiency in the public 
sector, when speaking of métropoles, the main idea that is evoked by the 
government is the increased competition of cities on a European and global 
scale related to globalisation. This idea is used to justify the need for strong, 
integrated institutions to govern city-regions. Their new legal status and 
functions such as economic development, marketing and innovation are 
supposed to enable them to better ensure their international competitiveness 
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and economic dynamism (Lebranchu 2014). The debate focuses on the dis-
tribution of functions between layers of government, whereas the spatial 
dimension of metropolitan regions is left aside. In consequence, the national 
laws favour institutional integration of the métropoles instead of addressing 
an enlargement or redefinition of perimeters.
Another idea often referred to is the provision of services of general inter-
est. The argument is that city-regions are congested areas with an increased 
need for steering and coordination. The city-region is seen as an appropriate 
problem-solving level for housing, transport, education, social services and 
environmental issues related to the needs of the inhabitants. This argument 
justifies the transfer of additional responsibilities to the métropole. It also 
implies that métropoles are not only dedicated to production functions, but 
also to functions of social reproduction, which is in fact reflected in the pro-
file of their compulsory responsibilities set by the legislator. The concentra-
tion of functions at the level of métropoles is justified in conjunction with 
efficiency arguments.
The idea of local self-government was relevant in 2009–2010. The issue 
was whether metropolitan governments should be created top-town by 
national law as argued by the expert commission Balladur (Comité pour la 
réforme des collectivités locales 2009) or based on voluntary inter-municipal 
initiatives. The interior minister Hortefeux (2010) argued at that time that 
“the dynamics must come from the territories themselves. State-imposed 
métropoles, from Paris, will guarantee useless polemics and certainly fail” 
(own translation).5 Accordingly, the legal status of métropole was first 
introduced as a voluntary option. But only one city-region, Nice, adopted 
it. This position was therefore partly revised with the MAPTAM law in 
2014, when the transformation into a métropole became compulsory for 
the largest municipal groupings with at least 400,000 inhabitants located 
in a functional urban area (aire urbaine) of 650,000 or more inhabitants. 
Smaller ones may be granted this status on their request but only with the 
agreement of the national government.
The idea of national territorial cohesion (égalité du territoire) is related to 
the concern of rural areas and small towns about being disadvantaged by the 
reforms strengthening the territorial organisation of metropolitan regions. 
The counter-argument of the government follows the theory of spill-over, 
arguing that the entire country will benefit economically from strengthen-
ing metropolitan regions. This is related to the idea of competitiveness as 
metropolises are seen as engines of growth.
Participation has played a minor role when justifying the reforms. The 
idea of citizen involvement and strengthening local democracy was there-
fore not the driving force behind the legislative initiative, but was taken 
into account. It is related to decentralisation (“closer to the citizens”) and 
accountability and concerns mainly the local level. Still, the democratic con-
trol of inter-municipal politics by the citizens is acknowledged as a weak-
ness: “there is some anomaly in the fact that the EPCIs, some of which 
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exercise almost general competence, remain indirectly elected, even though 
the expenditure they incur is equivalent to that of the regions” (own trans-
lation,6 Comité pour la réforme des collectivités locales 2009). At the same 
time, the representation of municipalities within the EPCI will be kept 
(Hollande 2012). Despite attempts to overcome the democratic deficit 
(Wollmann 2008, 45; Demazière 2018, 70) by introducing direct elections, 
the election of the metropolitan council is still tied to the municipal election. 
Since 2014, candidates that will represent the municipality in the metropoli-
tan council have been separately listed on the ballots for municipal elections 
(Hertzog 2018, 147). The only exception, with different constituencies and 
electoral lists for the metropolitan council, is Lyon due to its status as a 
département (see 2.3.1). Therefore, the legitimacy of metropolitan govern-
ance and planning remains weak, whereas technical capacities are strong.
2.1.4  Spatial relationships: partial enlargement 
based on population threshold
The creation of the pôle métropolitain displays a multi-scaled logic of cre-
ating flexible spaces for governance. The dimension of space did not play 
any role in the process of creation of the métropoles. If any cartographic 
visualisation was used at the national level in the context of the creation of 
the métropoles, the city-regions were represented as dots on the map (see 
Figure 2.3). The debate centred on their number and their functions in the 
multilayer system. Regarding their sociospatial relations, métropoles were 
conceptualised as “scale” (Jessop et al. 2008, 293), meaning that the verti-
cal differentiation between state institutions and scalar division of labour is 
emphasised. The national laws left the definition of the appropriate perime-
ter to the municipal groupings themselves. An exception was Aix-Marseille, 
where local actors could not reach a consensus to overcome institutional 
fragmentation, and the national government intervened by merging six 
municipal groupings (Parnet 2016; Douay 2013).
Instead of setting a perimeter, a minimum threshold of population was 
fixed to be eligible as a métropole. However, this criterion turned out to be 
flexible and was modified by various tailor-made exceptions at the request 
of local actors willing to acquire the status. This means that the criteria of 
eligibility have been adapted to the existing municipal groupings instead 
of forcing them to expand their territory to meet the population threshold. 
The category of métropole was initially intended for the largest agglom-
erations with at least 500,000 inhabitants (law RCT 2010) as well as the 
four CUs compulsorily created in the 1960s.7 In 2014 (law MAPTAM), the 
threshold was lowered to municipal groupings of 400,000 inhabitants with 
a functional urban area of 650,000 or more. During the elaboration of the 
law, Montpellier and Brest, which were below the population threshold, 
successfully campaigned to be granted the metropolitan status. Tailor-made 
additional criteria fitting each case were included (Geppert 2017, 235): 
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regional capitals as well as EPCIs, which already exerted the full powers of 
the métropoles when the law entered into force. In 2017, the criteria were 
relaxed again due to lobbying of the presidents of the municipal group-
ings (Demazière and Sykes 2021; Beyer 2017, 38) and enabled a substan-
tial increase of métropoles from 15 to 22 (see Figure 2.3). Each municipal 
grouping can request to be granted the status of métropole if it has more 
than 250,000 inhabitants and is a regional capital with an employment zone 
of more than 400,000 inhabitants or a former regional capital8 with an 
employment zone of more than 500,000 inhabitants.
Apart from the first métropole Nice, none of the current 22 métropoles 
voluntarily changed their perimeter during the transformation into a métro-
pole. They did not wish to integrate and enlarge at the same time. Since 
Figure 2.3  Map of métropoles by the French government
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gaining the status of métropole, the spatial extension has been stable in 20 
out of 22 cases; only Lille and Strasbourg added new member municipalities. 
Therefore, “instead of creating large alliances on the scale of broad urban 
areas, metropolises result in the increased integration of the urban cores of 
the municipalities, crystallizing pre-existing territorial structures” (Geppert 
2017, 235). However, in a few cases, an enlargement took place in the years 
before the creation of the métropole (see Table 2.3). The CAs of Rennes and 
Saint-Étienne had fewer than 400,000 inhabitants before their enlargement 
and thereby exceeded the threshold. All in all, eight métropoles did adapt 
their perimeter at all between 2010 and 2020, and three only in minor terms 
with one or two additional municipalities. The most significant changes of 
Table 2.3  Enlargement of métropoles by additional member municipalities between 
2010 and 2020 (March 2020)







creation of métropole 
(until 2020)
Grand Paris 2016 New creation 0 
Aix-Marseille 
Provence 
2016 New creation 0
Lyon 2011 + 1 municipality
2014 + 1 
0 0 
Lille 0 0 2017 + 
5 municipalities
Bordeaux 2013 + 1 0 0
Toulouse 2011 + 12 0 0
Nantes 0 0 0
Nice 0 2012 + 
22 municipalities
0
Strasbourg 0 0 2017 + 5 
Rouen 0 0 0
Montpellier 0 0 0
Rennes 7/2012 + 1
2014 + 5 
0 0
Grenoble 2012 + 1
2014 + 21 
0 0
Toulon 0 0 0
Saint-Étienne 2013 + 2
2017 + 8 
0 0
Tours 2014 + 3 0 0
Clermont 0 0 0
Orléans 0 0 0
Nancy 0 0 0
Dijon 2013 + 2 0 2019 -1 due to 
merger of two 
municipalities
Metz 2014 + 4 0 0
Brest 0 0 0
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perimeter took place in Aix-Marseille, Rouen (already in 2009 by merging 
two CAs and two CCs), Nice, Grenoble, Toulouse and Saint-Étienne. Aix-
Marseille, Nice and Saint-Étienne are also among the métropoles with the 
largest area (see Table 2.1).
The dynamic of spatial redefinition and consolidation has been higher 
in spaces beyond the métropoles. Other types of municipal groupings have 
been considerably enlarged due to many mergers of small communautés 
de communes and the emergence of large communautés d’agglomération, 
partly in direct vicinity of métropoles or pôles métropolitains (see AdCF 
2017, 22 and Figure 2.1). An example of a huge CA is Pays Basque with an 
area of 2,967 km², 159 member municipalities and about 300,000 inhabit-
ants. Its territory is much larger than most métropoles (see Table 2.1). The 
CU Grand Reims with 144 municipalities was created out of seven CCs and 
the CA Reims Métropole. Both were established in 2017 as alternatives to a 
pôle métropolitain initially preferred by the municipalities.
The redrawing of the map of inter-municipal cooperation was pushed 
by the state and was largely accomplished by 2017 (Hertzog 2018, 142; 
Geppert 2017, 233). Since 2010, a representative of the government (préfet) 
has prepared a scheme (schéma départemental de coopération intercomu-
nale, SDCI) after each municipal election which includes a proposition on 
how to redefine the boundaries of municipal groupings in the département. 
It is submitted to a committee of local representatives; they can deviate from 
the proposition, but only with a two-thirds majority. The second generation 
of SDCI was adopted in 2016 and induced significant changes, though not 
in all départements equally. The objective was to complete the coverage 
of the national territory by municipal groupings, reduce their number and 
upgrade them into more integrated categories in order to rationalise the ter-
ritorial organisation and increase the efficiency of the local administration. 
As a result, the weight and technical capacity of municipal groupings has 
increased, but the very large groupings are running the risk of losing the 
proximity to their citizens (Geppert 2017, 234).
The upscaling also concerned planning perimeters. The more integrated 
groupings are obliged to take responsibility for land use planning. Even CCs 
and CAs are supposed to draw up inter-municipal land use plans (Plan local 
d’urbanisme intercommunal, PLUi) since 2010 (law Grenelle), because the 
national law foresees the PLUi as the desired standard and the municipal 
PLU as an exception (Molino and Allé 2013, 7). A PLUi with a regulatory 
part for the entire municipal grouping already exist in the métropoles such 
as in Lyon and Nantes (see 2.2.2 and 2.3.2) or are under preparation. They 
will become much more common in the near future in other areas as well. 
Until December 2017, only 22 PLUis were valid in France, but 324 were in 
the process of elaboration (Fédération des SCoT 2018, 4).
The city-regional strategic plan schéma de cohérence territoriale (SCoT) 
has also been up-scaled. As standard for the future, the SCoT has to be 
developed by several groupings forming a planning association instead 
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of individual municipal groupings. In addition to that, the size of EPCIs 
increased and thus led to the revision of SCoT perimeters (Vanier et al. 2017, 
34). Note that the institutional territory of a métropole and the territory 
for a SCoT do not coincide, with few exceptions. Whereas the métropoles 
themselves are mainly monocentric, covering one urban core and its adja-
cent built-up area, the planning regions are larger, mostly more polycentric, 
and include peri-urban areas. The functional area defined as aire métropoli-
taine is in most cases even larger than the SCoT planning region (see 2.3.2). 
Not all métropoles are yet part of a larger SCoT with surrounding munici-
pal groupings. Montpellier (Moscarelli 2016), Rouen, Nice and Orléans still 
have a SCoT for the territory of the métropole and a more detailed PLUi for 
the same area under preparation.
The legal possibility of a PLUi having the function of a regional land use 
plan (SCoT) existed for a short period, but was revoked in 2017, meaning 
that their number is limited to the 13 plans already started and is not an 
option anymore. All urban regions are part of a SCoT. This is not the case 
for all rural territories. Though the number and size of planning regions 
have increased in the last decade, the plans do not cover the entire coun-
try yet (see Figure 2.4). The size of planning regions varies greatly and is 
defined at the local level. However, strong legal incentives due to limited 
possibilities of urban extension without a SCoT have led to a step-by-step 
implementation even in rural areas and to an enlargement of planning areas.
Hence, the French planning system foresees in the future a hierarchy of 
three planning documents with a SRADDET at the scale of the région, a 
SCoT at the scale of several EPCIs and a PLUi at the scale of each métro-
pole. At the national level, a comprehensive spatial development plan does 
not exist, but several sectoral schemes (e.g. regarding flood risk manage-
ment) define binding rules that have to be taken on in the subsequent plan-
ning instruments SRADDET, SCoT and PLUi (Desjardins and Geppert 
2020, 126). These changes in the planning system seek to ensure the coor-
dination of spatial planning across different levels and thus to reduce the 
institutional fragmentation and the competition between municipalities for 
investments and tax revenues. Whether this aim is achieved or not varies 
from city-region to city-region and depends to a high degree on the maturity 
of inter-municipal cooperation, as Demazière (2018) argues.
The French state intervened in the 1990s by launching regional plans for 
some areas of national interest, the “directive territoriale d’aménagement” 
(DTA). They cover city-regions such as Lyon and Nantes (see sections 2.2 
and 2.3), but also areas with high vulnerability (the Alps and river del-
tas) or difficult economic situations such as the former mining area of the 
Lorraine (Carpenter and Verhage 2014, 61). Six DTAs were approved by 
the state between 2003 and 2007.9 Existing DTAs are still legally binding 
for local land use plans, but new ones after 2010 (Law Grenelle II) would 
only have a guiding character (and are called DTADD [directive territoriale 
d’aménagement et de développement durable]). After this legal change, no 
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state-led regional plans have been developed. All in all, France is en route 
towards more consolidated forms of territorial governance for city-regions. 
The main components are the municipal groupings of the core of metropoli-
tan regions (métropoles), supplemented by larger spaces for regional plan-
ning and soft coordination of policies.
2.2  Multi-scaled governance of Nantes: métropole 
and bipolar metropolitan region
Nantes is a regional capital and gateway city in Western France, a former 
working-class town (ship-building industry, agri-food industry) as well as 
an inland port city (Masson et al. 2013, 26). In addition, Nantes was the 
former residence of the dukes of Bretagne. Its economic structure, physical 
shape and image have been altered over time and especially in the course of a 
successful structural change. While the industry and port activities have been 
Figure 2.4  Planning regions for SCoT Data: DGALN/ BSCI SuDocUH
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declining since the 1960s, the university reopened in 1962 and around 5,500 
jobs in the tertiary sector were transferred to the city between 1970 and 
1985 due to a deconcentration of the national administration, for example 
the services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Devisme 2009, 23). Multiple 
transport connections have been enhanced in the last 40 years, increasing the 
gateway function of the city-region. Among these enhanced connections are 
the motorway to Paris (mainly constructed in the 1970s and 80s) and con-
nections to Bordeaux and Rennes, a high-speed rail line (opened in 1989) as 
well as flight connections to various European destinations (Renard 2015). 
During the 1990s, Nantes was the French city-region with the highest popu-
lation growth (Devisme 2009, 23). At the same time, large public and pri-
vate companies such as the French Post and the railway company SNCF as 
well as the multimedia chain FNAC settled in Nantes (Masson et al. 2013, 
12–13). Industrial working places have been replaced by higher service func-
tions. Nowadays, the university hospital (CHU, to be relocated on the Île de 
Nantes), French Post, Airbus, public administrations (région, département, 
métropole and city), the university as well as banking services and regional 
headquarters of construction and insurance companies are large employers. 
Nantes’ economy has proved to be reasonably resilient since the 2008 cri-
sis (Griggs et al. 2018, 6). Alongside economic transformation, Nantes has 
succeeded in branding itself as an attractive, vibrant city with a high qual-
ity of life. This was mainly achieved through cultural events, international 
networking, large-scale urban projects, rankings and labels such as EcoCité 
(Griggs et al. 2018, 6; Garat et al. 2005, 149; Gravari-Barbas 2009).
When talking about metropolitan governance and planning, the fol-
lowing key characteristics should be mentioned, which will be unpacked 
throughout this chapter:
 • Strong inter-municipal institution Nantes Métropole with the main inte-
gration phase in the 2000s;
 • Specific governance arrangements such as pôles de proximité and merged 
administration show that the national laws only define a framework for 
the metropolitan institution, leaving space to adapt it to local conditions;
 • Cooperation in the wider metropolitan region Nantes – Saint-Nazaire 
has been developed in parallel to the strong municipal grouping and 
relevant for local actors though less institutionalised;
 • The mayor of Nantes has a leadership position within the city-region 
due to multiple positions as president of the métropole, of the pôle mét-
ropolitain and of the local development agency SAMOA;
 • Importance of the successful flagship project regeneration of Île de 
Nantes and the SAMOA for the entire metropolitan region.
In this section, we will analyse governance and planning in the metropolitan 
region of Nantes as one of two French case studies in the book. We first 
focus on the core of the metropolitan region, organised in the form of the 
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institution Nantes Métropole (2.2.1). Second, we will show institutional 
borders, planning perimeters and functional interrelations in the metropoli-
tan region (2.2.2) and we will scrutinise governance arrangements covering 
larger spaces than the core area (2.2.3).
2.2.1  The institution: Nantes Métropole
Nantes was one of the 11 city-regions adopting the status of a métropole in 
January 2015 due to the national law MAPTAM (see 2.1.1). The transfor-
mation of the municipal grouping into a métropole was mandatory since 
it exceeds the threshold of 400,000 inhabitants. Nantes was not subject to 
special arrangements in the legislation, unlike Lyon, Aix-Marseille, Paris, 
Brest and Nancy (the latter two were exceptions due to their population size 
being below 400,000) or Lille and Strasbourg (appellation that refers to their 
cross-border character). Compared to the other 21 métropoles existing since 
2018, Nantes is above the median in terms of number of inhabitants (7th 
largest) and in the middle position in terms of area (11th largest), but has a 
relatively small number of member municipalities (15th of 22 métropoles).
2.2.1.1  From communauté urbaine to métropole
In the case of Nantes, the intensification of inter-municipal integration 
started late compared to the first four communautés urbaines created in the 
1960s (see 2.1.1). Nevertheless, it was one of the most integrated municipal 
groupings in the 2010s when the national metropolitan reform was estab-
lished. The major step in its institutional development was the creation of 
the CU in 2001. The emergence of inter-municipal cooperation started in 
1982 with the creation of a syndicat intercommunal à vocation multiple, 
the SIMAN, that became a district urbain with own tax revenues in 1992, 
but these predecessors were very light structures with few human resources, 
limited tasks and at that stage a poorly developed attitude towards inter-
municipal collaboration. The transformation from a district urbain to a 
CU was fundamental, as a common policy was gradually put into place 
(Garat 2013, 99). The crucial impetus for the transformation towards a 
municipal grouping with substantial responsibilities and resources came 
from the national level (law Chevènement 1999) with the incentive of addi-
tional financial allocations. The mayors of the 24 member municipalities 
reached a compromise about governance rules through intensive debate. 
The compromise included tangible advantages for the municipalities 
through municipal projects realised by the CUs and a key role of the may-
ors in decision-making processes through a regular conference of mayors 
(conférence des maires). The governance rules were laid down in a charter 
(charte de fonctionement), which forms the foundation of today’s govern-
ance mechanisms. The fundamental rules of the Nantes model of collabora-
tive governance were
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the maintenance of a central role for mayors across the conurba-
tion; negotiated outcomes, often between mayors; multicenter urban 
development not solely concentrated on Nantes; the multiplication of 
spaces of dialogue and engagement; and significantly, the investment 
in the “urban project” as a primary site for, and instrument of, urban 
governance.
(Griggs et al. 2018, 7)
Due to its late creation, the CU de Nantes deliberately transferred a larger 
number of responsibilities to the inter-municipal level compared to other 
CUs that had been created decades previously. These included urban 
planning, housing, transport, management of public space and economic 
development.
The municipal grouping has slowly progressed: in the first years munici-
pal projects were put together, but later on collective objectives were defined 
to guide its public policies in a more transversal way. A significant step in the 
institutional development took place in 2008/2009. At that time the admin-
istration of the CU was pooled with the city administration of Nantes (see 
below), a plan for investment for the period 2008–2014 (PPI programmes 
pluriannuals d’investissement) was negotiated between the CU and each 
member municipality, and thematic conferences were started to prepare 
strategic documents on transport and housing (Garat 2013, 99–108).
In 2012, the presidency of the municipal grouping changed. Jean-Marc 
Ayrault, who had been mayor of Nantes for 25 years and president of 
the CU since its foundation, became Prime Minister10 in 2012 when the 
MAPTAM national law was passed and he did not stand as a candidate 
again afterwards. He had established a “consensual and pragmatic logic 
of decision making” (Griggs et al. 2018, 7) and had been crucial for inter-
municipal integration. The handover of power to his successors Patrick 
Rimbert (interrim) and Johanna Rolland elected in 2014 cannot be seen 
as political disruption as both politicians belong to the left-wing party PS. 
Nevertheless, it caused some changes in terms of the leading positions, 
including a generational change, a surplus of women in power as well as a 
change in policy priorities, communication style and topics. During the era 
of Ayrault, community participation went hand in hand with highly visible 
redevelopment projects, and an agenda of internationalisation and growth 
orientation. Rolland, whose first mandate was shaped by a period of auster-
ity, reinforced the culture of proximity associated with the Nantes model by 
highlighting citizen dialogue (Griggs et al. 2018, 6–15). Also, she directed 
the political work towards the everyday life of citizens, services of general 
interest in the neighbourhoods, schools, green spaces in the city and energy 
transition.
The legal status of métropole obtained in 2015 did not induce a sig-
nificant institutional change in Nantes, in contrast to what has happened in 
many other métropoles. The municipal grouping already possessed all the 
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competencies required by the MAPTAM law at that time. Only minimal 
changes of its functions took place on a voluntary basis, concerning the 
responsibility for some cultural and sports infrastructure such as the opera 
as well as financial support for inter-municipal company kindergartens. Due 
to a national law (Law NOTR 2015, art. 90) Nantes had to adopt an agree-
ment (convention de transfert de competences) with the département about 
departmental responsibilities to be transferred until 1 January 2017 and 
took over the competence for departmental roads as well as the assistance 
for social housing, youth care and the elderly. According to the interview-
ees, the creation of the métropole felt like a natural step. This was mainly 
because it was not intensively debated on the political level and passed 
almost unnoticed by the citizens. The name of the institution did not change 
either as the term métropole had already been used since 2004.
2.2.1.2  Nantes Métropole in the multilayer system
The métropole is part of the multilayer system and shares responsibilities 
with higher territorial authorities. Additionally, it seeks to coordinate public 
policies via soft institutions beyond its own boundaries (see 2.2.3). Nantes 
is the largest agglomeration and the capital of both the Région Pays de la 
Loire and the Département Loire-Atlantique, and has been growing in terms 
of its economy and population in the last 30 years. This has contributed 
to Nantes’ economic relevance as well as to its self-confidence and claim 
for self-government, underpinned by the capacities of its institution. The 
described configuration could potentially lead to conflicts with the région 
whereas the sharing of responsibilities with the département is more consen-
sual because of similar political majorities and fewer overlapping functions.
The département is mainly responsible for social reproduction functions, 
more specifically social policy, and has seen its responsibilities being dimin-
ished within the last decade (see 2.1.2). In the past, it has played a role in 
coordinating spatial development, but this is no longer the case. Nowadays 
it rather supports the inter-municipal level on a project base, e.g. concerning 
bicycle paths along the river Loire. According to the interviewees, a merger 
of métropole and département within the perimeter of the métropole such 
as in Lyon is unwanted. One of the main reasons is the high costs of social 
policy. The president of Nantes Métropole has explicitly proclaimed her 
objections against such ideas pushed at the national level, pleading instead 
for more agile soft cooperation beyond the métropole instead, e.g. in the 
form of contracts (Dubois 2018; see 2.2.3).
The perimeter of the Région Pays de la Loire remained unchanged during 
the reform of the regions in 2016. Due to decentralisation of some strate-
gic competencies, the functions of all French regions have been increased. 
The region is supposed to have a strategic role concerning the production 
function (infrastructures, economic development), leading to an over-
lap of responsibilities and to potential tensions with the métropole. Both 
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institutions have roughly the same budget (Devisme 2009, 37). In the 
field of economic development, the region is the leading territorial author-
ity. Anyway, the territory of the métropole is to a certain degree excluded 
from the responsibility of the region: the métropole also has competen-
cies in the field of economic development and can therefore deviate from 
the regional strategy. Besides that, the région has gained responsibilities in 
spatial planning and possesses for the first time in its history a planning 
instrument that is legally binding for local land use plans, the SRADDET. 
Nantes Métropole has outlined its role and expectations within the partici-
pation process, portraying itself as the economic engine of the region and 
outlining at the same time particular challenges in terms of social cohesion 
(Nantes Métropole 2017). Concerning its more traditional instruments of 
distributing funding for regional development, the Région Pays de la Loire 
signs co-financing contracts with all municipal groupings within its terri-
tory, using two instruments depending on the size and the type of grouping: 
the Contrat de Développement Métropolitain (CDM) for Nantes Métropole 
and the two communautés urbaines (CU Angers Loire Métropole and CU 
le Mans Métropole) as well as the Contrats Territoires-Région (CTR) with 
the CA and CC (see 2.3.2). The difference is that the amount of subsidies 
for each territory is, in the case of the CTR, calculated using a distribution 
key11 but has few thematic restrictions, whereas the choice of projects to be 
co-financed via CDM is more political. The distribution of funds among 
Nantes, Angers and Le Mans is negotiated after the local proposals have 
been handed in.
Apart from setting the legal framework, the state has a far-reaching 
influence on planning and governing the metropolitan region by taking 
infrastructure decisions. In the case of Nantes, the cancellation in January 
2018 by the French Government of an airport project planned since the 
1960s and located between Nantes and Rennes (Notre-Dame-des-Landes) 
has turned the development strategy of the region upside down. Due to 
these circumstances, the deadline for the SRADDET Pays de la Loire has 
been pushed to the end of 2020 to give the region sufficient time for the 
necessary reorientation and to organise a territorial dialogue. Secondly, 
the harbour of Saint-Nazaire with its considerable spatial dimension is cur-
rently under state responsibility but is no longer considered as one of the 
main ports of national interest according to the current national strategy. 
Both sites are not within the boundaries of Nantes Métropole, but have 
considerable importance for the metropolitan region and its spatial devel-
opment (Terrassier 2012). In terms of strategic planning, the estuary of the 
Loire with Saint-Nazaire and Nantes is one of six territories of national 
interest covered by a directive territoriale d’aménagement (DTA Estuaire 
de la Loire, started in 1996 and approved in July 2006). The document has 
been particularly relevant for dealing with land use conflicts in the sensible 
river delta (Devisme 2009, 35). Today, the DTA is still formally binding 
for the SCoT, but is partially outdated and not likely to be renewed.
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2.2.1.3  Functions of the Métropole
The institution Nantes Métropole does not have the status of a territorial 
jurisdiction, but takes on a substantial number of municipal responsibili-
ties on behalf of the member municipalities since 2001. The competencies 
that the member municipalities agreed on slightly exceed those prescribed 
by law as compulsory competencies for métropoles (see 2.1.2). These addi-
tional competencies concern both production and social reproduction func-
tions, e.g. accommodation for Roma and travelling communities, actions 
in favour of disabled people, equipment for higher education and research 
as well as major equipment for transport, telecommunications, sports and 
culture.
Regarding production functions, Nantes Métropole is responsible for the 
following policies:
 • Economic development;
 • Marketing and tourism;
 • Support of innovation, higher education and research;
 • Major infrastructure for transport, telecommunications, sports and cul-
ture (e.g. the art museum, the stadium, the opera house).
Regarding social reproduction functions, Nantes Métropole is competent in 
the following policies:
 • Housing;
 • Public transport (via the public transport company Simetan);
 • Public spaces and roads (except roads of national importance; planning 
and construction, cleaning, street lighting, video surveillance);
 • Environmental protection;
 • Energy (distribution of electricity, gas and heat; advancement of renew-
able energies and energy efficiency; climate plan);
 • Waste collection and treatment as well as water distribution and waste-
water treatment;
 • Minor tasks concerning social policy, e.g. services for elderly people and 
disabled persons.
In the field of town planning and mobility, the mayors of the member 
municipalities have only kept minor responsibilities. Planning procedures 
as well as operational tasks are carried out at the inter-municipal level. The 
mayors are still signing building permits but are supported by the inter-
municipal administration, if they wish to be. This service is much used 
by the smaller municipalities or for complicated cases. Mayors also have 
local police power and therefore sign decisions about road closures and 
whether street parking is charged or not. All other issues concerning mobil-
ity and transport are decided at the inter-municipal level. When an area is 
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developed, the métropole establishes the roads, water and electricity supply 
as well as public spaces, whereas the municipalities have kept the respon-
sibility for providing public facilities such as sports facilities, community 
facilities and schools. All in all, the remaining tasks of the mayors dem-
onstrate their relevance to the citizens of their municipality, but technical 
know-how and complex administrative tasks have shifted to the administra-
tion of the métropole.
2.2.1.4  The inter-municipal administration – large, decentralised, 
pooled with City of Nantes
The métropole possesses substantial resources due to its vast responsibilities. 
The voted budget for 2019 amounts to 1.31 billion €, subdivided into a main 
budget (769 M€) and six annexed budgets for waste (85 M€), potable water 
(105.9 M€), wastewater (57.3 M€), industrial and commercial premises (e.g. 
business incubator; 3.3 M€), parking (44.3 M€) and public transport (293.7 
M€). The revenues come from own taxation, fees for services, allocations from 
the state, compensation from the département (for the responsibilities fulfilled 
by the métropole) and co-financing by the région, the European Union or oth-
ers. In terms of human resources, Nantes Métropole has about 3,300 employ-
ees, out of which 30% work in the administration (2017).12 The inter-municipal 
administration is marked on one hand by decentral organisation units called 
pôles de proximité (since the creation of the CU in 2001) and on the other hand 
by shared management together with the City of Nantes (since 2008).
The administration of the métropole and the City of Nantes are closely 
interwoven. A double leadership with the mayor of the core city as president 
of the métropole is a common model in French métropoles (Zimmermann 
and Feiertag 2017, 20–21) and is also practised in Nantes.13 In addition 
to that, since 2008 the entire leadership of the administration has been 
shared, including the heads of administrative units (Directions Générales 
DG) and the central services have been pooled, forming a joint adminis-
tration of the métropole and City of Nantes with about 7,000 civil serv-
ants (Dèbre and Garat 2015, 30). Within the other DGs, some divisions are 
assigned to the City of Nantes, some to the métropole and some provide 
services for both. According to the organisation chart from January 2018, 
the only DG with predominantly municipal tasks is social cohesion (com-
posed of the divisions “childhood & education”, “prevention & solidarity” 
as well as “citizenship & social activities”), whereas the units for “economic 
development & international attractiveness”, for “environment & urban 
services” as well as the one for “territorial cohesion” have a large propor-
tion of units dealing with metropolitan responsibilities. This reorganisa-
tion can be interpreted as a way to augment the influence of the City of 
Nantes on the administration of the métropole through strategic leadership 
positions, especially because its administrative director, Benoist Pavageau 
(2009–2014), had been head of the administration of the city of Nantes 
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before and had been a collaborator of Ayrault since the 1980s (Masson 
et al. 2013, 92). On the other hand, the merger is strongly driven by the idea 
of efficiency and cost-saving, and was implemented in a tense financial situ-
ation (Masson et al. 2013, 91). The pooling of staff is a step-by-step process 
that has been expanded each year, with staff numbers increasing from 173 
positions in 2008 to 1,514 in 2016, resulting in a constant reshaping of the 
organisation (Dèbre and Garat 2015, 30). The process has not ended yet 
and has been extended to the other member municipalities. In the current 
phase of institutional development, the métropole and interested munici-
palities conclude individual arrangements for the pooling of municipal tasks 
that require special equipment or technical know-how (e.g. archives or 
video surveillance) instead of the transfer of additional competencies to the 
metropolitan level. This means to centralise the administration with the aim 
of providing efficient, professional services, but at the same time seeking to 
keep the political control partly at the municipal level.
The principle of proximity was called for by the mayors of the periphery 
in order to reduce the risk of hegemony of the core city, and was established 
from the beginning in the “charte de fonctionnement”. Each of the seven pôles 
de proximité groups several municipalities or city quarters of Nantes based on 
common characteristics. They consist of units of the administration located 
in municipalities around Nantes with about 200 civil servants each, and are 
charged with missions of planning and maintenance of public spaces and streets, 
sanitation, urban development and relations with companies within their 
geographic area (Masson et al. 2013, 90). They are meant to be an interface 
between the metropolitan administration and the municipal administrations; 
their directors are direct contact persons for the mayors as well as department 
heads of the metropolitan administration (Dèbre and Garat 2015, 28).
On one hand the pôles de proximité form an intermediary level to discuss 
territorial strategies, such as the land use plan PLUm, the traffic plan PDU 
or the climate plan for an area sharing some similarities; on the other hand 
they have an operational function as the mayors, metropolitan councillors 
and technicians meet every two months to deal with detailed questions about 
the implementation of public policies within their area, such as lighting for 
public spaces or street trees (commission locale). The term “proximity” thus 
refers to a proximity between the decision-making process of the métropole 
and its member municipalities, whereas the citizens are less aware of the 
decentralised units and mainly continue to use the municipal administra-
tion as a contact point (Garat 2013, 96–98; Conseil de Développement de 
Nantes Métropole 2017). In the first years of their existence, the staff of the 
pôles de proximité mainly consisted of previous employees of the munici-
palities of their area who had been transferred to the municipal grouping, 
whereas the central administration of Nantes Métropole was mainly com-
posed of former employees of the City of Nantes or the district urbain or 
newly recruited staff (Garat 2013, 97). This composition has been slowly 
changing over time.
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2.2.1.5  Representation of municipal interests
Political decision-making takes place in two deliberative bodies, the metro-
politan council (conseil communautaire) with 97 members (election period 
2014–2020) and the bureau with 47 members. The bureau is a body formed 
by members of the metropolitan council. They meet more often than the 
metropolitan council, i.e. seven or eight times a year instead of four times for 
the metropolitan council. The 20 vice-presidents elected by the council are 
responsible for different policy fields and form the executive power together 
with the president. The council of the métropole is indirectly elected; its 
members have to be municipal councillors at the same time. The parties 
flag those candidates they intend to send to the metropolitan council on the 
electoral lists for the municipal election. The mayors are usually members 
of the metropolitan council. The election campaign topics have so far con-
centrated on issues concerning the respective municipality, not on a politi-
cal programme for the entire inter-municipal territory. This can be seen as 
problematic in terms of democratic representation because substantial func-
tions have been transferred to the inter-municipal level.
The representation of the municipalities within the inter-municipal organ-
isation depends on their demographic weight. However, each municipality 
has at least one seat in the metropolitan council and the bureau, regardless 
of its size. The smallest municipality St-Léger-les-Vignes had 1,640 inhabit-
ants at the time of the 2014 election, i.e. 0.3% of the population against 
1.0% of seats in the council and 2.1% in the bureau. The city of Nantes 
on the other hand dominates the metropolitan council with 48 out of 97 
seats and also holds the presidency as well as seven vice-presidents. In the 
bureau, its proportion of members is lower with 11 members out of 47 
(2014–2020). The socialist mayor of Nantes and president of the municipal 
grouping could in the past also rely on a solid socialist majority of above 
80% in the council (Masson et al. 2013, 92). The model of representing 
every municipality even in the smaller bodies is possible in Nantes due to 
the relatively small number of 24 member municipalities. Métropoles with 
a similar number of municipalities are Nancy, Bordeaux, Tours, Clermont-
Ferrand, Dijon and Orléans, whereas Lille, Aix-Marseille and Grand Paris 
have 90 or more member municipalities. Until 2014, each municipality of 
the CU even provided one of the vice-presidents (Masson et al. 2013, 90); 
Nantes Métropole had 33 vice-presidents at that time, but their number was 
reduced in 2014 to 20 due to national legislation.
The mayors of the member municipalities play an important role in deci-
sion-making processes within the métropole. According to the interviewees, 
they are the ones that express their opinions most during the council meet-
ings, mainly speaking for their municipality. Furthermore, a conference of 
mayors with advisory status is a crucial mechanism to prepare council meet-
ings and reach a consensus about political orientations beforehand (Masson 
et al. 2013, 89). The mayors are usually the ones occupying the position of 
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vice-president or member of the bureau. They also conduct bilateral nego-
tiations with representatives of the métropole, e.g. within the PLUm process 
or concerning contracts between municipality and métropole about projects 
that will be carried out in shared responsibility (contrats de co-développe-
ment). However, Masson et al. (2013, 91) argue that the practice of negotia-
tion between mayors has been limited to some extent by formal procedures 
with quantified targets. This means that the inter-municipal administration 
provides a binding framework.
2.2.1.6  Île de Nantes and SAMOA – cornerstone of 
metropolitan development
When talking about the metropolitan ambition of the Métropole de Nantes, 
its major urban development project Île de Nantes and the public agency 
Société d’Aménagement de la Métropole Ouest Atlantique (SAMOA) cre-
ated in 2003 to implement it must be mentioned (Devisme 2009, 59). The 
Île de Nantes is an island of about 350 hectares at the heart of the city. It 
was a fragmented area composed of industrial brownfields of the former 
harbour, functionalist administrative buildings from the 1960s–70s and a 
small residential district from the 19th century and has been transformed 
into a united space that is understood as an enlargement of the centre of 
the agglomeration. The mixed-use area for creative industry, culture, higher 
education, commercial and residential functions is the cornerstone of an 
overall strategy which follows the idea of increasing the attractiveness of 
the agglomeration through urban quality and the use of water as a design 
element in the city (Pinson 2009, 44; Violeau 2011, 88–89).
The planning process of the Île de Nantes is seen as innovative because 
of its openness: instead of a static master plan, the urbanist Chemetoff 
has developed an evolving “plan guide” that has been updated every three 
months and values the existing traces of the history as well as the activities 
of actors on the site (Pinson 2009, 44; Diedrich and Dahl 2016, 76). The 
regeneration of the area focussed on the emergence of a creative cluster in 
parallel to the urban development. The SAMOA achieved this by acting as a 
facilitator and by providing catalyst locations with cheap temporary rooms, 
co-working spaces and showrooms in unused warehouses (Nicolas and Roy 
2015, 78–82). All in all, the Île de Nantes is a field of experimentation with 
a strategic relevance extending well beyond the site itself, also influencing 
the external image of the city-region. Nantes Métropole was very active 
in European networks and projects in the 2000s during the development 
of the area and hosted a meeting of the Eurocities network about creative 
economy in 2009, presenting itself as an innovative forerunner (Nicolas and 
Roy 2015, 77).
The SAMOA is a public developer owned by Nantes Métropole (58%) 
and the municipal grouping CARENE around Saint-Nazaire (5%), the City 
of Nantes (17%) and the neighbouring city Rezé (5 %), the département 
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(5%) and the région (5%) as well as the Syndicat mixte du SCoT Nantes 
Saint-Nazaire (5%). It is headed by the mayor of Nantes and works closely 
with the administration of Nantes Métropole responsible for urban devel-
opment. SAMOA represents a remarkable form of governance because 
stakeholders from different levels are responsible for different territories 
and meet and collaborate, with the concrete outcome of the Île de Nantes 
regeneration scheme. Though its primary mission is to develop this spe-
cific site, SAMOA has helped the larger territory of the metropolitan region 
Nantes Saint-Nazaire to emerge and to institutionalise by organising the-
matic conferences (conférences métropolitaines), applying for the label 
EcoCité obtained in 2009 and conducting feasibility studies (Ouvrard 2016, 
91, 108). This orientation towards the metropolitan scale was also linked to 
its first director, Laurent Théry. He had previously been head of the admin-
istration of the CU (Ouvrard 2016, 98; Devisme 2009, 59) and is seen as 
the crucial mediator of the city-regional plan SCoT 2007 (Violeau 2011, 
88). In 2012, when the Pôle métropolitain Nantes Saint-Nazaire (see 2.2.3) 
was founded, part of the staff from SAMOA working on the metropolitan 
scale had been transferred to the pôle. Since then, the SAMOA has mainly 
concentrated on the regeneration of the Île de Nantes.
2.2.2  Spatial relations within the wider metropolitan 
area of Nantes Saint-Nazaire
The spatial dimension of the metropolitan area is defined in different ways. 
Viewed as a layer of governance, Nantes Métropole corresponds to an inter-
mediary layer between municipality and département and is responsible for 
the local land use plan (PLUm), whereas in morphological terms it roughly 
corresponds to the urban agglomeration of Nantes and is the core of a wider 
functional urban region.
2.2.2.1  Institutional perimeters: Nantes Métropole in 
the multilevel system
The territory of Nantes Métropole fits in the multilevel system of the territo-
rial authorities région, département and municipality without transcending 
administrative borders (see Figure 2.5 and Table 2.4). It is composed of 
24 municipalities; the city of Nantes is by far the largest one with 319,284 
inhabitants,14 whereas all the others have fewer than 50,000 inhabitants. 
The four other municipalities with more than 25,000 inhabitants (Saint-
Herblain, Rezé, Saint-Sébastien-sur-Loire and Orvault) are directly adja-
cent to Nantes. The municipal grouping hosts 46% of the population of the 
département and is one of 17 EPCIs in the Département Loire-Atlantique:15 
one métropole, four CAs and 12 CCs, but no CUs (since January 2017, 
dynamics see below). Nantes is the only one of the 22 French métropoles 
situated in the Région Pays de la Loire. The two next largest cities in the 
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region are Angers (158,000 inh.) and Le Mans (146,000 inh.), which are 
both part of a communauté urbaine (CU Angers Loire Métropole with 29 
municipalities and 306,000 inh., CU Le Mans Métropole with 19 munici-
palities and 210,000 inh.)16 and a pôle métropolitain that is also responsi-
ble for the regional plan SCoT (Pôle Métropolitain Loire Angers with four 
Figure 2.5  Nantes in the multilevel system 2021 Concept: P. Feiertag Cartography: 
F. Gela
Table 2.4  Nantes in the multilevel system
Level Type of institution Name Composed of
Région Territorial Authority Région Pays de la 
Loire 
5 départements




Métropole Etablissement Public 
de Coopération 
Intercommunale (EPCI)
Nantes Métropole 24 municipalities
Municipality Territorial Authority Ville de Nantes
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EPCIs and Pôle Métropolitain Le Mans-Sarthe with seven EPCIs). Another 
large city in close proximity to Nantes is Rennes, the capital of the region 
Bretagne. 
The area covered by city-regional planning documents takes into account 
the estuary of the river Loire due to various shared issues at stake (Fritsch 
2006, 27; Renard 2008, 136; Masboungi 2012). However, the two docu-
ments SCoT and DTA covering the bipolar metropolitan region of Nantes 
Saint-Nazaire use a different spatial definition and have a low degree of insti-
tutionalisation (see Table 2.5 and 2.2.3). The SCoT Nantes Saint-Nazaire 
includes three CCs between Nantes Métropole and the CARENE on the 
northern riverbank with 61 member municipalities in total (see Figure 2.5), 
whereas the DTA Estuaire de la Loire covers 199 municipalities (Renard 
2008, 133). The latter has a significantly larger perimeter in the south and 
east as compared to the SCoT, is centred around the river delta and exceeds 
the département in the east, covering the municipalities Oree d’Anjou and 
Mauges-sur-Loire. Additionally, an informal Inter-SCoT dialogue is organ-
ised with all SCoTs within the Département Loire-Atlantique (Auran 2017; 
see 2.2.3). Thus, the SCoT du Pays des Mauges, which touches Nantes 
Métropole directly in the east, is not included because the territory is part 
of the neighbouring Département Maine-et-Loire. Six out of eight SCoT 
planning regions end at the administrative border of the Département Loire-
Atlantique (see Figure 2.6).
The municipal PLU within the territory of Nantes Métropole has 
recently been replaced by an inter-municipal land use plan, the plan local 
d’urbanisme métropolitain (PLUm). The municipalities continue to play 
an important role in the process of development and have opted to break 
down the orientations of the document for each municipality (cahier com-
munal). This part of the PLUm is not legally binding and has rather a peda-
gogical character as its purpose it to make the implications of the PLUm 
more understandable for citizens, politicians and public servants of the 
municipalities.






SRADDET 2020 Région Pays de la Loire Région 
Inter-SCoT - Informal dialogue supported 
by agences d‘urbanisme
8 SCoTs of the 
Département 
Loire-Atlantique 
DTA 2006 State 199 municipalities 
SCoT 2016 Pôle métropolitain Nantes 
Saint-Nazaire
5 EPCIs (with 
61 municipalities) 
PLUm 2019 Nantes Métropole 1 EPCI (with 
24 municipalities)
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2.2.2.2  Morphological and functional definitions: unité urbaine and 
aire urbaine
The territory of the municipal grouping Nantes Métropole roughly corre-
sponds to one continuous urban agglomeration (“unité urbaine”), meaning 
a built-up area without interruptions of more than 200 metres, as defined 
by INSEE.17 Its size can therefore be seen as pertinent from a morphological 
point of view. Its exact delimitation, respectively the membership of some 
of the border municipalities, also depends on the political will to cooper-
ate or not at the time the CU was formed rather than compelling morpho-
logical reasons. On one hand three member municipalities in the west (Le 
Pellerin, Brains) and east (Mauves-sur-Loire) along the river Loire are not 
part of the continuously built-up space; on the other hand three non-member 
municipalities on the south bank of the river Loire (Haute Goulaine, Pont-
St-Martin, Port-St-Père) are part of the urban unit according to the INSEE 
definition.
Figure 2.6  Inter-SCoT area of Nantes 2021 Concept: P. Feiertag Cartography: 
F. Gela
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The functional urban area defined by commuter relations (“aire urbaine” 
meaning a group of adjoining municipalities, where at least 40% of the 
employed resident population works in the centre or in the municipalities 
attracted by this centre)18 is much larger in the northern and southern direc-
tion. According to the INSEE definition it is made up of 108 municipali-
ties,19 covers 3,405 km² and has 961,500 inhabitants (2016). As reflected 
in regional planning documents, Nantes has strong functional relations to 
the neighbouring city of Saint-Nazaire due to the river and port activities 
and is described as bipolar (Mahé and Bois 2012, 18; Fritsch 2006, 26). The 
geographers Jean Renard (2015) and Claude Cabanne (Garat et al. 2005, 
36) even define the functional territory as stretching to the sea on both river 
banks, thus also including the seaside resorts as well as vineyard areas south 
of Nantes. The two agglomerations have strong economic links and are con-
nected by the industrial and logistics axis of the estuary, but Fritsch (2006, 
26–27) argues that the two cities, separated by a distance of about 50 kilo-
metres, do not yet form a unit in terms of household practices and each has 
its own catchment area. It can be concluded that functional relations as well 
as shared interests exist in a far wider area than the institutionalised perim-
eter of the métropole. This wider metropolitan region has fuzzy boundaries 
that can be defined in different ways.
2.2.2.3  Boundaries: evolution of perimeters and 
their impact on cooperation
Institutional boundaries of the metropolitan region have mainly been defined 
by local actors and are contingent on the political will of municipalities to 
be part of an inter-municipal cooperation. They evolved in several steps.
The inter-municipal grouping district urbain was established by 20 
municipalities in 1992 and expanded its territory in two steps. First, in 
1995, one additional municipality became part of it. Then, in 2001, three 
other municipalities joined the district urbain. Since the transformation to 
a CU, there have been no additional changes to the territory. The perim-
eter is a political construction. Some adjacent municipalities with close links 
to Nantes have decided not to join, such as Treillières in a referendum in 
2002. One of the reasons was the self-perception of being a rural municipal-
ity rather than part of the urban agglomeration and the wish to preserve 
this identity. Afterwards, the focus of the CU was on integration instead of 
extension. Today, an extension is unwanted by the members of the métro-
pole, who argue that it is too late and too complicated because they have a 
well-established mode of collaborating with 24 members.
Whereas the territory of Nantes Métropole has solidified, a number of 
EPCIs adjacent to it merged and thus considerably enlarged their territory 
between 2010 and 2017. This was mainly done due to incentives from 
the national government and also to legislation defining minimum sizes 
of municipal groupings in terms of inhabitants (see 2.1.4). The SDCI for 
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2016–2022 has led to six mergers of CCs, of which five neighbour Nantes 
Métropole. This means that a ring of larger groupings around Nantes has 
been created instead of enlarging the métropole itself. Two of the EPCIs 
adjacent to Nantes have become communautés d’agglomération as a result 
of the merger: CA Pornic Pays de Retz in the west and CA Clisson, Sèvre & 
Maine with 16 communities and 54,000 inhabitants in the southeast. The 
departmental schéma had the explicit objective of creating CAs with addi-
tional competencies in the fields of mobility and social housing as a counter-
balance to Nantes. They should contribute to a stronger complementarity 
between urban and rural areas (Préfecture de la Loire-Atlantique 2016, 24).
It can be concluded that there is consent among the member municipali-
ties of the métropole as well as adjacent municipal groupings and the state 
representative prefet not to expand the territory of the municipal group-
ing of Nantes Métropole to its functional area because it would otherwise 
encompass wide parts of the département. The recomposition of municipal 
groupings within the département instead aims to create more similar ter-
ritories in terms of area and competencies relevant for spatial development, 
relating to the idea of égalité du territoire. In consequence, negotiations 
about urban–rural relationships cannot be resolved within the more or less 
homogeneous municipal groupings themselves, but are shifted to another 
institutional layer, that of much softer cooperation between municipal 
groupings.
2.2.3  Coordination of public policies beyond the métropole
Given the relatively small size of the city of Nantes and of the métropole, a 
second scale of cooperation has developed in parallel to the strong municipal 
grouping: that of the bipolar metropolitan region of Nantes Saint-Nazaire. 
It has become widely accepted as a natural area of reference in the thinking 
of territorial actors (Fritsch 2006, 27) and has been institutionalised gradu-
ally in the form of the Pôle métropolitain Nantes Saint-Nazaire. In addition 
to this, a range of other soft forms of coordination between the métropole 
and adjoining territories as well as the région exist: the Inter-SCoT dialogue, 
reciprocity deals, a second pôle métropolitain in the form of a city network, 
and a territorial conference at the scale of the région.
2.2.3.1  Pôle métropolitain Nantes Saint-Nazaire – strong imaginary, 
but light institution / “le projet avant l’institution”
The pôle métropolitain Nantes Saint-Nazaire is based on a partnership 
between the two cities Nantes and Saint-Nazaire. It evokes the spatial imag-
inary of the estuary of the river Loire as an area with strong interdepend-
encies. The metropolisation of Nantes and its ambition to be an economic 
and cultural hub of European relevance is conceptualised at the scale of 
the Nantes Saint-Nazaire estuary (Fritsch 2007, 118; Devisme 2009, 12; 
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Gravari-Barbas 2009, 287; Masboungi 2012). Nantes defines itself as a har-
bour city, but the harbour has moved to the river mouth and both cities 
need each other to have a critical mass in terms of inhabitants and economic 
activities to reach a metropolitan dimension in national and European 
competition. Besides economic considerations, the vulnerable river delta 
has put ecological questions at the heart of metropolitan cooperation 
(Masboungi 2012, 30).
The construction of the large territory has taken place in parallel to the 
strengthening of the municipal grouping of Nantes Métropole, both driven 
by Nantes’ mayor Ayrault, though the pôle métropolitain is much weaker in 
terms of functions and resources. Symbolic acts and cultural events such as 
the art festival Estuaire between 2007 and 2012 have been used to construct 
a collective imaginary that was meant to be shared not only by decision-
makers, business leaders and planning professionals but also by the general 
public (Gravari-Barbas 2009, 288). An important step towards metropoli-
tan cooperation has been a territorial dialogue in the form of “conférences 
métropolitaines” held at irregular intervals between 1999 and 2011. It has 
had an open format including politicians, civil society actors and experts. 
The dialogue contributed to a common identity within the city-region and 
served to advance projects of common interest (Ouvrard 2016, 91).
The first step in formalising the dialogue was the creation of the plan-
ning association Syndicat Mixte du SCoT in 2003 and the development of 
the first regional plan SCoT approved in 2007. The association was trans-
formed into a “pôle métropolitain” in July 2012, keeping its perimeter and 
members as well as its internal structure (Bariol-Mathais 2017, 48). The 
new name was intended to add to its visibility, but the continuity of the 
institution was high. The change of status became possible by national leg-
islation (see 2.1.1.) and made it possible to adobt additional tasks beyond 
regional planning, including an operational dimension. This confirmed the 
existing practice as the syndicate had had the ambition to play an active 
part in implementing the SCoT since 2008 and had been launching studies 
to prepare operational projects with the support of the urban development 
company SAMOA (see 2.2.1). After becoming a pôle métropolitain, this 
became an official task and the way to debate and decide about operational 
projects changed from a one by one basis to a voted four-year action pro-
gramme. However, the main task has remained regional planning, i.e. the 
SCoT, and the pôle clearly concentrates on topics with a strong link to land 
use, landscape and urban design.
The pôle métropolitain is an interface structure between existing munici-
pal groupings and thus is dependent on the resources and political will of its 
five members for implementation. As the former mayor Ayrault puts it (2012, 
173), it was more important for him to develop a shared territorial project 
and to commit to it than to build a new institutional layer. According to the 
annual report of 2016, its budget amounts to about 1.1 M€, financed by 
its members (thereof 75% Nantes Métropole) as well as additional funding 
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from national programmes. Its office is composed of a small team of four 
employees. Its president is the mayor of Nantes and the deliberative bodies 
are constituted of representatives of each municipality.
According to the interviewees, the pôle métropolitain is mainly valued 
as a space for regular exchange, providing opportunities for meetings and 
coordination between decision-makers. The elected representatives of the 
municipal groupings are used to working together on issues of territorial 
development such as commercial development and interrelations due to 
their monthly meetings. The institution is also used for a joint positioning 
towards the region, e.g. for the SRADDET or towards the state. It seeks to 
mobilise funding from the national or EU level by preparing joint propos-
als, e.g. for the national label EcoCité. EcoCité is one of several programs 
launched by the French state with the aim of influencing urban agendas via 
competitive mechanisms rather than large amounts of funding (Demazière 
and Sykes 2021). The pôle conducts feasibility studies, e.g. concerning 
urban development around train stations, and has organised a landscape 
planning competition focused on the topic of water, with six sites spread 
across the territory. Its role is mainly to initiate projects, take care of the 
conceptual aspects and ensure consistency as part of an overall strategy as 
well as deal with communication and marketing, whereas the realisation is 
done by the municipal groupings or the concerned municipalities themselves 
(Bariol-Mathais 2017, 50). The municipalities between the two large group-
ings Nantes Métropole and CARENE particularly benefit from the project 
support and the know-how partly transferred from experience gained within 
Nantes’ Urban Development Company SAMOA.
The governance arrangement is well established and valued by the local 
actors because it produces a benefit for its members without excessive costs 
in terms of additional administrative structures. However, its success is 
dependent on the consent of the two mayors of Nantes and Saint-Nazaire as 
the main drivers. The generational change in the two cities has caused a less 
dynamic phase for the pôle métropolitain, because the new mayors elected 
in 2014 concentrated first on their own cities and municipal groupings.
2.2.3.2  Overcoming boundaries – Instruments of soft coordination 
with variable geographies
In contrast to the bipolar space of Nantes, the following arrangements cor-
respond to a more selective inter-territorial cooperation seeking to address 
issues beyond the boundaries of the pôle métropolitain.
 • Inter-SCoT dialogue – Coordination of regional plans
The eight planning associations within the Département Loire-Atlantique are 
maintaining a dialogue, though without a regular frequency or any kind of 
formalisation. They do not have the same rhythm in preparing their SCoTs, 
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meaning that some planning associations such as Nantes Saint-Nazaire had 
already approved their second generation of SCoT in 2016 whereas others 
had just started the process at that time or had recently approved their first 
regional plan. Furthermore, they do not use the same cartographic language 
or definitions, leading to high heterogeneity. The purpose of the dialogue 
is to avoid incompatibility and direct competition, e.g. concerning indus-
trial sites. Meetings are focussed on topics with relevance to the scale of 
the entire territory, such as risks of flooding. Additionally, each planning 
association involves the neighbouring associations when developing a new 
regional plan.
The Inter-SCoT dialogue was initially driven by the département, which 
has withdrawn from the task due to changes of responsibilities between ter-
ritorial layers (see 2.1.2). The Agence d’Urbanisme de la Région Nantaise 
(AURAN), which is working with several planning associations to support 
the development of the SCoT, has partly stepped in by taking the initiative 
to produce an overview of the orientations of the SCoT. This “Panorama 
des SCoT” (AURAN 2017) is meant to share information about the objec-
tives in each plan, e.g. concerning the number of housing units and density. 
All in all, the coordination is rather loose and depends on occasions.
 • Contrat de réciprocité with PETR (pôle d’équilibre territorial rural) du 
Pays de Retz – urban–rural relations
The reciprocity deals (contrat de réciprocité) are intended to be an instru-
ment of mutual agreement between rural, peri-urban and urban territories 
and were launched by the interministerial committee of rurality in 2015, fol-
lowed by an experimental phase in four territories, thereof only two (Brest 
and Toulouse) had actually agreed on a contract by 2018 (Bigay et al. 2018, 
30). Nantes was not part of the experimental phase, but adopted the instru-
ment afterwards.
One of the weaknesses of the Pôle métropolitain Nantes Saint-Nazaire 
is that it does not include the south bank of the river Loire, because no 
political consensus has been reached, either at the time of the creation of the 
SCoT perimeter, or in 2012 when transforming it into a pôle métropolitain. 
The seaside has a recreational function for Nantes, whereas Nantes pro-
vides jobs for the inhabitants of the Pays du Retz, leading to commuting 
activities. Instead of changing the institutional perimeters, the decision has 
been to conclude contracts about collaboration. Nantes Métropole and the 
PETR du Pays de Retz signed their first contract in April 2019 after one year 
of preparation, with four topics of cooperation: food provision, mobility, 
economy and tourism. Concrete projects will be, among others, traffic lanes 
dedicated to non-polluting vehicles and cars with several passengers, imple-
mented in 2021. Further steps would be a contract between the agglomera-
tion of Saint-Nazaire and the Pays du Retz as well as closer coordination 
between the two SCoTs.
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 • Espace métropolitain Loire-Bretagne – city network focussing on 
competitiveness
The “Espace metropolitain Loire-Bretagne” has the legal form of a pôle 
métropolitain and consists of three métropoles (Brest, Nantes and Rennes) 
as well as two CAs (Angers and Saint-Nazaire), thus regrouping the larg-
est agglomerations of north-western France in a city network with a rotat-
ing presidency. Initially, all five were cities with a socialist mayor, but this 
changed in Angers after 2014 and has had an impact on the cooperation 
with the other cities. The idea of a city network had already been discussed 
since the 1990s, but the historically difficult relation between the main cit-
ies Rennes and Nantes hampered stable cooperation. For decades they had 
been either turning their backs on each other or competing for influence 
instead of seeking to complement each other (Renard 2008, 115–124).
The pôle was created in 2012 and addresses the topics of accessibility, 
higher education and research as well as economic development (Bariol-
Mathais 2017, 120). Due to the distance between the cities, the focus is 
entirely different from the other pôle métropolitain where Nantes is a 
member. Instead of dealing with spatial planning or urban–rural relation-
ships, it is a strategic alliance focussed on competitiveness and promotion 
of the territory at national and international scales (Bigay et al. 2018, 62). 
Examples of joint efforts are campaigning for better high-speed train con-
nections and a joint presentation at an international real estate exhibition. 
Infrastructure alliances have lately been emerging on a much larger spatial 
scale than that of a city-region, as also observable elsewhere in Europe 
(Feiertag et al. 2020, 161).
 • Vertical coordination – the new role of the région
In searching for potential mediating institutions for an inter-territorial bal-
ancing of interests, the region is seen as the most likely candidate rather than 
the département or national government (Bigay et al. 2018, 31). The region 
has become competent in spatial planning and has thus also become the 
host of a vertical territorial dialogue. This dialogue takes place on one hand 
as part of the development process of the planning document SRADDET 
and on the other hand due to a new instrument of territorial conferences 
(Conférence territoriale de l’action publique CTAP) introduced by the 
MAPTAM law.
During the development of the SRADDET, the Région Pays de la Loire 
first contacted the planning associations of SCoT, as there had been few 
thematic overlaps before. A consultation with each of the planning asso-
ciations took place and a joint statement by all planning associations of 
the region was produced, formulating their expectations. Presentations 
in each département took place in 2017, but the territorial dialogue was 
opened up and intensified in 2019 after the cancellation of the airport 
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project Notre-Dame-des-Landes (see 2.2.1) with a process called “my 
region in 2050”.
The territorial conferences of the Région Pays de la Loire had its first 
session in February 2015. The CTAP are mandatory and include representa-
tives of the region, the départements and the municipal groupings. Each 
EPCI with at least 300,000 inhabitants has its own seat whereas the smaller 
ones share one representative per département. According to the law, their 
purpose is to debate and give an opinion. However, the instrument has been 
criticised for being too formalised and heavy, and thus not inviting open 
debate (Acar and Reix 2017, 5).
2.3  Lyon: powerful institution with a (too) small perimeter
Lyon is located in the south-east of France and is the third largest French 
city in terms of inhabitants. It is situated on a north-south transport axis to 
the Mediterranean Sea (Marseille) and connected to Paris with a high-speed 
train (TGV) with two hours’ travel time. This line was the first high-speed 
connection in France and was already inaugurated in 1981. Lyon has a 
strong industrial basis with large companies. Historically, the beginning of 
the industrial production was related to silk production, later on developing 
towards textile production in general, chemistry and mechanics and in the 
20th century, as well as automotive, metallurgy and petrochemical indus-
tries (Galimberti 2015, 93).
The centre of the city-region is formed by Lyon and the adjacent city 
of Villeurbanne. Both cities together have roughly 650,000 inhabitants. 
The other municipalities within the city-regional institution Métropole 
de Lyon are significantly smaller and part of a continuous urban fabric. 
Thirteen of them have between 20,000 and 61,000 inhabitants, 21 between 
5,000 and 20,000 and 24 municipalities have fewer than 5,000 inhabit-
ants. The agglomeration is “marked by historical segregation between its 
western (residential, affluent, composed of single-family homes) and eastern 
(industrial, working-class, surrounded by large housing estates) suburbs” 
(Rousseau 2015, 624) and a high social homogeneity of its western suburbs. 
The agglomeration of Lyon is part of a wider metropolitan region including 
the city of Saint-Étienne as the second urban centre and several medium-
sized cities such as Vienne and Villefranche-sur-Saône.
The following key characteristics concerning metropolitan governance 
and planning will be highlighted in this chapter:
 • Since 2015, the strong city-regional jurisdiction Métropole de Lyon 
with additional responsibilities has been replacing the municipal group-
ing created in the 1960s;
 • International competitiveness as an important driver for the mayors of 
Lyon and presidents of the inter-municipal grouping since the 1990s, 
becoming apparent in urban development projects, city marketing and 
efforts towards more powerful forms of city-regional governance;
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 • Unusually long tradition of inter-municipal land use planning within 
the métropole;
 • Steady urban extension as well as increased commuting distances, in 
contrast with the almost stable institutional perimeter of the city-region 
for half a century;
 • Several governance arrangements for the wider metro region beyond the 
Métropole de Lyon, but with a low degree of institutionalisation.
In this section, we will analyse governance and planning in the metropoli-
tan region of Lyon. We first examine the Métropole de Lyon covering the 
urban core of the metropolitan region (2.3.1). Second, we will elucidate 
institutional borders, planning perimeters and functional interrelations in 
the metropolitan region (2.3.2) and investigate different soft governance 
arrangements within the wider metropolitan area, including regional plan-
ning associations (2.3.3).
2.3.1  The institution: Métropole de Lyon
Lyon has the most integrated metropolitan governance arrangement of all 
French city-regions and is the only one with the status of a jurisdiction. Its 
special status is fixed by national law, but was negotiated by powerful local 
actors. Compared to the other 21 métropoles existing since 2018, Lyon is 
one of the largest in terms of inhabitants (third largest) and has more mem-
ber municipalities than the median (fifth rank of 22). However, the métro-
pole is only in the middle field concerning the area (10th largest) covering a 
territory similar to the métropoles Grenoble or Nantes. The area covered by 
the Métropole de Lyon is considerably smaller than the métropoles Saint-
Étienne, Rennes and Rouen despite the fact that each of them has fewer than 
500,000 inhabitants (see Table 2.1).
2.3.1.1  Long-standing inter-municipal cooperation and planning
The city-region of Lyon was among the first city-regions in France where 
a strong municipal grouping with responsibilities in spatial planning was 
created based on the need to think in terms of city-regions (Parnet 2016, 
242). Inter-municipal cooperation in the city-region of Lyon started long 
before it adopted the status of métropole. Lyon is one of four city-regions 
that were obliged by national law to create a communauté urbaine in the 
1960s with a perimeter defined by the state. The Communauté Urbaine de 
Lyon (COURLY) was created in January 1969, two years later than the 
other CUs of Lille, Bordeaux and Strasbourg because departmental bounda-
ries had to be altered (Bariol-Mathais 2015, 27; see 2.3.2). Even prior to 
this imposed creation of a municipal grouping, Lyon had already had asso-
ciations for joint service provision for water supply, electricity and public 
transport since the 1920s (Gardon and Meillerand 2007, 11). The early 
start of inter-municipal cooperation at the beginning of the 20th century 
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is unique among French metropolitan regions. This early accumulation of 
experiences of cooperation has led to the emergence of a politically signifi-
cant multi-communal territory (Aguiar Mol 2015, 128). By targeting topics 
such as urban transport, social housing and internationalisation, the CU 
became a veritable metropolitan institution in the 1980s.
In 1991, the COURLY was renamed “Grand Lyon” (Bariol-Mathais 
2015, 27). The key role of the CU was enhanced by the revision of the stra-
tegic planning document schéma directeur with the major participation of 
the economic actors. Its title “Lyon 2010, un projet d’agglomération pour 
une métropole européenne” underlined the focus on international competi-
tiveness. During the terms of office of the two mayors Michel Noir (1989–
1995) and Raymond Barre (1995–2001), economic development was a 
dominant concern, combined with city branding, emblematic urban pro-
jects (Cité internationale designed by Renzo Piano, congress hall) and traf-
fic projects (metro line extension, northern ring road) (Aguiar Mol 2015, 
129–132). Later on, the idea of the economic competitiveness of the city 
at the global scale centred on expanding the service sector also included a 
strategy of residential densification of the suburbs due to the scarcity of land 
within the boundaries of the métropole (Rousseau 2015, 624–626).
The ADERLY economic development agency was created as early as 1974 
(Frébault and Sozzi 2010, 44; Galimberti 2015, 104). It was set up with 
the aim of promoting Lyon and to attract foreign investors (Ben Mabrouk 
and Jouve 2002, 92). ALDERLY also addressed issues of metropolisation 
and internationalisation and included public, private and semi-public actors 
(Aguiar Mol 2015, 129; Galimberti 2015, 108). Since 2015, it is co-financed 
by the métropole, but was steered in the first 15 years by the chamber of com-
merce and industry as the operator without the involvement of COURLY 
on the operational side. The early focus on competitiveness and economic 
development of the COURLY was not supported by the industrial sector at 
that time, but instead regarded with suspicion, because the economic policy 
of the president and mayor of Lyon Michel Noir focussed on the service sec-
tor as an element of urban modernity and considered industrial buildings to 
be harmful to the quality of life in urban areas, wishing to relocate them to 
the countryside outside the CU (Ben Mabrouk and Jouve 2002, 101).
Whereas the COURLY integrated more policy fields step-by-step, its ter-
ritorial dimension remained unchanged over decades. Minor extensions 
occurred between 2007 and 2014, when four small municipalities succes-
sively joined the CU at their request (Fitria 2016, 172–173). Two of them 
were motivated by a difficult financial situation whereas the other two 
joined due to joint interests concerning opposition against a highway pro-
ject; they saw a strategic advantage in joining the large municipal grouping 
with regard to negotiations with the state services. The new member munici-
palities were incorporated into the SCoT strategic planning document, but 
the extension had only minor effects on the municipal grouping due to their 
small number of inhabitants. When Lyon was a municipal grouping with a 
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voluntary character it was possible to add single municipalities in case of 
agreement of the potential new member and Grand Lyon, but any exten-
sion has been made much more complicated since 2015 by the new juris-
dictional status of the métropole because a national law would be needed 
(Galimberti et al. 2014, 201; Fitria 2016, 269). Further voluntary exten-
sions are unlikely, because the representation of the municipalities has been 
altered since 2020, making it less attractive for smaller municipalities to ask 
for admission (Fitria 2016, 276). The métropole itself is not actively pur-
suing the integration of individual municipalities as changing its territory 
would only bring strategic advantages in the case of a substantial enlarge-
ment. Therefore, the current perimeter of the métropole has become rigid 
and could only be enlarged by state intervention. If such a law were passed 
(which is not a current preoccupation of the government), it would most 
likely only be prepared to annex a significant number of municipalities.
Lyon is a forerunner when it comes to spatial planning at a city-regional 
scale, both within the perimeter of the CU and beyond (see 2.3.3). Even 
before the creation of the CU, strategic plans for the metropolitan region 
were prepared in the 1960s, covering a vast territory (Plan d’urbanisme 
directeur and Plan d’Aménagement et d’Orientation Générale PADOG; see 
Bariol-Mathais 2015, 32; Gardon and Meillerand 2007, 14; Verhage et al. 
2007, 86). Since its creation, the municipal grouping itself has developed a 
range of strategic spatial plans (SDAU 1978, schéma directeur 1992, SCoT 
2010, modified in 2017). An inter-municipal planning association, the 
SEPAL, was first created in 1985, but dissolved in 1992 after finalisation of 
the plan and only reopened in 2003. Since 2001, municipal groupings have 
been legally obliged to keep their planning associations after finalisation of 
a plan; thus the planning associations can monitor and adapt their regional 
plans. Local land use plans have been developed for several municipalities 
since 1980, organised in five sub-territories, and the first inter-municipal 
land use plan PLUi covering the entire territory came into force as early as 
2005. Even today, the two other municipal groupings within the regional 
planning area of Lyon still have separate municipal land use plans for each 
of their member municipalities. This long-standing tradition of inter-munic-
ipal land use planning is unusual in France.
The city-region is considered in the literature as a forerunner of city-
regional governance in the French context, both concerning service pro-
vision and planning (Aguiar Mol 2015, 50; Galimberti et al. 2014, 191; 
Bariol-Mathais 2015). The organisation itself emphasises the linear charac-
ter of its institutional history since the 1960s, interpreting it as a logical pro-
gression. This smooth narrative of the métropole can partially be questioned 
according to Parnet (2016, 246) as it overlooks the question of the adequate 
perimeter (see 2.3.2) and sweeps conflicts with smaller municipalities, rural 
territories and the région under the carpet. Anyhow, the transformation of 
the former CU into a métropole certainly means a continuation and further 
integration of a long-established institution rather than a discontinuity.
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2.3.1.2  Special status of métropole fixed by national law
The transformation of the communauté urbaine Grand Lyon into the métro-
pole was a turning point because of its special status. It led to substantially 
more functions, budget and staff as well as a direct election of the metro-
politan council. The national law MAPTAM from January 2014 describes 
the general rules for the métropole and foresees specific tailor-made rules 
for the three largest in terms of population (Geppert 2017, 226): the capital 
Paris (art. 12–14), Aix-Marseille (art. 40–42) and Lyon (art. 26–39). Lyon 
is the only one that has become a full local self-government (collectivité ter-
ritoriale à statut particulier) instead of only a legal public person (etablisse-
ment public) like all other métropoles (Hertzog 2018, 150). Hence, the new 
jurisdiction, in terms of functions is a combination of the competencies of 
the département that have been entirely transferred and the former munici-
pal grouping CU. The additional responsibilities have also led to additional 
financial resources and the transfer of staff from the departmental adminis-
tration. Geppert (2017, 237) describes the Métropole de Lyon as a “power-
ful entity” with “full control over its territory”.
The making of a tailor-made status appears “in very different con-
texts: the crystallisation of a solid collaboration in Lyon, the authoritar-
ian intervention of the national government in the conflict-ridden area of 
Aix-Marseille, a compromise between the numerous players of the Paris 
region” (Geppert 2017, 237). In the case of Lyon, the initiative came from 
the local level, driven forward by an alliance of Gérard Collomb, the mayor 
of Lyon and president of the municipal grouping at that time, and Michel 
Mercier, president of the council of the Département Rhône (Conseil 
Général du Rhône) via informal negotiations at the beginning of the par-
liamentary process. The first draft of the law assigned the status of EPCI to 
Grand Lyon like to the other city-regions (Parnet 2016, 252). Rather than 
a top-down intervention of the state, “two prominent local politicians who 
dominated the local scene” (Parnet 2016, 260) used the opportunity of 
the legislative process. The other municipalities of the Grand Lyon group-
ing were not involved in the decision-making process (Galimberti et al. 
2014, 192). The métropole has been cut out of the Département Rhône, 
but the département continues to exist and to carry out its functions for 
the rest its territory. This was a win-win situation that both suited the 
métropole, which was strengthened, as well as the département, which 
became socially more homogeneous, slightly better off than the core city 
and got rid of responsibilities in social welfare for the urban area as well 
as the costly Confluence Museum (Geppert 2017, 238; Galimberti et al. 
2014, 192). In the case of Lyon, the national legislative process created 
a window of political opportunity for an institutional solution that fitted 
the specific geographical and demographic situation of this particular city-
region (Hertzog 2018, 151).
A mayor difference compared to the former status as CU as well as com-
pared to the other “métropoles de droit commun” is the direct election of 
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its councillors, carried out for the first time in 2020.20 This changes the 
role of municipalities and the representation of the smaller ones. It also 
means a change in leadership from one super-president to two leading fig-
ures because the double role of mayor and president of the métropole is not 
allowed in this case. This concentration of power had been a frequent prac-
tice in Lyon for decades. The first president of the COURLY was the mayor 
of Lyon at that time, Louis Pradel21 (Bariol-Mathais 2015, 27), followed by 
Francisque Collomb, Michel Noir, Raymond Barre and Gérard Collomb. 
Most of them have also been influential on the national level like many 
mayors of large cities in France (“Grand Elus”, see also Thoenig 2006, 55), 
providing them with additional power via shorter circuits to decision-mak-
ing in Paris (Mallon et al. 2010, 88–92). Noir, Barre and Collomb have all 
been ministers at some point in their career. However, in the case of Gérard 
Collomb, becoming minister of the interior in May 2017 marks the end of 
its hegemony in Lyon as he ceased to be mayor and president of the métro-
pole and could not restore this position after his return. He continued to be 
a councillor throughout all this time in both the municipal and metropolitan 
councils, as well as president of the SEPAL planning association, and was 
re-elected mayor of Lyon in November 2018 by the municipal council, but 
had to cede the position of mayor and failed to become the first directly 
elected president of the métropole in June 2020. The positions of president 
of the métropole and mayor of Lyon have been conquered by two members 
of the Green Party, Bruno Bernard and Grégory Doucet. The Green Party 
(Europe Ecologie-Les Verts) had an unprecedented success at the municipal 
elections in 2020 in many large cities such as Bordeaux, Strasbourg and 
Tours.
2.3.1.3  Extensive functions of the Métropole de Lyon
The functions of the Métropole de Lyon are more extensive than in any other 
French métropole, because they include all functions of the département 
along with many former municipal functions. The decades since the crea-
tion of the COURLY have been marked by a steady increase of functions, a 
model of concentration that is likely to have reached its limits due to a risk of 
sluggishness and reduced acceptance by the municipalities (Galimberti et al. 
2014, 192–193). Due to its status as full local self-government, the métro-
pole has the right to act in any kind of policy field (clause de compétence 
générale), but does not necessarily have the interest to do so. As one example 
from the field of housing policy, the métropole has not claimed the compe-
tence for the accommodation of the homeless, but rather leaves this task to 
the state.
Regarding production functions, the Métropole de Lyon is competent in 
the following policies:
 • Economic development;
 • Marketing and tourism;
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 • Major events and equipment for transport, telecommunications, sports 
and culture (e.g. the Confluence Museum, the Gallo-Roman Museum 
Lugdunum).
Regarding social reproduction functions, the Métropole de Lyon is compe-
tent in the following policies:
 • Housing policy and Social Housing including personal aid;
 • Public transport (via the public transport association Sytral);
 • Public space and roads (except roads of national importance; planning 
and construction, maintenance);
 • Town planning and urban development (SCoT, PLUi, ZAC);
 • Schools (collèges);
 • Environmental protection;
 • Energy (distribution of electricity, gas and heat; advancement of renew-
able energies and energy efficiency; climate plan);
 • Waste collection and treatment as well as water distribution and waste-
water treatment;
 • Social services (services for families; financial support for low-income 
households);
 • Fire and rescue services.
In the field of town planning and urban mobility, almost all former munici-
pal functions are carried out at the metropolitan level. Concerning public 
transport in the wider metropolitan area, a high interdependence with the 
Région Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes (responsible for regional trains) as well as 
to some extent with the surrounding départements and municipal group-
ings exists due to shared responsibilities, and thus necessitates agreements 
and steering mechanisms for common action (Idt et al. 2012, 226). The 
mayors sign building permits, but planning instruments as well as projects 
of urban renewal are the responsibility of the métropole. The municipalities 
are still responsible for street lighting and the maintenance of green spaces. 
As mentioned above, inter-municipal planning was introduced long before 
the creation of the métropole, since the early days of the CU (Gardon and 
Meillerand 2007, 216). It has been one of the vehicles to create a sense of 
belonging to the same metropolitan territory among the member municipal-
ities (Galimberti et al. 2014, 196). Urban development projects were linked 
to economic development and attractiveness of the city: “the priority given 
to the tertiary sector in Lyon was mainly organised around a series of major 
real estate operations in the town centre” (Ben Mabrouk and Jouve 2002, 
102). Vast property developments for business with high quality public 
spaces and architecture, which were the joint responsibility of the COURLY 
and the chamber of commerce and industry, were seen as projects of met-
ropolitan interest (Ben Mabrouk and Jouve 2002, 103). The connection of 
urban planning, economic development and metropolitan policies has been 
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pursued in projects such as Confluence on the southern part of the peninsula 
where the river Rhône and Saône flow together, or the refurbishment of the 
Part Dieu business district in the making.
Compared to the former municipal grouping of the CU, social reproduc-
tion functions have been strengthened, in particular by adding social poli-
cies. This is a field where the metropolitan institution did not have much 
experience before (Galimberti et al. 2014, 192). The additional responsibili-
ties also concern the field of housing policies. The former CU already had a 
strategic programme for housing (PLH), but the personal aid directly paid 
to the households had been administered by the département. A large num-
ber of civil servants working in this field were transferred to the administra-
tion of the métropole. The important place social policy takes now in terms 
of manpower is in contrast with the competitive agenda that has been driv-
ing the institutional development since the 1990s up to today (Galimberti 
et al. 2014, 193–196; Carpenter and Verhage 2014, 63). However, even the 
benefit seen by President Collomb in integrating the reproduction functions 
of the département was driven by a logic of competitiveness, because the 
metropolitan institution has become more powerful and autonomous by 
gaining full control of the territory without interference from other layers 
of government. As one interviewee put it, the unique status of Lyon also 
creates the opportunity to spread the image of the Métropole de Lyon as a 
strong metropolitan government. Whether the changed responsibilities will 
influence the agenda in the long run remains to be seen, but this was not 
perceptible in the first years of the métropole.
2.3.1.4  Substantially enlarged administration of the métropole
The Métropole de Lyon has a larger administration than any other French 
métropole and even slightly exceeds the staff of the city of Lyon (Demazière 
et al. 2022). At the time of the creation of the métropole in January 2015 
it had about 8,700 employees, of which 4,800 civil servants were from 
the former CU Grand Lyon and a large number were transferred from the 
Département Rhône. This means that the change in status introduced by the 
MAPTAM law has also brought a considerable change for the administra-
tion of the Métropole de Lyon. The restructuring of the administration took 
time and was still ongoing in 2018. The two parts were largely working 
in separate divisions – and to some extent in different buildings – in their 
respective policy fields with the same staff and working culture as before.
For the contact with the citizens regarding social assistance, the métropole 
has inherited 18 deconcentrated units from the Département Rhône spread 
over the territory that have been renamed “Maisons de la Métropole”. They 
provide services e.g. for the disabled, elderly, families or households facing 
housing difficulties.
The métropole already had another kind of territorial sub-unit intro-
duced following deliberation by the metropolitan council in 2002, the nine 
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conférences territoriales. Their main purpose is to organise the regular 
information flow between the mayors within those sub-territories and the 
metropolitan administration by a monthly meeting with the vice-presidents 
of the métropole. It is not a decision-making level, but allows discussion 
of aspects related to that territory in more detail than would be possible in 
the metropolitan council or the conference of all 59 mayors. Therefore, it 
is an important forum for opinion making, bridging the municipalities and 
the métropole. In addition, the responsibilities within the administration of 
the métropole are organised according to these sub-areas and the coordina-
tion between sectoral policies within these spaces. However, decentralised 
administrative units of the métropole based outside Lyon do not exist. The 
definition of the nine sub-territories (bassins de vie) is based on a mix of geo-
graphic characteristics, strong functional interrelation, and political habits 
of working together. They are also meant to break down the metropolitan 
policy to the specifics of the different areas and are picked up in strategic 
documents as relevant units for spatial planning. The SCoT strategic city-
regional plan makes specifications on that territorial level instead of the 
scale of single municipalities, e.g. concerning the target for housing units 
to be built. The PLU-H inter-municipal land use plan adopted in 2019 also 
uses these sub-territories. It makes specifications on three scales: the entire 
métropole, the bassins de vie and each municipality. In the previous PLUi of 
2005, only the two levels of the metropolis and municipality were used, as 
the focus was on a common orientation for the entire métropole.
Although the mayors of Lyon have for a long time also been presidents 
of the grouping, the two administrations of the city and the municipal 
grouping have always been separate entities with different heads of admin-
istration, unlike in Nantes. Mixed teams with civil servants from métro-
pole and city only exist for specific projects with shared responsibilities. 
Pooled services where the métropole carries out tasks for the municipali-
ties are rare in Lyon. One example of such a service is to check if build-
ing permits can be approved for smaller municipalities lacking their own 
know-how in that domain. However, some groups of municipalities have 
created their own pooled services to prepare building permits rather than 
rely on the metropolitan administration. Large investments of the métro-
pole in the municipalities are negotiated with each municipality and fixed 
in a multi-annual investment programme (PPI). The separation of the two 
administrations is also manifested spatially as the town hall of the city of 
Lyon is located in the old centre on the peninsula of the two rivers Rhône 
and Saône, whereas the administration of the métropole is located in the 
eastern part of Lyon in the office district Part Dieu. This separation is 
amplified by the direct election of the municipal council. Because both are 
full local self-governments, it is no longer possible to be mayor and presi-
dent of the métropole at the same time. President Bruno Bernard, elected 
in 2020, is also the first president not to be part of the city council of Lyon 
at the same time.
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2.3.1.5  Direct election of the metropolitan council leading to a lower 
political relevance of the municipalities
After decades of each metropolitan councillor automatically having the dou-
ble function of municipal councillor of one of the 59 member municipalities, 
this tie has been changed with the direct election of the municipal councils 
with separate election lists. Each party has to constitute a list with alterna-
tion of women and men. In each constituency, the list with the majority 
(either an absolute majority in the first round or a simple majority in the 
second round) obtains half of the seats, whereas the other half is divided 
proportionally between lists with at least 5% of the votes, including the 
winning list. Decisions in the council are taken with a majority vote.
Between 1983 and 2020, each member municipality was represented by 
at least one seat in the metropolitan council. Beforehand, a demographic 
threshold of 15,000 inhabitants was required to obtain a delegate, which 
was not reached by 41 out of 55 municipalities, leading to a political domi-
nance of the core city obtained by its demographic weight. The number 
of councillors of the core city was reduced from half to one-third in 1983 
(Galimberti et al. 2014, 197). The changed composition of the councils 
had become possible due to a modification of national laws (Fitria 2016, 
140–141).
At the time of creation of the métropole in January 2015, the 165 coun-
cillors of the CU elected in March 2014 were automatically transformed 
into councillors of the métropole. Since the first direct election in June 2020, 
democratic representation has again been tied to demographic weight rather 
than to municipalities as basic units of representation. Representatives are 
now elected in 14 constituencies (see Figure 2.7). The new metropolitan 
council is composed of the slightly reduced number of 150 councillors with 
seven to 17 councillors from each constituency, depending on their demo-
graphic weight. Most constituencies are composed of several municipalities 
or of several districts (arrondissements) of the city of Lyon. The largest con-
stituency in terms of area, “Val de Saône” in the north, corresponds to 25 
municipalities, whereas the city of Villeurbanne forms its own constituency 
(see Figure 2.7).
The delimitation of the constituencies is similar to the nine sub-territorial 
units (e.g. Plateau Nord, Rhône Amont, Porte des Alpes, Portes du Sud)22 
used in strategic documents and for regular meetings (conférences territori-
ales), but gives more importance to demographic weight. Accordingly, the 
conférence territoriale “Lyon Villeurbanne” corresponds to seven electoral 
constituencies, whereas by contrast the constituency “Val de Saône” con-
sists of two territorial conferences. The representation of smaller munici-
palities is changed compared to the former regime. The small municipalities 
of the new circumscription Val de Saône has lost the most seats, as they 
are represented by 14 councillors instead of 26 formerly, but they are still 
slightly overrepresented in terms of demographic weight. The city of Lyon 
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Figure 2.7  Constituencies for direct election of the metropolitan council 2021 
Concept: P. Feiertag Cartography: F. Gela
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is represented with a similar proportion to before, with about one-third of 
the seats (55 out of 150 councillors).
The mayors are still involved in the governance of the métropole, but with 
a reduced role within the council and the executive bureau. The “bureau” 
composed of the president and his vice-presidents is the main place for deci-
sion-making (Galimberti et al. 2014, 198). Within the new council, only 24 
out of 150 councillors are mayors. However, the mayors of the 14 cities with 
more than 20,000 inhabitants except Lyon and Saint-Genis-Laval are all part 
of the metropolitan council. The left-wing mayors of the three largest cit-
ies Villeurbanne, Vénissieux and Vaulx-en-Velin adjacent to Lyon are also 
vice-presidents of the métropole (being in charge of culture, combatting dis-
crimination and territorial equality) and thus maintain a direct influence on 
metropolitan policies. Historically, a seat as vice-president has always been 
guaranteed to the second largest city Villeurbanne, but for decades it has 
been common practice to exclude the municipalities run by opposition parties 
(Fitria 2016, 144). The mayors of the medium-sized cities Vaulx-en-Velin and 
Vénissieux were first vice-presidents in 2001 and 2008 respectively, despite 
the fact that their communist mayors were still part of the opposition in the 
metropolitan council (Galimberti et al. 2014, 197–198). Compared to pre-
vious election periods, the proportion of mayors among vice-presidents was 
much reduced in 2020 with three out of 23. Seventeen out of the 23 new vice-
presidents are members of the Green Party, none of them being a mayor. Thus, 
the choice of vice-presidents is mainly based on the political party affiliation, 
but also takes gender and territorial representation into account. The vice-
presidents have been elected in 13 different constituencies (all but Lyon-Nord).
2.3.2  Spatial relations within the wider metropolitan area of Lyon
How to define the metropolitan region of Lyon is ambiguous. There is no 
single, dominant conception of the territory; many coexist. This is per-
fectly illustrated by the book l’expérience métropolitaine lyonnaise (Bariol-
Mathais 2015, 11), starting with six different answers on how to imagine 
the territorial dimension of the metropolitan region: as institutional terri-
tory (métropole or pôle métropolitain), as territory for strategic planning 
(Inter-SCoT or DTA) or as statistically defined area (aire métropolitaine 
lyonnaise or aire urbaine de Lyon) (see Figure 2.8). Out of those territorial 
definitions, the Métropole de Lyon is by far the smallest one and only covers 
the core of the metropolitan region.
2.3.2.1  Morphological and functional definitions: unité urbaine, 
aire urbaine and aire métropolitaine
The métropole and pôle métropolitain institutionalised territories as well 
as the SCoT and DTA territories for strategic planning are significantly 
smaller than the statistically defined aire métropolitaine (see Figure 2.8). 
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The two informal arrangements of Inter-SCoT (formed of several SCoT) 
and the former Région Urbaine de Lyon (RUL) covered a similar territory, 
almost corresponding to the aire métropolitaine. The metropolitan area 
(aire métropolitaine) visualised in Figure 2.8 corresponds to 1,039 munici-
palities with about 3.4 Mio inhabitants and an area of 13,445 km², roughly 
forming a square with sides 160 km in length (Bariol-Mathais 2015, 10). It 
is composed of several urban areas (aire urbaine) with strong interlinkage. 
Urban areas are calculated separately for each urban centre providing at 
least 10,000 jobs according to the national statistical institute INSEE on the 
basis of commuter relations between centres.23 According to this definition, 
the urban area of Lyon is formed by 498 municipalities with 2.3 million 
inhabitants and an area of 6,012 km² and the neighbouring urban area of 
Saint-Étienne encompasses 117 municipalities with 0.5 million inhabitants 
and an area of 1,689 km² (INSEE, data from 16 June 2020). Those areas of 
strong interrelation have been substantially growing in the last decades; in 
the case of the urban area of Lyon by about 200 municipalities since 1999 
(Fitria and Charmes 2014).
A second statistical definition by INSEE concerns the urban form, the 
urban unit (unité urbaine) meaning the built-up area without interrup-
tions of more than 200 metres.24 Even this much narrower definition of 
the urban agglomeration of Lyon would be substantially larger than the 
institution Métropole de Lyon. It corresponds to 128 municipalities and 
extends in the northern direction along the river Rhône even beyond the city 
of Villefranche-sur-Saône. Ben Mabrouk and Jouve (2002, 104) describe 
a “growing unsuitability of the territory of the Lyon urban community” 
since the 1970s. Due to topographic reasons, the plains east of the river 
Rhône have been the main direction of extension for centuries and have 
a peri-urban character, whereas the hilly landscape towards the west has 
prevented continuous urbanisation (Dugua 2015, 288).
Figure 2.8  Spatial definition of the metropolitan region of Lyon © Urbalyon, 2015
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2.3.2.2  High fragmentation of institutional perimeters
The Métropole de Lyon includes 59 municipalities with 1.38 million inhabit-
ants (1/2019; thereof 0.5 million in the city of Lyon) and an area of 533 km² 
(see Figure 2.9). Its territory has been very stable over decades: the COURLY 
was founded with 55 member municipalities and kept its boundaries for 37 
years. Since 2007, only the river Rhône connected the territory in the South. 
A strip of land along the river was conceded to the métropole in 2013 to 
formally fulfil the criterion of territorial continuity required by the law RCT 
(Fitria 2016, 254–61). Since the change to a métropole, the perimeter has 
not been altered and is unlikely to be extended in the near future.
Lyon is part of the Région Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes, one of the 
enlarged French regions created by amalgamation of two regions in 2016 
Figure 2.9  Métropole de Lyon 2021 Concept: P. Feiertag Cartography: F. Gela
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(see Table 2.6). The new boundaries of the super-region do not corre-
spond to the shape of the urban system. Instead, three urban networks 
with strong internal links are discernible: Clermont-Ferrand, Lyon and 
Grenoble (Desjardins and Geppert 2020, 128–129). All of them are organ-
ised as métropoles (see Table 2.1), just like Saint-Étienne which is part of 
the urban network of Lyon. In addition, the north-eastern border region 
is part of the cross-border urban network of Geneva (Région Auvergne-
Rhône-Alpes 2020, 12). 
As has been mentioned before, the Métropole de Lyon is the only métro-
pole that has the function of a département at the same time, and has been 
cut out of its former département, Rhône. The département never formed a 
pertinent space for city-regional coordination of policies, but instead con-
tributed to the institutional fragmentation despite continued adaptation of 
its borders (Boino 2007, 43). The functional city-region is divided into three 
départements: Ain, Isère and Rhône, or even four with Saint-Étienne located 
in the Département Loire. Historically, this administrative separation was 
deliberately chosen in 1793 to weaken the influence of the city of Lyon after 
an uproar. The Département Rhône has been enlarged three times (1852, 
1967 and 1971) towards the east because of the extension of the urban 
agglomeration of Lyon. The original boundary was the river Rhône that runs 
through the city from north to south. The enlargement in 1967 was closely 
linked to the creation of the CU because its territory would otherwise have 
covered municipalities from three départements. To avoid this, the national 
government choose to shift the departmental boundaries and attached six 
municipalities of the Département Ain and 23 of the Département Isère to 
Rhône, though not all of them became part of COURLY in 1969. This 
shift of boundaries acknowledged the extensive urbanisation towards the 
east on the left bank of the river Rhône that had already taken place. The 
third enlargement of the Département Rhône involved only one municipal-
ity, Colombier Saugnieu, and was made to incorporate the area of the future 
airport Lyon-Satolas, later renamed Lyon Saint-Exupéry (Bariol-Mathais 
2015, 26–27).
The municipal boundaries of the city of Lyon itself are rather narrow. 
The administrative territory was enlarged in the middle of the 19th century 
Table 2.6  Lyon in the multilevel system

















but could not keep pace with its urban extension. At the beginning of the 
20th century, the attempt to incorporate the city of Villeurbanne located 
in the north-east of Lyon, mostly within the first ring road (boulevard péri-
phérique) failed. Afterwards, the first attempts at inter-municipal coop-
eration were undertaken as an alternative to annexation (Bariol-Mathais 
2015, 24, 28).
The Métropole de Lyon is surrounded by small peri-urban communautés 
de communes. They were founded during the 1990s by municipalities with 
similar socioeconomic characteristics with the intent to prevent incorpora-
tion into Greater Lyon (Carpenter and Verhage 2014, 60). The main rea-
sons to reject incorporation despite the advantage of better services were 
a good fiscal situation, the lack of visibility of small municipalities within 
the large métropole and most notably the lack of identification with the 
political project of Grand Lyon. Rather than seeing themselves as part of 
a metropolis of European rank, municipalities such as Millery seek to pre-
serve a rural character and also to prevent the pressure to build social hous-
ing (Fitria and Charmes 2014). The existing structure of inter-municipal 
groupings thus contributes little to the solidarity between different terri-
tories – rich and poor, urban and peri-urban – intended by the legislator 
(Boino 2007, 49; Rousseau 2015, 623). This is still true despite the general 
reorganisation of inter-municipal groupings brought about by law and the 
schéma départemental de coopération intercommunale (SDCI) (see 2.1.4). 
The state services had proposed in the SDCI 2011 to add two municipali-
ties (Jons and Millery) to Greater Lyon due to territorial discontinuities, 
but this was never put into practice because of the opposition of those 
municipalities. Greater Lyon also objected to it as the municipal group-
ing did not wish to integrate new municipalities against their will (Fitria 
and Charmes 2014). There were some dynamics regarding the merger of 
municipal groupings in the wider metropolitan area between 2011 and 
2017, but the first ring around Lyon is still organised as CCs, many of 
them with unchanged perimeters. Within the functional aire métropolitaine 
lyonnaise (see Figure 2.8), two communautés d’agglomération with a larger 
area than each of the two métropoles Lyon and Saint-Étienne were cre-
ated in January 2017: the CA du Bassin de Bourg-en-Bresse in the North-
East (merger of seven EPCIs with 75 municipalities and 1,300km²) and 
Loire Forez agglomération around Montbrison in the South-West with 88 
municipalities (merger of four EPCIs). None of them is a member of the soft 
pôle métropolitain (see 2.3.3). One incentive to create larger groupings is 
a better visibility within the enlarged Région Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes. The 
municipal groupings are direct interlocutors of the région. The région con-
cludes co-financing contracts with each of them based on a local develop-
ment strategy and project propositions for any kind of investment of more 
than 60,000 € (apart from roads and sewage).
The municipal groupings (CA and CU) of the larger cities in the immedi-
ate surroundings of the Métropole de Lyon are organised within the soft 
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cooperation space pôle métropolitain, forming a city network (see Figure 2.2 
and 2.3.3). With about two million inhabitants, it is by far the largest pôle 
métropolitain in France and the only one including more than one métro-
pole (Bariol-Mathais 2017, 35). Several other pôles organised as networks 
instead of a continuous space exist, but most of them have larger distances 
between the cities than in the case of Lyon (e.g. Loire-Bretagne, Strasbourg-
Mulhouse or Centre-Franche-Comté).
All in all, institutional perimeters of territorial authorities have not been 
in line with the morphological and functional territory of the city-region for 
more than a century. This fragmentation has not been reduced by the emer-
gence of municipal groupings. This also applies for the spatial dimension of 
the much weaker institution pôle métropolitain (see 2.3.3). The creation of 
the métropole, meaning a concentration of functions without enlargement 
of its perimeter rather aggravates the divide. According to Geppert (2017, 
238), there is no entity that could ensure solidarity between a dynamic 
urban core area and a suburban residential periphery at the fringes of the 
agglomeration. Dugua (2015, 792) argues that overcoming the inter-terri-
torial battle and opening up to a larger diversity of stakeholders beyond the 
public actors might eventually happen in the future, triggered by the pres-
sure of an economic crisis or by a renewal of elected officials as heads of the 
main institutions.
2.3.2.3  Perimeters for regional planning
During the 1960s, state initiatives for strategic spatial planning covered 
a large metropolitan area: the plan d’aménagement et d’orientation géné-
rale (PADOG) developed by the Ministry of Construction and the Schéma 
d’Aménagement de la Métropole Lyon-St Étienne – Grenoble (OREAM 
1971). However, the introduction of the SDAU planning instrument in 
1967 led to “a shift in scale from the level of the metropolitan area to the 
level of the agglomerations” (Verhage et al. 2007, 86). The inter-municipal 
communauté urbaine was created in the same period and took over the task 
of strategic planning, though for a smaller perimeter (Bariol-Mathais 2015, 
35–39). The development took ten years in the agglomeration of Lyon and 
was completed in 1978, but other parts of the metropolitan area did not 
succeed in producing an SDAU. Thus spatial planning at the level of the 
larger metropolitan area disappeared at that time (Verhage et al. 2007, 86). 
The state launched the development of another city-regional plan, the direc-
tive territoriale d’aménagement (DTA; see 2.3.3) at the end of the 1990s. Its 
perimeter was fixed based on morphological definitions and corresponded 
to the aires urbaines of Lyon, Saint-Étienne and Bourgoin Jallieu/ Nord-
Isère (see Figure 2.8). The east of Lyon was seen as an important develop-
ment area, whereas the more rural western side towards the city of Roanne 
was not included (Dugua 2015, 670). The DTA was smaller than the space 
covered by the RUL and not coherent with SCoT-boundaries defined shortly 
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after by the local actors themselves: it cuts across eight of ten affected SCoTs 
(Préfecture de Région Rhône-Alpes 2006, 12). 
Today’s SCoT de l’agglomération lyonnaise has a limited perimeter and 
does not correspond to the metropolitan region (Aguiar Mol 2015, 310). 
It includes two small municipal groupings in the south-east of Lyon, CC 
de l’Est Lyonnais with 40,000 inhabitants and CC du Pays de l’Ozon with 
25,000 inhabitants (see Figure 2.9). This area has particular relevance for 
spatial development because the airport Saint-Exupéry is located there 
and encourages important economic activities in its surroundings (Fitria 
and Charmes 2014). Since a minor extension in 2016, the SCoT covers 
74 municipalities with an area of 756 km². Two small municipalities have 
been added because they had joined the municipal grouping of Lyon. This 
extension, which is insignificant in terms of demographic weight (6,200 
inhabitants), does not increase the coherence of the perimeter. The infor-
mal Inter-SCoT dialogue (see 2.3.3.) first covered nine SCoT territories, 
i.e. the ring directly adjacent to Lyon and was later enlarged towards the 
west; today it encompasses 13 SCoT territories (Dugua 2015, 317; Verhage 
et al. 2007, 87) with 914 communes, 3.1 million inhabitants and an area 
of 10 400 km². Since 2004, it has also covered the agglomeration of Saint-
Étienne, and since 2006 the medium-sized city of Roanne. The rural space 
in-between (SCoT Loire Centre and Mont du Lyonnais) was integrated in 
2011 (Dugua 2015, 317; see Figure 2.10). Cooperation on this spatial scale 
is not entirely new, as it is similar to the association Région Urbaine de Lyon 
(RUL) created in 1989 (see 2.3.3.). The RUL has treated questions of spatial 
development and produced a charter for planning and development, but 
does not possess a formal planning instrument.
2.3.3  Coordination of public policies beyond the métropole
The inability of traditional institutional perimeters to handle the reality of 
metropolitan dynamics (Dugua 2015, 282) has led to the creation of several 
additional soft spaces with different perimeters. Three other bodies are rel-
evant for metropolitan politics: the RUL, the Inter-SCoT and the pôle mét-
ropolitain (Aguiar Mol 2015, 138). The Métropole de Lyon is a powerful 
actor present in all of them. Furthermore, the state and the région intervene 
in this strategic territory of high national relevance.
2.3.3.1  Regional planning: Inter-SCoT, DTA and SRADDET
Regional planning at a metropolitan scale has a long tradition in the metro 
region of Lyon, although without institutionalised planning association at 
that scale (see 2.3.1 and 2.3.2). As the SCoT planning document only cov-
ers the core of the metropolitan region, its potential to bring coherence into 
metropolitan policies is limited. It is complemented by three other processes 
of regional planning that have taken place in the last two decades. All three 
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cover the wider metropolitan region of Lyon, though with different perim-
eters, at different times and piloted by different actors (see Table 2.7). The 
DTA as an instrument for areas of national interest was launched by the 
state and developed between 1998 and 2007; the SRADDET is a new plan-
ning instrument of the région first developed between 2016 and 2020; and 
the Inter-SCoT is a continuous dialogue between inter-municipal planning 
associations started in the 2000s. All three are binding for the SCoT de 
l’agglomération lyonnaise: DTA and SRADDET in legal terms as part of 
hierarchical vertical coordination and the Inter-SCoT due to a self-bind-
ing commitment as part of vertical coordination between bodies of local 
self-government.
The Inter-SCoT dialogue in the region of Lyon is an informal process, but 
is more intense and engaging than in most other French city-regions due to 
the necessity induced by the small size of the SCoT de l’agglomération lyon-
naise (see Figure 2.9) compared to the functional area of interdependence 
(Interviews; Dugua 2015, 318). However, its governance arrangement has 
remained weak. The Inter-SCoT dialogue started in parallel to the devel-
opment of the first generation of SCoT and was initiated in 2002 by the 
Figure 2.10  Institutional organisation within the Inter-SCoT area of Lyon © Dugua, 
Source: Dugua 2015, 309)
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Agence d’Urbanisme pour le développement de l’agglomération lyonnaise 
(UrbaLyon) after the creation of a large SCoT for the entire metro region 
had failed (Aguiar Mol 2015, 142; Boino 2007, 55; see also 2.3.2). Even 
two decades later, there is no political will to reduce the number of SCoTs. 
The leading role of the president of UrbaLyon was crucial for convincing 
the municipal groupings around Lyon to participate in this less obligating, 
flexible form of coordination, because the agency was seen as neutral and 
valued due to its know-how (Aguiar Mol 2015, 205). For the project lead-
ers of the first generation of SCoT, the possibility to exchange with other 
syndicats de SCoT about the practices that had to be established was a 
high incentive to engage in the dialogue (Aguiar Mol 2015, 188). The two 
agences d’urbanisme of Lyon and Saint-Étienne have produced over 50 
studies on the scale of the metropolitan region as part of the Inter-SCoT 
dialogue as well as indicators for monitoring of residential development, 
transport, green and blue infrastructure as well as commercial development 
(Bariol-Mathais 2015, 48; Verhage et al. 2007, 87; Dugua 2015, 317). An 
important outcome is that the exchange has led to a common chapter at the 
beginning of each SCoT, introducing the main principles of the development 
for the entire metropolitan region.25 The topics treated on the scale of the 
entire metro region were centrality and transport, housing and urban forms, 
economic development as well as agriculture and environment (Dugua 
2015, 368–382). The Inter-SCoT itself has no legal quality, but the content 
becomes legally binding once it is integrated into the SCoT of its members 
(Aguiar Mol 2015, 157). The common chapter also includes a schematic 
map showing development axes and the main green spaces (see Figure 2.11).
The Inter-SCoT is a useful platform for exchange and consultation, but 
with some restrictions. A real coordination of spatial policies is made diffi-
cult by the fact that the development of the SCoT has not been synchronised 
since the beginning: whereas the first SCoT in the metropolitan region was 
already approved in 2003, the SCoT for the core area was launched as last 
one and only approved in 2010 (Boino 2007, 56; SEPAL 2010). This time 
Table 2.7  Layers of planning documents in the city-region of Lyon
Planning document Year of approval Institution Area covered
SRADDET 2020 Région Auvergne-
Rhône-Alpes
Région 





DTA 2006 State 382 municipalities 




Syndicat de SCoT 3 EPCIs (with 
74 municipalities) 
PLUi including housing 
programme PLH





lag has persisted in the updating process. Secondly, one of the reasons for 
its success is its voluntary character, but it does not allow to treat highly 
conflictual topics (Aguiar Mol 2015, 322; Dugua 2015, 319). The Inter-
SCoT remains an informal dialogue without any decision-making power. 
A formalised governance arrangement was pushed on several occasions by 
Figure 2.11  Map development axes from the common chapter of the Inter-SCoT de 
l’aire métropolitaine lyonnaise
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some SCoT presidents, but rejected both by Grand Lyon and many of the 
peripheral SCoT associations (Dugua 2015, 394). The Inter-SCoT is an 
expert dialogue between planners of the planning associations “syndicat de 
SCoT” and the two agences d’urbanisme, but also an arena for exchange 
of the elected representatives of the member EPCIs. The planners respon-
sible for the 13 SCoTs meet at six-week intervals, share know-how and 
discuss common problems (Interviews; Aguiar Mol 2015, 168–169). The 
presidents of the EPCI meet once or twice a year to decide the missions to 
be developed for the following year, but also to discuss a specific topic rel-
evant to metropolitan planning (Dugua 2015, 317). This personal contact 
has been helpful to build trust and facilitates other forms of informal coop-
eration within the larger metropolitan region such as the pôle métropolit-
ain (Aguiar Mol 2015, 319). These meetings are one of the rare occasions 
where the influential political representatives of the core cities meet face to 
face with the presidents of small municipal groupings in the periphery of the 
metropolitan region (Dugua 2015, 318). At the beginning of the dialogue, 
the smaller municipal groupings mistrusted the dominant Lyon (Fitria 
2016, 99) and feared losing power, but working together has helped to 
acknowledge common interests and to build a climate of confidence within 
this arena characterised by low political visibility (Aguiar Mol 2015, 173-
174). The Inter-SCoT dialogue enables the local actors to reason and act 
on a metropolitan scale (Aguiar Mol 2015, 186). The Inter-SCoT dialogue 
was partly triggered by the development of the binding directive territoriale 
d’aménagement (DTA) for the aire métropolitaine lyonnaise by the state to 
keep a say in the process of defining the spatial strategy of the metropolitan 
area (Dugua 2015, 316). Today, a strong motivation for the Inter-SCoT 
dialogue is to express common points of view, e.g. concerning railway con-
nections or the SRADDET and to produce agreements on a unified position 
towards investors, e.g. concerning large-scale commercial developments.
Lyon is one of six territories of national interest covered by a regional 
plan established by the state, the DTA. The metropolitan region of Lyon 
was chosen because of its importance for the national economy, but also 
because of the high institutional fragmentation. According to the DTA,
the implementation of real “governance” for this metropolitan terri-
tory requires strong action by the state, in its own areas of competence 
but also as a partner of the local authorities which are responsible but 
which, locked within their own limits, cannot meet the requirements of 
regional or national interest. The initiatives observed are still too slow 
and not sufficiently binding for the coordination of public policies (own 
translation,26 Préfecture de Région Rhône-Alpes 2006, 11).
The process started in 1998 with a preparatory analysis and the document 
came into force in January 2007 (Bariol-Mathais 2015, 40; Dugua 2015, 
315). It formulates the state’s priorities in the medium and long term, in 
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particular regarding large-scale infrastructure such as highways, high-speed 
rail connections, harbours and intermodal hubs (Carpenter and Verhage 
2014, 61; Bariol-Mathais 2015, 42). Its main impact was to keep potential 
sites for infrastructure free from other land uses (Dugua 2015, 691). In 
the area surrounding the airport, building restrictions are related to noise 
protection, expansion plans of the airport as well as a multimodal plat-
form and a planned high-speed connection to Turin. A modification was 
made between 2013 and 2015 to allow for additional sites for cargo and 
economic activity zones. Today the content of the DTA is partly outdated 
because infrastructure projects such as a new highway bypassing Lyon in 
the west have been rejected. This creates a paradoxical situation because the 
DTA continues to be formally binding for the SRADDET and SCoT plan-
ning documents. They therefore have to integrate infrastructure projects 
programmed 15 years ago even though all actors agree that they will never 
come about. Thus, the DTA has mainly become an inconvenient constraint 
in the eyes of local actors rather than an instrument that helps to structure 
the future development of the metro region.
Although the state is not developing regional plans anymore, the régions 
have had the duty to develop a strategic document for their entire territory 
since 2015, the SRADDET (schéma régional d’aménagement, de développe-
ment durable et d’égalité des territoires). In the case of Auvergne-Rhône-
Alpes, the objective of the region was to define a unified, coherent vision 
of the new regional territory created by the amalgamation of two regions. 
The development process of the SRADDET included a territorial dialogue 
in each département as well as thematic consultations, both at the begin-
ning and after drafting the document. For both the participation process 
and the document, the title “Ambition Territoires 2030” was chosen as it 
was believed to sound less technocratic and be easier to communicate than 
“SRADDET”. The planning document entered into force in April 2020 and 
is binding for the already existing SCoT, but is not likely to cause modi-
fications. It defines general principles concerning territorial development, 
transport, climate, air and energy, biodiversity and waste management, but 
no quantitative aims concerning land consumption, densification or reserva-
tion of agricultural land. Territorialised specifications are only made with 
a low level of precision: it contains a list of infrastructure projects that the 
région is willing to co-finance such as high-speed rail connections, and indi-
cates ecological corridors and biodiversity reservoirs schematically. Thus, 
the région defines a frame, but its impact on land use planning is low in the 
first generation of SRADDET.
2.3.3.2  The région urbaine de Lyon (RUL) and its dissolution
The association Région Urbaine de Lyon (RUL) was “a permanent forum for 
dialogue and debate, with the aim of providing a clearer vision of the chal-
lenges facing the metropolitan area of Lyon and Saint-Étienne, proposing 
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strategy plans for development and planning, and being a catalyst for coor-
dinated action by both local authorities and local stakeholders” (Bideau 
2003, 108). It was created in 1989 and dissolved in April 2015. The asso-
ciation was based on the voluntary action of members to address issues of 
metropolitan development and transcend administrative boundaries within 
an area close to the functional metropolitan region. According to Aguiar 
Mol (2015, 141), it was the only arena where all actors of the metropolitan 
region came together. Other authors refer to it as a unique institutional 
solution that did not exist in any other metropolitan area in France (Bideau 
2003, 108; Verhage et al. 2007, 87). What made it so special apart from its 
early creation and its perimeter was the horizontal as well as vertical coor-
dination across different layers of the state. The association has brought 
together the départements, the région as well as the largest municipal group-
ings of the metro region. Its founding members were the three départements 
Ain, Rhône and Isère as well as the Communauté Urbaine de Lyon. Two 
years later, it was enlarged towards Saint-Étienne with the fourth départe-
ment Loire, though without the municipal grouping of Saint-Étienne. The 
Région Rhône-Alpes became a member in 1996 and held the co-presidency 
from 2002 together with the president of Grand Lyon. In the same year, 
the other EPCIs representing the urban centres of the metropolitan region 
became associated members (Bideau 2003, 108; Boino 2007, 54; Aguiar 
Mol 2015, 141). Thus, Grand Lyon, and the mayor of Lyon as its president, 
had a key role within the RUL and was far more influential in agenda setting 
than the other municipalities and municipal groupings of the metro region.
The RUL had some similarity to the Inter-SCoT dialogue existing in par-
allel for about ten years. Both were soft, dialogue-oriented forms of met-
ropolitan cooperation with a similar perimeter, and both had the role of 
producing knowledge and joint strategies. They involved slightly different 
actors and topics, though with overlaps (Aguiar Mol 2015, 191). The work 
of the RUL was coordinated by a small team of four employees. The core 
activity of the RUL was an annual forum as a basis for producing common 
ideas and developing propositions that were then validated by the members. 
Each year, another topic was addressed: 1997 logistics, 1998 sustainable 
development, 1999 metropolitan functions, 2000 peri-urban areas, 2002 
leisure, etc. (Bideau 2003, 108–109).
The main merit of the RUL was to reach consensus about some questions 
and to develop a common vision for spatial development of the metropoli-
tan space despite a very fragmented institutional landscape (Bideau 2003, 
108; Boino 2007, 54). According to its former director, it was a place for 
open dialogue, because of low media exposure. In the annual conferences 
the members agreed on a charter for planning and development (Charte 
d’aménagement et de développement 1994) as well as several strategies 
(e.g. schéma logistique in 1997). During the term of office of Raymond 
Barre, comprehensive planning processes were regarded as too heavy and 
time-consuming and the activities were turned towards specific sites, e.g. 
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in the logistics sector (Aguiar Mol 2015, 131). One of the successes of the 
RUL has been the establishment of a partnership between the public trans-
port companies of the metro region in 2000 (Bideau 2003, 108–109, Boino 
2007, 54). Thus the RUL contributed to multimodal pricing, a web tool for 
public transport route planning on the perimeter of the RUL, and the crea-
tion of a logistics cluster (Dugua 2015, 310). Although it has been an incu-
bator for some projects, the main activities of the RUL remained reflection, 
dialogue and networking. Activities in the last years of its existence included 
the topics of economic development, intermodal transport, logistics and the 
metropolitan dimension of tourism (Aguiar Mol 2015, 141–142). Today, 
intermodal transport is the responsibility of the région, whereas the pôle 
métropolitain pursues the work regarding tourism.
Despite positive acknowledgements in the literature (Bideau 2003; 
Verhage et al. 2007; Boino 2007; Aguiar Mol 2015), some shortcomings 
have to be mentioned to explain the disappearance of the RUL. The out-
come in terms of concrete project implementation was rather limited and 
slow. Like any other form of soft governance, the RUL did not possess 
any decision-making power (Aguiar Mol 2015, 198) and its low formali-
sation caused fragility and a lack of democratic legitimacy (Boino 2007, 
54). In addition, the boundaries of the départements remained very present 
(Aguiar Mol 2015, 183; Dugua 2015, 310), and political conflicts between 
the actors persisted (Aguiar Mol 2015, 130). A certain amount of mistrust 
and distance from the presidents of the intercommunal bodies (Aguiar Mol 
2015, 142) as well as rivalries between Grand Lyon and the région about 
metropolitan leadership (Dugua 2015, 310) complicated the process. The 
RUL also lacked good relations with the local economic sphere. Most large 
companies with industrial plants in the metro region had their headquarters 
in Paris and were involved very little in local politics whereas the chamber of 
commerce and industry mainly supported the interests of small and medium-
sized businesses (Ben Mabrouk and Jouve 2002, 101). Thus, despite its long-
standing existence as part of metro governance in Lyon, the RUL was called 
into question by the emergence of other metropolitan institutions. Although 
it coexisted with the Inter-SCoT dialogue, it was dissolved in favour of the 
pôle métropolitain due to a unilateral decision of the mayor of Lyon not to 
support it anymore. Two years after the formalisation of the pôle métropoli-
tain as an association, its members withdrew from the RUL on the initiative 
of Gérard Collomb and thus caused its dissolution in November 2014 as it 
made no sense to pursue it without Lyon (Dugua 2015, 311). Thus, the RUL 
ceased to exist at the moment Grand Lyon became a métropole.
2.3.3.3  The Pôle métropolitain as alternative to the RUL
The pôle métropolitain is slightly more formalised than the former RUL 
and the Inter-SCoT dialogue because it has a legal form defined by national 
law (see 2.1.1). However, it remains a light form of cooperation based on 
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dialogue and voluntary action of the members, with all the advantages and 
disadvantages of soft governance arrangements. With a headquarters with 
six employees and a budget of 1.8 Mio € (i.e. about 0.05% of the budget of 
the Métropole de Lyon), it does not have significantly more capacities than 
the former RUL. Creating a new organisation instead of formalising the gov-
ernance of the Inter-SCoT or using the long-standing RUL for metropolitan 
projects was a unilateral choice of Grand Lyon, justified by the argument to 
be more action-oriented instead of focussed on reflection and strategy formu-
lation. The Inter-SCoT is portrayed as complementary (Dugua 2015, 394), 
restricted to reflections on spatial planning within the SCoT procedures and 
with the main value of a regular exchange between planners, whereas the 
pôle is a more political arena and totally free in the definition of its topics and 
actions, as long as a consensus among its members can be reached. Compared 
to the RUL, the crucial difference is the circle of actors since the new asso-
ciation is only formed of municipal groupings representing the urban cen-
tres of the metropolitan region (see Figure 2.2). This reduction to horizontal 
cooperation without the région, the départements and the state was seen as 
an advantage by the cities and can be interpreted as one of the aims of the 
institutional change (Aguiar Mol 2015, 187). It reflects fundamental changes 
in the multilayer system in the three decades since the creation of the RUL 
with the rise of the largest municipal groupings and the marginalisation of 
the départements (see 2.1), but means that a shared forum with the région 
has disappeared, despite mutual fields of action such as intermodal transport, 
economic development and regional planning (SRADDET).
The aspiration behind the pôle métropolitain was to create a more potent 
organisation that would be able to advance concrete projects quicker and be 
more politically visible. The driving idea behind the pôle was to enhance the 
competitiveness of the metropolitan region at a European scale. This idea 
was mainly related to the symbolism of having more weight due to a higher 
number of inhabitants within this larger area as compared to the métropole 
(Interviews; Dugua 2015, 313). Its fields of action are not so different from 
the agenda of the RUL. The initial topics formulated in a first cooperation 
agreement signed in 2010 were the economy, culture, transport and spatial 
development (Dugua 2015, 312). Concrete actions that were implemented 
until 2018 mainly concerned tourism (booking destinations within the 
entire region in each tourism office), marketing (joint presentations at real 
estate fairs) and regional food cycles (use of local products for large events) 
as well as two sites of particular relevance: the airport Saint-Exupéry and 
the Valley of the river Gier between Saint-Étienne and Lyon. In the field of 
transport, some ideas about reduction of car traffic in the centre of Lyon by 
creating park and ride car parks with carpooling services as well as ferry 
transport on the river Rhône have been proposed, but the implementation 
of joint solutions has been difficult.
The airport was initially not part of the pôle, which is called illogical by 
Carpenter and Verhage (2014, 60). The association was officially created by 
96 France 
prefectoral decree in April 2012 with four members, the municipal group-
ings of Lyon, Saint-Étienne, Vienne and Bourgoin Jallieu (see Figure 2.8). 
The patchworked territory acknowledges the role of the large urban EPCI 
as key actors due to shifts of responsibility in the past decade, but also poses 
problems because the topics addressed at the metropolitan scale are not only 
restricted to these territories. One obvious example is urban agriculture and 
regional consumer cycles, as production areas are to a large part located in 
those municipalities that are not members of the pôle. In 2016, after the dis-
solution of the RUL, Villefranche in the north of Lyon and the CC de l’Est 
lyonnais with the airport joined the pôle.
The airport is the symbol of the difficulty of the various bodies of met-
ropolitan governance in making the link between strategies on the scale of 
the large territory and local actions (Dugua and Trotta 2012). Since 2016, 
the pôle métropolitain has taken over the responsibility to coordinate the 
development of activity zones in the institutionally highly fragmented area 
around the airport, cutting across three départements and four SCoTs. The 
process includes only three of the six members of the pôle, but a wide range 
of other actors such as state services, EPCIs and SCoTs covered by the study 
area, départements, région, chambers and economic development agencies. 
The urgency of coordinated action in this area had already been recognised 
by the Inter-SCoT in 2010. As a first step the UrbaLyon had been mandated 
to carry out a survey as the basis for a joint strategy initially piloted by the 
state, also leading to a modification of the DTA. It was under discussion to 
create a new association for the Saint-Exupéry plain to implement the strat-
egy, but the task was instead entrusted to the pôle métropolitain (Dugua 
2015, 440–448).
The mode of operation of the pôle métropolitain is incremental, i.e. based 
on the preparation and initiation of innovative projects that would add to 
overall goals of metropolitan development. It is a place for experimentation 
and dissemination of good practice (Bariol-Mathais 2017, 119) as well as 
dialogue between the elected representatives of the members. Each of the 
six municipal groupings provides one vice-president and sends members to 
the council composed of 88 members (thereof 43 Métropole de Lyon). The 
crucial element of governance is to bring the presidents of the six municipal 
groupings together. Their meetings take place every second month and are 
prepared by a meeting of their heads of administration with the director 
of the pôle. The head office has the means to initiate processes by bringing 
actors together and financing smaller studies, but larger investments have to 
be financed by each of the members and thus must be deliberated by their 
democratic bodies. The pôle has already raised funds to a smaller extent, 
but is not made for this and does not have the capacity for EU funding 
applications.
The pôle métropolitain launched promising projects in its first years, but 
entered a phase of lower activity between 2015 and 2018. The lower inter-
est of the members was caused by a fundamental restructuring within all 
 France 97
of the municipal groupings themselves as well as political change after the 
municipal election of 2014 with new mayors. Conflicts of interest persist 
despite the seemingly more heterogeneous circle of actors as compared to 
the RUL, but can be addressed. The voluntary status and light structure is a 
precondition for its existence and allows for flexibility, but is seen by most 
interviewees as a step in the right direction rather than as an entirely sat-
isfactory solution of metropolitan governance. Concerning future perspec-
tives, the conceptions range from an enlarged territory of the pôle, i.e. more 
coherent soft space, to a much larger métropole, i.e. replacement by a hard 
institution. Thus, rather than conducting debates on its form, it seems more 
auspicious to concentrate on concrete projects with joint benefits that can 
be launched within the given institutional frame.
2.3.3.4  Saint-Étienne – second hub of the metropolitan region 
or a metropolis in its own right?
Saint-Étienne is the core city of a municipal grouping that acquired the sta-
tus of métropole in 2018. It is one of the largest French métropoles in terms 
of area, but has only about one-third of the population of the Métropole 
de Lyon (see Table 2.1). The centres of the two métropoles are only about 
50 km away from each other and their borders now almost touch each 
other since the municipality of Givors joined the Métropole de Lyon (see 
Figure 2.10). The two cities are part of one urban network with strong inter-
nal links (Desjardins and Geppert 2020, 129). Saint-Étienne is the second 
largest centre whereas the others are medium-sized cities (Vienne, Bourgoin 
Jallieu and Villefranche-sur-Saône).
The state-led regional plan PADOG from the 1960s interpreted Lyon 
and Saint-Étienne as two city-regions (régions urbaines) that are both part 
of the metropolitan region of Lyon (aire métropolitaine de Lyon) (Bariol-
Mathais 2015, 33). The DTA calls for a multipolar urban development and 
also describes Saint-Étienne as a separate agglomeration (agglomération de 
Saint-Étienne) within the metropolitan region of Lyon (Préfecture de Région 
Rhône-Alpes 2006, 15). It can be argued that the subsystem of Saint-Étienne 
is more coherent in terms of planning than the one of Lyon because Saint-
Étienne is part of the SCoT Sud Loire covering a vast area of 116 munici-
palities. The agglomeration of Saint-Étienne has been part of the three soft 
networks on the metropolitan level, RUL, Inter-SCoT and pôle métropolit-
ain. However, it was not a founding member of the RUL or the Inter-SCoT. 
In both cases its territory was soon included in the considerations due to 
the strong functional interrelation, but Saint-Étienne was first invited only 
as an observer (Boino 2007, 54–56). Within the governance of the pôle 
métropolitain, the Saint-Étienne Métropole has a more equitable role, at 
least symbolically: according to the statutes, the presidency rotates every 
three years between Lyon and Saint-Étienne and its headquarters is located 
in-between the two centres. The ADERLY economic development agency 
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has extended its radius of action to the municipal groupings of Saint-Étienne 
and Capi in 2015 (Bariol-Mathais 2017, 117). Furthermore, the universi-
ties of Saint-Étienne and Lyon have started an alliance within a national 
initiative for excellence. All in all, competitiveness functions are carried out 
at a larger scale including Lyon and Saint-Étienne, whereas services for the 
population are provided by each of the métropoles.
Regarding the terminology, most actors refer to the urban or metropoli-
tan region of Lyon. However, in the context of the Inter-SCoT-dialogue, 
documents refer to the “aire métropolitaine Lyon – Saint Étienne”, empha-
sising a bipolar character. The pôle métropolitain has been named only 
“pôle métropolitain” without referring to Lyon in its name and thus avoid-
ing the question of the relevance of the agglomeration of Saint-Étienne in 
the partnership.
2.4  Conclusion: recent changes of city-regional 
governance in France
In the chapter on French metropolitan governance and planning, two métro-
poles created in January 2015 have been the main objects of investigation. 
The Métropole de Lyon has a special status as full local self-government, 
whereas Nantes is one of the “ordinary” métropoles organised as a legal 
public body (EPCI). The main differences between the two cases are that 
the Métropole de Lyon fulfils functions of the département and has had a 
directly elected assembly since 2020. Lyon also has a longer history of inter-
municipal cooperation and regional planning, whereas the main integration 
process in Nantes took place in the 2000s. In both cases, the mayors of the 
core city have had a key role in governance of the metropolitan region in 
the last two decades, both within the métropole and beyond. However, this 
concentration of mayoral power ended in Lyon after 2020, as the métropole 
became an independent layer of governance.
In terms of a functional definition of the metropolitan region, i.e. aire 
urbaine defined by commuter sheds, Lyon is significantly larger. However, 
the institutionalised space of the two métropoles is almost the same with an 
area of a little more than 500 km². With regard to city-regional planning, 
Lyon even has a smaller SCoT than Nantes (compensated by a more commit-
ted Inter-SCoT dialogue including the surrounding planning associations). 
In Nantes, the wider metropolitan area of Nantes – Saint-Nazaire forms a 
second, albeit weak, level of metropolitan governance (pôle métropolitain 
responsible for SCoT) composed of several EPCIs. With regard to vertical 
cooperation, actors from different levels responsible for different territories 
meet and collaborate within the SAMOA development agency with the con-
crete outcome of the Île de Nantes regeneration scheme. In Lyon, coordi-
nated action from a multitude of actors is needed for the area around the 
airport Saint-Exupéry located outside the métropole; this task has been del-
egated to the pôle métropolitain after preparatory analysis by state services.
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The case of Nantes shows that the existing instruments create capaci-
ties to act despite persistent institutional fragmentation of the metropolitan 
region. Lyon has succeeded in establishing one of the most powerful city-
regional governments in Europe (Galimberti et al. 2014, 192) for the core 
of the metropolitan region. In France, it is an experimental case that receives 
much attention and is often seen as the most advanced, most exemplary 
model of metropolitan government. The full impact of its transformation 
will only become assessable in the years to come, namely the impact of 
direct elections, the dissociation of the mayor of Lyon and the president of 
the métropole as well as the political shift to the Green Party in 2020. On 
the wider scale of the large functional urban region, the metropolitan region 
of Lyon is still a highly fragmented space. It has a rich, long-standing tradi-
tion of metropolitan dialogue, though the definition of metropolitan space 
remains fluid and coordinated action is split into several arenas with low 
degrees of institutionalisation. Their fragility and dependence on the good-
will of the métropole is shown by the dissolution of the RUL. Strengthening 
the métropole institution has rather intensified the “fronts of the inter-
territorial battle” in the Lyon metropolitan area (Dugua 2015, 395) and 
the realisation of concrete projects with a multitude of actors, interests and 
rivalries remains cumbersome. For the field of public transport Idt et al. 
(2012) argue that collective action can be reached even without a shared 
vision or the existence of common interests, if actors assume their interde-
pendence and if steering mechanisms for inter-institutional cooperation are 
able to manage the competition between territorial administrations.
This comparative section is organised according to the four dimensions 
of institutions, functions, ideas and space that form the analytical frame-
work of the book. It synthesises the three previous sections on national ter-
ritorial reforms and the two in depth case studies of Nantes and Lyon, and 
interprets on this basis recent changes of city-regional governance in France.
2.4.1  Institutions
Métropoles have become a powerful layer above the municipalities and are 
key institutions for metropolitan governance. They are the result of many 
decades of inter-municipal cooperation. The new status granted by the 
national government is not particularly exclusive, given the number of 22 
métropoles since 2018. Whether the status of métropole came with impor-
tant changes or not depends greatly on the individual city-region and its his-
tory of inter-municipal cooperation. Regarding the two cases of Nantes and 
Lyon, the impact of the MAPTAM law has been quite different: in the case 
of Nantes, the transformation was minor, whereas it triggered great institu-
tional change in Lyon. This was primarily related to Lyon’s special status, 
i.e. to the transfer of all departmental responsibilities within its territory and 
the direct election of its council. The two métropoles were preceded by a 
CU and already possessed most of the municipal responsibilities prescribed 
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by the MAPTAM law. This does not apply to all French métropoles, e.g. 
Grenoble.
The national laws set the framework for the métropoles, such as man-
datory responsibilities and rules for political representation. Therefore, a 
similar type of metropolitan institution exists in all French city-regions. 
Nonetheless, we can observe some heterogeneity and variation. On one hand, 
tailor-made rules for some métropoles such as Lyon have already become 
part of the legislative process. On the other hand, specific local arrange-
ments are possible within the framework of the national law such as in the 
case of Nantes (pooled administration with deconcentrated units, additional 
responsibilities, key role of the local development agency, SAMOA).
Both métropoles have established sub-units regrouping several munici-
palities or city-quarters of the core city, although the national law does 
not include them. These are called “pôles de proximité” in Nantes and 
“conférences territoriales” or “bassin de vie” in Lyon. In the case of Lyon, 
their outline is largely consistent with the boundaries of the new electoral 
constituencies of the métropole. The idea behind them is to create spaces 
with similar characteristics and issues. An advantage is that those spaces are 
more alike in size than the municipalities and partly overcome the dichot-
omy between a large core and small peripheral units. They do not form an 
official decision-making level, but are used in strategic documents (e.g. for 
diagnosis and formulation of the development strategy “projet territorial” 
within the land use plan PLUi/PLUm)27 and for coordination of concrete 
questions regarding the implementation of public policies in the particular 
area (interface between métropole and municipalities). Both in Nantes and 
Lyon, this intermediary level for consultation guarantees regular communi-
cation among the mayors within those sub-territories and the heads of the 
metropolitan executive. In Nantes, the pôles de proximité also correspond 
to deconcentrated units of the metropolitan administration, and their estab-
lishment was one founding principle of the CU. In neither of the two métro-
poles are they used for contact with the citizens, neither for consultation nor 
for administrative procedures. The municipalities remain the main interface 
between the local administration and the citizens. For example, the citizen 
participation during the preparation of inter-municipal land use plans took 
place in each municipality individually and was jointly organised by the 
municipal administration and the métropole.
Municipalities also remain the basic unit for democratic representa-
tion in the métropoles, with the exception of Lyon. Direct election with-
out a simultaneous mandate in a municipal council was much discussed 
but never implemented in the national legislative process. In the case of 
Lyon, the transformation into a jurisdiction with directly elected council has 
reshaped the relationship between the Métropole de Lyon and the munici-
palities within its perimeter. They are no longer members of a voluntary 
municipal grouping. Instead, the métropole, which fulfils many functions 
of local self-government and raises its own taxes has become a layer of 
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territorial government without asking its former members for their con-
sent. Direct elections strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the métropole 
and match the high influence of the political decisions of the metropolitan 
council on living conditions in the agglomeration. At the same time, the 
status of the municipalities and their mayors within the decision-making 
process has changed, causing internal conflicts between the métropole and 
the municipalities. Representation of interests is especially an issue for the 
small municipalities in the north-west, run by mayors of parties that are in 
the opposition in the current metropolitan council and have also lost all 
seats as vice-presidents of the métropole.
Whether Lyon will remain a single case or is a forerunner of the future 
reorganisation of the multilevel system will be seen in the long run. Extending 
the institutional arrangements to other large city-regions has been favoured 
by president Macron among others, but is opposed by many métropoles 
such as Nantes. Whether it would really increase their problem-solving 
capacities or rather add to hyperintegrated bodies that collapse under their 
own weight (Demazière et al. 2022) has to be scrutinised. The social ser-
vices responsibilities of the départements are heavy in terms of budget and 
staff, but the exercise of these responsibilities is largely framed by national 
regulations and therefore has few additional possibilities to shape policy 
(Galimberti et al. 2014, 200). The benefit of the proposed reorganisation 
also highly depends on the boundaries of the départements. If they cut 
across the metro region and are thus hampering city-regional coordination 
of policies as was the case in Lyon, or are almost identical to the territory 
of the métropole, as in Aix-Marseille-Provence, it makes sense to merge 
métropole and département.
When analysing the spatial relations it becomes apparent that territo-
rial coordination beyond the borders of the métropole is needed to address 
shared issues. This is already done by a range of soft territorial alliances, 
using different instruments, partially introduced by law (CGET 2019, 11). 
Municipal groupings are the main actors for territorial coordination as they 
negotiate shared strategies and common projects between each other. This 
has the advantage that the number of interlocutors is significantly lower than 
in case of negotiations between municipalities. In addition, the dialogue is 
more balanced than it would be when a small suburban municipality with 
2,000 inhabitants negotiates with a city. However, important asymmetries 
in size, responsibilities, resources and political weight remain. The restruc-
turing of municipal groupings around the métropoles has been seeking to 
amend this partially but has in the short term led to stagnation of inter-
territorial cooperation because of new positioning, internal reorganisation 
and construction of a common territorial project within the EPCI in both 
case study regions. A discontinuity in leadership in the largest cities (Nantes 
and Saint-Nazaire as well as Lyon and Saint-Étienne) has also slowed down 
soft cooperation, as cooperation is largely built upon personal contact and 
trust among the presidents of the most influential municipal groupings.
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The institutional form of pôle métropolitain (PM) has far from the same 
importance as the métropoles nor the same attention in national discourses. 
They remain difficult to grasp for many due to their heterogeneity in terms 
of fields of action (freely defined on the basis of a common interest) and ter-
ritorial coverage (either continuous or discontinuous, with the possibility to 
overlap with other pôles métropolitains), and appear weak due to their very 
small budget compared to that of métropoles as well as the lack of exclusive 
responsibilities. The instrument PM has been picked up both in Lyon and 
in Nantes with the aim of formalising inter-municipal cooperation beyond 
the métropole, but is only one of several mechanisms for soft coordination. 
Those pôles métropolitains have in common that they were created with 
the expectation of being an action-oriented format that would facilitate 
joint projects. Both are devices for horizontal cooperation between EPCIs 
with rather small headquarters. The regular meeting of the presidents of 
EPCIs is their key governance mechanism. Their cooperation space is more 
polycentric than the métropoles themselves and a step towards cooperation 
among equals with the second largest cities. However, major differences 
exist between the pôles. Whereas the PM Nantes Saint-Nazaire covers a 
continuous area, both the pôle métropolitain of Lyon and the second pôle of 
Nantes, PM Loire-Bretagne are organised as city networks with the EPCIs 
of the largest centres. The fields of action defined as common interests as 
well as the type of projects are different as well. In Lyon, the pôle has been 
an alternative replacing an existing forum, whereas the PM Nantes Saint-
Nazaire represents a deepening of an existing association and the PM Loire-
Bretagne is an entirely new format.
2.4.2  Functions
All 22 French métropoles perform a wide range of functions and form the 
local level of self-government together with the municipalities. Most of their 
functions have been transferred from the member municipalities. Fulfilling 
functions at the inter-municipal level takes place as an alternative to the 
forced merger of municipalities. Today, the métropoles fulfil more functions 
than the cities themselves. This is in particular true for the field of spatial 
planning as the responsibilities both for land use planning and large urban 
projects have been transferred to the level of the métropole. The administra-
tion of the métropoles in some cases such as Lyon or Bordeaux even exceeds 
the staff of the administration of their core city (Demazière et al. 2022). This 
shift of functions has not happened overnight, but was a gradual process 
over several decades. In Lyon, this process started three decades earlier than 
in Nantes due to the creation of a CU in 1969. In addition, the Métropole de 
Lyon has performed all functions of the département since 2016. In Nantes, 
the process of delegating municipal tasks to the inter-municipal administra-
tion has not ended yet, but took place recently mainly in the form of indi-
vidual agreements between municipalities and the métropole. Unlike Lyon, 
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the administrations of the Métropole de Nantes and of the city of Nantes 
have become deeply entwined, forming one pooled administration with 
joint departments. The functions of the métropole and of the city of Nantes 
are carried out under the same head. Deliberation takes place in separate 
councils for municipal or metropolitan competencies. However, important 
overlaps exist there as well, because each metropolitan councillor has to be 
a member of one of the municipal councils of the 24 member municipali-
ties and it is common practice that the mayor of Nantes is president of the 
métropole.
Social reproduction functions have been the starting point of inter-
municipal cooperation, initially in the form of single-purpose associations 
for technical services such as water supply, waste treatment and energy sup-
ply. Those functions have been absorbed by the métropoles of Lyon and 
Nantes. Both are also responsible for urban planning, strategies for housing 
and transport, building and maintaining roads and public spaces as well as 
for environmental protection. Public transport is also under the responsibil-
ity of the métropole but is carried out by a transport company (Sytral in the 
case of Lyon, Semitan in the case of Nantes) with majority ownership of 
the métropole. In the case of Nantes, the métropole has almost no functions 
regarding social policy and health; those services are divided between the 
département and the municipalities. In Lyon, since 2015, substantial social 
functions, including financial support for low-income households, have 
changed the functional profile. Social assistance is organised in a decentral-
ised way with buildings in different quarters of Lyon and other municipali-
ties (Maison de la Métropole). In all French métropoles, substantial parts 
of the services of general interest for the citizens are today provided by the 
métropole.
With regard to production functions, the métropoles are responsible for 
economic development, marketing and tourism as well as large projects 
and events of city-regional relevance. The individual municipalities cannot 
provide production functions alone due to their small size. Municipalities 
join forces when addressing investors and visitors in order to have a better 
chance of attracting attention and promoting their city-region. In the case 
of Lyon, the CU started activities in the field of economic development at an 
early stage. At the same time, even the métropoles are small in a European 
comparison with other city-regional governments. Therefore, production 
functions are in part addressed in wider networks such as pôle métropolit-
ains and joint business development agencies. Functions related to economic 
competitiveness are partially shared with the région. Métropoles have the 
right to deviate from regional strategies concerning economic development. 
However, a main lever of influence is the co-financing of projects, as enhanc-
ing the production functions is often related to extensive investments that 
cannot be financed by the local level alone.
Functions of soft institutions on the scale of the wider metropolitan 
region concern both social reproduction and production. Regarding the 
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pôles métropolitains, the focus lies more on production functions in the 
case of Lyon, e.g. the joint representation of the city-region at real estate 
shows. However, the topics of joint interest defined by the members are not 
limited to production functions. One of the topics treated successfully is 
regional food cycles. In Nantes, given the responsibility for strategic plan-
ning, the focus on the Pôle métropolitain Nantes Saint-Nazaire is more on 
the coordination of land use in the city-region. This task touches both upon 
production functions (e.g. sites for industry, business and logistics) as well 
as reproduction (e.g. landscape protection). Projects for landscape design 
launched by the pôle via a design competition rather concern local recrea-
tion and can therefore be attributed to the social reproduction function. 
However, the pôle also uses the image of a green sustainable city-region for 
marketing purposes, e.g. by applying for a national label (EcoCité). Thus, 
the ideas of sustainability and attractiveness both for citizens and externals 
are linked together. The second Pôle métropolitain Loire-Bretagne, which 
consists of a city network, more exclusively targets competitiveness with the 
common interests of accessibility by high-speed rail, university cooperation 
and joint marketing at real estate shows.
2.4.3  Ideas
In both the cases of Lyon and Nantes, the idea of competitiveness of city-
regions on a European scale is central to metropolitan policy. It becomes 
manifest on several spatial scales: one being the métropole, but also at the 
larger scale of the metropolitan region beyond its institutional boundaries 
as well as on the smaller scale of specific places within the city-region with 
symbolic value for the image of the metropolis (i.e. Lyon Confluence and 
Île de Nantes). The idea of European competitiveness prompted the mayors 
of the core cities to act long before the métropole was invented as an insti-
tutional form by the French government. In Lyon, an orientation towards 
competitiveness goes back to the 1990s and guided the actions of the succes-
sive mayors Noir, Barre and Collomb. However, the recent election of the 
summer of 2020 might mean a reorientation of priorities; the Green Party 
has won both positions of mayor of Lyon and president of the métropole, 
and its political programme stands for sustainability rather than having a 
growth orientation.
In Nantes, the aspiration to transform the city into a metropolis of 
European importance started a decade later and is mainly attributed to 
the long-term mayor and first president of the CU Jean-Marc Ayrault. He 
is also seen as the driving force behind inter-municipal cooperation such 
as the creation of the CU, support of the national legislation concerning 
métropoles (as prime minister during the development of the MAPTAM 
law), rapprochement with the mayor of the former rival city Saint-Nazaire, 
creation of the planning association for the SCoT including both cities and 
later on transformation into a pôle métropolitain. In the competition with 
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other cities, Nantes has been successfully branded as a sustainable, live-
able city, e.g. as the first French city that has reintroduced the tramway 
as a transport system. The self-understanding and image combine attrac-
tiveness, participation and sustainability (Griggs et al. 2018, 15). Ayrault’s 
successor, Johanna Rolland, is pursuing the political legacy with regard to 
inter-municipal cooperation, but with an even greater focus on the quality 
of life for citizens in all city quarters beyond showcase projects. The ideas of 
proximity to the citizens, participation and welfare have gained importance.
In both city-regions, competitiveness has been an argument to justify the 
step-by-step integration of the municipal grouping towards a strong institu-
tion (métropole) and to claim for the integration of policy fields related to 
the production function. This logic corresponds to the metropolitan reform 
position (see Chapter 1). In Nantes, the creation of the CU was a major 
step towards a stronger inter-municipal institution. In Lyon, the métropole 
has started early activities regarding economic development and has broad-
ened the functions of the municipal grouping. Both cities have used strate-
gies of festivalisation, i.e. culture and big events to change the image of the 
city-region (not only marketing campaigns of the economic development 
agencies).
Due to the logic of a “critical mass” needed in comparison to other 
European city-regions, competitiveness has also been a reason for interpret-
ing and describing the metropolitan region as a larger space, beyond the 
métropole itself. This is obvious in the case of Nantes as the city itself is 
not among the large cities of Europe in terms of inhabitants. Rather than 
size, the positioning of the city-region is justified by quality of life, good 
economic development and innovation. The imaginary of a bipolar metro-
politan region Nantes Saint-Nazaire has been cultivated in parallel to the 
consolidation of the inter-municipal grouping Nantes Métropole. Still, the 
institution Pôle métropolitain Nantes Saint-Nazaire contributes to social 
reproduction rather than production functions, with the key focus on 
regional planning, water and landscape. Although Lyon is the third largest 
French city (after Paris and Marseille), the idea of a critical mass in terms 
of inhabitants is very present in the mind of local actors. Due to the French 
urban system with a huge gap between Paris and all other cities as well as 
narrow administrative boundaries of the core cities, the demographic size of 
French cities is much lower than the demographic size of the European cities 
with similar importance that they wish to be compared with (Megerle 2008, 
26). However, by presenting benchmarking numbers of the metropolitan 
region for the pôle métropolitain or even the entire aire métropolitaine, this 
critical mass in quantitative rankings is attained.
The competitiveness strategies of both city-regions are closely related to 
large urban projects. Thus, metropolitan policy focussed on competitive-
ness and city branding is manifested within the city via high quality urban 
design, (star)architecture and place-making. According to Pinson (2009), 
urban projects such as the Île de Nantes enable the European cities of second 
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rank (beyond global cities such as Paris, between 300,000 and three million 
inhabitants) to position themselves in a more competitive environment. “lls 
[les projets urbains] sont l’occasion de la definition de strategies de devel-
oppement economique, de la redecouverte et de la mise en valeur d’avantages 
competitifs. L’occasion aussi de doter les villes des amenites et des equipe-
ments censés y attirer les activites economiques et les classes sociales les plus 
valorisees dans le capitalisme globalisé” (Pinson 2009, 404). The close inter-
relation of the economic development strategy and urban development was 
already observable in Lyon at an early stage. The promotion of the tertiary 
sector was pursued through the construction of attractive business districts. 
Given its size, Lyon has several sites implementing urban projects with stra-
tegic relevance for the city-region, recently Confluence in the southern part 
of the peninsula, along with the old city centre and the refurbishment of 
the second central district Part Dieu. In Nantes, the emblematic project Île 
de Nantes is closely related to creating favourable conditions for creative 
industry. The SAMOA development agency had from the beginning a dou-
ble role of developing the site and promoting the economy. The innovative 
approach of flexible development via a constantly evolving master plan, 
temporary use (Dietrich and Dahl 2016), art projects as well as favourable 
conditions for the creative industry has been actively promoted in interna-
tional networks.
In order to avoid a distorted perspective, it has to be stressed that compet-
itiveness is certainly not the only idea guiding the emergence of inter-munic-
ipal métropoles. Just like in the national discourse related to the territorial 
reforms (laws RCT and MAPTAM), efficiency has been an important jus-
tification for transferring more and more functions from the municipalities 
to the inter-municipal level. The idea behind this is that the administration 
of the métropole can provide a higher quality of service at lower costs as 
compared to a multitude of very small municipalities or a large number 
of single-purpose associations. This logic is also driving the merger of the 
municipal administration of the city of Nantes with the inter-municipal 
administration of the métropole, resulting in joint heads of administration 
responsible for both jointly used central services as well as the continued 
pooling of municipal tasks.
2.4.4  Space
French city-regions are institutionally fragmented. None of the three layers 
of territorial government région, département and municipality corresponds 
to the functional space of city-regions. Municipalities are for the most part 
very small, also in the first and second ring around large cities, and urbanisa-
tion expands way beyond the administrative borders of the core cities. The 
boundaries of départements were defined in the 18th century and in part cut 
across contemporary city-regions. Régions in turn are much bigger territo-
ries than city-regions and have recently been enlarged. This fragmentation 
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is in part addressed by the strengthening of inter-municipal cooperation. 
However, the métropoles only cover the urban core of the metropolitan 
regions, especially in the case of the larger ones in terms of inhabitants (see 
Table 2.1). This applies for both case study regions Lyon and Nantes, but is 
more pronounced in Lyon. With regard to boundaries of municipal group-
ings, there was dynamic change in the 2010s regarding the ring of small CCs 
around the métropole as well as regarding municipalities without municipal 
groupings. By contrast, the perimeter of the métropole and the previous 
CU has been rather stable (see 2.1.4). What is more, a voluntary accession 
of further municipalities has become even less likely after the creation of 
métropoles, as the two case studies show.
The spatial definition of metropolitan regions is contested and remains 
blurred. The term “metropolitan region” (literally translated “région métro-
politaine”) is rarely used in French. Instead, authors speak of “aggloméra-
tion lyonnaise/nantaise”, “région urbaine”, “aire urbaine/ métropolitaine”, 
“territoire métropolitain” or even the plural “territories métropolitains” 
referring to the co-existence and evolution of several institutionalised perim-
eters for planning and soft cooperation (e.g. used by Bariol-Mathais 2015, 
45).28 What is more, they use these terms in parallel. Among a sample of 
academic publications in the French language about the two city-regions 
Nantes and Lyon (sample composed of five PhD and two book chapters: 
Aguiar Mol 2015; Boino 2007; Dugua 2015; Fitria 2016; Galimberti 2015; 
Fritsch 2007 and Ouvrard 2016), all authors used each of the terms “agglo-
mération”, “région urbaine”, “aire urbaine” and “territoire métropolitain” 
in their publication, with the only exception being Arie Fitria who did not 
speak of “territoire métropolitain”. Apart from Deborah Galimberti (speak-
ing as often of “région urbaine”), all have in common that “agglomération” 
is the by far most used appellation. This multifaceted use of terms shows 
the complexity and fuzziness of describing the spatial dimension of French 
metro regions. The terms have different connotations and in part refer to 
a different perimeter defined by spatial analysis (aire urbaine/ métropolit-
aine, see 2.2.2 and 2.3.2) or institutions (territoire(s) métropolitain(s)). The 
more general term “city-region” (région urbaine) relates to a specific institu-
tion and its perimeter – in the case of Lyon, the RUL (see 2.3.3) – whereas 
agglomeration (agglomération) relates to the urban form, but does not have 
a clear spatial delimitation in either of the two cases Nantes and Lyon. 
Dugua uses the term “agglomération” for the core of the city-region.
Those spatial definitions have in common that the centre of the metro 
region is clearly denominated and name giving, but that the external bound-
ary is subject to change over time, more precisely to enlargement. In the case 
of the institutional territories (métropole, planning association, pôle métro-
politain), the perimeter is defined by membership, but can be extended. In 
the case of the functional definitions, they are calculated based on statistical 
definitions, but change when they are reviewed due to ongoing urbanisation 
and longer commuter distances. The blurriness of the fringe is even more 
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evident when superimposing the various coexistent spatial definitions. Thus, 
the French metropolitan regions have a clear core and maybe a number of 
medium-sized cities where most citizens, politicians and scientists would 
agree that they are part of the metropolitan region. However, for the peri-
urban and rural municipalities between and at the fringes, no shared defini-
tion exists, whether they are part of the metro region or not. What is more, 
the exact spatial delimitation does not play any role because the metropoli-
tan region is not a container space with a clear inside and outside.
Rather than as territories with explicit boundaries, the spatial dimension 
is conceptualised as a network of places with several layers. This is true 
both from the national perspective and from the local perspective. From 
the national perspective, métropoles are dots on the map (see Figure 2.3), 
linked by the high-speed rail network (TGV). From the local perspective, 
metropolitan regions are either a network of urban centres or a network of 
places with relevance for metropolitan functions. This can be the case due 
to their gateway functions (e.g. having an airport or central train station), 
symbolic functions related to the image of the city-region (e.g. iconic build-
ings), decision-making role (e.g. public administration or headquarters) or 
innovation (e.g. having universities) (for more examples see Blotevogel and 
Schmitt 2006, 62). When representing the metropolitan region visually, this 
is done by pictures of places, not by showing boundaries.
Admittedly, jurisdictions have a clearly defined territory, which is consti-
tutive for democratic representation, accountability and financing of public 
services. This is also valid in the case of the métropole as the dominant (most 
powerful and most recognised) institution in French metropolitan regions. 
Their budget stems from the taxes paid by the citizens within their bound-
aries and their political executive is elected in the member municipalities. 
Nevertheless, their perimeter is not constitutive of the way the spatial dimen-
sion of the metropolitan region is conceptualised, not even for themselves. 
Although a voluntary enlargement was not possible in the past, local actors 
acknowledge the functional interdependencies stretching way beyond the 
institutional territory. In their development strategies, they take into account 
interdependencies, strategic places outside their territory as well as the addi-
tional weight of an enlarged definition in benchmarking. They also act out-
side the restricted territory of the métropole. In fact, the president of the 
métropole is the only inevitable actor in all forums concerned with the future 
of the metropolitan region. He or she in turn has a range of different partners 
and instruments at his or her disposal to pursue the interests of the core ter-
ritory. Thus, policy-making beyond territorial boundaries i.e. despite institu-
tional fragmentation, is possible but highly complex due to the multitude of 
actors. Furthermore, it is restricted to consensus finding and thus contingent 
on steering mechanisms and the possibility of creating win-win situations.
Key foundations for city-regional cooperation are shared knowledge 
about the spatial development of the entire area and a shared vision of the 
desired future development. Regional planning seeks to create common 
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spatial knowledge and a shared vision, and in both case study regions is done 
on a larger scale than the territory of the métropole. Instruments of regional 
planning are adding to coherent spatial development in those regions with 
high development pressure. However, the success in limiting sprawl depends 
on the extent to which municipal groupings adhere to self-limitation in their 
SCoT and PLUi. The Inter-SCoT is purely voluntary; the first generation 
of SRADDET essentially fixes general principles of development and the 
state withdraws from the task of coordinating spatial development. Beyond 
the regulatory impact within the formal planning system, regular spatial 
observation and cartographic representation as well as forums to discuss the 
spatial dynamics of the wider metro region have an effect on the mental map 
of local actors. If members of municipal and metropolitan councils regularly 
meet within the committees of planning associations (syndicat de SCoT and 
Inter-SCoT dialogue) or other associations targeting the spatial develop-
ment (Lyon: formerly RUL, today pôle métropolitain; Nantes: SAMOA), 
their own spatial positioning (Williams 1996, 97) within the metropolitan 
region is likely to change. The shared conception of the spatial development 
is even more pronounced between planners working in planning depart-
ments of the EPCIs as well as the syndicats de SCoT. The publicly financed 
agences d’urbanisme29 have an important supporting role in that regard 
(Ouvrard 2016; Bendjador 2007).
Notes
1 All Districts were transformed into communautés after 1999 and do not exist 
anymore. Their maximum number was 324 in 1995 (Hertzog 2018, 137).
2 With the exception of four geographically isolated municipalities located on an 
island.
3 Aix-Marseille-Provence did not participate because cooperation is mainly estab-
lished within the métropole itself given the large size of the recently created 
territory.
4 In three cases, the pôle is responsible for the regional plan schéma de cohérence 
territoriale (SCoT), namely in Nantes Saint-Nazaire, Pays de Brest and Loire 
Angers. In one case, it corresponds to the cooperation area of several SCoT 
(Inter-SCoT), namely Le Mans – Sarthe (Bariol-Mathais 2017).
5 “je suis convaincu que la dynamique doit venir des territoires eux-mêmes. Des 
métropoles imposées par l’Etat, depuis Paris, c’est l’assurance de polémiques inu-
tiles et c’est la certitude de l’échec.”
6 “il y a quelque anomalie à ce que les établissements publics de coopération 
intercommunale (EPCI), dont certains exercent une compétence quasi géné-
rale, demeurent issus du suffrage indirect, alors que les dépenses qu’ils exposent 
équivalent à celles des régions.”
7 This exception was designed to include Strasbourg.
8 This applies to cities that lost the status of regional capital in 2016, when the 
number of regions was reduced from 22 to 13: Metz (former capital of the region 
Lorraine) and Clermont-Ferrand (former capital of the region Auvergne).
9 Alpes Maritimes adopted by decree 2.12.2003, Bassins Miniers Nord-Lorrains 
2.8.2005, Estuaire de la Seine 10.7.2006, Estuaire de la Loire 17.7.2006, Aire 
métropolitaine lyonnaise 9.1.2007, Bouches du Rhône 10.5.2007.
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10 In France, being mayor of a large city is an important power base for a national 
political career. Since 1958, only four prime ministers out of 22 have not been 
mayor before heading the national government (Demazière and Sykes 2021).
11 Criteria: the lower the density of population and the lower the tax income per 
inhabitant, the higher the basic subsidy; additional funds are given for places of 
higher centrality, islands, the coast and UNESCO heritage sites.
12 Nantes Métropole (2017). Retrieved from: https://www .nantesmetropole .fr / 
institution -metropolitaine /institution /l -organisation -22934 .kjsp, accessed 14 
March 2018, last update 12 June 2017.
13 With one exception: the mayor of Rezé was president in the intermediary phase 
when Ayrault became prime minister in 2012 until the next election in April 
2014. He retired afterwards and announced in September 2013 that he would 
not be a candidate in the next elections, leaving the floor to Johanna Rolland.
14 On 1 January 2021, data from INSEE (population totale).
15 Three EPCI cross-departmental borders, namely CAP Atlantique and Redon 
Agglomération in the north and the CC du Pays d’Ancenis in the east.
16 On 1 January 2021 (population totale), data on composition of EPCI from 
DGCL.
17 Definition INSEE see www .insee .fr /en /metadonnees /definition /c1501 (30 July 
2019).
18 Definition INSEE see www .insee .fr /en /metadonnees /definition /c2070 (30 July 
2019).
19 see https://www .insee .fr /fr /metadonnees /cog /aire -urbaine /AU2010008 -nantes 
(30 July 2019).
20 The first round of municipal elections took place on 15 March 2020 despite the 
Corona pandemic, but the second round needed in all constituencies without an 
absolute majority was postponed to 28 June 2020.
21 Mayor of Lyon from 1957 to 1976.
22 Only one municipality west of Lyon, Sainte-Foy-lès-Lyon, is attributed differ-
ently. It is part of the southern conférence territoriale “Lônes et Coteaux du 
Rhône”, but is attributed to the circumscription “Ouest”, otherwise identical to 
the conférence territoriale “Val d’Yzeron”.
23 Definition INSEE see www .insee .fr /en /metadonnees /definition /c2070 (30 July 
2019).
24 Definition INSEE see www .insee .fr /en /metadonnees /definition /c1501 (30 July 
2019).
25 First version in 2006, updated in 2013 (Dugua 2015, 394).
26 “La mise en oeuvre d’une réelle ‘gouvernance’ pour ce territoire métropolitain 
exige une action forte de l’Etat, dans ses compétences propres mais aussi en tant 
que partenaire de collectivités responsables mais qui, chacune enfermée dans 
ses seules limites, ne sauraient répondre aux exigences de l’intérêt régional ou 
national. Les initiatives constatées demeurent trop lentes et trop peu contraig-
nantes pour que la coordination des politiques publiques mises en oeuvre par des 
acteurs dont les intérêts individuels sont parfois contradictoires soit à la hauteur 
des enjeux et des ambitions de la métropole.”
27 In the city-region of Nantes, the inter-municipal land use plan has been 
called “Plan local d’urbanisme métropolitain (PLUm)” instead of “Plan local 
d’urbanisme intercommunal (PLUi)” to highlight the aspect of being a joint plan 
for the métropole with a shared vision for the development of the entire metro-
politan territory.
28 Map “Les territoires métropolitains lyonnais, 2000–2006” showing the perim-
eter of the DTA regional plan and three different spatial definitions of the RUL
29 Agences d’urbanisme have been created since the 1960s with the mission to 
provide services regarding spatial analysis and development of formal planning 
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instruments to municipalities and municipal groupings within a large city-regional 
area. Thus, they are involved in many planning procedures in metro regions 
(Kuhlmann et al. 2011, 162). They are co-financed by municipal groupings, cit-
ies, départements, the région, the state, planning associations and semi-public 
partners such as transport companies or chambers of commerce. In 2019, 49 
agences existed in France and all métropoles had an agence d’urbanisme at their 
disposal. With regard to the two case study regions, both agences d’urbanisme 
UrbaLyon and AURAN were founded in 1978. Both cover much larger areas 
than the métropoles with their work, and their perimeter of intervention has 
greatly evolved since the year 2000 (FNAU 2012, 4, map périmètres statut-
aires des agences d’urbanisme). With regard to the wider metropolitan region, 
a second agence exists in both cases: the Agence d’Urbanisme de la région de 
Saint-Nazaire (ADDRN) and the Agence d’Urbanisme de la Région Stéphanoise 
(EPURES). Today, those agences cooperate and produce joint spatial analysis for 
the larger space of their joint territories.
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Loi No. 2017-257 du 28 février 2017 relative au statut de Paris et à l’aménagement 
métropolitain.
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3
3.1  Metropolitan policies and institutional reforms in Italy
Over the last 15 to 20 years, Italy has undergone numerous institutional 
reforms, affecting the division of responsibilities and fiscal relationships 
between the different levels of government (Brunazzo 2010). In principle, the 
direction of the reforms can be described as a form of regionalisation since 
the 20 regions gained significantly in relevance from the 1970s onwards.1 
Regional governments are an important actor with regard to the supervi-
sion of local government and the implementation of the national law on 
metropolitan cities. Especially in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the regions 
were strengthened politically and also in terms of functions (Behnke 2010; 
Brunazzo 2010; Cotta and Verzichelli 2007; Grasse 2005). The 20 regions 
are not constituent states of the Italian republic but rather administrative 
levels with some political autonomy. For a long time, they were finan-
cially dependent on the central government. Only in recent years have they 
incrementally developed into institutions of regional self-government. The 
regional parliament (Consiglio) is elected for five years; the regional com-
mittee (Giunta regionale) is made of elected members of the parliament 
or experts without any political affiliation. The regional president, who 
is directly elected by the people, leads the Giunta. Regionalisation is the 
notion used most often for this ongoing process of institutional change. 
Federalism and devolution, on the other hand, are not entirely appropriate 
as a description, but are in use (Köppl 2007, 179–180; Behnke 2010).
With regard to the separation of powers between regional and central 
government, the principle of framework legislation applies (although it is 
called competing legislation). A positive catalogue is used to determine the 
areas in which the regions were given additional legislative and executive 
powers. These included the administrative structure of the regions, prov-
inces, città metropolitane and municipalities, health care, schools, welfare 
services, urban development, spatial planning and regional policy, transport 
policy (infrastructure) and tourism. However, the possibilities for deroga-
tion remained within narrow limits until the 2001 constitutional reform. On 








the other hand, regional laws were (and still are) not allowed to contradict 
the principles of the constitution, basic state norms, national interests and 
the interests of other regions (Köppl 2007, 180–181; Cotta and Verzichelli 
2007). In addition, the corresponding norms were often formulated in an 
imprecise manner, so that in many cases there were repeated legal disputes 
that had to be decided by the constitutional court (this has happened also 
with the law on metropolitan cities). The result was and still is an overlap 
of competences (both executive and legislative) between the regions and the 
state.
The constitutional reform in 2001 changed the situation considerably. 
The reform was the result of a longer-lasting process that began in the 1990s. 
In 1997, the Bassanini Acts initiated a process of change strongly influenced 
by the ideas of subsidiarity, efficiency and better coordination of state levels 
(Köppl 2007, 182; Behnke 2010; Bolgherini and Lippi 2016). More com-
petences and a share of the tax revenues were allocated to the regions. The 
constitutional law introduced by a centre-left government in 2001 followed 
on seamlessly and is widely considered a far-reaching reform of the state 
(Cotta and Verzichelli 2007). In particular, Chapter V of the Constitution, 
which regulates the matter of regions, provinces and municipalities, has 
been significantly amended and città metropolitane have been introduced 
as an additional level of the state. Art. 114 defines regions, provinces, città 
metropolitane and municipalities as levels of the Republic (Köppl 2007, 
183). Hence, the Italian state, as defined in 2001, has four levels: central 
government, regions (20), provinces (today 89) or città metropolitane (10 
plus 4 in the regions with special status) and municipalities (about 8,100). 
The relationship between the 14 città metropolitane and the provinces was 
not clearly defined at this moment but the substitution of provinces in city-
regions was envisioned. Article 117 of the reformed constitution refers to 
the term “territorial governance” (Governo del territorio) as being part of 
competing legislation between the regions and the state (Fedeli 2012). This 
is more than a change of words and indicates a stronger recognition of 
European debates on territorial development in the field of spatial planning. 
The principle of framework legislation was restricted and formulated more 
clearly. A clearer distinction was made between exclusive legislation of the 
state and competing legislation (the latter usually takes the form of imple-
mentation and enforcement laws, so the notion competing legislation is a bit 
misleading, Schefold 2010).
In a process that started in the 1980s, the increasing relevance of the 
regions became visible in particular in the areas of urban development, spa-
tial planning, environmental planning and nature conservation, regional 
development, infrastructure planning and local government (Grasse 2005). 
Within the framework of national normative principles, the regions can 
enact independent laws for urban and regional planning and they make use 
of these options in very different ways (Fedeli 2012). The field of industrial 
and economic policy falls within the exclusive legislative competence of the 
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regions. Since then, many authors use formulations such as differentiated 
or asymmetrical regionalism in order to describe the relationship of central 
government and the regions (Zwilling and Alber 2019). It has to be men-
tioned that these reforms of the multi-level governance system in Italy did 
not follow a clear strategy but were influenced by frequent changes of gov-
ernments in a fragmented political landscape (Bolgherini and Lippi 2016, 
267). Over the last 15 years, many amendments, revocations and delays 
happened with the result of a permanent re-allocation of functions and the 
re-shaping of inter-institutional relations. Overall, the sluggishness of these 
reforms can be explained by the still existing centralism and the govern-
ment’s pronounced distrust of downstream levels.
Italy’s local government system is characterised by many small munici-
palities, which in comparison still have a limited functional profile (Bobbio 
2005; Bolgherini and Lippi 2016, 268). For a long time, they were seen 
merely as administrative bodies and were strictly controlled by upper-level 
government. In the 1990s, however, numerous far-reaching reforms took 
place that gave municipalities more political, administrative and financial 
leeway (especially the Bassanini laws in 1997). With the introduction of the 
direct election of the mayor in 1993, municipalities were gradually upgraded 
to genuine units of local self-government (Magnier 2003; Bolgherini and 
Lippi 2016, 270; Citroni et al. 2013).
The role of the provinces (second tier of local government) in the Italian 
multi-level system has also been under discussion in Italy for a longer period 
and national government and the regions did not always have the same 
opinion. The government partially upgraded provinces and their role has 
been debated in particular with regard to the governance of city-regions. 
There were, however, considerable differences in the way the regions dealt 
with the provinces.
Central government withdrew more and more and left the field to the 
regions, which in turn established a range of different working relationships 
with the provinces. Only some regions have used the provinces as a level of 
strategic spatial development policy. Baccetti (2011) sees territorial coordi-
nation of services and planning as a core task of the provinces but as has 
been said before some regions delegated additional functions to the prov-
inces. Within these reform discourses, the provinces had a strong institu-
tional self-interest but faced two parallel institutional developments. Firstly, 
the regions became stronger due to the regionalisation of the state, accu-
mulating more and more functions and legislative competences. Secondly, 
the municipalities benefited from the introduction of the directly elected 
representatives and decentralisation reforms. The European financial sta-
bility rules as defined in the treaty of Maastricht resulted in a change in 
the fiscal relationships of the governmental layers, with greater financial 
autonomy of the local level (Bolgherini and Lippi 2016, 271). In connection 
with the collapse of the former party system in the Tangentopoli crisis and 
the implementation of New Public Management tools, a new generation of 
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political leaders took office in the 1990s in many cities and initiated a period 
of considerable policy change (especially in Bologna, Turin, Rome, Naples 
and Palermo). The direct elections were also introduced on a provincial level 
and led to a temporary revival of the provinces but the effect was less strong 
(Baccetti 2011). In addition, the provinces received some planning functions 
(Balducci 2003, 62) and at the same time some new provinces were created 
(e.g. in Greater Milan and Prato). Some of these new provinces were rather 
small, hence aggravating the problem of territorial fragmentation of these 
city-regions.
With the Delrio Law from 2012, however, the provinces were consider-
ably weakened as the città metropolitane (CM) replaced them in the city-
regions and inter-municipal Unioni di Comuni were given more relevance 
in the rural parts (Bolgherini and Lippi 2016). The still existing provinces 
will have to give up 50% of their staff (instead of 30% for the CM, Legge 
190/2014; Legge di stabilità 2016, Legge 208/2015). The council and the 
president are no longer directly elected and they are reduced to basic func-
tions (Bolgherini and Lippi 2016, 275). Already in 2012, the Monti govern-
ment had plans to abolish or re-organise the provinces (spending review act, 
Dl 35/2012 or Legge 135/2012). The final abolishment of the still existing 
provinces and the subsequent substitution by inter-municipal unions was 
part a legislative proposal in 2016 that failed in a referendum. Hence, there 
would be no second tier of local government with constitutional status 
except the città metropolitane. For the following governments of Gentiloni 
and in particular Salvini, Di Maio and Conte (who took over the govern-
ment in 2018), these plans were no longer a priority. Hence, the provinces 
still exist outside the city-regions, but, as we will see later, the provinces can 
be seen as the losers in this stream of reforms.
Spatial planning and urban development fall within the scope of national 
framework or competing legislation,2 with the regions being granted consid-
erable scope for derogation here. The national planning law dates from 1942 
(Law 1150/1942) and has never been completely revised, though intense 
debates have been going on since the mid 1990s (Fedeli 2012; Servillo and 
Lingua 2014). The most relevant binding plan laid down in the law is the 
local general plan (Piano Regolatore Generale – PRG). The PRG must be 
drawn up by all municipalities and defines land use for the entire urban 
area in the sense of zoning, and also contains statements for urban design 
(height, density, building typologies, etc.).3 It thus combines land use plan-
ning and development planning. The resulting considerable effort is prob-
ably one of the reasons for the implementation deficits of this plan.
Some regions have adopted independent planning laws and introduced a 
two-tier urban planning system consisting of a structural plan and an imple-
mentation plan (Piroddi 2009; Fedeli 2012).4 Further levels of supra-local 
or strategic spatial planning were not initially planned, with the exception 
of a state regional plan that was hardly used. In the 1990s, provinces were 
granted the function of provincial territorial planning. Some provinces have 
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taken up the task of strategic spatial development planning in the 2000s 
and this has also been introduced in supplementary regional laws. However, 
these plans, the provincial PTCP (Piano Territoriale di Coordinamento 
Provinciale) in particular, are not plans in the sense of a comprehensive 
control of spatial development, but rather a coordination of local land use 
plans. As a result, they are descriptions of a state to be aimed at by defining 
development axes, infrastructures and environmental protection zones. The 
concepts or mission statements primarily bind the level at which they were 
drawn up.
The higher scale territorial plans of the regions usually do not address 
the scale of city-regions and make only limited prescriptions for settlement 
development. Only the environmental plans relating to nature conservation 
and flood risks have an effect here in the sense of a plan hierarchy through 
the binding designation of protected areas (Colavitti et al. 2013). Since the 
regions are responsible for tourism, economic development, environmental 
planning and some infrastructures, the effect in terms of implementation is 
high. On the other hand, no binding statements were made for settlement 
development (in the sense of growth rates, centralities, cartographic defi-
nitions, caps for settlement development). As we will see later, the recent 
legislation and the new generation of regional plans in Tuscany and Emilia 
Romagna demonstrate more ambition with regard to the reduction of land 
consumption and control of settlement but they do this by defining general 
rules for the reduction of land consumption.
3.1.1  The role of city-regions in the Italian 
multi-level governance system
A profiled national policy for city-regions or metropolitan areas is a rather 
recent phenomenon in Italy (Vinci 2019; Fedeli 2017). One of the few 
national initiatives targeting city-regions was the so-called Progetto 80 
(Project 80) that was published in the late 1960s. Project 80 (full name 
Rapporto preliminare al secondo programma economico nazionale 1971–
75) was a comprehensive socio-economic development programme for 
the whole nation. Progetto 80 defined spatial development priorities for 
the first and second half of the 1970s and defined a range of territories to 
be the target for funding and sectoral policies. Besides tourism areas and 
rural parts of the county, numerous city-regions were defined as metro-
politan systems (sistemi metropolitani) that were supposed to be the basis 
for Italian industrial development and coordinated infrastructure planning 
in the 1970s (Allulli 2010, 24; Renzoni 2012, 40). In particular, scenario 
P (modello programmatico P) described a national system of separated 
polycentric city-regions well connected by a nation-wide system of infra-
structure (Renzoni 2012, 87). Like similar national planning initiatives 
in many European states, the economic crisis of the early 1970s stopped 
Project 80.
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City-regional governance and inter-municipal planning remained a rare 
phenomenon in Italy, although there have been numerous attempts in city-
regions such as Milan and Torino (in part forced by national legislation, 
Tortorella and Allulli 2014, 25). In Milan, an inter-municipal master plan 
was debated and elaborated in the period between the mid-1950s and 1967 
(Balducci 2003; Gualini 2003). The final document, however, included sev-
eral compromises and was more a general statement with uncertain pros-
pects for implementation.
With regard to metropolitan policies and planning, the provinces as the 
second level of local self-government are particularly relevant in city-regions, 
since they at least partly represent a functional urban region. However, it 
is only since the 1990s that the provinces have had limited resources and 
competencies in urban-regional policy and planning and took initiative in 
city-regions such as Milan or Bologna (see below).
The more recent history begins in 1990 with a national law (legge 
142/1990 Ordinamento delle autonomie locali), which aimed to promote 
inter-municipal cooperation in metropolitan regions (so-called aree metro-
politane) (see Table 3.1). As the regions were called upon to implement the 
law and define perimeters, this law is considered to be a top-down initiative. 
Although this law was in line with the European-wide trend at the time 
(renaissance of city-regions), some regional and many local governments 
largely ignored it (Riboldazzi 2017; Vinci 2019; Vandelli and Vitali 2014, 
80). In the following years, the state government reacted to this imple-
mentation deficit of the 1990 law. A new law from 1993 provided for the 
establishment of city-regions as a more voluntary task of the municipalities 
but left the role for the provinces unclear (Law 436/1993). The effect was 
Table 3.1  Milestones in metropolitan policy
Act Content
142/1990 Obligation to form city-regions (aree metropolitane)
436/1993 Obligation is transformed to voluntary cooperation, 
aree metropolitane as arenas of voluntary 
cooperation of cities, regional conferences
265/1999 Initiative for CM is assigned to the municipalities 
and provinces, but remains voluntary
Title V Constitution 2001 CM are described as equal constitutive units of the 
state (next to municipalities, provinces, regions)
42/2009 Law on fiscal 
federalism
Provides for the creation of the CM, with the 
simultaneous abolition of the provinces
2012 Spending
Review Act /135/2012
adjusted in 2013 
Provides for the creation of the CM, but was 
declared invalid by the Constitutional Court in 
2013 because of concerns about the electoral 
arrangements (judgement No 220/2013)
56/2014 Delrio law provides for the formation of the CM as 
of 1 January 2015
Source: Tortorella and Allulli 2014, 33–41; Balducci 2003, 62–64
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again a cumbersome implementation. A few attempts were made to estab-
lish regional conferences as a format for inter-municipal coordination and 
concerted action for strategic development (Debernardi and Rosso 2008). 
Only in some city-regions such as Turin, Milan, Bologna and, to a limited 
degree, also in Florence did city-regional initiatives emerge in the 1990s 
(Bologna) or later (Torino, Milan in the 2000s) as more stable arrangements 
(Balducci 2003; Vandelli and Vitali 2014, 80). The case of Bologna is often 
referred to as a pioneer because in this city-region, 48 mayors concluded a 
kind of contract and founded a regional conference (1994) that produced 
significant outputs (see section 3.3; Vandelli and Vitali 2014). However, it 
was not until the end of the 1990s, with the adoption of Law 265/1999, that 
the municipalities were given a more binding responsibility for the establish-
ment of city-regions together with the provinces (Balducci 2003).
This ambiguity reflects a more general contradiction between admin-
istrative decentralisation and regional centralism. Law 265/1999 
attempted to overcome this ambiguity by giving municipalities and 
provinces the task of establishing the metropolitan city.
(Allulli 2010, 9)
In fact, in some city-regions inter-municipal initiatives were taken. A pro-
cess of strategic planning began in Turin in 2000, which also led to the crea-
tion of a Conferenza Metropolitana. This was followed in 2008 by a kind 
of round table, to which the city of Turin invited 17 mayors from the sur-
rounding municipalities (Tortorella and Allulli 2014, 64). The province of 
Milan initiated a city-regional dialogue (città di città – city of cities) in 2005 
(Balducci et al. 2011). All these initiatives remained isolated and temporary 
initiatives and did not provide for any institutional changes.
3.1.1.1  The Delrio Law and the Città Metropolitana
Despite the isolated approaches of city-regional planning and governance 
in Bologna, Turin and Milan, the problem of more effective coordination 
and strategic planning remained largely unsolved in most city-regions, for 
various reasons. Firstly, in contrast to Germany and France, there is no 
comparable offer of institutional formats for inter-municipal cooperation 
that have been successfully tested (such as the French Intercommunalité or 
the Regionalverbände in Germany). Unioni di comuni (municipal unions) 
have existed since at least the 2000s in most city-regions, but were less rel-
evant because of a lack of incentives. Secondly, institutional immobility is 
evident, which makes reforms in the area of city-regional cooperation rather 
unlikely (D’Albergo 2012). As already mentioned, the new constitution of 
2001 recognised city-regions (città metropolitane) as a constituent level of 
the state alongside municipalities, provinces and regions but attempts to 
create city-regions were not taken immediately. In the wake of the financial 
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crisis and the need to consolidate public budgets, the initiative was taken 
up again in 2009 in the Fiscal Federalism Act with the ultimate goal to 
replace provinces with città metropolitane. The provincial governments and 
the biggest city of the province were requested to make proposals for the 
territorial demarcation and functional profile of the new entity. In 2012, 
the introduction of the città metropolitane was made more binding. The 
background was the spending review act passed by the Monti government 
in July 2012, which included città metropolitane as a measure of budgetary 
consolidation (Tortorella and Allulli 2014, 33–41; Donati 2018). As part 
of a decree that was basically dedicated to the revision of public expendi-
ture and approved in August 2012, Article 18 introduced the institution 
of metropolitan cities, due to be implemented on 1st January 2014, as an 
accompanying measure to the reduction of the number of the provincial 
tiers all over Italy (Bolgherini and Lippi 2016, 275–276). The law aimed 
at the reduction of the number of provinces from 110 to 50. A province 
should have a minimum size regarding area and population (2,500 km² and 
350,000 inhabitants) (Barbieri 2012; Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, 127).
The declared aim of the national government was to abolish the provinces 
in the metropolitan regions and replace them with a new kind of second 
tier of local government (città metropolitana) (D’Albergo 2012; Camagni 
2014). The legislative initiative, named after the then Minister Delrio, was 
enacted as early as 2012 in the course of a series of legislative acts (Decreto-
Legge 6 luglio 2012, n. 95. see above),5 but was then classified in part as 
unconstitutional (at the request of the provinces) (Fedeli 2017; Vandelli and 
Vitali 2014). Despite this (temporary) victory of the provinces and the delay 
of the reform, the introduction of the città metropolitana was seen as inevi-
table and the next two years were used intensively by local actors to discuss 
the functional profile and competences of these new bodies.
After amendments, the law came into force on 1 January 2015 and had 
to be substantiated in regional laws in accordance with the joint legislation 
of the state and the regions, whereby there was some room for manoeuvre 
(Mobilio 2018; Tubertini 2015).6 The Delrio law had to be implemented by 
the regions in their respective laws (e.g. Lombardia Regional Law. no 19, 
2015; Toscana Regional Law no 22, 2015). Following the national law, the 
regional governments were invited to make proposals for the structures and 
competences of the new city-regions as well, which led to intensive discus-
sions between the regional governments, provinces and local governments, 
often with participation of local university departments (D’Albergo 2012; 
Fedeli 2012; Camagni 2014). Questions of financing (how to deal with debts 
of the provinces, takeover and redistribution of personnel, etc.) were prob-
lematic. It was not necessary to stick to the previous borders of the province. 
However, the hurdles for changing territorial boundaries were set very high 
in Law 42/2009 (with reference to Article 133 of the Constitution).
As a result, in ten city-regions the provinces ceased to exist. Some pro-
vincial functions were to be transferred to the regions, some to the new 
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entity. Strategic planning was defined as an essential new function of the 
città metropolitana. A total of 14 metropolitan areas are affected, although 
for the four city-regions in the semi-autonomous regions of Sardinia and 
Sicily (Cagliari, Palermo, Catania, Messina-Reggio-Calabria) discussion of 
regional laws took much longer, not least because of the disputed option of 
the direct election. A special provision has been made for the Roma Capitale 
city-region in the draft law. In the original text, the Città Metropolitana di 
Roma coincided with the city of Roma Capitale and the province would 
continue to exist for the rest of the territory. Municipalities of the prov-
ince would have the option to join the città metropolitana until the end of 
February 2014. However, the national parliament (Camera dei deputati) 
did not follow this suggestion (Tortorella and Allulli 2014, 44). As can be 
seen in Table 3.2, the size, number of municipalities and number of inhab-
itants of the 14 CM differs considerably (with Torino being exceptionally 
big). This is a result of the delimitation of the provinces and institutional 
policies of the early 1990s. 
3.1.1.2  Inter-municipal cooperation and territorial 
reforms – an alternative?
Besides the creation of the città metropolitana, the Delrio Act had a sec-
ond goal: facilitating amalgamations of municipalities and inter-municipal 
cooperation (unioni e fusioni di comuni). Intercommunal cooperation in 
Table 3.2  Città Metropolitane
Number of municipalities 
and inter-municipal unions




Bari 41 (1 Union) 1,246,297 / 313,213 3,862.88
Bologna 55 (8 Unions) 990,681 / 380,635 3,702.3 
Firenze 42 (4 Unions) 987,354 / 366,039 3,513.69 
Genova 67 (7 Unions) 851,283 / 582,320 1,838.5
Milano 134 (5 Unions, 
7 Homogeneous zones)
3,075,083 / 1,262,101 1,575
Napoli 92 3,055,339 / 959,052 1,178.93 
Reggio Calabria 
(est. 2016)
97 (1 Union) 550,323 / 180,686 3,210.37 
Roma Capitale 121 (6 Unions) 4,039,813 / 2,638,848 5,363.28 
Torino 315 (27 Unions, 
11 Homogeneous zones)
2,254,720 / 872,091 6,830.3
Venezia 44 (3 Unions) 847,983 / 259,263 2,472.91 
Cagliari (est. 2016) 17 (2 Unions)i 431,657 / 154,083 1,248 
Catania 58 (2 Unions) 1,115,535 / 311,402 3,573.68 
Messina 108 (15 Unions) 640,675 / 229,565 3,266.12 
Palermo 82 (19 Unions) 1,271,406 / 657,960 5,009.28
i  The CM of Cagliari is the only case where the number of municipalities does not coincide with 
that of the former province (17 instead of 71).
Source: www.urban@it.it; Tortorella and Allulli 2014, 55
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city-regions in the form of special-purpose associations does not have the 
same status in Italy as in Germany or France. It is, however, well established 
in the sparsely populated mountainous areas and also in rural areas (Fedeli 
2017; Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, 161). Since a territorial reform has 
never been carried out, almost 7,000 out of the more than 8,000 munici-
palities have less than 10,000 inhabitants (see for figures Bobbio 2005, 31). 
Four thousand, six hundred municipalities have less than 3,000 inhabitants 
Figure 3.1  Città Metropolitane d’Italia (creative common licence) 2021 Concept: K. 
Zimmermann Cartography: F. Gela
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(see also Riboldazzi 2017; Bolgherini et al. 2016). To solve the problem of 
size and efficiency, the instruments of consortia and unioni di comuni were 
introduced long before the Delrio Law. Since the early 2000s, unioni di 
comuni as a form of inter-municipal cooperation has been strengthened by 
national and regional laws and more precisely defined in terms of its status 
(Bolgherini and Lippi 2016, 273).7 Unioni di comuni are special-purpose 
associations that can be set up on a voluntary basis for the provision of 
public services (social services, local public transport). This is increasingly 
being used, also in city-regions (Riboldazzi 2017).8 Within 13 out of 14 
CM, unions have been established, but cover only parts of the territory 
(with CM Bologna being the most advanced case, see Table 3.2). The num-
ber differs from one (Bari, Reggio Calabria) to 27 (Torino). The core-cities 
are usually not part of a unione. With the Delrio Law and the subsequent 
regional laws, inter-municipal cooperation was to be strengthened, with the 
unioni di comuni being the ultimate instrument of choice.
3.1.1.3  Institutional aspects and legitimacy of the Città 
Metropolitana
The Italian expert discourse distinguishes two institutional models for the 
città metropolitana (Tubertini 2015, 10; Mobilio 2018):
 a) a federal model, which ultimately remains more of a coordinating 
body, with relations between the municipalities being more horizontal 
(inter-municipal association model)
 b) a territorial model that is a sum of municipalities and represents a met-
ropolitan community (with the consequence of direct elections and a 
stronger role for the strategic plan).
Mobilio sees most CMs as mixed forms, with Milan, Rome and Naples 
forming one pole due to the possibility of direct election of the metropolitan 
council and Bologna, Florence and also Genova corresponding to the more 
federal model (Mobilio 2018, 5). In terms of institutional status, the estab-
lishment of the CM is a big change as provinces were a genuine level of self-
government, while the CM are a derivative entity with local governments 
being the constituent parts. This is reflected in the legitimacy structures and 
the functional profile.
In all CM, the mayor of the core city, which will keep its status as a munic-
ipality, is automatically the mayor of the new entity. Hence, the mayor is 
elected by the population of the core city but not by the citizens of the entire 
città metropolitana. The mayor has the authority to issue directives and is 
the head of the executive. He chairs the meetings of the metropolitan coun-
cil, which varies in size depending on the size of the city-region: 24 members 
for city-regions with more than 3 million inhabitants, 18 for city-regions 
with 800,000 to 3 million inhabitants and 14 for city-regions with less than 
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800,000 inhabitants. The Delrio Law explicitly allows for the direct election 
of the council and the mayor but defines conditions for that. Direct election 
is only possible if the core city is divided into subunits (de-amalgamation). 
For the city-regions with more than 3 million inhabitants (Rome, Milan 
and Naples) slightly different rules apply. The law stipulates that homog-
enous zones (zone omogenee ZO, see below) have to be established and, in 
addition, the core city needs to establish decentralised subunits with some 
administrative autonomy. Hence, the conditions for the big three cities are 
less demanding. In fact, the big three voted for this option and aimed at 
direct election of the mayor and the metropolitan council. In addition, the 
statute of Genova mentions that the metropolitan mayor can be directly 
elected. However, in order to realise the direct election, the national elec-
toral law has to be changed which is still pending (Vandelli 2015; Camera 
dei Deputati 2020a). Hence, in all CM the members of the metropolitan 
council are delegated municipal councillors or mayors. The direct election 
of the council has also been abolished for the remaining provinces.
The Metropolitan Conference forms the second chamber and consists 
of all mayors of the city-region. It must be consulted in several matters, 
but may also make proposals that must be adopted or rejected by quali-
fied majority. In some cases, the matters are determined in a positive list 
(Tubertini 2015, 11). A local referendum and civic initiatives are possible 
but not all statutes mention this option explicitly (i.e. Florence). Some stat-
utes underline the necessity of additional initiatives of participation and sug-
gest a range of measures of participation (Genova, Milan, Naples) such as 
a metropolitan forum (Naples, Milano) and a youth forum (Naples). The 
statute of Bologna gives more emphasis to the role of municipalities as the 
appropriate sites for civic involvement. All statutes highlight the role of digi-
tal citizen involvement.
With regard to financing, the composition of the budget is similar to 
the ones of the provinces. As part of the decentralisation reforms and the 
(incomplete) introduction of fiscal federalism, every level of government in 
Italy has its own sources of income. In the case of the provinces and città 
metropolitane, this is mainly a fee for the registration of vehicles (imposta 
di trascrizione, IPT), a share of the liability insurance fee (for cars, imposta 
assicurazioni contro la responsabilità civile), a share of the income tax and 
an environmental fee (tributo ambientale) (Camera dei Deputati 2020b). 
Other sources are transfers from the region and the state. The proportion of 
these different sources varies from region to region but on average the inde-
pendent sources constitute more than half of the budget (Garganese et al. 
2018, 36). In general, the income of the provinces and CM has decreased 
(ibid. 32; Agnoletti et al. 2015). It is important to note that the subnational 
levels of government had to make a large contribution to the fiscal con-
solidation of the Italian state as the debts of central government are much 
higher than the debts of the subnational levels (Garganese et al. 2018, 23).9 
However, in the same period (2013 onwards) national government paid for 
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back payments of local governments in order to relaunch local economies 
(Ambrosanio et al. 2016). Financial help for provinces and città metropoli-
tane continued in 2017 (CM Milano 2020, 9–10).
Within the CM there is the possibility of introducing a kind of city dis-
trict as decentralised units (homogeneous zones, zone omogenee or ZO) 
which can also take over tasks (specifiche funzioni, con organismi di coor-
dinamento) of the CM. So far (as of 3 September 2020) this has been done 
in two of the 14 metropolitan cities: Milan (7) and Turin (11). Note that the 
CM Turin is much bigger in terms of territory and number of municipalities 
than other CM (see Table 3.2). In Naples, five zone omogenee have been 
identified but the final decision is to still to be made; in Reggio Calabria and 
in Rome this is still under discussion. In Bari, Cagliari, Florence, Genova 
and Venice their formation is possible according to their respective statutes, 
but there are no plans for implementation.10 In terms of function and insti-
tutional status, the ZO are a mix of a territorial framework for policies of 
the CM and a unit for coordination of services in the area. The delimitation 
of the zones is done based on common spatial, social or cultural characteris-
tics. Hence, one can assume that the zone can be referred to as soft interven-
tion space for specific policies in the strategic plan. The strategic plan (piano 
strategico) for the CM Milan sees the zone omogenee as an instrument for 
the perpetuation and inspiration of further inter-municipal cooperation in 
addition to already existing cooperation between surrounding municipali-
ties (CM di Milano 2016, 21–23). In the case of Milan, the zones are rep-
resented by an assembly of mayors of the municipalities being part of the 
zone. One of the members of the assembly (called coordinator) is chairing 
the assembly and represents the zone in the conference of all the ZO. The 
assembly is a consultative body with regard to decisions of the metropolitan 
council. Decentralisation of administrative capacities is possible but institu-
tional effects of the ZO have not yet been observed: neither do the ZO have 
their own administrative capacities nor are there any political effects on the 
Metropolitan Council or Assembly. The ZO have a different spatial delimi-
tation than the unioni di comuni and cover the whole territory of the città 
metropolitana, whilst only 17 of the 134 municipalities of the CM Milano 
are organised in one of the five unioni di comuni (UdC).
3.1.2  Functions and competences
The Italian literature usually identifies two models for the re-distribution 
of tasks between the regions and the città metropolitane (Bolgherini et al. 
2016, 348): a more conservative model that sees the CM as a continuation 
of the provinces plus the new task of strategic planning (i.e. Lombardia); a 
more residual model that foresees a substantial transfer of former provincial 
functions to the regions (Emilia-Romagna, Toscana). This may also include 
a transfer of provincial functions to municipalities or unions of municipali-
ties (the latter being the preferred solution).
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Among the former provincial functions that often have been up-scaled 
or re-centred to the regions are agriculture, fishing and hunting, tourism, 
vocational education and labour market policy, management of hydrologi-
cal risk and in some cases social services (Bolgherini et al. 2016, 348). The 
staff attached to these tasks has been transferred to regional governments. 
The loss of staff in this transition process was in most cases substantial 
(Vandelli and Morisi 2016, 187). As a result, the competences of the città 
metropolitane include three bundles of functions.
 1) The basic function as defined by the Delrio Law (applies for all CM).
 2) In addition, and unless otherwise provided for by regional laws, all 
the basic tasks of the provinces (so-called funzioni fondamentali 
provinciali).
 3) In addition, regional governments may delegate more non-basic tasks 
(funzioni non fondamentali).
In particular with regard to the latter two bundles of functions, signifi-
cant differences exist between the regions. Even the core tasks as defined 
in the national law have been taken up in the statutes in a variety of 
ways.
An essential element of the basic functions and new tasks is strategic 
planning. The strategic plan is supposed to be the central document for the 
coordination of spatial, social and economic development of the city-region 
and is to be renewed every three years. The coordinating effect and binding 
nature of this plan with regard to the municipalities is still not entirely clear 
as the prescriptions made in the law are minimal. The strategic plans already 
available show a high degree of diversity in terms of content and methods 
applied. They should serve to describe a future state of territorial, social and 
economic development and indicate the steps that need to be taken together 
with the municipalities and other actors.
Furthermore, the portfolio of basic tasks inherited from the provinces 
include:
 • A regional territorial plan (pianificazione territoriale al livello metro-
politano), which defines land use in the areas of infrastructure, environ-
ment and green spaces and can also give guidelines to the municipalities;
 • The coordination of public services of regional relevance (waste man-
agement plans, transport infrastructures such as provincial streets, in 
some cases also regional streets as delegated tasks);
 • Mobility (public transport planning and coordination, usually busses 
but also bicycle highways, creation and implementation of Sustainable 
Urban Mobility Plans – SUMP);
 • Coordination and promotion of economic and social development;
 • Communication networks, technology and digitalisation;
 • Maintenance and planning of school buildings.
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Further tasks are environmental planning (parks and protected areas, forests, 
risk management) and nature conservation, tourism as well as energy but 
this varies from region to region. The national as well as the regional laws 
and the statutes underline the option of increased cooperation between the 
CM and the municipalities or unions of municipalities. The municipalities 
and municipal unions can make use of the CM and delegate tasks via agree-
ments, but conversely, the CM can also delegate the execution of functions 
to the unions. The further assignment of municipal tasks has been explicitly 
highlighted as a possibility in many regional laws. In the case of Florence, the 
CM can also draw up the structure plan for all or some of the municipalities 
(piano strutturale = a kind of land use plan), if municipalities so wish.
The implementation of strategic planning and territorial planning reveals 
a great variety of forms and procedures. Reduction of land consumption, 
for instance, is mentioned in some but by far not all statutes (in Torino and 
Milan in the first article of the statute). With regard to the execution of ter-
ritorial planning, Vandelli sees some options for hierarchical interventions 
that are possible due to the Delrio Law: article 1, Comma 44 stipulates 
that the Piano Territoriale Metropolitano may “fissare vincoli e obiettivi 
all’attivita e all’esercizio delle funzioni dei comuni compresi nel territorio 
metropolitano” (Vandelli and Morisi 2016, 189).11
As mentioned above, the regions followed different paths when imple-
menting legislation. The law on the CM Florence makes hardly any state-
ments on the contents, procedures and objectives of the Piano Strategico 
(even the Delrio Law remains vague here), except that it must be in line 
with the objectives of the region (which are expressed, among others, in 
the regional territorial plan (PIT) of the Region of Tuscany). The law of the 
Liguria Region (Genova), on the other hand, emphasises economic develop-
ment and infrastructure planning as core elements (Tubertini 2015).
With regard to territorial planning, the instrument piano territoriale met-
ropolitano is defined in the national law but has to be used and implemented 
according to regional planning laws. Similar to the former provincial terri-
torial plan (PTCP), the piano territoriale metropolitano should serve for the 
implementation of the CM’s objectives. At the same time the plan sums up 
and include the intentions of the municipalities in urban development and 
sectoral planning. On the basis of the law, the CM can issue directives that 
the municipalities must implement within the scope of their planning com-
petences. It is still unclear, however, whether the CM will be able to assert 
itself as a level of strategic territorial governance. CMs have yet to find their 
exact function and role, in particular with regard to strategic planning.
Some of the matters mentioned in the Delrio Law have been defined more 
precisely in bylaws. Sustainable urban mobility plans are a case in point. 
A decree of the national ministry for transport in 2017 made the elabo-
ration of a sustainable urban mobility plan (following the principles of a 
SUMP as promoted by the European Commission) more or less obligatory 
for the CM (see also Legge n. 232/ 2016). The Decree of 4 August 2017 of 
the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport adopted the guidelines for the 
 Italy 133
drafting of a SUMP and established, in particular, that metropolitan cities 
need to elaborate a SUMP in order to access state funding for infrastruc-
ture, in particular for new interventions for rapid mass transport, such as 
metropolitan railway systems, metro and tram. This regulation is valid for 
the period 2019–2033. One third of the funding of this type available is 
reserved for the core city.
3.1.2.1  EU structural funds (2014–2020)
In the course of the programming of the Structural Funds period 2014–2020, 
city-regions were explicitly taken into account by the government. The pro-
gramme PON Città metropolitane (PON Metro, stands for Programma 
operativo nazionale plurifondo Città metropolitane 2014–2020) allowed 
for the application for projects in five priority axes: digital agenda, urban 
mobility and sustainable public services, services for social inclusion, infra-
structures for social inclusion and technical assistance. The programme 
provided roughly 892 M€ for the funding period 2014–2020 (Ministero 
Economia 2016, 6). The national programme makes a difference between 
the CM in terms of eligibility and identifies three groups: well off, in need, 
heavily in need (Agenzia per la Coesione Territoriale 2019). The national 
operational programme emphasised that integrated programmes should be 
designed, but that the core city should be preferred (Ministero Economia 
2014, 2). In addition, the metropolitan mayor was responsible for the pro-
cess of selecting projects (Ministero Economia 2016, 6). The reality shows, 
however, that in the later course of the implementation of PON Metro by 
no means only the core-cities were preferred. Therefore, the effect can also 
be assessed as ambivalent: the CM only defines the territorial framework by 
using the strategic plan and the metropolitan mayor moderates the selec-
tion process together with the municipalities and the region. The CM as an 
organisation does not implement the projects itself but acts as an interlocu-
tor for national and regional government. Hence, the CM exerts an admin-
istrative and moderating function. In Bologna, a certain degree of content 
and spatial control was achieved through the link with the Sustainable 
Urban Mobility Plan (SUMP).
To conclude this section on functions, the CM is responsible for some 
of the services of general interest inherited from the provinces (largely re-
production functions and administrative tasks). Economic development is 
present in the strategic plans but not very profiled. In addition, there is 
no specific governance form or instrument for implementation of economic 
development policies.
3.1.3  Ideas: discourse on services of general interest, 
competitiveness, territorial and functional reforms
The analysis of the ideational dimension of the reform reveals a sort of 
schizophrenic situation. On the one hand, the national law and regional laws 
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underline the overall responsibility of the new entity for the coordination 
of social and economic development in the territory of the 14 city-regions. 
On the other hand, this initial idea (already present in the national legal 
initiatives of the 1990s) was totally overwhelmed by the management of the 
financial and economic crisis post-2008. The private sector did not play a 
great role during the reform (Assolombarda/Rete Associazioni Industriali 
Metropolitani 2014).
Administrative simplification with regard to the territorial entities has 
been a topic of the political discourse for a very long time in Italy. In the 
corresponding documents of the Senate and the Camera dei Deputati in 
2010, the CM plays an important role with regard to the balanced alloca-
tion of functions between municipalities, municipal unions, provinces and 
regions. The national discourse of these years is clearly shaped by the quest 
for administrative simplification (semplificazione) and fiscal federalism (fed-
eralismo fiscale). At the level of the regions, subsidiarity is emphasised. In 
2011, 2012 and 2013 the focus is clearly on austerity measures (Spending 
Review Act, Decree Salva Italia, Stability Acts). The Salva Italia decree of 
5 December 2011, which came into force at the height of the financial cri-
sis and was followed by further regulations, provided for specific measures 
to reduce costs. The provinces were in particular a target (abolition of the 
Giunta, transfer of functions). The Delrio Act was preceded by other legis-
lative initiatives, most notably the one on fiscal federalism (law 42/2009), 
which reorganised the financial relations of local authorities (towards 
financing in line with needs) (Bolgherini and Lippi 2016; Ambrosio et al. 
2016). In this law, the CM was already treated on an equal footing with 
municipalities and provinces and in some articles (15, 23) it was specifically 
described in terms of a transitional regulation of function and scope. The 
CM were supposed to finance themselves through fees (tributi) and prob-
ably would have no tax revenues of their own.
With regard to the relevance of ideas, there are also substantial differ-
ences between the different levels of government as the regions and the local 
statutes underline the relevance of social and economic development with 
the strategic plan being the main instrument whereas on national level there 
is much more emphasis on austerity and simplification of the public sector. 
It is striking that the statutes and regional laws deal much more clearly 
with issues of competitiveness and socio-economic regional development, 
without, of course, forgetting the aspect of territorially evenly distributed 
quality of services in the field of social services (as well as cultural heritage 
and nature conservation).
The same applies for the aspect of enhancing accountability and legiti-
macy. On national level discourse, this dimension was not very relevant 
with exception of the option for the direct election in Milan, Rome and 
Naples. However, as has been shown above, most of the statutes do offer 
much more than that.
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3.1.4  Spatial relationships
The scholarly debate on spaces of flows and flexible geographies in Italy is 
rich and full of inspirations (Balducci et al. 2017; CSS 2011). There is also 
a long debate on so-called large areas (aree vaste) and the optimal size of 
functional territories in public administration. However, in terms of spa-
tial relationships, the reform was a simple substitution of the provinces 
with the CM. Other municipalities may join voluntarily, but municipalities 
may also withdraw (depending on the regional law, with mandatory ref-
erence to Article 133 of the Constitution, which already provided similar 
provisions for the provinces). Accordingly, a municipality would have to 
express its interest, the state would have to enact a law and consult the 
regional government on it. So far, this has not been the case in any CM and 
is unlikely to happen in the futures as this procedure is quite complex and 
time-consuming.
At the time of the reform process, with few exceptions, no spatial analy-
ses (i.e. with reference to the perimeters of functional urban regions) were 
included in the preparation of the legislation at all. The eventual territo-
rial management of rescaled relationships and the in-between spaces of 
metropolitan areas such as Torino – Milan, Milan – Bologna or Firenze – 
Bologna, the so-called metropolitan question, was not discussed. A white 
paper by the Consiglio Italiano per le Scienze Sociali (CSS and Dematteis 
2011, 387), which dealt with the administrative paradox in Italy, mean-
ing that no differentiation is made between small and large cities regarding 
their competences, had no influence either. At least the Spending Review 
Act (2009) suggested a reorganisation of the provinces in November 2012. 
The province of Milan, for example, was supposed to be merged with the 
Province of Monza and Brianza and the province of Florence would have 
been merged with Pistoia and Prato. These regulations were later declared 
unconstitutional.12
In the case of Torino this neglect of functional spatial relationships means 
that a lot of small municipalities in the mountainous areas in the west of 
Torino are part of the CM but have only limited functional relationships 
with the core city (Voghera 2017). Other CMs, such as Genova are very 
small in terms of jurisdictional territory. The Italian planning system does 
not foresee any format or instrument for territorial cooperation at a larger 
scale (i.e. a portfolio of different governance forms for a variety of territo-
rial scales that differ in institutional strength). The neglect of concepts such 
as soft spaces or relational space has been criticised by scholars at greater 
length (Fedeli 2017; Paba et al. 2017; Paba and Perrone 2018).
Besides the question of the role and perimeter of the provinces, in public 
administration in Italy there is an ongoing discussion about the optimal size 
for territorial forms of state action. The large areas (aree vaste) are thought 
for the provision of public services (Bolgherini et al 2016; Donati 2018). 
These so-called ATO (Autorità di ambiti territoriali ottimali = optimal 
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territories for public policies) are a form of functional territories that have 
been introduced from 1994 onwards for policies such as health services, 
waste management and wastewater management (Bolgherini et al. 2016; 
Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014, 161).
A minimum of internal spatial flexibility and scaling is possible through 
the use of the zone omogeene (see Table 3.2). ZOs exist or are planned 
in several CM, but are used differently. In CM Turin, the largest CM in 
terms of surface area und number of municipalities, they have so far served 
exclusively to represent their member municipalities in the Conferenza 
Metropolitana. In addition, some municipalities cooperate in unioni di 
comuni, mostly in the fields of human resources development, with com-
bined use of IT infrastructure and office space, economic development, envi-
ronmental services and local police, but also to some extent in the field of 
spatial planning. In contrast to ZO, unioni di comuni do not cover the entire 
CM and have a different perimeter. In this respect, the various regions seem 
to have different degrees of close ties: while in Bologna almost all the munic-
ipalities of the CM (except Bologna) are organised in unioni di comuni (no 
ZO exist here), in Venice this is the case only for 12 of the 44 municipalities, 
although there are no ZO (yet) here either. In Turin, there are 11 ZOs 
covering all municipalities and 27 unioni di comuni covering most of the 
315 municipalities. However, 17 of the unioni di comuni are successors of 
the unioni montane, which were dissolved as an association in 2014 (cf. the 
respective websites of the CM at http://osservatorio .urbanit .it/).
3.1.5  Interpretation and conclusion
The start of the CM was anything but smooth. From the perspective of the 
municipalities, the new CMs were initially seen as successors to the prov-
inces and not accepted as a new level of city-regional policy-making. The 
CM were also not strongly supported discursively as expected by the regions 
and the central government. Thus, they inherited many weaknesses and 
problems of the provinces (budget problems, unpopularity with the munici-
palities and regions etc.) (Fedeli 2017). The main problem of the provinces 
was the lack of acceptance vis-à-vis the other levels of government. The 
provinces were first grade entities working within their own framework of 
goals that were not in all cases well-coordinated with other levels of govern-
ment. The CM, in contrast, follows a more utilitarian model of legitimacy 
as they have to prove that they are useful and effective. However, some of 
the functions are not well defined in national law.
Seen against the background of the ad hoc legislation in the period 2009–
2012 with many laws and decrees on fiscal consolidation with frequent 
changes of government, Bolgherini and Lippi (2016) state that the Delrio 
Law was at least successful in giving the reform a more comprehensive out-
look, bringing the different ends of the various reform ideas together (aus-
terity, simplification, better coordination of social, economic and territorial 
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development in city-regions). The Delrio Law did not create a strong insti-
tution but highlighted better horizontal and vertical coordination of levels 
(regions, CM, municipalities, municipal unions), decentralisation, and the 
integrated perspective on territorial forms of government. Most of the previ-
ous legal initiatives were purely focussed on austerity measures and took a 
very fiscal-technical view. It was only the second passing of the law under 
Matteo Renzi in 2014 that allowed for a broader range of arguments and 
overcame the purely technocratic character of the reform at least in its ini-
tial stages (planning, modernisation of the state through further territorial 
and functional reforms also beyond the CM, combating the economic crisis, 
etc.).
The dominance of the core city is also criticised. Automatically designat-
ing the mayor of the core city as mayor of the CM has failed to create a bal-
anced system of representation between sometimes very small municipalities 
and the core city (Riboldazzi 2017, 93). The homogeneous zones form an 
intermediary level in some of the CM but are not suitable for achieving a 
balance. They are not used to pool the interests of municipalities in their 
perimeter. It is not clear whether these zones will actually be given tasks. 
The CM can also hardly be described as a unit of local self-government. 
First of all, the metropolitan mayor is always the Lord Mayor of the core 
city, which he will primarily take care of, since he (or she) was directly 
elected by its inhabitants. Furthermore, the council is only indirectly elected. 
However, the mayor can delegate tasks to the second mayor or other coun-
cillors (as happened in Milan).
3.2  The Città Metropolitana di Bologna: frontrunner for 
territorial cooperation in Italy?
Our intention for the metropolitan city is to be a body with a light 
structure, but with a strong ability to guide and coordinate the munici-
palities, a body that performs mainly planning and programming func-
tions, with a vision in which the metropolitan city is first and foremost 
a federation of municipalities.13
Virginio Merola, Sindaco metropolitano di Bologna 
(Preface of the PSM 2.0)
The political debate about a potential metropolitan government for the city-
region of Bologna is not new. A process of collaboration between Bologna 
and 15 surrounding municipalities started already in the late 1960s with the 
inter-municipal plan Piano Intercomunale del Comprensorio Bolognese.14 In 
1967, an inter-municipal land-use plan was elaborated, trying to define a 
general outline for the territorial development of the city-region. The plan 
was indicative for the local plans of Bologna and 16 surrounding munici-
palities (Gabellini et al. 2017, 178–179). This initiative found a successor in 
the inter-municipal urban plan in 1984 (Piano Urbanistico Intercomunale) 
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(Fabbricatti 2016, 94). Still being an informal instrument for the coordination 
of local urban development (mobility, settlements), the perimeter was bigger 
as a reaction to suburbanisation. However, the impact was weak due to the 
voluntary character of the plan (Gabellini et al. 2017, 183). While the city of 
Bologna considered a city-regional dimension in its local plans (in particular 
with regard to the extension of infrastructure), it was the province of Bologna 
that took over a city-regional planning function from the 1990s onwards. 
At the same time, the regional government of Emilia Romagna renewed its 
territorial policies, taking into account the polycentric urban structure of the 
whole region Emilia Romagna but this initiative was only partly coherent 
with the initiatives taken by the province of Bologna (ibid. 185).
An important step was taken in 1994 when the agreement on the 
Metropolitan City of Bologna was signed by 37 mayors and the province of 
Bologna (Accordo per la Città Metropolitana di Bologna; Tubertini 2018, 
2; Gabellini et al. 2017; Jouve and Lefèvre 2002). This agreement estab-
lished the Metropolitan Conference, where mayors and managers of the 
involved municipalities collaborated on a voluntary basis for the creation 
of common development plans (CM Bologna 2016, 5; see also Jouve and 
Lefèvre 2002). The idea of a city-regional railway system was on the agenda 
since then. The idea of an enforced inter-municipal cooperation has also 
been supported by the regional government of Emilia Romagna since the 
late 1990s and early 2000s through the approval of several laws promot-
ing inter-municipal cooperation (not only in the Bologna city-region). The 
existing inter-municipal associations in the Bologna city-region (unioni di 
comuni) are partly the result of this period. With the approval of Regional 
Law Nr. 33 in 1995 on the territorial boundary of the metropolitan area of 
Bologna and reallocation of functions, the regional government delimited 
the functional area of the city-region of Bologna by referring to the jurisdic-
tional boundary of the province of Bologna (Fabbricatti 2016, 94).
The regional government tried to improve the cooperation between the 
city of Bologna and surrounding municipalities and supported the concept 
of a polycentric development in the regional territory. Several initiatives can 
be mentioned: the signature of the inter-institutional agreement (Accordo 
Quadro per la Città Metropolitana di Bologna) by the Region, Province and 
City of Bologna in 2009 or the creation of the first voluntary strategic met-
ropolitan plan between 2011 and 2013 (Fabbricatti 2016, 92). At the same 
time, the regional government continued to support inter-municipal cooper-
ation on a smaller scale. Since 2012, a regional law has existed that enforces 
inter-municipal collaboration even more strongly for smaller municipalities 
(RER 2012).15
This demonstrates that, in the case of Bologna, during the several politi-
cal (and economic) moments of crisis that have happened in Italy in the last 
decades (Regalia and Valbruzzi 2016, 55–56), the idea of creating a city-
region did not lose its relevance and appeal. The city-region of Bologna is 
considered to be one of the rare cases in Italy where the idea of metropolitan 
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governance has met continuous and considerable support by different levels 
of government (local, provincial, regional). Hence, the implementation of 
the Delrio Law met some pre-existing structures and attitudes that were in 
favour of inter-municipal cooperation.
In the course of the implementation of the Delrio Law, the Province 
of Bologna has been replaced on 1 January 2015 by the new entity, Città 
Metropolitana di Bologna, which took over the former provincial bound-
ary and also quite a few of its tasks (Tubertini 2015). However, relevant 
tasks in environmental policies and planning have been shifted to the region 
(Tubertini 2015, 2018; RER 2015a), together with a significant number of 
employees (almost 500 out of 900, CM Bologna 2017, 5). The Metropolitan 
City of Bologna comprises 55 municipalities differing in population and 
size. The size of the area is 3.703 km², the number of inhabitants is 1,006 
million (2016). The biggest city is Bologna with 389.261 inhabitants and a 
surface area of 140km².
3.2.1  The institution Città Metropolitana di Bologna
The current statute of the Metropolitan City of Bologna has been approved 
by the Metropolitan Conference on 23 December 2014 (CM Bologna 2016c). 
The document defines the main principles, roles and functions of the new 
institution. According to the Delrio Law and the statute, the Metropolitan 
City has different ruling bodies: the metropolitan mayor, the metropoli-
tan conference and the metropolitan council. In addition, the statute of the 
Metropolitan City includes the presidency office which is a unique element.
 • As defined by national law, the mayor of the city of Bologna is simul-
taneously the mayor of the Metropolitan City of Bologna (Virginio 
Merola from the Democratic Party). He has been in office since June 
2011, re-elected in 2016. He is the political head of the metropolitan 
city by convening and presiding over the metropolitan council and the 
metropolitan conference. Moreover, his tasks are the supervision and 
execution of actions, the implementation of guidelines and other func-
tions assigned to the metropolitan city by laws or regulations in force 
(CM Bologna 2016c, art. 33).
 • The metropolitan council consists of 18 councillors: they are elected 
based on party lists by councillors of all 55 municipalities. As a result 
of the 2016 elections, the Democratic Party has the majority of seats 
with 13, followed by the Uniti per l’Alternativa and Rete Civica which 
have two seats each, and the Five Stars Movement with a single seat. 
Five councillors are from the city of Bologna, two from Casalecchio 
di Reno. The other councillors are from one municipality, and in total 
the councillors represent 13 municipalities out of 55. The distribution 
of seats is to the benefit of the bigger municipalities whereas smaller 
municipalities are not well represented (but see the representation of the 
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unione di comuni in the institutional fabric of the CM in the following 
section). The situation provoked a discussion about a lack of territorial 
representation and the advantages of a direct election of the Consiglo 
(council), which is also prevalent in other city-regions (Tubertini 2015). 
Seven of the councilors have a thematic responsibility (consiglieri del-
egati) but the CM has no collegial organ or managing board with full 
time assignments (giunta or Mayor’s cabinet).
 • The Metropolitan Conference is a collegial body that encompasses the 
metropolitan mayor and all mayors of the 54 municipalities within the 
Metropolitan City. It has advisory and consultative powers set by the 
Delrio Law and the statute of the Metropolitan City of Bologna (CM 
Bologna 2016c, art. 31). The metropolitan mayor may consult the 
Metropolitan Conference on every matter. The main responsibility is, 
however, an eventual change of the statute. The metropolitan confer-
ence has only weak supervisory and control functions. Veto options are 
limited.
 • With regard to the territorial governance structure, the CM Bologna dif-
fers from the other Italian metropolitan cities. Besides the council and 
the metropolitan conference, all involved parties agreed to establish a 
consultative body (Art. 32 of the statute): the Ufficio di Presidenza della 
Conferenza metropolitana. The Presidency Office of the Metropolitan 
Council is a body specifically set out by the statute of the Metropolitan 
City of Bologna. The body is part of the metropolitan conference and 
brings together the presidents of the seven municipal unions (unioni 
di comuni). The tasks are to support the work of the Metropolitan 
Conference. More importantly, the presidency office serves as a link 
between the seven unions of municipalities and the policies of the 
Metropolitan City.
Unioni di comuni are associations of municipalities and are responsible for 
services they accomplish on behalf of their members (RER 2012). The range 
of responsibilities and organisational forms of the seven unioni di comuni 
differs (CM Bologna 2018a). Some have joint offices and their own staff, 
others use offices and staff in different municipalities, mainly for the purpose 
of cost savings. Unioni di comuni have existed in Bologna for 20 years (since 
the late 1990s) and are an important pillar of metropolitan governance, both 
in terms of bundling and representation of local interest as well as imple-
mentation of public services (CM Bologna 2016b). Fifty-one municipalities 
form seven unions (Unione di Comuni dell’Appennino Bolognese, Unione di 
Comuni Savena-Idice, Unione Valli del Reno, Lavino e Samoggia, Unione 
Terre di Pianura, Unione Reno Galliera, Unione di Comuni Terre d’acqua 
and Nuovo Circondario Imolese, see Table 3.3). The strongest one in terms 
of functions and organisational capacities is Reno Galliera with eight mem-
ber municipalities and the responsibility for the following functions: civil 
protection, social services, ICT services, local police, territorial governance 
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and environmental services (one stop shops) (CM Bologna 2018a). Only six 
municipalities are non-associated municipalities. Besides the regional capital 
of Emilia Romagna, the City of Bologna, these are Budrio, Castenaso, Alto 
Reno Terme, San Lazzaro di Savena and Molinella (CM Bologna 2018, 
updated July 2021). The municipalities Molinella and Alto Reno Terme 
are situated in the western and eastern periphery of the CM; San Lazzaro 
borders directly with Bologna. Alto Reno Terme was part of an Unione 
until 2017 but this association collapsed.16 Two of the neighbouring munici-
palities of Alto Reno Terme were also not part of a union but joined the 
Unione di Comuni Appenino Bolognese in 2018. The regional government 
and the CM promote the amalgamation of municipalities and strengthen-
ing of the unions. Almagamations happened in 2013/14 and in 2016 when 
five municipalities merged and created the new municipality of Valsamoggia 
in the north-west of Bologna and two municipalities merged to create the 
municipality Alto Reno Terme (CM Bologna 2017, 14).
The creation of unioni di comuni is mandatory for smaller municipalities 
and voluntary for bigger ones but the regional government offers finan-
cial incentives, defines optimal cooperation areas and gives procedural help 
(RER 2018). Regional law 21 of 2012 defined the conditions and minimum 
size for unioni and follows national guidance on this matter. In addition, 
regional laws and guidance define a minimum portfolio of functions (see 
section 3.1). Municipalities can make a choice but have to organise joint 
services for at least four out of the following public tasks: staff management, 
social services, one-stop-shops for enterprises, spatial planning, local police 
and civic protection (RER 2018). The law also defines minimum thresholds 
for the population size.
Each municipal union has a president, usually one of the mayors of the 
member municipalities, a giunta (a collegial body made of the other mayors) 
and a council made of local councilors. The idea of creating stronger forms 
of inter-municipal collaboration in the territory of the former province of 
Bologna for a specific portfolio of functions was already part of Regional 
Law. Nr. 6 of 2004, which defined rules for the partial unification of local 
Table 3.3  Unioni di Comuni in the CM Bologna
Name Municipalities Size km2 Inhabitants
Unione Terre d’Aqua 6 375 82.904
Unione Reno Galliera 8 296 73.996
Unione dei Comuni Terre Pianura 6 333 70.712
Nuovo Circondario Imolese 10 787 133.205
Unione Savena – Idice 5 378 44.987
Unione dei Comuni Valle del Reno, 
Lavino e Samoggia 
5 404 11.608
Unione dei Comuni Appenino Bolognese 11 742 49.246
Source: CM Bologna 2017, 14
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administrations within the provincial boundary (RER 2004, art. 22, 23). 
The law defined the forms of unions of municipalities and the special form 
of inter-municipal cooperation of the Nuovo Circondario Imolese.17
Within the governance arrangement of the Metropolitan City, the munic-
ipal unions are a sort of consultative organ but they are also relevant as 
representational bodies (Tubertini 2015). In fact, several policy documents 
as well as the statute state that “municipal Unions represent the priority 
reference for the territorial articulation of the Metropolitan City’s policies 
and actions” (CM Bologna 2018a, 9, own translation).
In a way, they perform the function of the zone homogeene mentioned in 
the Delrio Law (implemented in CM Milan, see section 3.1)
The unioni di comuni have several advantages with regard to the govern-
ance of the city-region. They bundle interests of the member municipali-
ties and are also involved in the distribution of national and ERDF funds 
(Bando Periferie, CM Bologna 2016a, 3). The mayor of the CM Bologna 
and the presidents of the seven unioni (themselves being mayors) have the 
opportunity to speak on equal terms, which is not possible with many of 
the mayors of smaller municipalities. However, the mission of the unions 
is not totally clear and they also differ in terms of organisational strength 
and joint execution of functions. In terms of politics, there is also a certain 
risk as some of the unions are of the opinion that the level of inter-munici-
pal cooperation and planning realised is sufficient, so that there is no need 
for a CM. This is valid for the Nuovo Circondario Imolese where the Five 
Star Movement won the majority in 2019 but this general concern was not 
shared by all interviewees.
Also in spatial planning, inter-municipal land use plans gained in rel-
evance. The regional government gives financial support to those munici-
palities who decide to elaborate an inter-municipal structure plan. The 
municipal union Reno Galliera established a joint office for urban planning 
which means that the local plans are elaborated by one body and that some 
inter-muncipal coordination for territorial development exists. The Unione 
di Comuni Valle del Reno, Lavino e Samoggia opted for an inter-municipal 
structure plan in 2017 (under preparation in 2020). Inter-municipal land 
use planning raises the question of the appropriate level of supra-local plan-
ning, but this issue was interpreted differently by interviewees. However, 
when larger groups of municipalities decide to cooperate on this matter, 
one is inclined to ask what a city-regional general plan will add. At least this 
demonstrates how, as well as the fact that a multi-level system of govern-
ance and planning is emerging. 
3.2.1.1  Forms of cooperation between municipalities, 
the municipal unions and CM
Shortly after the inauguration of the CM, the municipalities and the munic-
ipal unions signed a sort of framework regulation for different types of 
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cooperation between the CM, the municipalities and unions of munici-
palities (CM Bologna 2016c). The document refers to regional legislation 
that defines three forms of inter-municipal cooperation: joint metropoli-
tan offices (Ufficio in comune metropolitano), delegation (the CM is doing 
a service for a municipality and gets paid) and other forms of informal 
cooperation.
Joint offices have been used already in the past for the elaboration of the 
provincial territorial plan (PTCP). Since the CM started, joint offices have 
been installed for the Urban Sustainable Mobility Plan (PUMS, see below), 
which is one of the core projects of the CM, and for housing policies. 
Other jointly executed tasks are statistics and data management, tourism, 
information technology and economic development. More joint offices are 
planned, for example for the implementation of the bicycle plan (Ufficio 
Unico Metropolitano Bici) (CM Bologna 2019b, 101). Joint offices estab-
lish continued cooperation between the technical staff of the municipalities 
Figure 3.2  Municipalities and municipal unions in the CM Bologna, areas in white 
are non-associated municipalities 2021 Concept: K. Zimmermann 
Carto graphy: F. Gela
144 Italy 
and the CM. CM, municipal unions and municipalities signed a series 
of agreements that establish joint offices or other forms of cooperaton 
(joint office for legal issues / ufficio unico avvocatura civica), housing, 
EU Programmes, public procurement, social services). However, the joint 
office for tourism is restricted to Bologna and the CM and, in fact, the rela-
tionships between the CM and Bologna seem to be closer compared to the 
other municipalities, which is in part the result of the fact that the metro-
politan mayor leads both organisations. Also the secretary general (secre-
tario generale) is responsible for both the city administration and the CM. 
Usually a city, CM or province would have a secretary general of its own 
but for reasons of cost efficiency the position is shared in Bologna (as well 
as in Florence). Another form of inter-institutional collaboration between 
the CM and the municipal unions are round tables of higher adminis-
trative staff members for different policies (Tavolo di coordinamento dei 
vertici amministrativi, CM Bologna 2018b, 18). Municipalities may also 
use the services of the CM on a case-by-case basis. The municipality of 
Molinella did this for a change in the local land use plan (Giglioni 2016, 
9). There is, however, a clear indication that the CM will give priority 
to cooperation with the municipal unions, instead of the municipalities 
(Tubertini 2018, 3).
Another inter-institutional body is the committee for urban planning 
(Comitato Urbanistico Metropolitano). This is an obligatory institution 
(according to regional planning law, RER 2017).18 It is composed of repre-
sentatives of all the entities involved in planning matters of the city-region 
with the ultimate goal of bundling and simplification of planning proce-
dures and permissions (municipalities, unioni di comuni, CM, regional 
government). The committee also examines the conformity of local and 
city-regional plans with the legal requirements and goals of the regional 
planning law (reduction of land consumption in particular).
3.2.1.2  Inter-institutional relationships
The introduction of the CM also reorganised the institutional relationship 
between the second tier of local government and the regional govern-
ment. The former province was an independent governmental layer being 
able to define its own priorities. At the same time, this autonomy resulted 
in a certain degree of isolation with regard to institutional relationships 
with the region. Currently, a so-called “inter-institutional conference” 
(Conferenza interistituzionale) exists that gathers the president of the 
Region Emilia Romagna, the metropolitan mayor of the CM Bologna, the 
presidents of the other still existing provinces of Emilia Romagna and the 
president of the regional branch of ANCI (Italian association of munici-
palities and cities) (Tubertini 2018, 4; RER 2015a, art. 10). The terms of 
trade are part a of so-called “Patto interistituzionale tra Regione, Città 
metropolitana di Bologna, Province, ANCI e UPI” (inter-institutional 
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agreement) that seeks to establish a multi-level governance arrangement. 
The inter-institutional conference agrees upon a document (documento 
unitario di strategia istituzionale e di programmazione degli obiettivi del 
governo territoriale) which defines the basic goals for territorial develop-
ment. These are binding for other territorial plans (including the PSM 
and PTM of Bologna). With reference to this inter-institutional confer-
ence, the regional government and the CM also signed a general frame-
work agreement in 2015 (Intesa Generale Quadro, RER 2015b). This 
document clearly defines the instruments and fields of activities of the 
CM and shows ways for collaboration and co-decision-making with the 
regional government. A predecessor of this body was part of an agree-
ment between the region, the province and the city of Bologna which had 
the foreseen task to define functions to be dedicated to the potential Città 
Metropolitana (l’accordo del 2006 tra Regione, Provincia e Comune) 
(Tubertini 2018, 2).
In addition, the CM is now also a beneficiary of national government 
programmes partly funded by the EU (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 
2017b). One of these programmes is the programme for urban regenera-
tion and security in the periphery of city-regions with a total sum of fund-
ing available for the CM Bologna of 40 M€ (Bando Periferie, CM Bologna 
2016a). The CM coordinated the selection of the projects on the basis of the 
strategic plan (PSM) and in accordance with the municipal unions. The CM 
is not the beneficiary itself, implementation is done by the municipalities. 
The former province was less relevant in this regard.
3.2.2  Spatial relations
The perimeter of the CM is the old province and this applies to all newly cre-
ated CM in Italy. While there are ongoing discussions about the mismatch 
between functional urban regions and the now-existing jurisdiction in the 
metropolitan cities of Torino, Florence and Milan, the spatial delimitation 
of the CM Bologna reveals a higher congruence between the jurisdiction 
and the functional urban region. None of the interviewees saw any need to 
discuss this. For the process of creating the CM Bologna this consensus on 
the spatial delimitation was a big advantage.
The aspiration for better territorial coherence and cost-efficient struc-
tures is significant in Emilia Romagna. Regional laws prescribe collabora-
tion for municipalities that are part of a pre-defined optimal collaboration 
area (ATO – Ambito territoriale ottimale, see Figure 3.3). These areas 
are primarily designed for social services and health care but in Emilia 
Romagna the ATO should also serve as a territorial framework for other 
inter-municipal services in order to increase territorial coherence and reduce 
fragmentation as well as functional overlaps (see the section on municipal 
unions above). In fact, five out of seven municipal unions in the territory of 
the CM Bologna are also a social service area or ATO.19 Regional law no. 
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21/2012 prescribes functional areas and defines that within these areas only 
one municipal union should be present.
The CM Bologna is not as polycentric as many other metropolitan cit-
ies in Italy (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 2017a). The core city has 
390,000 inhabitants, the second largest city is Imola with 70,000 inhabit-
ants. In terms of territorial development, big differences exist between the 
first ring municipalities (such as Casalecchio di Reno or San Lazzaro) and 
the smaller municipalities in the hills of the Appenin mountains or the plains 
in the north-east of Bologna. The municipalities in the Appenin are smaller 
and less growth oriented. There is, however, a functional polycentrism 
Figure 3.3  ATOs and municipal unions 2021 Concept: CM Bologna Cartography: 
F. Gela
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in terms of planning. The provincial regional plan (PTCP) as well as the 
territorial plan of the CM (PTM) define more than 20 regional poles or 
hubs (poli funzionali) as a means for structuring the territory and channel-
ling funding (CM Bologna 2020b; CM Bologna 2018b, Ch. 6). These are, 
among others, the airport, the trade fair, the main station, the university 
as well as commercial zones. They are considered as places with higher 
mobility needs and in part form the backbone for the metropolitan railway 
system.
Emilia Romagna is considered a region with a polycentric urban structure 
and the role of the CM Bologna within this system of hubs and nodes is shortly 
adressed on the first pages of the PSM where cooperation on wider territorial 
scales is mentioned (CM Bologna 2018b, 2). Again, incentives come from 
above. The regional government of Emilia Romagna enforces cooperation (if 
not amalgamation) of provinces, so-called aree vaste inter-provinciale (large 
inter-provincial cooperation areas). This was part of the implementation of 
the Delrio Law for instance in the area of Piacenza, Parma and Modena and 
includes also the CM Bologna. The PSM mentions this larger scale coopera-
tion with the provinces of Modena and Ferarra (so-called triannual protocoll, 
signed last time in November 2017) (CM Bologna 2018b, 28). On a wider 
scale, the two mayors of the metropolitan cities of Bologna and Florence 
signed an agreement (Memorandum) in 2017. They agreed to cooperate in 
the field of tourism and rural development in the Appenin mountainous area. 
This area is the border zone of the two city-regions. In fact the Florence – 
Bologna metropolitan cities are the only ones that share a border. In a similar 
way, the CM Bologna also signed an agreement on tourism with the province 
of Prato in November 2017 (Tubertini 2018).20, 21
To sum up this section: although there are spatial relationships beyond 
the territory of the CM that found institutional or policy repercussions, the 
focus of territorial policy clearly is on Bologna and the 54 municipalities. 
Larger scale cooperation is not as strong as in France and Germany.
3.2.3  Coordination of public policies
In terms of functions formally assigned to the new body, the CM Bologna 
does not differ significantly from the other CMs in Italy. However, the 
weight given to the new division of work between regional government, 
CM and municipal unions differs. The CM is responsible, in general, for 
the promotion and strategic coordination of socio-economic development. 
The main instruments that the CM can use for this purpose are the strate-
gic plan (PSM), the general territorial plan (PTM) and the urban mobility 
plan (PUMS). The CM is in charge of the provincial streets and secondary 
schools and shares some tasks with municipalities and the region (tourism, 
economic development, mobility services, see below). There is a range of 
further tasks where the CM has a moderating and coordinating function 
(housing, urban regeneration) but implementation is in the responsibility 
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of the municipalities. Functions that have been transferred in part or full to 
the region or regional agencies are agricultural and environmental policies, 
energy policy, culture, vocational education and civil protection (Tubertini 
2018, RER 2015a).
The functions are mainly mirrored in the plans the CM is expected to 
elaborate, the more relevant plans being the PSM and the PTM. The third 
essential plan is the PUMS (sustainable urban mobility plan). We will start 
with the latter one as the preparation of this plan was a priority for the CM.
3.2.3.1  Mobility
The CM Bologna gives high priority to mobility policies and is involved in the 
implementation of a metropolitan railway system (servizio ferroviario metro-
politano – SFM). Bologna shows a mix of excellent connectivity (motorways, 
airport, high-speed rail) and congested inner city routes due to high numbers 
of commuters (Delpiano and Ferroni 2016). The result is a considerable high 
level of air pollution and noise. The CM Bologna started preparing a sustain-
able urban mobility plan (SUMP / PUMS in Italian) in 2016 and the plan was 
approved in 2019 (CM Bologna 2019b). The metropolitan mobility plan for 
the CM of Bologna was the first inter-municipal SUMP in Italy. This indi-
cates the priority that CM and City of Bologna give to mobility policy. The 
plan is a collection of priority projects with detailed steps and measures for 
implementation. The voluminous plan defines goals and suggests projects for 
the different transport modes (walking, cycling, public transport).
The implementation of the plan depends to a certain degree on EU fund-
ing, in fact without a SUMP there is no access to national and European 
funding. Additionally, the funds of the PON Metro programme were used 
for mobility projects. Although not necessarily a programme for mobility 
policies, the CM decided that projects financed through this programme 
must implement ideas taken from the SUMP.
The envisioned mobility policy for Bologna also includes larger infrastruc-
ture projects: a new tram system with four lines is planned and the system of 
metropolitan trains will be extended. The idea of a metropolitan railway sys-
tem (SFM) emerged in the 1990s and implementation started in 1994. Some 
of the main components are an extension of the existing regional railway 
lines and an increase in the number of stations within the city-region. The 
main station of Bologna would be the central hub but this caused capacity 
problems as the high-speed and long-distance trains have priority. Hence, a 
tunnel with an underground station for the high-speed trains was constructed 
to give enough space for the SFM. The project had to face considerable delays 
and as a consequence the CM recognised that, in terms of metropolitan pub-
lic transport, Bologna is lagging behind other city-regions in Europe and Italy 
(CM Bologna 2019b, 25, 110). In 2019, most of the investments for the SFM 
have been completed, although further improvements are envisioned (inte-
grated ticket system, upgrading of existing stations, acquisition of new trains, 
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15 min sequence of trains). In addition, the creation of 30 inter-modal mobil-
ity hubs is seen as the main task for the future. Since the 1990s, regional gov-
ernment, city of Bologna and the province of Bologna collaborated closely 
and the CM continues with this project. However, the CM is not the ser-
vice provider. As a longer section on governance in the PUMS indicates, the 
CM would have welcomed a bundling of planning, management and service 
provision of all city-regional public transport services but for the moment 
this task is shared between the region (regional railways), the municipalities 
(local busses) and other service providers (CM 2019b, 110):
In materia di trasporti, l’intesa prevede inoltre che la programmazione 
del servizio ferroviario metropolitano sia fatta d’intesa tra Regione e 
Città metropolitana, mentre è rinviata al riordino della legislazione 
regionale la previsione di funzioni di promozione e coordinamento della 
mobilità e delle infrastrutture da parte della Città metropolitana, non-
ché la gestione del servizio ferroviario metropolitano.
With regard to transport, the agreement also provides that the planning of 
the metropolitan railway service is to be carried out by agreement between 
the Region and the metropolitan city, while the provision of functions to 
promote and coordinate mobility and infrastructure by the metropolitan 
city, as well as the management of the metropolitan railway service, is 
postponed to the change of regional legislation. (own translation)
The reintroduction of the tram is a more recent project and partly will sub-
stitute busses and give higher priority to public transport instead of cars. The 
tram certainly will be the major infrastructure project of the CM Bologna 
and the city of Bologna for the next decade.
The envisioned regional bicycle route system is a mix of a tourism project 
and an enhanced offering for residents of the region. The goals of the plan 
are ambitious in this regard. The major infrastructure projects and invest-
ments are all done with the financial help of and in coordination with the 
region.
3.2.3.2  Metropolitan Strategic Plan (PSM)
According to the specifications of the Delrio Law, the metropolitan cities 
are responsible for the creation of a compulsory and binding three-year 
Strategic Metropolitan Plan (Piano Strategico Metropolitano PSM), which 
must be updated every year (National Law n. 56/2014, Art.44). In Bologna, 
a strategic plan has been prepared on a voluntary basis already before the 
implementation of the CM. The process goes back to the formation of a 
civic platform (Comitato Promotore Bologna 2021 in 2011)22 that gathered 
various stakeholders that wanted to join forces for the socio-economic pro-
motion of the city-region of Bologna. These were the chamber of commerce 
150 Italy 
and industry, the university, firms and civic associations, the province and 
the municipalities. The first strategic plan was published in 2013. However, 
the continuity between the two strategic plans is not given, although, for 
marketing purposes, many people speak of PSM 1.0 and PSM 2.0. The first 
strategic plan was a list of wishes and projects that a group of private and 
public actors collected and handed over to the politicians of the province 
and the municipalities (Bologna in particular). The plan was voluntary and 
there was no real strategy, i.e. a priority given to some issues or projects 
instead of others. There was also no clear mechanism for implementation. 
The Comitato Promotore still exists but in terms of relevance it has been 
replaced by an advisory board (largely academics) and a consiglio di svi-
luppo (Advisory Board for Economic Development) which is composed of a 
range of high-ranking public and private leaders.23 Both bodies are new and 
need to find their roles in the current PSM process.
The new strategic plan is compulsory and was elaborated under the guid-
ance and leadership of the CM. The character of this plan is very different 
compared to the previous one. The CM considers the PSM to be the main 
policy document for the city-region, providing a framework also for other 
plans and policies.
The plan-making process started in January 2016 and the final plan 
was adopted in 2018. During this period, several preparatory documents 
have been created (La Voce delle Unioni, Le Linee di indirizzo del PSM 
2.0, Documento Preliminare, Resoconto Fase Preparatoria) and after six 
meetings with the councils of the different unions of municipalities and the 
municipality of Bologna, the consultation phase with the presidency office, 
advisory board for economic development, advisory board and the involved 
stakeholders, and the final consultation, the PSM was approved in July 
2018 (CM Bologna 2018b, 2–3). Other CM in Italy presented the PSM 
earlier (Milan, Firenze) but Bologna gave more priority to the elaboration 
of the PUMS.
With regard to the content, the PSM 2.0 Bologna differs from many other 
PSM in Italy that have their origin in urban design (i.e. Firenze). The PSM 
Bologna has no maps but is structured around the three principles of inclusiv-
ity, sustainability and attractiveness (CM Bologna 2018b, 9). Within these 
cross-cutting principles, the PSM clearly has two thematic priorities: mobility 
and urban regeneration. A third focus is on the governance of implementa-
tion and inter-municipal coordination. This refers also to the involvement of 
stakeholders through committees and round tables (Consiglio di Sviluppo und 
Tavolo delle Società Participate) which are part of an extended governance 
arrangement. The PSM puts a significant emphasis on the improvement of the 
quality of government (homogenous public administration, quality of govern-
ment must be the same for the whole territory). In general, there is a strong 
consideration of sustainability goals (SDGs) which have been defined in a sep-
arate document called Charta Bologna (CM Bologna 2019a). Some goals are 
steep, such as the increase of green space by 45m2 per capita by 2030 which 
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would be, according to CM sources, a 50% increase (CM Bologna 2018b, 
36; CM Bologna 2019a, 60). Social inclusion and welfare is mentioned but is 
less significant. The consideration of the relaunch of the economy mirrors the 
adverse effects of the Covid-19 crisis. Digitisation is considered to be the new 
paradigm for the economy but also for public administration and mobility.
3.2.3.3  The Metropolitan Territorial Plan (PTM)
Spatial planning is not a totally new function for the second tier of local gov-
ernment in Italy as the provinces have been responsible for the elaboration of 
territorial plans (Piano Territoriale di Coordinamento Provinciale – PTCP) 
since the 1990s. The territorial plan of the former province of Bologna was 
valid until the new PTM came into force in December 2020. The provincial 
plan has been in force with a small number of modifications since 2004. 
The PTCP was considered to be a well elaborated plan, hence nobody felt 
that it needed to be replaced quickly. The PTCP was a voluminous docu-
ment and defined the regional territorial structure by indicating functional 
poles such as the railway station, fairground, airport, university hospitals 
and the logistics interport (poli funzionali – an idea that is kept in the PTM, 
CM Bologna 2020b). In addition, larger zones for commercial development 
have been defined together with the municipal unions. The main instrument 
used for the implementation of the goals of the plan are called Accordi 
Territoriali and Accordi di Programma. These are agreements between the 
regional government, municipalities and the province that were part of the 
PTCP. They largely define the conditions for financing any kind of territo-
rial development projects.
Further sectoral plans have been inherited from the province, such as 
the Piano di Commercio (a plan for retail and commercial uses), plans for 
towers for mobile communications (PLERT Piano di Localizzazione delle 
Emittenti RadioTelevisive) and plans for surface mining (Piano dello attiv-
ita Estrattive). The new PTM has a stronger ambition to integrate these 
sectoral plans into one coherent document. The PTM constitutes a new type 
of regional plan. Differing from the largely coordinative PTCP, the PTM 
will also be an urban design plan and should achieve more (according to 
interview results). It can also prescribe limits for local development.
One important element in this regard is a new regulation of the region 
Emilia Romagna for territorial planning and the reduction of land con-
sumption. The new spatial planning law of the Emilia Romagna region 
of 2017 sets the goal of reducing land consumption to zero in 2050 (RER 
2017).24 Until then, a growth of 3% is allowed (reference is the actual 
urbanised area, including the intended land activations in municipal plans 
as of the cut-off date 31 December 2017) (CM Bologna 2020c, 94). The 
impact of the 3% goal depends on the definition of urbanised territory and 
the rules for exceptions. In the course of the plan development, an inven-
tory was carried out with the municipalities in order to find out which 
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areas are provided for in the plans and are thus considered urbanised and 
which are not. The 3% growth potential was calculated with reference to 
the current state of consumed land based on existing plans and satellite 
images (755km2). In addition to the already urbanised areas, building areas 
activated in the plans but not yet built on are added on top.25 Excluded 
from the 3% limitation are public infrastructures (social housing) and com-
mercial areas that are considered strategically important for the city-region 
(CM Bologna 2020a). Expansion of commercial areas is still possible if it 
takes place as an extension at the existing well-connected functional poles 
identified in the PTM. In any case, the goals and priorities of the PSM 
apply.
The mechanism allows for some flexibility in the distribution of growth: 
as long as the 3% target is kept, some municipalities may grow stronger 
while others will not grow at all. The specification of which municipality is 
allowed to grow beyond 3% will be in the hands of the planners of the CM. 
Hence, the CM Bologna has an important role to play in the implementa-
tion of the 3% target which makes a difference to the former province. Since 
an equal allocation of 3% growth to all 55 municipalities of the CM would 
lead to very small new building areas in some cases, the CM has been given 
the task of defining criteria in the new PTM that distribute growth in such 
a way that 3% is achieved for the area of the CM as a whole and at the 
same time reasonable lots can be realised from a spatial planning perspec-
tive (concentration, public transport connection). Thus, in individual cases, 
new development areas larger than 3% can be realised in a municipality. 
The CM does not conclusively define these areas in the plan. Also the car-
tographic presentations of the plan do not define precisely which territories 
will be allowed to grow and which will not. But the PTM defines clear rules 
and territorial priorities that the municipalities must follow when they take 
corresponding initiatives. The CM moderates this selection with the munici-
palities according to the PSM and PTM criteria.
However, these regulations and priorities clearly show that some smaller 
municipalities would not benefit from growth as commercial areas and 
housing of strategic regional relevance are not realisable in the periphery. 
Realisation of growth is only reasonable in the centre or the plain (pianura) 
along the main transport axis (railway in particular). As a complementary 
measure, a compensation fund already provided for in the region’s planning 
law (and national planning law) has been created to the benefit of those 
municipalities that cannot participate in the 3% growth target (Fondo pere-
quativo metropolitano). The use of this fund must be in line with the objec-
tives of the PSM, the mobility plan and the charter for a sustainable Bologna 
and will be used primarily in municipalities in the periphery to balance dis-
advantages or to reward these areas for their provision of eco-system ser-
vices (CM Bologna 2020c, 96). The fund is financed by urban planning 
levies (10 M€) and is a tool for solidaric development as the levies will at 
least in part originate from the growing municipalities. This compensates 
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for disadvantages insofar as these are compatible with the objectives of the 
PTM, the PSM and PUMS.
3.2.4  Conclusion
The new governance arrangement in Bologna certainly shows a higher level 
of inter-institutional and inter-municipal coordination and collaboration. 
However, the CM is only in part an independent layer of policy-making 
as the organisational autonomy in terms of financing and also in terms of 
legitimacy is low. Nevertheless, the PSM and the PUMS are the instruments 
that express the political will and priorities of the CM. The PTM, in con-
trast, is embedded in a new hierarchy of territorial plans and goals defined 
by the regional government. Whether the CM is equipped to solve the most 
pressing problems and issues is debatable. The following challenges have 
been mentioned in the interviews:
 • Transport infrastructure: Bologna is a node of several important 
national highways and hub for logistics (Delpiano and Ferroni 2016). 
The system of highways and tangential roads is overstrained and needs 
investment. Bologna has a big freight distribution centre (interporto).
 • The extension of the metropolitan railway system (FSM) in combina-
tion with the re-introduction of a tram.
 • Housing policy and urban regeneration (not being a full competence of 
the CM but some supportive initiatives are done in collaboration with 
municipalities, Bologna in particular). A joint metropolitan office for 
housing policies has existed since 2015 (in terms of organisation the 
office is part of the city administration of Bologna).
The status quo of plans and inter-institutional arrangements between the 
region and the CM and the CM and the municipal unions at least indicates 
that these problems will be addressed according to their priority.
In the first years of the CM, some conflicts emerged between the CM 
and municipalities when strategic decisions on mobility infrastructures 
and amendments of local plans were made (Tubertini 2018, 6). The cause 
was the indirect legitimacy of the council of the CM and the lack of ter-
ritorial representation: there are not enough councillors and these prob-
ably follow local interests but not a genuine regional rationality. This is 
partly compensated by the representation of municipal unions (ufficio di 
presidencia).
The big advantage of the reform is the merger of political power. The 
mayor of the biggest city is also the mayor of the CM. Hence, he or she 
can facilitate more cooperation and cost-efficient structures between the 
two biggest administrations in the city-region. There is also no competi-
tion any longer between the political head of the province and the mayor of 
the biggest city. The result of the previous structure with two full levels of 
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policy-making and planning were limited integration and lack of coordina-
tion (there was no city-regional mobility strategy and no joint strategy for 
tourism). This is now possible.
Another advantage is that the CM now has direct contacts and working 
relationships not only with the region but also with the national govern-
ment and is considered the addressee for programmes. This was less the case 
before and the CM performs a mediating role with regard to the municipali-
ties. This is important for the EU programme PON Metro and the national 
programme for the peripheries (bando periferie). The CM was in the leading 
position in the awarding of the programme for the peripheries (EU funding) 
and organised the selection according to criteria (the focus was on sustain-
able transport and territorial coherence or regional significance). A steering 
effect was thus achieved here.
The provinces were strong in Emilia Romagna as a result of decentralisa-
tion. Now, after a range of austerity measures have been implemented, the 
situation is different because many functions can no longer be fulfilled by 
the provinces. With regard to the territory outside the metropolitan city (i.e. 
the remaining provinces) there will be an unbalanced situation as the CM 
Bologna is stronger in terms of policy-making capacity. Compared to the 
provinces in the rural areas, the CM has partly kept its role and position and 
is given a role for strategic planning. The CM has a better standing because 
it communicates directly with the region and is seen as an institution of the 
municipalities. This federal model results in a better position although the 
CM also had to face a loss of resources. The mobility plan PUMS, for exam-
ple, is actually a municipal plan that has been up-scaled in Bologna and also 
in other CMs. The CM organises all the consultation and participation with 
citizens and stakeholders, on behalf of the municipalities. Here, the CM 
plays a positive role.
The field of mobility, however, shows the limits of this new arrange-
ment with a lot of shared responsibilities. In the area of transportation, 
the creation of the CM in combination with the PUMS and changed legal 
requirements has created a certain spirit of optimism and sense of relaunch. 
However, the CM largely remains a coordinating body in a network of 
agents, while the actual responsibilities for planning, financing and service 
provision remain distributed. There is only limited integrated management 
of public transport. All in all, the relevance of the city-region level in Bologna 
has risen, in terms of functions. At the same time, the cuts and shifts of tasks 
(in environmental planning, in particular) limit the capacity to act in specific 
fields. There is certainly a focus on socio-economic development and a sense 
of pro-active intervention.
3.3  The Città Metropolitana di Firenze: mismatch of socio-
economic regionalism, territory and jurisdiction
The need for a change of the governance structures in the urban network of 
northern Tuscany and, closely linked to this, the establishment of large-scale 
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spatial planning in the settlement areas of Florence, Prato and Pistoia has 
been the subject of ongoing debates in recent decades (Giovannoni and 
Innocenti 2010; Paba et al. 2017; De Luca 2017). Corresponding inter-
municipal plans have repeatedly been drawn up and submitted to politi-
cal consultations, and forms of cooperation have been established on an 
experimental basis (see below). However, a spatially coherent solution 
was never found. In 1992, Prato was founded as a separate province, thus 
adding another territorial entity between the Province of Florence and the 
Province of Pistoia (Giovannoni and Innocenti 2010, 72). Institutionally 
and spatially, this redesign of the provinces in the 1990s increased institu-
tional fragmentation in the area.
The evolution of inter-municipal planning and cooperation in the Florence 
city-region goes back to the 1950s but throughout the whole period, inter-
municipal cooperation has been less intense compared to other city-regions 
in Europe and also Italy (Giovannoni and Innocenti 2010; De Luca 2017). 
The major periods and milestones were:
 • 1951–1966: discussion of an inter-municipal plan according to national 
law 1150/1942, Art. 12, which was intended as an official plan based 
on the initiative of Florence but never came into force (De Luca 2017, 
215). In this period, 13 municipalities were involved. A conference of 
mayors was established in 1962 but reached no consensus (Paba et al. 
2017, 109; Giovannoni and Innocenti 2010, 597).
 • 1966–1978: second Florence inter-municipal plan, focussing on the 
area Piana Fiorentina (i.e. the Florence-Prato-Pistoia area), but this 
plan was only an informal scenario with analytic maps; the number 
of municipalities involved increased to 21 (Vannucchi 2008; De Luca 
2017, 220).
 • 1983–1990: structure plan (schema strutturale) for the metropolitan 
area Florence-Prato-Pistoia (19 municipalities) according to regional 
law 74/1984, art 826. This was an initiative of the regional government 
(Giovannoni and Innocenti 2010, 598). The structure plan (schema 
strutturale con valenza di piano territoriale di coordinamento) came 
into force in 1990 through a regional law and largely covered infra-
structures and environmental planning; implementation would happen 
through municipal directives.
 • 1990: a regional law (n. 42/1990) creates Conferenza pianificazione 
territoriale dell’area, a coordinating body that should strengthen the 
structure plan (Giovannoni and Innocenti 2010, 599).
 • During the process of reorganising the provinces in the early 1990s 
(creation of province of Prato), the provinces were given supra-local 
planning competences (based on law 42/1990). As a consequence, the 
structure plan and the Conferenza pianificazione territoriale dell’area 
lost relevance, inter-municipal initiatives ebbed away, although being 
defined in the same law (Giovannoni and Innocenti 2010, 599; De Luca 
2017, 224).
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 • 1996: Patto per il governo dell’area metropolitana and creation of the 
Conferenza Metropolitana by the regional government as a minimal 
response to the national law 42/1990 on creating the Città Metropolitana 
(signed by the Region, the city of Florence, the Province of Florence and 
some municipalities and municipal associations (Mugello, Valdarno)) 
(Giovannoni and Innocenti 2010, 599).
 • In the 2000s, initiatives of strategic planning were taken under the lead-
ership of the city of Florence. The strategic plan was supported by the 11 
municipalities of the first ring and a range of private actors (Giovannoni 
and Innocenti 2010, 600). The first strategic plan was published in 2002. 
For the implementation, an agency called Firenze 2010 was established 
in 2003. In parallel to the strategic plan, in 2006, 11 municipalities 
(Florence and the first ring municipalities) started a collaborative pro-
cess for better planning of public transport (called PINCO). The ulti-
mate goal was the creation of a municipal union (URBACT 2009, 34), 
which did not happen in the end. The re-introduction of the tram in 
Florence was partly connected to this as the tram connects (or will con-
nect) Florence and some of the adjacent municipalities. This has been 
realised in the case of Scandicci, plans are made for Sesto Fiorentino 
where a branch of the University of Florence is located. The strategic 
plan was renewed in 2009 (Firenze Futura).
 • In 2007, the three provinces of Pistoia, Prato and Florence and the regional 
government signed a pact for development of the metropolitan area.
Summing up these developments, we can say that several initiatives were 
taken over the last decades but remained fragmented and had weak imple-
mentation power. The city of Florence focussed on the municipalities of the 
first ring while the regional government tried to establish cross-jurisdictional 
collaboration on a wider scale. The creation of the province of Prato in the 
early 1990s, which is basically an extension of the city of Prato, increased 
institutional fragmentation. Institutional changes happened only with the 
implementation of the Delrio Law in 2014.
The population of the CM Florence is about 1,000,000 (27% of the 
Region of Tuscany), of which 366,039 live in the core city of Florence (CM 
Florence 2018, web). The size of the territory is 3,514 km2. With regard to 
demographic development, the city-region is growing more in the suburban 
areas and less in the core city. The CM comprises 42 municipalities, some of 
which are grouped together in municipal unions.
3.3.1  The Institution Cittá Metropolitana Firenze
With the final adoption of the Delrio Law in 2014, the Città Metropolitana 
had to be created in the greater Florence city-region on 1 January 2015. Since 
the national law made in part vague specifications with regard to the organi-
sational form and functions, it was left to the municipalities concerned and 
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the regional government of Tuscany to develop an appropriate and accepted 
organisational form. For that purpose, in 2014, several workshops were 
held, also with the participation of academics of the University of Florence, 
in order to discuss these aspects. At one of these workshops, the mayor of 
Florence, Dario Nardella, made clear how he envisioned the CM: as a coor-
dinating body that, following the principle of administrative simplification, 
should try to share administrative services and act as a service provider for 
the municipalities that set the objectives. Offices should be used together 
or merged, which has been partly realised. For example, just as in the CM 
Bologna, the position of the Segretario Generale of the administration was 
created as a joint position of the CM and the city of Florence. Also, some 
other staff work for both administrations. This measure saves costs and 
provides a certain effectiveness.
The CM Florence was created quite quickly, which is also reflected in the 
very rapid development of the strategic plan. Although the plan prepara-
tion process produced a considerable volume of preparatory documents, the 
plan was already adopted in 2017 and updated in 2018 and 2019 (DCM n. 
26 del 5.4.2017).
In line with the Delrio Law, the three organs of the CM are the mayor of 
the CM (the lord mayor of Florence), the council (Consiglio Metropolitano), 
which in the case of Florence has 18 members, and the conference of mayors 
as a consultative organ (Conferenza Metropolitana). Seven members of the 
Consiglio Metropolitano are mayors, 11 are delegates of the local coun-
cils.27 Six members (one third) represent the city of Florence. The mayor 
presides over both the Consiglio and the Conferenza Metropolitana. The 
Consiglio meets monthly, the metropolitan conference only twice a year 
(but then on the same day as the Consiglio). The metropolitan conference 
decides in particular on changes of the statute and must be consulted on 
certain issues. The Città Metropolitana does not have a Giunta (mayor plus 
deputies) as is common in local politics in Italy. Some of the members of the 
Consiglio, however, have a similar function and form professional profiles 
for one or several of the various tasks of the CM (schools, mobility, envi-
ronmental issues, etc.).
The statute of the CM Florence is 12 pages long and was adopted on 16 
December 2014. The option of creating homogeneous zones is briefly men-
tioned in Art. 2 but not implemented. According to the statute, the CM’s 
task is strategic regional development, integrated management and coordi-
nation of services of supra-local relevance, infrastructures and communi-
cation networks, and management of institutional relations (towards the 
regional government and national government). According to the regional 
law, the CM takes over the functions of the province, unless they have been 
transferred to the region. Specifically, the CM has the responsibility for:
 • The elaboration of the strategic plan (PSM);
 • Territorial planning on a city-regional scale (PTM);
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 • School transport, school buildings and locations;
 • Public transport and roads (provincial roads and planning of public 
transport (busses), traffic information system and the elaboration of the 
urban sustainable mobility plan (PUMS)). The former province was in 
charge of 1,071.9 km of provincial roads and of 276.6 km regional roads;
 • Economic development and tourism, the latter shared with the region 
and municipalities (Regione Toscana 2018, 63);
 • Digitisation and communication networks;
 • Waste management28 (shared with service providers);
 • A limited number of tasks in the field of labour market policy (anti-
discrimination policies);
 • Support of the municipalities in data processing and statistics;
 • In addition, maintenance and preservation of a limited number of parks 
and monuments owned by the CM (the majority of which, however, 
have been transferred to the region).
Numerous functions of the former province were transferred to the region. 
Most of them are environmental and nature conservation policies (environ-
mental assessments, noise abatement planning, air pollution control, water 
pollution control, agriculture, responsibility for nature reserves and parks). 
Additionally, labour market policy and energy policy are now a regional 
task (Regione Toscana 2018; Regional Law 22/2015, art. 2). In the field of 
infrastructures, some responsibilities have been transferred to the region but 
are now partly managed by the CM on a contractual basis (regional roads). 
This transfer of functions was accompanied by a significant reduction in the 
number of staff and most of the former provincial staff members were real-
located to the region (Regione Toscana 2018, 74). The municipalities did 
not have to hand over functions to the CM (or vice versa).
In regional law, provisions are made which regulate the takeover of 
functions of the remaining provinces outside the CM by municipalities and 
municipal associations. The strategy of the region is thus becoming appar-
ent, namely to dispense the provinces in the medium term and to hand over 
the tasks to the municipalities or municipal unions.
3.3.1.1  Forms of cooperation between municipalities, 
the municipal unions and CM
The CM Florence can delegate functions to municipalities if this is in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. In addition, the CM can con-
clude agreements with individual municipalities or associations of munici-
palities for the provision of services. In contrast to Bologna, the municipal 
unions do not have an institutional role in the CM Florence and were 
also not formed region-wide. The unions in the CM Florence are rather 
less recognised and used as partners of the CM. The existing ones are 
Mugello, Empolese-Valdelsa, Chianti Fiorentino, Valdarno e Valdisieve 
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(see Table 3.4). The municipal unions in the Florence area differ in size and 
institutional strength. They perform mainly a limited coordination of pub-
lic services. Two of them, Mugello and Empolese-Valdelsa, are responsible 
for an inter-municipal structural plan (Piano Strutturale Intercomunale). In 
particular, the unione di comuni Mugello has developed an inter-municipal 
planning level that covers a considerable part of the territory of the CM. It 
is striking that the four municipal unions cover only the second ring of the 
CM while the first ring municipalities are not organised in unions (https://
osservatorio .urbanit .it /unioni -di -comuni -firenze/). 
3.3.1.2  Inter-institutional relationships
The relevant law for the constitution of the Città Metropolitana of Florence 
also provides for a coordination body with the region (Conferenza Regione – 
Città Metropolitana), in which basic policy goals and concerted actions are 
to be discussed (Regione Toscana 2018, 11). The efficacy of this instru-
ment was questioned by interviewees. The regional government defines the 
framework for territorial development in different documents and plans. 
The “Integrated Regional Spatial Planning and Landscape Plan” (Piano di 
indirizzo territoriale con valenza di piano paesaggistico – PIT, 2015) and 
the Regional Development Programme (Programma di Sviluppo Regionale, 
Regione PRS, Regione Toscana 2017) are the more relevant ones. The 
laws stipulate that agreement is reached on this (Regional Law 22/2015, 6; 
Regional Law 9/2016). It is stated that the subsequent plans must comply 
with the objectives and principles of the regional plans. However, the scale 
of the PIT is rather imprecise in its maps, but it lays down general prin-
ciples for settlement development that severely restrict growth. The main 
purpose is, however, environmental protection, landscape planning and 
management of risks. In the relevant area of the CM (Ambito 06 Firenze 
Prato Pistoia in terms of the document) cartographic presentations include 
existing industrial sites, settlements, tourist zones and infrastructures. These 
Table 3.4  Unioni di Comuni in the CM Firenze
Name Municipalities Size km2 Inhabitants
Unione Comunale del Chianti 
Fiorentino
2 277.21 30,962
Unione di Comuni Del Circondario 
dell’Empolese Valdelsa
11 735.08 174,762
Unione Montana dei Comuni del 
Mugello
8 1, 131.13 63,847
Valdarno e Valdisieve 6 495.02 55,165
Total CM 42 3,514 1,004,298
Source: http://www.comuniverso.it/index.cfm?Unioni_di_Comuni_ della_Toscana&menu=547, 
26 August 2020
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cartographic presentations, however, are indicative and demonstrate criti-
calities (Regione Toscana 2015b, 60).
Beyond that it is open for procedural arrangements on how the relation-
ship between the region and the CM will be structured and which role the 
spatial development plan Piano Territoriale Metropolitano (PTM) of the 
CM will play in the regional system of spatial planning (De Santis 2015).29 
With the current planning legislation (Regional Law 65/2014) the region 
expressed stronger leadership in regional planning with the ultimate goal of 
reduction of land consumption.
3.3.2  Spatial relations
Central Tuscany is a polycentric space with complex functional and territo-
rial relationships. The ongoing process of suburbanisation, post-suburban-
isation and metropolisation has produced a patchwork of settlements and 
infrastructure corridors with in-between space seemingly being the domi-
nant form of territorial development (Paba and Perrone 2018). This applies 
for the Piana Fiorentina (Figure 3.5) but also for the wider area reaching 
from Florence to the coast (Pisa, Livorno) (Paba et al. 2017).
Figure 3.4  Municipalities and municipal unions in the CM Florence 2021 Concept: 
K. Zimmermann Cartography: F. Gela
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Functionally and also with regard to the settlement structures, Prato and 
Florence had long since grown together, which was already expressed in the 
PIT of the Tuscany Region from 2015 (see Figure 3.5). In particular, the 
municipalities of Campi Bisenzio and Sesto Fiorentino are equally suburbs 
of Florence and Prato, but in terms of territorial planning administration are 
part of the CM Florence. Similar constellations can also be found on a larger 
scale. As a consequence, the role of Florence in the polycentric city-network 
of northern Tuscany (Pisa, Livorno, Lucca, Pistoia, Prato) has been discussed 
for a longer time (Paba et al. 2017; De Luca 2017). Florence is the largest city 
in Tuscany and it is the seat of the regional government and thus historically, 
politically and economically in an outstanding position; on the other hand, it 
is functionally and structurally part of a larger polycentric network of cities 
in northern and central Tuscany and also has close functional relations with 
the neighbouring CM Bologna. In the past, the regional government certainly 
pursued the goal of a balanced structure of cities. In 1978, the decision was 
made not to expand Florence airport, but to develop Pisa as an international 
Figure 3.5  Piana Fiorentina. Source: Regione Toscana PIT 2015b, 16
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hub and to connect Florence by rail (Florence-Peretola airport was intended 
as a regional airport). However, given the importance of Florence as a mag-
net for international tourist flows and a trade fair location (fashion), the size 
of the airport is no longer appropriate and the runway is too short for larger 
aircrafts. The city of Florence has repeatedly raised the issue of expansion, 
but the spatial situation has become complicated by settlement and commer-
cial developments and designation of protected areas in the Piana Fiorentina. 
Municipalities and cities of the area (Prato) repeatedly raised their concerns.
The discussion on cooperative strategic planning in the early 2000s 
revived this debate on territorial re-organisation of territorial relationships. 
However, this only affected Florence and the municipalities of the first ring 
(Bagno a Ripoli, Calenzano, Campi Bisenzio, Fiesole, Impruneta, Lastra a 
Signa, Pontassieve, Scandicci, Sesto Fiorentino, Signa) (De Luca 2017). The 
strategic plan was adopted in 2002, being the result of a cooperative process 
involving many social groups. For the purpose of implementation, an asso-
ciation was founded in 2003 with the title “Firenze 2010: Associazione per 
il piano strategico dell’area fiorentina” (Giovannoni and Innocenti 2010, 
603). The plan fully corresponded in its aspiration and content to the then 
current idea of collaborative strategic planning. It was a collection of 32 
project ideas and 49 interventions but the initiative was strongly focussed 
on Florence and lost momentum in the following years.
In the second half of the 2000s, the larger spatial dimension of the city-
region was again discussed. For the area vasta (greater area) of Florence, 
Prato, Pistoia, workshops were organised in 2008. Discussions continued 
on other levels as well, although Florence has since then concentrated 
on the borders of its province or the first ring of municipalities. In the 
same period, so-called aree vaste (larger cooperation areas) of the region 
of Tuscany were under debate. Proposals for larger administrative areas 
were on the agenda, of which three to five for the whole of Tuscany were 
discussed in more detail. This could have been done by strengthening and 
enlarging the provinces. This was at least the position of the Regional 
President Rossi, but it was rejected by numerous municipalities such as 
Prato. However, the aree vaste are not completely new, but are already 
practised in the field of health services and nature conservation (ARPAT 
areas – Agenzia Regionale per la Protezione Ambientale della Toscana). 
The multitude of territorial frameworks for waste management, water 
management and social services is taken up in the strategic plan (CM 
Florence 2017, 24–25).
In the opinion of all interviewees, the keeping the borders of the old prov-
ince of Florence in the creation of the CM means that a perimeter is chosen 
that is too small and does not reflect the functional interdependencies. The 
perimeter is therefore not appropriate for planning settlement development 
or operating integrated infrastructure development, especially with regard 
to mobility. This became apparent when in the summer of 2018, the efforts 
of the municipality of San Giovanni Valdarno became clear to become part 
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of the CM. Up to now this town belongs to the province of Arezzo, but 
borders the CM (Figline – Incisa). Due to resistance in the Metropolitan 
Council, the process came to a standstill. The mayor of San Giovanni hoped 
to gain access to resources (EU funding) and argues that his municipality is 
part of the Florence labour market region (commuter shed).
The question of the adaptability of the spatial layout arises on several 
levels:
 1) A recurring theme is the clarification of the relationship between CM 
Firenze and the province of Prato, and the cities of Prato and Pistoia. 
The interdependencies between these places are so dense that a solution 
is needed to avoid further conflicts and to increase territorial coherence.
 2) What forms of cooperation are required for the network of cities in 
northern Tuscany (Pisa, Empoli, Lucca, Pistoia, Prato, Florence) but 
also for area south of Florence (Val d’Arno) (Paba et al. 2017)?
 3) How to integrate the mountainous and rural area of Mugello function-
ally and politically into the CM (north-east towards Bologna)?
 4) The two CMs of Florence and Bologna are adjacent and have func-
tional links (rail and motorway, alternative airport). Will a stable coop-
eration with the CM Bologna emerge?
The regional government clearly sees the advantage of cross-jurisdictional 
cooperation on a larger scale and intervenes in several ways. The region uses 
funding to give incentives for cooperation. The Piana Fiorentina is a case in 
point.
3.3.2.1  The Piana Fiorentina project
The Piana Fiorentina is a plain in the north of Florence, stretching beyond 
the boundaries of the CM (see Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.5). The area extends 
from Florence to Pistoia and thus encompasses a functionally and naturally 
well delimited area. Functionally, because there are dense functional inter-
dependencies between the three large cities and the smaller towns (commut-
ers, infrastructure), which should be managed through the collaboration of 
municipalities and provinces. Naturally, in the sense that it is a plain sur-
rounded by mountains, which is used for agriculture, with conflicts of land 
use arising because of new settlements, commercial zones and infrastructure 
development. Last but not least, there are objectives of environmental and 
nature conservation and for the management of risks (flooding).
The regional government has a territorial instrument called PIT (Progetti 
integrati territoriali) that is thought to bring public and private actors 
together and offers some funding for projects at the intersection of envi-
ronmental planning and regional development. The implementation is del-
egated to local authorities. In the case of the CM Florence there are three of 
them: the PIT Piana Fiorentina (a regional landscape planning project), and 
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two projects referring to biodiversity and watershed management along the 
river Arno (CM Florence 2018d, 145; Regione Toscana 2016). The regional 
government has handed over the implementation of the PIT for the Piana 
Fiorentina to the CM; for the other two, the CM is just a partner as several 
other provinces are included.30
In cooperation with the province of Prato and other municipalities out-
side the CM, a kind of landscape park (parco agricolo), in the sense of green 
Figure 3.6  Piana Fiorentina, administrative boundaries with Pistoia, Prato and 
Florence 2021 Concept: K. Zimmermann Cartography: F. Gela
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infrastructure and reduction of land consumption is to be created. The pro-
gramme is part of the Rural Regional Development Plan (Piano Sviluppo 
Rurale PSR 2014–2020) of the Tuscany Region, in which the participating 
municipalities concluded an agreement. Plans for the Piana Fiorentina have 
a history that goes back to the 1970s (Regione Toscana 2015b, 16). It is, 
on the one hand, a piece of land with valuable environmental qualities. On 
the other hand, the piecemeal extension of settlements and transport infra-
structures over the last decades has resulted in a situation of loss of green 
spaces and increasing hydrological risks. In fact, in the regional develop-
ment plan, the Piana Fiorentina is characterised as an area of incomplete 
metropolisation or a peri-urban zone with scattered mobility infrastructure 
and economic development competing with agricultural land use and parks 
(Regione Toscana 2017, 112).
In terms of governance, a form of cooperative and project-based plan-
ning has been created for the area and the process is in the moderating hand 
of the CM.
The PIT Piana Fiorentina can be characterised as a supra-municipal ini-
tiative based on a grant from the region. Interventions should happen in 
these areas:
 • Soil protection and flood prevention;
 • Water protection;
 • Biodiversity;
 • Landscape planning;
 • Sustainable energy;
 • Agriculture (Regione Toscana 2016).
Since 2018, a bicycle highway has also been promoted as part of the Piana 
Fiorentina project and this is also one of the pilot projects of the strategic 
plan of the CM. Participants are the Province of Prato, the City of Prato, 
various municipalities and CM Florence. The participating parties have con-
cluded an agreement (accordo territoriale) with the other actors and agri-
cultural enterprises. There are direct beneficiaries (receiving funding) and 
indirect participants (affected in a broader sense and involved in the imple-
mentation). However, the map of interventions shows that the PIT Piana 
Fiorentina is a selection of bigger and smaller projects and less a comprehen-
sive strategy. Financial support started in the 2000s.
This is thus an incentive-based cooperative planning process, which has 
been promoted for a longer time period, particularly by the Province of 
Prato, because it owns large parts of this area. From the perspective of the 
regional government, it is an attempt to give an impulse to this unplanned 
area on an intercommunal basis. In the past, Florence, in particular, consid-
ered this area as a backyard where waste incinerators, landfills, the airport 
and industry were located. This helped to protect the areas in the south-west 
of the city that are of great touristic value. This led to conflicts (between 
166 Italy 
Prato and Florence, but also Campi Bisenzio, Sesto Fiorentino), especially in 
connection with the expansion of the airport, which has been under debate 
for some time.31
3.3.2.2  Intercommunal land use planning below the CM
The regional government of Tuscany supports inter-municipal cooperation 
and, with limited success, the amalgamation of smaller municipalities. The 
elaboration of inter-municipal structure plans is part of this strategy as the 
region gives a financial incentive for the elaboration of these plans. In the 
territory of the CM Florence, there are three cases. The neighbouring munic-
ipalities of Sesto Fiorentino and Calenzo have developed an inter-municipal 
structure plan (adopted in 2019); the unione montana di comuni Mugello 
with a total of eight municipalities has a joint planning office that drew up 
an inter-municipal structure plan (adopted in 2018, see Figure 3.4 Nr. 4). 
Another municipal union is about to finish the work on the inter-municipal 
structure plan (L’Unione dei comuni della Valdisieve, see Figure 3.4 Nr. 5) 
As a result, almost half of the territory of the CM will be covered by three 
inter-municipal structure plans. This emerging intermediate level of land use 
planning raises the question of what the territorial plan of the CM (PTM) 
would add or regulate (De Santis 2015).
3.3.2.3  Cooperation with CM Bologna
In March 2018, an MoU (Memorandum of Understanding) was signed 
between CM Bologna and CM Firenze (Patto Bologna – Firenze). This MoU 
aimed at enhanced cooperation in the fields of tourism, transport, EU pro-
jects (PON) and the Apennine area (mountain region between the cities, 
Mugello). In fact, the two CMs are the only ones directly bordering with 
each other. The two city-regions are well connected by rail and the motor-
way, which has been greatly improved in recent years.
We can conclude that several territorial reference frameworks exist 
within and beyond the territory of the CM. In particular, the region uses 
and refers to different territorial perimeters (including the Piana Fiorentina) 
but these are not institutionalised.
3.3.3  Coordination of public policies
As a result of the reform, the region took over many of the functions of 
the former province, but did not hand over significantly more functions to 
the CM (Regione Toscana 2018). The CM thus remains relatively weak 
compared to the former province. Although the new obligatory func-
tion of strategic planning is highlighted, the CM has a limited functional 
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portfolio. With regard to the functional coordination of policies, the stat-
ute of the CM Florence clearly makes reference to the idea of integrated 
regional development. That is to say that the “mission statement” goes 
beyond the functions formally assigned to the CM as many goals have 
to be implemented with partners (i.e. the region and/or the municipalities 
and the private sector). This ambition (and broad interpretation) for inte-
grated regional development is even stronger in the strategic plan and the 
activities of the CM in the first years since its foundation show that strong 
emphasis is given to the strategic plan which has been constantly debated 
and updated.
3.3.3.1  The strategic plan – PSM
The strategic plan (Piano Strategico Metropolitano) is referred to in Art. 5 
of the statute as “atto di indirizzo” (i.e. indicative and only coordinating) 
for the municipalities and municipal unions. This means that the plan may 
indicate goals and directions for municipal action but rather as a framework 
that depends also on regional policies and plans. The strategic plan should 
express which priorities in regional development are set jointly, i.e. it takes 
up problems and proposes projects. The plan sets development priorities, 
chooses methods and instruments and indicates resources (if available). It 
is binding for the CM; the municipalities can voluntarily orient themselves 
to the plan.
In terms of content, the PSM touches upon a wide range of issues with-
out giving too clear priorities. These are urban regeneration and inner 
peripheries, brownfield development and reduction of land consumption (as 
requested by the regional planning law), economic development through 
incubators and new spaces for manufacturing, bicycle highways, an inte-
grated metro ticket for public transport and green infrastructure. However, 
some important topics such as affordable housing, renewable energies, resil-
ience and sustainable tourism are underrepresented. The topics and policies 
addressed in the various documents of the strategic plan are organised in 
three priority axes (or visions as they are called): (1) universal accessibility 
(referring to space and mobility but also to services); (2) distributed oppor-
tunities (or opportunities for all); (3) territories for well-being (referring to 
ecological values and urban-rural linkages). Although there is one document 
called strategic plan, the strategic plan consists of a variety of documents 
and contributions (preparatory documents, an atlas with indicative maps 
and graphics, analytical documents, a synthesis report and visions) (CM 
Florence 2017a –f; 2018a –d). All other plans, PTM and PUMS in particular 
are in a way inferior as they are means of implementation of what is defined 
in the PSM as being the priority.
The plan defines 11 sub-areas that are supposed to be territorial frame-
works for cooperation between CM, municipalities and private actors in 
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various fields. These areas are defined based on the assumption of some 
homogeneity in terms of socio-economic and spatial structures. They are 
not granted with any institutional status or governance form.
In terms of implementation, the regional government declared that the 
PSM will be part of the regional development programme (PSR) which 
increases the relevance in terms of funding (CM Florence 2018a). In fact, 
the PSR refers quite often to the Città Metropolitana and mentions a range 
of planned interventions.
The PSM foresees additional measures for those policies that are not part 
of the formal responsibilities of the CM. These are a round table for all 
actors and institutions in the realm of social policies and, even more impor-
tant, a round table called EasyMetroCity as a voluntary unit for coordinat-
ing all municipal services. This round table would be a sort of self-governing 
unit and will be open also for private actors and neighbouring municipali-
ties (CM Florence 2017b, 25).
The implementation and the regular update of the plan is accompanied 
by a promotion committee, in which the CM, the University of Florence, 
the chamber of commerce, a local bank and a few other actors are involved. 
This is a sort of soft governance mechanism because the committee also 
supervises an agency called “Laboratorio per l’Operatività del Piano 
Strategico Metropolitano”. This lab is the agent of the promotion com-
mittee and brings together staff of the university, the CM and several pri-
vate and public agencies (Fondazione per la Ricerca e l’Innovazione (FRI), 
Laboratorio Regional Design del Dipartimento di Architettura (Re-DLab), 
Istituto Regionale Programmazione Economica Toscana (IRPET)). It is the 
task of this lab to evaluate and monitor the progress of plan implementation 
(annual reports) but this group of experts also elaborated and designed the 
plan. The triannual update of the plan started in 2020 and puts an empha-
sis on the connections between the three major plans (CM Florence 2021). 
The three priorities (or visions) of universal access, general opportunities 
and areas of well-being have not been changed so far. The short sequence 
of updates of the plan demonstrates that measurement of progress is rather 
difficult in such a complex environment. The process of drawing up the plan 
is evaluated differently by interviewees in terms of inclusiveness, prospects 
for implementation and territorial priorities.
3.3.3.2  The territorial plan – PTM
The second instrument is the metropolitan territorial plan (Piano Territoriale 
Metropolitano – PTM) with the ultimate task of coordinating the commu-
nication structures, service networks and infrastructure being in the com-
petence of the CM. This may include setting constraints and objectives for 
the activity and functions of the municipalities within the metropolitan 
territory (according to Art. 6 of the statute that defines the scope of the 
PTM in the context of the regional law on spatial planning, Regional Law 
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no 65/2014). The plan is intended to be the reference framework for the 
municipal land use plans. The statute of the CM mentions municipal struc-
ture plans that can be issued by the CM (according to regional law, but not 
yet implemented). With a similar intention, directives can be issued that 
refer to the operational plans (§ 95 Regional Law no 65/2014). The council 
decision to start the plan preparation process was taken on 18 December 
2018. According to the initial documents the plan will make specifications 
for mobility infrastructures and services of regional relevance, urban regen-
eration and reuse of existing settlements (brownfields), regional economy 
(industry, craft industry), preservation of natural heritage, territorial equali-
sation, digitisation and rural development (CM Florence 2018e, 5–6). The 
PTM will in addition include an atlas of brownfield sites, the indication of 
bioregions, zones of conflict and transports networks (cycling in particular) 
(CM Florence 2018e, 18). There will be less detailed specifications for set-
tlement development, but the draft of the plan includes some conceptual 
elements that give guidance in this regard (CM 2019). These are brown-
field sites as intervention zones for urban regeneration, biodistricts and their 
functional relationships, intermodality of transport and cycling routes and 
declarations of intended projects in the sub-territories.
It is questionable whether the CM will have the instruments and resources 
to implement all the specifications made in this plan that is largely indica-
tive. Particularly with regard to settlement development, hardly any speci-
fications are likely to be made. In general, regional plans in Italy do not 
specify densities or growth rates for municipalities. There is no binding 
planning of the structure and hierarchy of centres and only a weak prescrip-
tion for the distribution of functions in space. With regard to the process, 
the PTM takes up the initiatives of the municipalities and seeks to form 
them into something spatially coherent. With regard to the territory of the 
CM, the PTM largely uses the existing municipal unions as reference for the 
analysis for the environmental assessment and the consultation process (CM 
Florence 2018e, 23; CM Florence 2018c, 54). However, as many munici-
palities are still in the process of adapting their local plans to new regional 
planning legislation, the whole process is delayed (CM Florence 2018e, 20).
The specifications with regard to settlement development are made in the 
regional plan and regional planning law. Art. 4 of the Regional Planning 
Law (2014) stipulates that settlement development and infrastructure devel-
opment on undeveloped land may only take place in the contiguous built-
up area (urbanised area, this area is defined by the municipalities in the 
local plans, which in turn are approved by the region). The Conferenza di 
Copianificazione, consisting of representatives of the region, the CM and 
the affected municipalities, decides on exceptions. The PTM must meet the 
requirements of the PIT of the region and the latest planning law of Tuscany 
that stipulates the cessation of land consumption. The PTM should make 
use of the territorial reference frameworks of the PIT which do not corre-
spond with the territory of the CM (CM Florence 2018a, 16). For the Piana 
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Fiorentina planning area (Ambito 06), for example, a risk map is shown 
in the PIT accordingly, which shows the disadvantages and criticalities of 
the settlement development to date: loss of open spaces and agricultural 
land, fragmentation and interruptions, underused railway lines, flood risks 
(Regione Toscana 2015b). In total, there are six territorial reference frame-
works in the regional plan PIT that overlap with the territory of the CM 
(ibid).32
The PIT of the region is also the landscape plan and thus the sectoral 
plan for nature conservation (including agriculture, forestry, flood protec-
tion) (Regione Toscana 2015a). It is clear from the preparatory documents 
that this aspect is given a great deal of weight, while settlement development 
is given rather little importance. The PTM documents attempt to clarify 
the status and content. This gives the impression that the plan is more a 
concretisation of the statements of the PIT and less a product of local self-
administration. It is not yet clear whether the municipalities of the CM want 
to / should use the plan to give themselves a joint binding guiding principle 
for spatial development or whether only requirements from “above” are ful-
filled. In any case, the aim is to draw up a holistic spatial development plan 
based on the objectives of the strategic plan PSM and to implement them.
The interviewees see the task of spatial planning mainly in the hands of 
the region and less in the CM, even if they speak of an emerging integrated 
planning system. In the past, each level made a plan, but only for itself. 
Now they are basically working top down. The new planning law from 
2014 has created the conditions for this and has treated settlement develop-
ment restrictively and has given priority to internal urban development. The 
combination of PIT and landscape plan sets clear limits for settlement devel-
opment through environmental planning. The regional planning law estab-
lishes the principle of zero growth and the priority for internal development 
(reduction of land consumption). This is justified in so far as the region is 
only growing slightly and there is still potential for internal development on 
brownfield sites (in particular in Florence).33 This means that regional plan-
ning in the sense of controlling settlement development is not left to the CM 
(or the municipalities in general) but is restricted due to regional legislation 
and related supervisory functions. The territorial plan of the former prov-
ince (PTCP) made only indicative statements about the settlement structure 
and environmental protection.
3.3.3.3  The mobility plan – PUMS
In the field of mobility, the CM created an integrated mobility plan (PUMS) 
in a cooperative process with the municipalities. The PUMS is supposed to 
take up the basic principles and suggestions of the PSM and, in fact, the 
PUMS partly reads as a copy of the PSM (sections on tram, multimodal 
hubs and cycling infrastructure). Unlike in Bologna, this plan was drawn 
up much later than the PSM (resolution was September 2019, CM Florence 
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2019). The PUMS of the CM Florence is a strategic document with a valid-
ity of ten years. It is intended to form and bundle supra-communal initia-
tives such as the extension of the tram of Florence, a metropolitan cycling 
system or an integrated metropolitan tariff system for public transport. The 
PUMS is binding (National Law n. 232 2016, updated in 2017).34 Still, 
concrete decisions in the field of mobility and digitalisation and services 
require supra-local (metropolitan) importance (di interesse della Città 
Metropolitana). The PUMS takes as a territorial reference the municipal 
unions, the city of Florence and the municipalities of the first ring.
The first part of the mobility plan is analytic, describing the major chal-
lenges of the area. The second part makes suggestions for a number of projects 
and measures. These include bicycle way systems (which is more a collec-
tion of information with regard to the legal background and opportunities, 
the measures are not very concrete but the chapter on cycling is very long). 
A region-wide integrated tariff system is also one of the measures foreseen 
in the PUMS. An integrated metro ticket for Florence and the municipali-
ties of the first ring exists already and includes busses, trams and regional 
railways in the area of Florence and a limited number of municipalities (but 
not for the whole territory of the CM) (Firenze, Calenzano, Fiesole, Sesto 
Fiorentino, Lastra a Signa, Signa and Campi Bisenzio and additional service 
in the municipalities Impruneta, Vaglia, Bagno a Ripoli and Scandicci). The 
re-introduction of a tram system in Florence is a great success story in par-
ticular for the first ring municipality of Scandicci. Previously the bus connec-
tion to the centre of Florence was rather poor. The tram was actively used 
in Scandicci to develop the centre of this town. However, the introduction 
of the tram was pushed by the city of Florence long before the introduction 
of the CM. The tram will be extended to Sesto Fiorentino, Revezzano and 
Bagno a Ripoli within the next years.
Another important project is the integration of the regional railway into 
a metropolitan train system (in connection with inter-modal hubs tram-
way – railway, cycling). Again, this idea had already been planned previ-
ously, largely financed by the municipalities and the region. Regional rail 
transport, which is very important for commuter networks, is the responsi-
bility of the regional government.
In general, although the plan has several hundreds of pages, it is a plan of 
goals and strategies and a collection of existing initiatives (i.e. the tramway). 
Concrete measures are rare (except for the streets). It is more an indicative 
plan with scenarios (which is a significant difference in contrast to Bologna).
3.3.3.4  Special funding: PON Metro and PeriMETRO
The moderating and coordinating function of the CM can be illustrated by 
the responsibility of the CM in the context of the implementation of the 
PON Metro programme. PON Metro was part of the national operational 
programme in the EU funding period 2014–2020 and specifically targeted 
172 Italy 
at the Città Metropolitane. The focus was on urban renewal as part of 
European territorial cohesion policy. In the first call for projects, however, 
only the core city was eligible to apply for funding, presumably due to the 
fact that in 2014 the CMs were not yet capable to act and the intention was 
no longer to hand over implementation to the provinces as the abolition of 
the provinces was basically done. But even with the second call, a tendency 
to give preference to the core city is evident. The CM is not a direct recipi-
ent of the subsidies and does not implement any projects itself. This is in 
the hands of the municipalities. However, the CM organises the selection 
process together with the municipalities and acts as an interlocutor for the 
government in Rome. PON Metro has significantly increased the munici-
palities’ attention with regard to the role of the CM. Fifty projects with a 
total funding of about 52 M€ (39 M€ EU funding) for schools, cycle paths 
and green infrastructure have been selected.
PeriMetro is a funding programme of the Italian government to support 
the development of the so-called peripheries. This relates to a recent dis-
course about disadvantaged areas in Italy. Fifty projects are supported in the 
territory of the CM Florence (in the three categories of social and cultural 
infrastructures, cycling and walking infrastructure and public spaces, in total 
ca. 50 M€). The selection process is similar to PON Metro. The importance 
of EU funding is also evident in the Piana Fiorentina project (see above).
In summary, it can be said that the planning competences of the CM are 
largely indicative. Only schools and transport infrastructure (provincial and 
regional roads, recently bicycle highway) fall within the scope of compe-
tence of the CM. However, the CM essentially acts in a coordinating and 
subsidiary manner and collaborates with the municipalities.
3.3.4  Conclusion
When comparing the factual competences of the CM and the answers of 
the interviewees to the question of the important and urgent subjects of 
inter-municipal politics, it is noticeable that some of the mentioned urgent 
problems of city-regional development are part of the functional portfo-
lio of CM. This is true for mobility and sustainable transport and urban 
regeneration, whereas there are large gaps with regard to topics such as 
circular economy (waste management) or tourism (for which there is no real 
control so far), climate adaptation and the coordinated promotion of the 
regional economy. In particular, the aspect of housing is hardly addressed 
at all although urban regeneration is one of the priorities.
With regard to the classification of functions, it is also clear that, accord-
ing to the statute, the law and the existing plans, the CM Florence is assigned 
more functions in the area of reproduction and services of general inter-
est (e.g. provincial roads, schools, infrastructure), but at the same time a 
coordination function for strategic regional development is indicated. The 
regional government of Tuscany, however, sees regional development as a 
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joint matter of the region and the CM. Moreover, at least the region and the 
CM itself emphasise the attempt to support socio-economic development. 
Although the idea of competitiveness is present in the strategic plan, the pos-
sibilities for implementation (resources, instruments, actors such as develop-
ment agencies) are lacking. The region’s expectations of the CM are quite 
high: it should implement regional policy and at the same time form a level 
of horizontal self-regulation. Municipal actors expect investments in infra-
structure (maintenance and extension of the roads, bridges) from the CM.
The strategic plan is the new instrument of the CM, a comparable instru-
ment was previously not available to the province. With the new instrument, 
the development function is emphasised and clearly separated from the 
rationale of the former province, which acted in a regulatory way. However, 
the CM can only give development impulses to a limited extent: in the area of 
infrastructure and through the PON / PeriMETRO programmes. In contrast 
to the PTM, the PSM is intended to be a holistic and process-oriented instru-
ment, with which spatial and sectoral projects of regional development are 
defined and steps of implementation are indicated. It is procedurally designed 
and is to be renewed every three years and updated annually. The PSM is 
supposed to form the basis for the objectives of the PTM and the PUMS 
and in fact at least on a declaratory level, there is a certain degree of coher-
ence between the three documents. But the PSM is largely coordinative and 
indicative, i.e. makes suggestions but prospects for implementation are vague 
or depend on some unknown variables. All three plans are, to a great extent, 
compilations of projects and measures that were on the agenda before (exten-
sion of the tramway, new train station for high-speed trains, landscape park 
Piana Fiorentina). The frequent update of the PSM also may create problems 
of coherence as the other plans (PUMS, PTM) are not updated so frequently.
The guiding idea of the Delrio reform on the national level was that of 
administrative simplification (both procedural and institutional), efficiency 
and cost reduction in the public sector. This is visible in some of the pro-
jects such as the sportello unico delle attività produttive (SUAP) – Unitary 
counter for economic activities. The idea of decentralisation can be seen as 
ambivalent, because in the end the regional government has gained person-
nel and functions and in fact some observers see the Delrio reform as an act 
of re-centralisation as the regions gained a lot of functions. However, both 
the interviewees and the documents speak of decentralisation. At least as 
a level of inter-municipal interest-mediation and coordination, the CM is 
more important and effective than the province. The latter was an independ-
ent level, which often enough worked in a rather contrary way to the region 
and municipalities. The interviewees confirmed that the CM is weaker than 
the former province. They see the benefit in the formation of a forum of 
mayors, which is now no longer to be shared with the provincial president. 
The province thus developed its own interests and was more an institution 
of the state (as an independent level), it acted top down. The CM, in con-
trast, can be understood as an organ of horizontal self-regulation. However, 
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conflicts are naturally on the increase.35 At the same time a concentration 
on Florence can be observed (politically) as many smaller municipalities do 
not feel sufficiently included in the plan-making processes. This points to 
problems of internal territorial coherence. In fact, in June 2021, the Mayor 
of Florence announced that there would be closer cooperation with the 12 
communities of the first ring. This implies in principle a splitting of the ter-
ritory of the CM into a core and a periphery and this splitting was already 
observable in the past. The unstable or unclear functional as well as politi-
cal relationships of the sub-territories (Mugello in particular) and the core 
city have been an issue from the beginning in the Città Metropolitana of 
Florence.
Overall, the CM Florence lacks the possibilities and instruments for 
implementation. The wealth of information and ideas contained in the stra-
tegic plan is inspiring, but contrasts with the abilities and possibilities of 
implementation. It remains to be seen whether the CM will succeed in form-
ing specific alliances with municipalities and regions. All in all, the imple-
mentation of the Delrio Law in Tuscany is an act of centralisation, since in 
addition to the creation of the CM, the provinces have been decisively weak-
ened. Many functions and the personnel have been transferred to the region, 
especially in the field of environmental planning and landscape protection.
3.4  Conclusion: recent changes of city-regional governance in Italy
The introduction of the new entity was also not part of a visionary idea or 
a national reform strategy of the multi-level governance system that would 
give a greater role for CM or at least give clearer functional profiles for 
the different levels (in terms of avoiding redundancy). The creation of the 
CM is only one element of a wider stepwise and fragmented process of the 
modernisation of the public sector that is largely guided by ideas of decen-
tralisation, cost efficiency, simplification and, to a lesser degree, territorial 
coherence. In fact, it’s questionable if we can use the notion “reform” as 
most of the changes were rendered on an ad hoc basis and did not fol-
low a coherent and comprehensive design (also due to the frequent changes 
of governments, with technical interim governments in power and changes 
required by the Constitutional Court). In Italy, various motives are mixed, 
such as decentralisation and local autonomy, desire for greater coherence of 
socio-economic development policies (vs. fragmentation), simplification of 
the public sector and austerity.
In view of current socio-spatial developments in Italian city-regions a 
new form of cooperative territorial action is actually needed (Fedeli 2017; 
Perrone and Rossi 2018). In the end, the reform was limited to a purely 
constitutional territorial reform; planning issues were not considered very 
strongly. The top-down implementation of the city-regions is a logical 
development, since the voluntary regional conferences of the 1990s were 
not very successful. However, the debate of the 1990s created a certain path 
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dependency (Vandelli and Vitali 2014, 80). New ideas (governance), apart 
from the discussion on strategic planning, were not considered. Flexible 
forms of cooperation in different spatial settings for different tasks would be 
more appropriate for the issues that have to be addressed at the city-regional 
level (Riboldazzi 2017, 96).
In a way, the Delrio reform was also an attempt to design a system of 
territorial public administration that was rather uniform in a more flexible 
way. The openness of the Delrio law would in principle allow for context-
specific arrangements in each metropolitan city but the regions did only 
in part interpret the creation of metropolitan cities in this way. There are, 
nevertheless remarkable differences and these can in part be explained by 
path-dependencies. In those city-regions where the former province took 
a more pro-active role for regional development as Milan or Bologna, the 
CM as successor (also on terms of staff and implicit knowledge) follows a 
similar pattern of action. Other provinces / CM were less prepared for a role 
change. There are also differences with regard to the autonomy that is given 
to the CM by the respective regional government. Emilia-Romagna and 
Toscany display a more centralised approach while Lombardy followed the 
principle of decentralisation and this is not only a question of size (Mobilio 
2018; Tubertini 2015). The national funding schemes PON Metro and 
Bando Periferie have had a limited homogenisation effect as this extra fund-
ing was very relevant for all CM. As the CM had to face serious budget cuts 
in the years 2015, 2016 and 2017, these funding schemes made an impor-
tant contribution to the implementation capacity of the metropolitan cities.
3.4.1  Comparison Firenze – Bologna
The two metropolitan cities of Florence and Bologna have a lot in com-
mon but there are also remarkable differences with regard to the factual 
practice of city-regional governance. From an institutional perspective both 
CM share a lot, largely because the national law defines the framework. As 
they are similar in size, the number of councillors is identical and also the 
conditions for the eventual introduction of the direct election of the metro-
politan council are similar. In both city-regions, this is not a priority. Also, 
both regional governments opted for a pattern of recentralisation as more 
functions were shifted to the region. Differences are observable with regard 
to the institutional legacies. What happened in Bologna since the 1990s in 
terms of city-regional initiatives and inter-municipal cooperation (unioni 
di comuni) had a big impact for the start and performance of the CM. In a 
way this is a seamless continuation. As a result, there is closer collaboration 
between the municipalities (and their unions) and the CM, and in particular 
the administration of the core city has close working relationships with the 
CM. Coordination with the regional government seems to be more regular 
in Bologna. In any case, the Delrio reform did strengthen the core city as the 
provincial counterpart does no longer exist and the mayor of the core city is 
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also the political and administrative leader of the CM. This may have two 
antagonistic effects: greater effectiveness and better coordination between 
the core city and the CM or suspicion of the other member municipalities of 
the CM because the core city extends its influence.
A major difference exists, also in terms of institutional design, with regard 
to the use of municipal unions as an instrument for coordinating local inter-
ests and services. In Bologna, the municipal unions cover almost the whole 
territory of the CM and their representation forms an institutional pillar next 
to the council and the metropolitan conference. In Florence, there is no such 
role and function for municipal unions and the existing unions do cover only 
the peripheral territories (although representing large parts of the territory). 
The municipalities of the first ring are not organised in municipal unions.
In both city-regions, issues of territorial political representation emerged 
at the beginning because the composition of the metropolitan council 
with only 18 members represents political parties but not communities. In 
Bologna, however, this is mitigated at least in part as the municipal unions 
are an important pillar of the arrangement (in terms of territorial represen-
tation and as implementation agencies for policies and programmes of the 
CM). If output legitimacy (i.e. effective problem-solving) or other means of 
political communication directly addressing citizens can soften this lack of 
territorial representation remains to be seen.
In terms of functions, it’s clearly visible that both CM interpret the gen-
eral task of strategic planning and coordination in a different way. Bologna 
gives a clear emphasis on mobility and (public) transport and the PSM has 
large parts dedicated to governance issues and joint public administration. 
This is largely absent in the PSM of the CM Florence. The PSM in Florence 
is more an urban design plan that gives greater emphasis on the differences 
of territorial subunits as soft spaces. The city-regional sustainable mobility 
plan (PUMS) of CM Florence is a collection of projects that were partly 
planned before. In Florence, the PTM is not yet finished. The plans of both 
city-regions share a great concern for urban regeneration and the support 
of the peripheries but Bologna established an equalisation scheme. In both 
CM, the PSM is seen as the superordinate plan and the other plans and 
documents (PUMS, PTM) are in a way an implementation tool of the PSM. 
The sequence of adaptations of the PSM is higher in Florence which prob-
ably may cause temporal inconsistencies with the other plans that are not 
adapted so frequently.
With regard to questions of space and scale, bot CM are identical with 
the jurisdictional boundaries of the former province but this is less a prob-
lem in Bologna than in the greater Florence area where there are several spa-
tial inconsistencies (Piana Fiorentina, city-network of northern Tuscany). 
There are also differences with regard to the internal territorial coherence as 
can be demonstrated by the splitting up of the territory of the CM Florence. 
There is a difference in terms of closer cooperation between Florence and 
the 12 communities of the first ring and the rest of the CM.
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Notes
1 Five regions have a special status with higher autonomy (Sardinia, Sicily, Valle 
d’Aosta, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino).
2 Article 117 of the Constitution decrees that the matter of territorial governance 
is the object of competing legislation between state and regions. This means that 
the central government sets the main guidelines and the general principles, while 
the regions determine specific laws and rules.
3 There are, however, implementation deficits. Many municipalities have outdated 
plans or the plan never came into force.
4 These include, besides others, Emilia Romagna, Lombardy, Tuscany.
5 Decree-Law no. 95 of July 6, 2012 provided – in art. 17 – for the reduction and 
reorganisation of the provinces (a topic known to the public debate as Dossier 
no. 9 “suppression of the provinces”) and – in art. 18 – the establishment of 
metropolitan cities and the suppression of the provinces in their territory.
6 see a complete report on http://www .upinet .it /4692 /istituzioni _e _riforme /lattu-
azione _della _legge _56 _in _ambit _regional/ (29 June 2016).
7 The union of municipalities is an Italian body governed by legislative decree no. 
267 of 18 August 2000, which implements law no. 265 of 3 August 1999, in 
particular article 32. The entity is made up of two or more municipalities for 
the joint exercise of functions or services falling within the municipal compe-
tence. The union is endowed with statutory autonomy within the framework of 
the principles established by the Constitution and by the community, state and 
regional rules. Legislative Decree no. 267/2000 defines it as a local authority, but 
the Constitutional Court ruling no. 50 of 2015 specifies that it is an institutional 
form of association between municipalities.
8 Riboldazzi (2017) refers to figures from ANCI and mentions 448 inter-municipal 
unions, 60 of which are in Lombardy. 2,387 municipalities are involved.
9 As part of several fiscal consolidation measures that have been rendered post-
crisis, the budget cuts for the provinces and CM defined by national decrees were 
300 million in 2011 and 500 million in 2012 (CM Milano 2020, 7). The Stability 
Act in 2015 requested additional budget cuts (Agnoletti et al. 2015, 248).
10 http://osservatorio .urbanit .it /pianificazione -territoriale -e -urbanistica/.
11 “setting constraints and objectives for the activity and performance of the func-
tions of municipalities within the metropolitan territory”, own translation.
12 Draft law on the reorganisation of Provinces n. 3558, conversion into law 
of Decree Law n. 188 of 5 November 2012, on the subject of Metropolitan 
Provinces and Cities http://www .senato .it /japp /bgt /showdoc /16 /DDLPRES /0 / 
683012 /index .html ?part =ddlpres _ddlpres1.
13 Nei nostri propositi la Città metropolitana vuol essere un ente leggero nella 
struttura, ma forte nella capacità di indirizzo e di coordinamento dei Comuni, un 
ente che svolge in prevalenza funzioni di pianificazione e programmazione, in una 
visione in cui la Città metropolitana è innanzitutto una federazione di Comuni.
14 https://www .bibliotecasalaborsa .it /cronologia /bologna /1959 /piano _intercomu-
nale _del _comprensorio _bolognese.
15 https://autonomie .regione .emilia -romagna .it /unioni -di -comuni /approfondiment 
i /attuazione -del -riordino -territoriale.
16 The smaller municipalities in the mountainous areas used a similar format for an 
even longer period.
17 The notion circondario is an older notion for a subdivision of a province. The 
circondario Imolese existed since the 1990s as an expression of a limited auton-
omy of this area. In 2010 the regional government of Emilia Romagna abolished 
the circondari and the circondario Imolese became a unione di comuni but kept 
the name.
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18 https://www .cittametropolitana .bo .it /pianificazione /cum.
19 https://www .ctss .bo .it /I _componenti _e _la _governance /Mappa _della _govern-
ance _della _Citta _metropolitana _di _Bologna.
20 https://www .cittametropolitana .bo .it /portale /Home /Archivio _news /Firmato _ 
il _Patto _tra _Bologna _Modena _e _Ferrara _L _obiettivo _e _rendere _quest _area _ 
ancor _piu _competitiva.
21 On a wider scale, an ESPON project investigates options for the creation of a 
space between Milan and the southern area of Lombardy and the CM Bologna. 
https://www .espon .eu /imagine.
22 http://www .fon dazi onei nnov azio neurbana .it /bologna /piano -strategico - 
metropolitano.
23 http://psm .bologna .it /Consiglio _di _sviluppo.
24 With strong reference to the Carta di Bologna. The goal of sustainable devel-
opment and reduction of land consumption was already defined in the period 
2016–2020, but this was a voluntary commitment.
25 This is done because the plans have an expiry date (CM Bologna 2020a).
26 http://www .legislazionetecnica .it /18164 /fonte /lr -toscana -31 -12 -1984 -n -74.
27 Two councillors are from Sesto Fiorentino and Pontassieve each. The other 
councillors are from Lastra a Signa, Empoli, Barbarino di Mugello, Bagno a 
Ripoli, Scandicci, Campi Bisenzio, Greve in Chianti, Vinci, Marradi.
28 Following a decision of the administrative court, http://www .cittametropolitana . 
fi .it /ambiente/ (15 April 2021).
29 The spatial development plan of the old province (PTCP) is still valid until the 
new PTM will come in force.
30 PIT “Acque e Biodiversità - Tutela e valorizzazione delle risorse ambientali del 
Padule di Fucecchio e delle colline delle Cerbaie” with 12 municipalities and four 
provinces (CM Florence 2018d, 115).
31 Due to a government decision in 2019, the prospects for the start of construction 
works for the new (and longer) runway became more realistic. However, as there 
were some doubts about the results of environmental assessment, the implemen-
tation is still pending.
32 n. 5 Val di Nievole e Val d’Arno Inferiore, n. 6 Firenze-Prato-Pistoia e n. 7 
Mugello, parte degli ambiti paesaggistici n. 9 Val d’Elsa, n.10 Chianti e n. 11 Val 
d’Arno Superior.
33 In March 2021 the final document of the PTM was not yet available.
34 A decree law from 4 August 2017 (Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti) 
defined guidelines for the metropolitan mobility plans and stipulated that access 
to funds would not be possible without such a plan.
35 The PSM, like the CM, cannot solve the conflicts of territorial development that 
emerge between Florence and Scandicci on a smaller scale. These are numerous 
and arise on the immediate border where infrastructure of Florence is used by 
citizens of Scandicci and retail centres of Scandicci attract citizens of Florence: 
a joint development of projects is obviously not conceivable, neither is coordi-
nation of larger retail centres. It was once thought to agree on a joint protocol 
between the two cities, but this has not come about.
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4.1  Metropolitan governance in Germany
In Germany, metropolitan governance can hardly be discussed as a national 
or nationwide uniform phenomenon. A preference for flexible and place-
based institutional solutions for metropolitan regions is observable instead 
of a nationwide approach (Zimmermann 2017, 254; Schmidt 2013; Fürst 
2005, Blatter 2006). Instead of one type of metropolitan institution intro-
duced by national law, various forms have developed via voluntary cooper-
ation of local self-governments or by state law (or contracts between states 
when the city-region crosses state borders). The three city-states Berlin, 
Hamburg and Bremen are themselves strong metropolitan governments, 
but functional interdependencies with the adjacent cities and counties due 
to commuter relationships and settlement development induced the need 
for an additional layer of governance (Zimmermann 2017, 255). Hence, 
in the case of the three city-states, the creation of metropolitan govern-
ance arrangements implies cooperation between local self-governments and 
between state governments at the same time.
National government has only a weak influence on governance and plan-
ning in city-regions as spatial planning, regional policies and local govern-
ment are a domain of the 16 states. One of the rare nationwide initiatives in 
the field of metropolitan policies is the concept of “European metropolitan 
regions” as new spaces for governance that was introduced in spatial planning 
(Raumordnung) as a joint initiative of states and the federal government in the 
late 1990s (Harrison and Growe 2014; see below). This indicated a change in 
the way city-regions and agglomerations were seen. Before this initiative, the 
policy discourse referred to smaller city-regions as agglomerations or densely 
populated areas (Ballungsraum or Verdichtungsraum) (Fricke 2017, 299).
4.1.1  Metropolitan institutions: place-specific models of 
multi-scaled metropolitan governance
This decentralised and non-uniform way of dealing with problems of 
metropolitan development is well accepted in Germany. Thus, it is up to 
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each city-region to find institutional solutions for a stable coordination of 
municipalities as well as private actors. This laboratory-like situation has 
both produced outstanding cases of effective metropolitan governance as 
well as fragmented regions with a rather weak degree of integration and 
coordinated action. There is a broad consensus in academia as well as in 
the world of practice that more effective inter-municipal coordination in 
most of the German city-regions is needed, but in contrast to many other 
European states changes happen by way of continuous and flexible adapta-
tions of existing legal frameworks and institutions instead of nationwide 
frameworks (Zimmermann 2017; Priebs 2019).
Inter-municipal associations (kommunale Zweckverbände or 
Regionalverbände) are the most frequently used instrument for the organisa-
tion of public services and planning functions in city-regions (Zimmermann 
2017, 254). They are characterised by binding inter-municipal decision-
making structures and have their own administration (Priebs 2019, 105–
106). First experiments took place since the beginning of the 20st century 
in the Ruhr area and Berlin. The early 1970s (e.g. Frankfurt, see 4.2.1) and 
1990s (e.g. Stuttgart, see 4.3.1) was a period where the establishment of 
metropolitan governments was very much en vogue. A more recent example 
is the Rhine-Neckar region (2004). The portfolio of tasks and institutional 
strength varies between city-regions.
Throughout history, the amalgamation of municipalities or municipali-
ties and counties has also been used to cope with issues of rapidly growing 
agglomerations. One example is Berlin with the creation of a regional city 
(Groß-Berlin) through the annexation of the smaller municipalities contigu-
ous with the core city in 1920 (Priebs 2019, 55). Much more recent cases 
are the Hanover region and the city-region Aachen. In 2001, the county of 
Hanover and the former regional planning association were amalgamated 
with broad consensus of the local actors. In addition, several of the tasks 
of the government office for the region of Lower Saxony and the city of 
Hanover have been shifted to the region (e.g. environmental planning) 
(Blatter 2008, 147–148; Priebs 2019, 114–115; Zimmermann 2017, 258). 
The city-region Aachen, founded in 2009, is smaller and has fewer functions 
compared to Hanover. Similar solutions have been discussed for other city-
regions as well, e.g. Frankfurt during the 1990s, but a consensus was never 
reached. Therefore, the Hanover region and city-region Aachen remain 
exceptional cases for Germany.
Territorial reforms to reduce the number of municipalities and counties 
by mergers were frequent in the 1970s in western Germany,1 but not to the 
extent to form city-regional entities. In some cases, e.g. Stuttgart (see 4.3.2), 
the core city was even excluded from enlargements. Another wave of ter-
ritorial reforms took place in some federal states in the 2000s, motivated 
by attempts to reduce costs and to increase the efficiency of the administra-
tive structure of counties by “economies of scale”. In less populated areas, 
this upscaling came into conflict with the principle of local self-government 
 Germany 189
guaranteed by the German constitution: the state’s constitutional court of 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern stopped the amalgamation of counties in 2007 
and pointed out that the new entities with a size between 3,000 and 7,000 
km² would not correspond to what is considered the everyday world of 
residents (Heinelt and Egner 2011, 120).
Amalgamated city-regions such as Hanover have a directly elected coun-
cil, just like a county. Direct election of the assembly can also be established 
in regional associations, if their statutes provide for it. In Germany, this is 
only the case in Stuttgart Region (see 4.3.1), the city-region Aachen, the 
regional association Saarbrücken and starting from 2020 also in the Ruhr 
Area. The difference to the Hanover region is that the counties still form a 
tier of local self-government within the Stuttgart Region and the Ruhr Area 
and that the regional assembly does not have the political function as a rep-
resentative body of local self-government. Nevertheless, it can be regarded 
as a strong form of input legitimacy that differs significantly from govern-
ance-like forms of metropolitan politics (Zimmermann 2014, 187, 195).
Despite the creation of metropolitan institutions, counties continue to 
exist as a second tier of local self-government in city-regions. The amalgama-
tion of counties and core cities is rare. Counties act at the same time as “(1) 
a multi-purpose state administration, (2) an association of municipalities 
and (3) a territorial unit exercising local self-government beside (above) the 
level of municipalities” (Heinelt and Egner 2011, 107). Large cities, how-
ever, have the status of county-exempt city, meaning that they fulfil all func-
tions of a county and of a municipality. All cores of metropolitan regions 
are either county-exempt cities (Kreisfreie Stadt) or city-states (Stadtstaat), 
the latter ones with even more autonomy as they are sovereign states. Apart 
from a few exceptions, all cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants have 
the status of a county-exempt city, but there are also numerous cities with 
only 40,000–50,000 inhabitants that have this status. This depends on the 
settlement structure in the federal state, but there are also historical reasons. 
All in all, 107 cities in Germany have the status of county-exempt city (see 
Figure 4.1). The 301 German counties vary enormously with regard to pop-
ulation size, surface and population density. The biggest counties such as 
the Uckermark (3,060 km²) even exceed the size of the federal state Saarland 
(Heinelt and Egner 2011, 109).
4.1.1.1  The nationwide initiative “European Metropolitan Regions”
In many German metropolitan regions several regional scales of governance 
have emerged over the last decades (see Figure 4.1). They are the result of 
local initiatives and / or incentives provided by other governmental layers 
(Zimmermann 2017, 262). One of those incentives was the joint “Initiative 
European Metropolitan Regions in Germany” (Initiative Europäische 
Metropolregionen in Deutschland) taken by the Federal and State Ministers 
responsible for Spatial Planning (see Table 4.1).
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The concept of “Europäische Metropolregion in Deutschland” was 
first mentioned as a new spatial category in the action framework 
(Raumordnungspolitischer Handlungsrahmen) enacted by the Standing 
Conference of Federal and State Ministers responsible for Spatial Planning 
(Ministerkonferenz für Raumordnung, MKRO) in 1995 (MKRO 1995, 27). 
Figure 4.1  Metropolitan regions and Regionalverbände in Germany 2018 Concept: 
P. Feiertag Cartography: F. Gela
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Initially being six regions (Berlin/Brandenburg, Hamburg, München, Rhine-
Main, Rhine-Ruhr, Stuttgart), the number increased to seven in 1997 
(including Halle/Leipzig-Sachsendreieck) and 11 in 2005 (including 
Hannover-Braunschweig-Göttingen, Nuremberg, Rhine-Neckar and 
Bremen-Oldenburg) (Blotevogel 2005, 642). Since 2005, this number of 
metropolitan regions has not changed and is not likely to grow any fur-
ther, though the Rhine-Ruhr Region is de facto split up into three coop-
eration spaces and no longer exists as a territorial framework for policies 
and politics (Zimmermann 2017). However, cross-border regions with 
metropolitan functions have been introduced as an additional category (see 
Figure 4.2). They have been targeted by two calls for model projects2 and 
were encouraged to build their own network IMeG (Initiativkreis metro-
politane Grenzregionen), which was founded in 2011. These regions were 
included in the revised national spatial vision for spatial development from 
March 2016 (Hager 2016).
The initiative to label European metropolitan regions nationwide cannot 
be considered as reconfiguration of the existing formal arrangements for 
metropolitan governance and does not change the diversity of institutional 
solutions (Zimmermann 2017, 254). Metro regions have been included in 
the national spatial vision and in state plans of the Länder but they have not 
been the cause of a territorial or functional reform granting them any com-
petencies or financial resources. It is more an affirmation of the function of 
a metropolitan region relevant in terms of location marketing. Fricke (2020, 
240) describes them as “rhetoric label related to positive expectations”. In 
part, existing organisational bodies have been labelled as European metro-
politan region or at least nominated as a representative within the national 
Table 4.1  European Metropolitan Regions in Germany










































































network of metropolitan regions, whereas at the same time additional 
regional and inter-municipal initiatives for cooperation have emerged on 
different scales. Apart from putting them on the European map, the sup-
port of the national ministry and its agency are limited to including the 
metropolitan regions as new spatial category in spatial strategies and spatial 
observation and monitoring as well as encouraging cooperation in form of 
calls for model projects (Modellprojekte der Raumordnung MORO).
4.1.1.2  Multi-scaled governance
The European metropolitan regions described in federal documents mostly 
have a larger spatial dimension than existing city-regional institutions (see 
4.1.4) and therefore lead in Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Hanover, Munich and 
Bremen to multi-scaled arrangements with an additional level of regional 
cooperation. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, a likely pattern is the combina-
tion of county-exempt cities, a strong institutional core on a smaller scale 
(usually a regional planning authority or Regionalverband in city-regions) 
and softer forms of governance on larger scales (European metropolitan 
region). Hence, the multi-scaled arrangements consist of two or even three 
levels of governance and cooperation. In Stuttgart and Frankfurt, strong 
core regions with statutory planning functions and equipped with further 
tasks are supplemented by an additional layer of the larger European met-
ropolitan region. In Munich, the regional planning authority is a less crucial 
part of the governance arrangement because its competence is limited to 
regional planning while we have a multi-purpose association in Stuttgart. 
An additional voluntary association of municipalities and counties cover-
ing a larger “Großraum München” exists since the 1950s: the “Planning 
Association for the Wider Economic Area” (Planungsverband Äußerer 
Wirtschaftsraum). Its role is a service provider for smaller municipalities 
but takes at the same time a regional perspective by coordinating traffic 
and settlement development on a voluntary basis and articulating inter-
ests in the region (Zimmermann 2017, 259). The association “Europäische 
Metropolregion München EMM e.V.” constitutes a third layer and is even 
larger. This voluntary cooperation between local governments, partners 
from the business sector, universities, research institutes and civil society 
organisations is financed through membership fees and has the aim to pro-
mote the economic development of the whole region and to increase its 
attractiveness and quality of life (Zimmermann 2017, 260).
In some cases, such as Stuttgart (see 4.3.3), the larger metropolitan scale 
remained a weak layer with low problem-solving capacities. In smaller and 
polycentric regions, where a single city cannot mobilise the critical mass to 
become internationally visible, local actors perceived mutual benefits that 
can be realised through cooperation (Zimmermann 2017, 257). City-regions 
such as Nuremberg and Rhine-Neckar used this opportunity to establish 
new metropolitan governance structures in the context of the national 
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European Metropolitan Regions initiative. The Rhine-Neckar region is 
worth mentioning in this context because this region spans over the bor-
ders of three states (Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden-Württemberg). 
Though being an association made of cities and counties, the creation made 
the signature of an inter-state treaty necessary because the task of statutory 
regional planning will be accomplished by the cross-border planning asso-
ciation (Nelles 2012).
Note that these multi-scaled metropolitan governance arrangements exist 
in addition to the five levels of the German multilevel system (Heinelt and 
Egner 2011, 107):
 • Federal level (Bund);
 • Federal states (Länder);
 • Government offices for the regions (Bezirksregierungen; in eight out of 
16 states);3
 • Counties (Landkreise) and county-exempt cities (kreisfreie Städte);
 • Municipalities (Städte und Gemeinden).
Thus, they add to the complexity of territorial administration (see 4.3.1). 
The only exception is Hanover as in that case, the region has substituted the 
county and the former planning authority.
4.1.2  Functions: production functions, regional 
planning and mobility
As we have seen in the previous section, metropolitan governance in 
Germany is implemented in various organisational forms, policy sectors and 
scales. As the institutions show high variations, the number of functions 
they fulfil diverges as well. There are no compulsory functions delegated to 
all German city-regions. Functions are either defined by the members on a 
voluntary basis depending on agreed common interests or fixed on a case-
by-case basis by state laws (e.g. Stuttgart, see 4.3.1). German city-regions 
are an institutional level above the counties and for the most are not respon-
sible for social production functions such as social housing, schools, social 
public services and environmental policies.
The federal states have almost total responsibility for organising their 
internal structure and this includes local government and inter-municipal 
arrangements. The local level has the right of self-government guaranteed 
by the constitution and is formed by municipalities as well as counties 
as second tier (Zimmermann 2017, 254; Heinelt and Egner 2011). Over 
the last decade, the Länder governments have decentralised a number of 
tasks. Thus, municipalities and counties play a vital role in administering 
and implementing both national and state policies. Also, a high share of 
employees in the public sector are working for municipalities or counties 
apart from teachers, the police and university staff employed by the states. 
The tasks and competences of municipalities and counties as well as the 
 Germany 195
grants they receive to fulfil those tasks differ from Land to Land (Heinelt 
and Egner 2011, 106–108). The local level was originally mainly respon-
sible for social reproduction functions such as social services, housing and 
recreational facilities, planning and urban regeneration. The functional 
portfolio of the municipalities was expanded in the period of deindustri-
alisation, so that the municipalities were given financial and legal means 
to take action, for example to promote the renewal of old urban quarters 
or to expand public transport (Zimmermann 2020). Whereas production 
functions, i.e. measures to promote competitiveness, were more likely to 
be articulated at state and federal level. This separation of scale-specific 
functions became blurred in the 1980s and 1990s when cities, and later on 
city-regions, gained relevance as the main sites of economic globalisation 
(Mayer 1996; Brenner 2004).
When describing the functions delegated to city-regional institutions, we 
have to keep in mind that many city-regions are nowadays characterised 
by multi-scaled governance arrangements and, in addition, single-purpose 
associations for tasks such as public transport, water supply or waste treat-
ment have not necessarily been absorbed by other more comprehensive met-
ropolitan institutions. Therefore, functions carried out at the city-regional 
level can be split between several institutions and these may refer to variable 
geographies.
Functions depend on the scale and type of institution. The initiatives of 
the 1970s focussed on planning issues, public transport and other public 
services, whereas governance forms created during the new regionalism 
period of the 1990s or triggered by the Initiative European Metropolitan 
Regions had a focus on economic development and internationalisation 
(Zimmermann 2017, 261–262). According to Blatter (2008, 157–158), the 
integrated steering of regional settlement development and burden-sharing 
for investment in regional infrastructure demand formalised regional insti-
tutions, whereas light, performative forms of governance with a flexible, 
project-oriented geometry and the inclusion of private actors, particularly 
from the business sphere are suitable for production functions oriented 
towards large-scale competitiveness such as regional marketing, promotion 
of economic development and attraction of investors. Hamburg metropoli-
tan region is a prototype of the latter functional profile, that corresponds 
best to the concept of a European metropolitan region:
The ahead of time self-designation as a metropolitan region, the suc-
cessful establishment of the metropolitan region as a “brand”, the clear 
focus on major flagship projects and a joint bid for the Olympic Games 
are clear indicators of such a form of governance (own translation).4
(Blatter 2008, 143–144)
Water supply and wastewater treatment (since the 1920s) as well as public 
transport and waste disposal (since 1970s) are organised via inter-munici-
pal associations in most city-regions. However, apart from public transport 
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associations these types of single-purpose inter-municipal cooperation 
often only concern a small number of adjacent municipalities and are not 
extended to the city-regional level. Hanover and Stuttgart are exceptions in 
this regard. In Hanover region, waste disposal as well as public transport is 
carried out by the region (Zimmermann 2014, 186). Stuttgart Region has 
the responsibility for regional public transport, i.e. construction and opera-
tion of the light rail system (S-Bahn) and also a limited competence in waste 
management.
Recently, some city-regions have taken up new activity fields such as 
broadband networks (and digitisation), wind energy and electro-mobility. 
They are not the responsible level for authorising, constructing or operating 
these infrastructures, but support the municipalities and help to establish 
common framework conditions in the city-region. In the cases of Stuttgart 
and Frankfurt (see 4.3.3 and 4.3.4), the regional associations facilitated 
a joint tender for broadband expansion. Potential sites for wind energy 
are indicated in the regional plan (Stuttgart) or regional land use plan 
(Frankfurt). E-mobility is, among others, supported by a masterplan for 
fast-charging infrastructure.
Social services, education (kindergartens, schools) and health care (hos-
pitals, local health authorities) are provided by the local level, either by 
the cities or the counties. Social benefits for the unemployed, handicapped 
or elderly people as well as health services account for a large share of the 
counties’ expenditure (Heinelt and Egner 2011, 117). Hanover region is 
also responsible for the management of public hospitals (Zimmermann 
2014, 186) but it is an exceptional case as it has replaced the county within 
the area of the city-region.
Regional planning and regional landscape planning are well established 
in Germany (see Figure 4.5), but political relevance and organisational 
forms differ from state to state (Schmidt 2009, 1915). In some states such as 
Hesse or North Rhine-Westphalia the government offices of the regions are 
responsible for statutory regional planning. Many other states have created 
single purpose inter-municipal authorities responsible for statutory regional 
planning (Planungsverbände) (Zimmermann 2017, 254). The authorities 
Verband Region Stuttgart, Verband Region Rhein-Neckar, Regionalverband 
Ruhr, Regionaler Planungsverband München and Region Hannover elabo-
rate statutory regional plans. In some city-regions, the tasks of the plan-
ning authority have been expanded, combining regional planning with other 
tasks such as public transport, regional parks, regional business develop-
ment and tourism (Stuttgart, see 4.3.1). The city-states are specific cases 
with regard to regional planning, because their local land use plan replaces 
the regional plan as well as the state plan. The federal states of Berlin and 
Brandenburg have established a joint state planning agency (Gemeinsame 
Landesplanung Berlin-Brandenburg). In the case of Bremen, an informal 
regional development concept as well as projects for implementation for 
a wider city-region have been developed by the inter-municipal associa-
tion Kommunalverbund Niedersachsen Bremen e.V. (Blatter 2008, 145). In 
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Hamburg metropolitan region, the elaboration of a joint spatial vision was 
discussed in the mid-2010s, but was not supported by all partners. As an 
intermediary step, thematic maps regarding demographic development and 
building activity with data from 1990, 2000 and 2010 have been elaborated 
for monitoring purposes and joint understanding of the spatial structure.
Local land use planning is a municipal task in Germany, carried out by 
the cities themselves or several small inter-municipal associations within a 
city-region. For example, the Stuttgart Region consists of 179 municipalities 
and is covered by 79 land use plans (see 4.3.2). Frankfurt is one of the few 
exceptions with a regional land use plan (RFNP) for the entire city-region 
(see 4.2). The instrument of a regional land use plan has been introduced 
in national planning law in 1998 (ROG § 13 Abs. 4) with the objective 
of reducing deficits in the interaction of the local and regional planning 
levels for meeting the complex challenges in city-regions (Domhardt and 
Hilligardt 2011, 398). However, 20 years later it has remained a niche solu-
tion with only two approved RFNP in the entire country.
Germany’s city-regions are also active in the field of green and blue 
infrastructure, either via shared responsibility for the maintenance of green 
spaces in-between municipalities (e.g. regional corridors or green belts) or by 
co-financing municipal projects (e.g. regional landscape park in Stuttgart). 
Creating a network of green corridors (Grünzüge) and bicycle paths both 
for residents and tourists has been one of the core tasks of the regional plan-
ning authority in the Ruhr Area (RVR).
The functions of regional marketing, business development and tourism 
are usually carried out at a city-regional scale, either by the core institu-
tion or a development agency organised as a public–private partnership. 
Associations with public and private partners such as the Europäische 
Metropolregion München EMM undertake voluntary actions with the over-
arching goal to promote the visibility, the economic development and the 
quality of life of the city-region (Zimmermann 2017, 260).
Large cultural or sports events such as the Olympics, the European Capital 
of Culture or an International Building Exhibition (IBA) also have the function 
of raising international awareness. City-regional institutions are often involved 
in these voluntary initiatives and bring local actors together. In the case of 
the European Capital of Culture 2010, the regional planning authority of the 
Ruhr region played an essential role during the process of application and 
implementation (Schmidt 2013). In the Stuttgart Region, the planning author-
ity VRS was part of the consortium that submitted a bid for the Olympics.
4.1.3  Ideas behind the concept of European metropolitan regions: 
competitiveness among global cities despite a polycentric 
urban system
The introduction of metropolitan regions as a spatial category has been dis-
cussed in Germany as a paradigm shift in spatial planning (Raumordnung) 
and regional development. German spatial planning followed the principle 
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of equal and balanced living conditions (Gleichwertige Lebensbedingungen) 
for decades. It is linked to a good standard of services of general interest in 
the proximity of citizens and the central-places concept as well as balanced 
economic growth. Regional development policy was (and still is) concen-
trated on peripheral or economically underdeveloped regions. Priority for 
metropolitan regions was a relatively new idea in this context.
The name “European metropolitan regions in Germany” already evokes 
that those city-regions are supposed to be able to compete with other large 
city-regions on a European if not a global scale. In response to the chal-
lenges of European integration and the intensification of globalisation, spa-
tial planning at the federal level centred in the middle of the 1990s on the 
task of positioning major cities and regions within European and global 
circuits of capital accumulation by emphasising the importance of a limited 
number of metropolitan regions due to their competitiveness (both nation-
ally and internationally) and their role as economic drivers of the national 
economy (Harrison and Growe 2014, 29). Germany has a polycentric urban 
system instead of one global city. Still, several city-regions were well posi-
tioned within European circuits of capital (Harrison and Growe 2014, 30).
The European metropolitan regions have been included in the national 
spatial vision (Leitbilder der Raumentwicklung) of 2006 and its updated 
version from 2016. The Leitbilder 2016 contain four thematic vision maps: 
“Enhance competitiveness”, “Ensure the provision of public services”, 
“Control and sustainably develop land uses” and “Shape climate change 
and the transformation of the energy system”. Metropolitan regions are the 
key element visualised in the map on competitiveness and are interpreted 
as main engines of economic growth: “The German metropolitan regions 
of European importance are the essential national economic areas with a 
high productivity and are facing international competition” (MKRO 2016, 
8). This increased relevance given to metropolitan regions triggered massive 
resistance against the concept from the Associations of German Counties 
and Municipalities (Kawka and Staats 2016, 535), fearing a redistribution 
of subsidies towards metropolitan regions at the dispense of rural spaces 
and towns. It was discussed if a paradigm change neglecting the equal 
provision of public services was about to happen (Blotevogel and Schmitt 
2006; Harrison and Growe 2014, 32). In fact, the vision acknowledged the 
enhanced role of metropolitan regions, but there was a reluctance to actively 
push them and they did not receive any specific funding from the federal 
level.
The national spatial vision from 2006 and its update in 2016 (see 
Figure 4.2) show the attempt to reconcile both principles of competitive-
ness and equal living conditions by depicting larger metropolitan zones of 
influence including rural areas (weitere metropolitane Verflechtungsräume 
einschließlich ländlicher Räume). The entire country is divided into such 
zones of influence of metropolitan cores in order to avoid left-over spaces 
(Hesse and Leick 2013, 353). Of course, the distance between Berlin and 
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the coast of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern or Munich and the Czech border 
is huge and that the interlinkage is not that strong can be illustrated by 
the main transport infrastructure, at least when not thinking in terms of 
daily commuters (see Figure 4.2). Metropolitan regions are depicted in a 
multi-scaled way, consisting of a metropolitan core and further locations of 
metropolitan functions linked by transport networks, the immediate metro-
politan zones of influence (engere metropolitane Verflechtungsräume) and 
the larger zones of influence that have been attributed to the metro regions. 
Thus, analytical elements regarding metropolitan functions, population 
density and transport axes are combined with a normative interpretation of 
desirable spatial relations. On this new map of Germany,
the territorial boundaries of the politico-administrative Länder are 
nowhere to be seen. What we see instead is an idealized structure of 
more networked forms of regional cooperation and collaboration on 
a regional level. Identified as “large-scale areas of responsibility”, each 
area is shown to comprise an existing metropolitan region and a wider 
“area of influence”. Of particular note is how the boundary lines remain 
ambiguous. They also do not correspond to any known administrative 
or functional boundary. (Harrison and Growe 2014, 33)
The concept of large-scale partnerships for territorial cohesion (großräu-
mige Verantwortungsgemeinschaften) was introduced in 2004 during the 
workshops for the preparation of the national spatial vision, although 
some doubts were raised as to whether these supra-regional partnerships 
were a mere rhetoric for appeasement (Hesse and Leick 2013, 353). How 
they could be realised in practice was explored later on by a national call 
for model projects for supra-regional partnerships (2007–2013) issued by 
the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial 
Development (Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung, BBSR). 
Despite a dominance of the metro regions in the discourse (Hesse and Leick 
2013), the federal initiatives to support the implementation of the national 
spatial vision did not target the institutional organisation of metropoli-
tan cores, but instead addressed the cooperation with their hinterland and 
urban-rural-partnerships.
A proposal of recommended competences for metropolitan institutions 
was part of the national spatial development report (Raumordnungsbericht) 
2005, though without any binding impact (BBSR 2005, 189). The report 
included a chapter on metropolitan regions in Germany as part of a chapter 
on spaces with particular need for intervention. The federal government 
is responsible for spatial observation and has the obligation to present 
national spatial development reports at regular intervals to the parliament. 
The shift in focus of the following reports show that metropolitan regions 
have lost momentum in the national discourse. The following spatial devel-
opment report (BBSR 2012) did use the term of metropolitan region, but 
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already far less prominently. Their importance for growth and innovation 
was confirmed without addressing their internal organisation. The most 
recent report, dating from 2017, has the title “Daseinsvorsorge sichern” 
(securing services of general interest), clearly confirming the idea of equal 
living conditions as central concern for Germany’s future spatial develop-
ment. The report focuses on the central-places system and speaks of regional 
centres (Oberzentrum) and big cities, not of metropolitan regions. Overall, 
metropolitan regions are today well established in the thinking of profes-
sionals and academics, but political attention has shifted again towards 
peripheral areas where services of general interest are under pressure due to 
a shrinking and ageing population, tight public budgets and privatisation. 
In urban agglomerations, the key issue, which receives a lot of media cover-
age, is housing shortage and rising rents, producing higher living costs and 
gentrification.
4.1.4  Spatial relationships: fuzzy boundaries of 
metropolitan regions
How many city-regions should be called “metropolitan regions” has been 
defined based on political decisions at national level, but their exact delimi-
tation has been left deliberately open. Schematic cartographic representa-
tions are used to leave the decision of the appropriate governance space to 
the Länder and the local actors themselves (Kawka and Staats 2016, 537; 
Fricke 2020, 237–240). Despite the blurry boundaries in the national vision 
maps (see Figure 4.2), some indications were given due to cities represented 
on the map. This has already been the case in earlier official representations 
from 1997 and 2006 adopted by the conference of ministers MKRO (see 
Figure 4.3).
The seven, or respectively 11, metropolitan regions are depicted in a very 
schematic way as a hexagon or network of several hexagons in case of the 
polycentric metropolitan region Sachsendreieck, later re-named Central 
Germany. Apart from the core cities of the metro region, other cities at the 
fringes are represented either as part of the metro region – or outside of it. 
Although the national vision maps themselves do not have any direct bind-
ing power, these choices had an impact on the local spatial definition of the 
European metropolitan regions, if they were supported by the Land. For 
example, in Stuttgart the national maps represent the metropolitan region 
larger than the pre-existent city-regional institution Region Stuttgart and 
therefore called for an additional layer of metropolitan governance (see 
4.3.2). In contrast, Rhine-Ruhr has never been institutionalised as one sin-
gle metro region such as suggested by the national representation. The large 
metro region had initially been picked up by the state plan of North Rhine-
Westphalia but did not have the full political support of the Land because of 
the unfavourable split of the Land. The municipal actors did not endorse the 








































Figure 4.4  Evolving delimitation of metropolitan regions used by IKM monitoring
large area formed of ten counties and 22 county-exempt cities never became 
a governance space (Blotevogel and Schulze 2010, 256–257). Instead, the 
two subspaces Ruhr and Köln/Bonn have been formed and are both part 
of the network of German metropolitan regions (Initiativkreis Europäische 
Metropolregionen in Deutschland IKM) (see Figure 4.4). Düsseldorf is left 
as a stand-alone city.
The European metropolitan regions did not initially have a clear spatial 
reference, but resembled variable geometries of cooperation (Fricke 2020, 
240). The necessity of a clear boundary first arose due to monitoring activi-
ties of the network of metro regions IKM, supported by the federal agency 
BBSR (Pütz 2016). The delimitations used in subsequent monitoring reports 
(see Figure 4.4) show, however, that the spatial outline of the metro regions 
is not definite. The evolution is most obvious in the case of Hamburg, where 
additional partners successively joined the club or in the EMR Central 
Germany. Changes also occurred in Munich, Nuremberg, North-West 
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(Bremen) and Köln/Bonn. In addition, those delimitations chosen by the 
local actors themselves deviate significantly from the spatial imaginary of 
the national vision map (see Figure 4.2). Both clearly show, however, that 
the concept of European metropolitan region does not correspond to the ter-
ritory of a new jurisdiction with container-like boundaries. The cooperation 
spaces of European metropolitan regions partially overlap, meaning that 
some counties and municipalities are partners of two different metropolitan 
cooperation spaces. In addition to that, they cross administrative borders, 
especially in the case of the three city-states Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen. 
Seven out of 11 metropolitan regions cross the borders of federal states.
Europäische Metropolregionen such as defined by the organisations rep-
resenting them in the network IKM are large entities, ranging from 5,637 
to 30,546 km² (2017, Monitoring IKM). In contrast, planning regions for 
regional plans only cover between 525 and 8,291 km², depending on the 
federal state (Schmidt et al. 2018, 646). Lower-Saxony has small planning 
regions compared to the other federal states: apart from Braunschweig 
region (Regionalverband Großraum Braunschweig, see Priebs 2019, 116), 
they correspond to the counties. Ten European metropolitan regions are 
much larger than the regional planning regions of their core cities (see 
Figure 4.5). Rhine-Neckar is an exception, where regional planning associa-
tion and European metropolitan region are congruent. Some European met-
ropolitan regions are composed of several regional planning regions such 
as Stuttgart (see 4.3.2) or Berlin-Brandenburg with a joint state plan for 
both federal states. The smaller core regions Ruhr (6a on Figure 4.4) and 
Verband Region Stuttgart (11a) correspond to the territory of a regional 
plan and the responsible planning association.
As additional larger scales of metropolitan cooperation have emerged due 
to the initiative European metropolitan regions, we can speak of a partial 
re-scaling of metropolitan governance (Zimmermann 2017, 261), whereas 
planning scales have not been modified. The differentiation of scaled met-
ropolitan policies as well as openness and frequent change of cooperation 
spaces renders the notions “metropolitan region” and “city-region” fuzzy.
4.2  Frankfurt/Rhine-Main: still a fragmented territory?
The Frankfurt/Rhine-Main region is a fuzzy political concept with a flexible 
geography and a range of collaborative arrangements (Nelles 2012; Hoyler 
et al. 2006; Schmidt 2013). As we will show later, there are several spatial 
delimitations present but for various reasons there is no commonly accepted 
understanding of the perimeter of the Rhine-Main region. In part, this is due 
to the fact that cooperation is based on actors and functions and not neces-
sarily on congruent space. We refer predominantly to the territory of the 
planning authority because membership of the 80 municipalities is manda-
tory and the planning authority is an agency with a high degree of centrality 
within the network of regional initiatives. We will, however, demonstrate 
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Figure 4.5  Planning regions for regional plans ©BBSR Bonn 2019
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that the scales, perimeters and actor composition for cooperation vary in 
this region, mostly depending on the task.
The core city (Frankfurt am Main) is the dominant urban centre with 
747,000 inhabitants. The territory of the planning authority, which is 
responsible for a special type of regional land use plan, has 2.4 million 
inhabitants meaning that the core city has a 31% share of the regional 
population. The second and third biggest cities in the planning region are 
Offenbach (127,000, directly bordering Frankfurt) and Hanau (96,000). 
The size of this region is 2,460 km² (Regionalverband FRM 2019). It is usu-
ally called an “agglomeration” (Ballungsraum).
The region for statutory regional planning is the territory of the govern-
ment district southern Hesse (size: 7,444,82 km2, 4 million inhabitants, ten 
counties, four county-exempt cities and three cities with a special status).
On a larger scale, it has become quite common to refer to a metropolitan 
region. This is a huge area with a polycentric structure and fuzzy bounda-
ries. Besides Frankfurt am Main, there are a number of cities with a popula-
tion between 100,000 and 250,000 inhabitants, like Offenbach and Hanau, 
Darmstadt and Wiesbaden (which is the capital city of Hesse) as well as 
Aschaffenburg and Mainz which are in the federal states of Bavaria and 
Rhineland-Palatinate (Mainz is the capital city of the latter). This area com-
prises 18 counties and seven county-exempt cities with roughly 5.8 million 
inhabitants and crosses the borders of three states: Hesse, Rhineland-
Palatinate and Bavaria. 
4.2.1  The institutional arrangement
The relevant institutional actors in the region of southern Hesse are the dis-
trict government of the region (Regierungspräsidium Darmstadt), responsi-
ble for statutory regional planning, the planning authority (responsible for a 
regional land use plan), the counties and the county-exempt cities. 
The history of regional planning and inter-municipal cooperation in this 
region goes back to the late 1950s and 1960s. In 1965, the Regional Planning 
Association Untermain (Regionale Planungsgemeinschaft Untermain) was 
established as a more formal arrangement with a rather small perimeter. Its 
successor, the Umlandverband Frankfurt was established in 1975 and was 
much stronger. The Umlandverband or UVF had a directly elected regional 
assembly and a broader portfolio of functions (Scheller and Langhagen-
Rohrbach 2004). Forty-three municipalities around the city of Frankfurt 
were members of this association. Among the responsibilities of the 
Umlandverband were (Freund 2003, 133):
 • Inter-municipal land use planning and coordination of land use (includ-
ing landscape planning);
 • Provision and management of leisure facilities of regional importance;
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 • Technical infrastructure, traffic planning and the public transporta-
tion system, water supply, energy provision, sewage treatment, waste 
disposal.
The UVF was, therefore, a kind of multi-purpose association and met the 
zeitgeist of the metropolitan reform era (Heinz 2007). In fact, in the 1970s 
it was the metropolitan organisation that was considered to be the most 
innovative one in Western Germany. However, the power of the UVF was 
limited by its internal structure. Apart from the directly elected council, 
a municipal chamber existed, composed of representatives of its member 
municipalities. The municipal chamber was necessary as land use planning 
is a municipal task. Hence, every municipality needed to be provided with 
Figure 4.6  Frankfurt/ Rhine-Main region 2021 Concept: K. Zimmermann 
Cartography: F. Gela
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participation rights during the plan preparation process. Both chambers 
rather competed and unfortunately, the UVF’s performance varied signifi-
cantly between the various fields of interest (see Freund 2003, 133).
As a result, criticism of the UVF never stopped and during the 1990s the 
debate on an appropriate and effective metropolitan governance arrange-
ment in the Frankfurt/Rhine-Main region gained considerable momentum 
and the UVF was in the middle of this turmoil. It was, however, not only the 
underperformance of the UVF but also the wider concern about economic 
competitiveness of the region that triggered the debate.
In any case, the gap between formal competence and actual capacity to 
implement policies provoked claims for the abolition of the UVF rather 
than calls to equip it with more powers. As a first step of change in the 
governance of Frankfurt/Rhine-Main the state government of Hesse took 
waste management away from the competence of the UVF. At the same 
time some classical conflicts emerged: the city of Frankfurt focussed on the 
fight for a financial equalisation scheme for the city and its surroundings, 
whereas the economic elite and the press (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) 
concentrated increasingly on issues of competitiveness (especially on rais-
ing the attractiveness of the metropolitan region for investors; see Blatter 
2005, 145).
As a result, and separate from the changes which were undertaken by 
political-administrative actors, the private sector initiated activities on 
behalf of the metropolitan area. These joint activities grew out of a grow-
ing consciousness of challenges resulting from worldwide competition and 
the creation of the European Common Market in 1993. In the middle of 
1991, the chambers of commerce (in short IHKs) of the Frankfurt/Rhine-
Main area intensified their cooperation and established the IHK-Forum 
Table 4.2  Regionalverband Rhine Main in the multilayer system of the 
Regierungsbezirk Southern Hesse





Name of institution 
Land (federal state) 1 yes Hesse
Regierungspräsidium 
(district government)
















Gemeinde (municipality) 80 (184/ca. 300) yes
Note: numbers in brackets refer to the district and the metropolitan region
208 Germany 
Rhine-Main. This Forum has a catchment area larger than the planning 
authority (Blatter 2005).5
In 1995, another organisation for economic cooperation was established: 
the Economic Development Agency for the Region of Frankfurt/Rhine-
Main (Wirtschaftsförderung Region Frankfurt/Rhein-Main). This time the 
UVF was the initiator and established this agency as a kind of counterweight 
to the IHK-Forum. But it quickly lost its ideological stance and turned into 
a marketing-association of a considerable capacity to attract new municipal 
members (Blatter 2005, 145).
Only a year later, in 1996, about 150 enterprises established the Economic 
Initiative Frankfurt/Rhine-Main (Wirtschaftsinitiative Frankfurt/Rhein-
Main). The main reason for founding this initiative was a shared concern 
about the lack of a “unified regional image” (Hoyler et al. 2006, 130). The 
creation of – at least – three initiatives from the business sphere (IHK-Forum, 
Economic Initiative Frankfurt/Rhine-Main and the Economic Development 
Agency for the Region of Frankfurt/Rhine-Main) indicates that economic 
development and competitiveness of the region in comparison with other 
regions worldwide was a reason for concern in the late 1990s. At the same 
time, it is justified to ask why there are three initiatives with partly overlap-
ping but also competing agendas.
The 1999 elections for the Hesse parliament (Landtag) brought signifi-
cant change for the governance of Frankfurt/Rhine-Main as the result of 
the election led to change of government (Christian Democrats (CDU) and 
Liberals (FDP)). According to the coalition’s position the best way to deal 
with the administratively fragmented metropolitan region was by means of 
sector specific municipal cooperation. As the metropolitan area is in any 
case polycentric and as the residents still retain their local identity, volun-
tary cooperation between the municipalities was seen as the best and only 
possible way of coordinating decentralised and fragmented activities. The 
government issued a law on the “strengthening of the inter-municipal coop-
eration and planning in the Rhine-Main Region”.6
The law abolished the Umlandverband and transferred in April 2001 
the planning responsibilities to a newly created planning authority 
(Planungsverband Frankfurt/Rhein-Main). This new planning authority 
comprises a much wider catchment area than its predecessor (75 munici-
palities instead of 43), but this geographic extension went hand in hand 
with less powers. At least at the beginning, the association was in fact 
more a single-purpose association, whereas the UVF had formally (and 
early on in reality) a wide range of responsibilities. The new planning 
association is responsible for the preparatory land use plan (Regionaler 
Flächennutzungsplan) and for the landscape plan (Landschaftsplan) for the 
area covered by its members. In German planning law, the preparatory land 
use plan is a municipal plan, but in the region Frankfurt/Rhine-Main this 
task has been shifted to the planning authority. Because the territory of the 
new planning association included 75 rather than 43 municipalities,7 the 
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plan exhibits a stronger regional dimension and was therefore considered 
to be an innovative instrument for the coordination of land use in metro-
politan areas.
Apart from its limited range of competencies the new planning associa-
tion also lacks – in comparison with the UVF – direct democratic legitimacy, 
as the regional chamber is not composed of directly elected members but 
of 93 representatives from the 75 municipalities who are the members of 
the planning association. Each municipality sends one representative, but 
the vote is weighted according to size (note that this describes the situation 
before the accession of five municipalities in April 2021):






70 other cities 1
The chamber is organised into four fractions, currently the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) has a majority (44 votes), followed by the conservative CDU 
(32), an independent list (11) and the Green party (6) (Regionalverband 
FRM 2020, 8).
The law also defined a list of public tasks of regional importance but 
not to be accomplished by the planning authority and gave one year for 
the municipalities to find collaborative new solutions for these tasks on a 
voluntary basis (MetropolG Land Hessen 2018). If this is not done, the 
federal state was empowered to impose an obligatory association. The tasks 
covered were waste disposal, water management, social and cultural infra-
structure, regional parks, marketing and attracting investment and public 
transport.
The body being responsible for this process of finding voluntary solu-
tions was the “council of the region” (Rat der Region) that gathered the 
county presidents and mayors of cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. 
The voluntary character of this process was put into question as the Hesse 
government preserved the right to force the municipalities to cooperate if 
this did not occur in a bottom-up way. The restriction of federal state inter-
vention is couched in vague terms. Cooperation should be imposed only for 
key policy areas (listed in the law). This issue of the possible intervention of 
the federal state government led to a strong reaction from the municipali-
ties (Heinelt et al. 2011), which argued that the law was unconstitutional, 
i.e. it cut across the constitutional guarantee of local self-government. The 
main reason for such a strong reaction was the fear of being forced to give 
up some competencies (as well as a share of financial resources) and the 
non-voluntary inclusion of 32 municipalities that had not previously been 
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members of the UVF. The appeal was rejected by the Hesse Constitutional 
Court in May 2002 and the law came into effect.
Apart from the two bodies created by the law, various other initiatives in 
the metropolitan area have flourished since the year 2000. This can be seen 
to be a result of the underperformance of the organisational setting estab-
lished by the law of 2000.
The council of the region was not very welcomed by the political leaders 
of local governments and their engagement in this context of forced vol-
untary collaboration was rather low. Instead, in May 2000, the mayor of 
Frankfurt initiated a regional conference that brought together the mayors 
of the big cities and the presidents of the counties of the area. The composi-
tion of the conference emphasised the extended boundaries of the metropol-
itan region insofar as it reached much further than the council of the region 
(i.e. beyond the boundaries of Hesse). The principle of dialogue characteris-
ing the interactions of this body is underpinned by the fact that the host of 
the conference was rotating.
The success of council of the region in finding arrangements for all the 
mentioned tasks of regional importance was limited and where solutions 
were found, the state government played a facilitating role (i.e. in the field of 
culture). The state government did not use the option of a top-down inter-
vention but instead, in 2011, changed the whole setting again. The ineffec-
tive council of the region was replaced by a board of the region. This board 
has similar tasks but fewer members and a more effective mode of decision-
making (i.e. the representatives of a municipality are not obliged anymore 
to vote concordantly). In addition, the planning authority and the board of 
the region should cooperate more closely which gives the planning authority 
more influence. The current structure is as follows: the board of the region 
(Regionalvorstand) is the main body in terms of leadership and decision-
making (§§ 14, 15 MetropolG). Members of the board are the director 
of the planning authority and up to two deputy directors. In addition, up 
to eight honorary members (representatives of the civil society but in real-
ity, mayors as well as members of the parliament of Hesse), the six county 
presidents and the lord mayors of Frankfurt am Main and Offenbach are 
full members of the board. The board also has members with a guest status 
(no right to vote). These are the mayors of adjacent cities that are not for-
mal members, such as Darmstadt and Wiesbaden. There is also an advisory 
board and the members are the chamber of commerce, the regional transport 
association (RMV), the chamber of crafts, the economic initiative and the 
German Trade Union Federation (DGB). In other words, the regional board 
fulfils two functions: it leads the planning authority and defines the regional 
key tasks as suggested by the law in a more concrete manner. At the same 
time, the board has the mission to find arrangements for these key regional 
tasks (so-called Ballungsraumaufgaben) if the board does not consider the 
planning authority to be the appropriate agency. Hence, the board of the 
region has the clear mission to find arrangements for the accomplishment 
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of regional key task but has considerable leeway to do this. This may imply 
that a function is delegated to a private agency.
Besides the planning region with two levels (regional land use plan, statu-
tory regional plan), several other initiatives exist in different sectors. As 
these initiatives coincide with specific tasks or functions (culture, mobility, 
economic development, regional landscape park) we will introduce them in 
section 4.3.3. on coordination of public policies.
4.2.2  Spatial relations within the metropolitan region of 
Frankfurt/Rhine-Main
As has been mentioned, the Rhine-Main region is characterised as polycen-
tric and in terms of its governance spaces as fuzzy. It has become common 
for many actors from the region to distinguish between the metropolitan 
region and the agglomeration (Metropolregion and Ballungsraum). The lat-
ter is the planning region for the regional land use plan, with Frankfurt and 
Offenbach being the dual urban core, surrounded by a polycentric system 
of cities, towns and suburban settlements. The notion metropolitan region 
indicates that there are many public policies that need coordination and col-
laboration on a larger scale (across the borders of the three states).
In addition, there is the statutory regional planning region which covers 
the entire territory of the government district of southern Hesse.
The metropolitan region emerged in the 2000s (see section 4.1) but ini-
tially found only limited response in the Frankfurt/Rhine-Main region. The 
territorial frame crosses two state borders (Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse and 
Bavaria) and represents about 5.8 million inhabitants. In terms of govern-
ance, it is weakly institutionalised. Following a longer period of debates, 
in 2018 a strategy forum (Strategieforum) was founded as a result of an 
initiative of the chamber of commerce and industry Frankfurt.8 It found 
support of the state governments, hence it is not a genuine municipal initia-
tive. Today, representatives of four state governments (Hesse, Rhineland-
Palatinate, Baden-Württemberg und Bavaria), the lord mayors of Frankfurt 
and Mainz, the county presidents of Hochtaunuskreis, Rhein-Neckar-Kreis 
and the region Bayrischer Untermain (Aschaffenburg) (i.e. a representative 
of local government from each of the four states) and the regional planning 
authority (the latter also represents municipalities) and the presidents of six 
chambers of commerce and industry are members of the steering board. The 
agenda of the forum clearly is economic development (entrepreneurship, 
smart region).
Although this arrangement is more stable now, clear boundaries of the 
metropolitan region do not exist. To give an example: in 2010, the chamber 
of commerce, the chamber of crafts and the Federation of Associations of 
Entrepreneurs of Hesse (Vereinigung der hessischen Unternehmerverbände 
e.V.) financed a study on functional and territorial interdependencies of the 
region. The report suggested to take also areas in the far north of Frankfurt 
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into consideration as being part of the functional region (Prognos 2010). 
Hence, there are flexible spaces for cooperation and delimitation depends 
on the perspective and interest of the actors (see next section). It is possible 
to divide the region into economic functional sub-regions and clusters but 
this does not necessarily transform into political cooperation (Hoyler et al. 
2008; FrankfurtRheinMain GmbH International Marketing of the Region 
2018; Ebert 2016).
In order to describe the spatial pattern of the Rhine-Main region we may 
refer to the TSPN framework (Jessop et al. 2008). The core of the region 
is covered by a territory (the planning authority with obligatory member-
ship). Besides the territory there is a range of functional networks and 
scales, some are more stable, some are more in a state of flux and they 
also refer to different spatial frameworks (flexible geographies). There are 
largely two dynamics: expansion (metropolitan region, now also including 
the Rhine-Neckar-County of Baden-Württemberg) and concentration (plan-
ning authority as institutional core). In fact, in 2019, the mayor of a smaller 
municipality in the north-east of the planning region (Limeshain) expressed 
the desire to became a full member of the planning authority. Accession 
is possible for municipalities that share a border with the planning region 
and this is the case in Limeshain. During the process three further villages 
(Echzell, Glauburg, Ranstadt) and the town Nidda followed and in April 
2021 these five municipalities acceded the planning authority that has now 
80 members.
4.2.3  Coordination of public policies within and beyond 
the perimeter of the planning authority
As has been mentioned already, the case of Frankfurt/Rhine-Main displays 
several task-specific arrangements that differ in terms of organisational 
form, actor composition and territorial outreach. In fact, it is the subject of 
a long debate where the region ends and which areas belong to it (Hoyler 
et al. 2006). As the planning authority is at least to a certain degree the 
organisational core of this arrangement, we will start with the policies coor-
dinated by the planning authority. The functional portfolio of the planning 
authority is defined in the law but the law opens an opportunity to allo-
cate more functions to the planning authority when the board of the region 
agrees upon this (see above). For the time being the planning authority has 
the genuine task of regional land use planning and landscape planning. In 
addition, the law mentions a number of key regional tasks calling for bet-
ter inter-municipal coordination. The law specifies that the board of the 
region is encouraged to find solutions for these tasks. This does not neces-
sarily mean that the planning authority will accomplish these tasks in full 
competence. Many options are possible and the planning authority may just 




 • Sports and recreational facilities;
 • Cultural facilities of regional relevance;
 • Marketing and economic development;
 • Regional landscape park Rhine-Main;
 • Regional transport planning and management.
In 2018, after a regular evaluation of the law, some additional remits have 
been added. The new tasks that are mentioned now in the law are housing 
and spaces for new settlements, sustainable sourcing of water, preparation 
of a regional energy and climate protection concept, and the design as well 
as implementation of a digitisation strategy. Note that this means that the 
board of the region may take the initiative in a variety of forms. As we will 
see in the following sections, the board and the planning authority became 
active in a variety of policies such as energy, mobility and digitisation.
4.2.3.1  Regional land use planning
The Regional Authority (Regionalverband) FrankfurtRheinMain is 
responsible for the regional preparatory land use plan (regionaler 
Flächennutzungsplan) (Regional Authority FRM, 2014; Schmidt 2013). In 
German planning law, the preparatory land use plan usually is a munici-
pal plan, being the structural element in a local two-tier system of land 
use planning. In the Frankfurt/Rhine-Main region this task was shifted to 
the Regional Authority in 2001. The regional land use plan controls the 
location of function in space (settlements, business zones, infrastructure, 
green spaces), but does not regulate details of urban design. The Regional 
Authority seeks to implement the general principles of German land use 
planning and gives priority to brownfield development and the inner cities 
along the major public transport axes.
The plan has to be developed in collaboration with the government office 
of the region responsible for the regional plan. Therefore, a tension between 
regional planning and inter-municipal land use planning (Regionaler 
Flächennutzungsplan) is not surprising. The new planning association was 
criticised by interviewees for its narrow delimitation and for responsibilities 
which overlapped with the competencies of the government office for the 
region. Since 1980, the government office for the region in Darmstadt has 
been responsible for the regional plan (Regionalplanung), the planning asso-
ciation (as mentioned above) for land use planning (Flächennutzungsplan) 
and for landscape planning (Landschaftsplan).
The former Umlandverband rendered a plan similar in character already 
before, but since 2001 it covers 75 municipalities instead of 43 (80 in 2021). 
This increase in size of this plan intensified the need for coordination with 
regional planning (Regierungsbezirk). Hence, the regional land use plan has 
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to be developed in collaboration with the government office of the region. 
The planning region “Southern Hesse” is much bigger than the territory of 
the Rhine-Main planning authority but the latter forms the densely urban-
ised core (see Figure 4.7). Both plans operate with different scales (1:50,000, 
1:100,000). As part of the technical solution, the regional land use plan 
becomes part of the regional plan, or to be more precise: it substitutes the 
Figure 4.7  Frankfurt/ Rhine-Main region in the multilevel system 2021 Concept: K. 
Zimmermann Cartography: F. Gela
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regional plan in the area of the planning authority. Although this sounds 
technically complex, the experts can manage to prepare the two plans in a 
coherent way. Still, this solution is unique in Germany.
When the elaboration of the new regional land use plan started in 2018, 
municipalities and planning authority and the government office of the region 
agreed to change the scale of the new plan from 1:50,000 to 1:25,000. Hence, 
it will be more detailed and the difference between the regional plan and the 
regional land use plan becomes clearer. Major issues of for regional planning 
are large shopping centres and finding enough space for housing. For the reg-
ulation of shopping centres, a regional retail concept (Einzelhandelskonzept) 
is in use. This concept tries to protect the (small-scale) retail business of the 
inner city from the adverse effects of large shopping centres outside the city. 
Mobilising space for affordable housing is an unsolved problem.
4.2.3.2  Regional Landscape Park
In the mid-1990s the former planning authority UVF promoted the idea of 
a regional landscape park as a connected system of green space for recre-
ational purposes. The motivation for this was twofold: on the one hand 
there was a lack of high-quality green areas that can be offered for recrea-
tional activities such as cycling and hiking. On the other hand, the planning 
authority wanted to protect green spaces and agricultural land. The planning 
authority followed an idea of decentralised implementation already in 1997: 
the planning authority did the strategic coordination and smaller groups of 
municipalities were envisioned to take the responsibility for a subarea of the 
park (in terms of implementation and maintenance). The implementation of 
this idea was taken away from the planning authority in the context of the 
reform in 2000/2001 and delegated in 2003 to a new special purpose govern-
ance form. This organisation started operation only in 2005 and is organised 
as a two-level system. Six decentralised agencies (usually municipalities and 
/ or a county) are responsible for the management and maintenance of the 
park in a defined subarea. In total, 45 municipalities and two counties are 
active on this implementation level and the planning authority is involved 
in two of these operational partnerships. All these implementation agencies 
work together in an umbrella organisation (a limited liability firm, seven 
counties, six cities, the planning authority and the state government of Hesse 
are the stakeholders, also financially). The umbrella organisation is responsi-
ble for marketing but also for financing. The regional park is a highly valued 
initiative as there is a lack of high-quality green space and leisure facilities. 
Substantial financial support derives from Fraport, the owner of the airport.
4.2.3.3  Digitisation
Digitisation and the extension of broadband access has been added to the 
list of tasks of regional importance in 2018. Since 2019 the planning author-
ity moderates a process called “Gigabit region” that includes nine counties 
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and three county-exempt cities, in total more than 161 municipalities. 
Again, this is more municipalities than the authority has in terms of mem-
bers, hence this is seen more as a task for the metropolitan region but the 
process is moderated by the staff of the planning authority. Joining forces 
makes sense as a larger group of municipalities can negotiate for better con-
ditions with the firms. Another goal is the extension of the 5G standard that 
is necessary for some measures and projects in the area of mobility.
A letter of intent was signed in May 2019, a feasibility study has been 
published, and a public procurement process started in late 2019. The next 
step is the foundation of a limited liability company (GmbH), which will be 
led by the director of the planning authority.
4.2.3.4  Cultural policies
Culture is another task that is mentioned in the law as one of the pending 
issues where the board of the region was encouraged to find a joint solution. 
Again, there are several initiatives active in the region and they differ in 
terms of membership and spatial reach. The Cultural Region (Kulturregion) 
is a voluntary association of 52 municipalities and counties and the plan-
ning authority. It was established in 2005 (www .kulturregion -frankfurt - 
Rheinmain .de). The Cultural Region is built up from below by municipali-
ties (together with the planning authority) and tries to coordinate their spe-
cific interests (especially in respect of joint financing). The Cultural Region 
organises events and exhibitions and supports cultural initiatives that are 
active the region.
In 2006, yet another cultural initiative came about – the Kulturfonds 
Frankfurt Rhein-Main GmbH (www .kultur -fonds -frm .de). This is an ini-
tiative bringing together the federal state government, larger cities such 
as Frankfurt, Wiesbaden and Darmstadt and two counties for supporting 
high-level cultural offers that are seen as crucial locational factor.10 The 
Kulturfonds is stronger compared to the Cultural Region due to financial 
help of the state government but membership is smaller. Initially it was the 
state government, Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, Darmstadt and the two counties 
Hochtaunuskreis und Main-Taunus-Kreis as these are places where high 
culture events usually take place. In 2020, the city of Offenbach and the 
smaller towns of Oestrich-Winkel and Bad Vilbel joined the association. 
Therefore, currently there are ten members (Hanau joined earlier). The 
municipal members pay two euros per resident, the counties 1.60 euros per 
resident and the state government contribute a similar sum. Overall, the 
goal of this initiative was enhancing the attractiveness of the region.
A third actor is the Cultural Initiative Frankfurt/Rhine-Main 
(Kulturinitiative Frankfurt Rhein-Main) that was established in 1998 and 
then converted into an association in 2003 (www .kirm .de /kirm /satzung 
.htm). The Cultural Initiative gathers representatives of culture-related 
organisations in the region (as well as individual actors) in order to jointly 
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run cultural activities and by these means, support the development of a cul-
tural identity for the metropolitan area. The Cultural Initiative is more an 
organisation for people being active in culture and the media. Municipalities 
are less relevant.
4.2.3.5  Economic Development and Marketing
Economic development and marketing is a shared task between the munici-
palities and several special-purpose associations. In particular, the smaller 
municipalities see a great benefit in inter-municipal cooperation as they 
can mobilise more resources and critical mass. Economic competitiveness 
became an issue in regional policy in the early 1990s. The initiation of the 
IHK-Forum Rhine-Main by the chambers of commerce and industry of the 
Frankfurt/Rhine-Main region was a clear reaction to this. The chambers of 
commerce and industry usually operate locally. The Forum is a sort of plat-
form that allows the various IHK to have more political weight and influ-
ence and bring regional topics on the agenda. The main motivation was a 
shared concern about a lack of coordination of local policies (infrastructure 
in particular, but also land use planning) and a lack of a common vision 
for the economic development of the region. The IHK Forum presents ten 
chambers covering a large area spanning from Mainz to Aschaffenburg.
The Economic Development Agency for the Region of Frankfurt/Rhine-
Main (Wirtschaftsförderung Region Frankfurt/Rhein-Main), established in 
1995 with the support of the UVF, has a different mission. It represents the 
interests of municipalities and also offers services for the member munici-
palities. Today also other actors such as technology clusters and Fraport are 
involved.11 Thus, membership is broad and the weight of the organisation is 
considerable. The aim of the agency, now connected to the planning author-
ity, is the coordination and fostering of metropolitan-wide cooperation in 
the field of economic development.12
The Economic Initiative (Wirtschaftsinitiative), founded in 1996, is 
still active but focuses more on the bundling of interests within the region 
(agenda setting).
In 2021, we can see a more consolidated situation and increasing culture 
of effective division of work – although on first sight the actor constellation 
still seems to be complex and initiatives can hardly be separated. The fol-
lowing actors and initiatives are relevant:
 • FrankfurtRheinMain International Marketing of the Region is respon-
sible for the attraction of foreign firms and investors (https://www .frm - 
united .de /ueber -uns/). Hence, the agency is very active internationally 
(Southeast Asia and North America). Stakeholders are 34 towns and 
counties, the chambers of industry and commerce and various other 
affiliated organisations (the agency is operational with direct contact 
to firms).
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 • The Association for the Promotion of the Frankfurt Rhein/Main region 
(Verein zur Förderung der Standortentwicklung, http://www .verein -frm . 
de) is an agency that acts also within the region. This association has a 
slightly different actor composition (state government of Hesse, City of 
Frankfurt am Main, Planning Authority (representing the other munici-
palities and countries), the Economic Initiative and Deutsche Bank). Its 
main purpose is agenda setting and it is also operational but with a 
focus on structural aspects of regional development.
 • The international attraction of high skilled workforce is the task of the 
FrankfurtRheinMain International Office (Willkommensportal). This 
agency is organisationally part of the planning authority but a joint ven-
ture of the chamber of commerce Frankfurt and the planning authority 
(www .find -it -in -frm .de).
 • Perform is a digital spin-off of the IHK-Forum and was established in 
2016. Perform is an open online platform for the generation and promo-
tion of ideas (together with Chambers of Crafts / Handwerkskammern). 
It is an open digital forum and follows the principle of crowdsourc-
ing and bottom-up initiatives. The success is questionable until today 
but its visibility is high. One success, according the interviewees, is the 
higher recognition of congested streets and traffic jams on the com-
muter routes. This issue has been raised for a long time, but it gained 
recognition and wider support once it was placed as a project sugges-
tion on the Perform platform. This is a form of digital regionalisation.
The economic initiatives and organisations were partly competing in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, or at least they presented different visions and organ-
isational solutions for the region. Today it is a network of initiatives with 
different but interwoven membership structures. A good example is the pro-
ject FRM2030 (FrankfurtRheinMain GmbH International Marketing of the 
Region 2018). The purpose of this project was the creation of one or several 
visions for the metropolitan region. The final report also included measures 
and initiatives that would contribute to the implementation of the vision. 
The project was initiated by the planning authority and the association for 
the promotion of the Frankfurt Rhine/Main region (Verein zur Förderung 
der Standortentwicklung FrankfurtRheinMain). The FrankfurtRheinMain 
GmbH International Marketing of the Region was coordinating the project 
on behalf of the planning authority. In addition to the above-mentioned 
institutions, the Business Initiative, the state government of Hesse, the city 
of Frankfurt, the Frankfurt Chamber of Industry and Commerce and the 
Perform Initiative were also members of the FRM 2030 steering committee.
4.2.3.6  Mobility
The UVF had the responsibility for a mobility master plan but with the 
abolition of the planning authority in 2000 the task has become void as the 
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new planning authority is primarily responsible for land use planning. As a 
consequence, although there are a range of mobility-related problems in the 
region, there is no overall planning authority or integrated mobility concept 
for the area since 2000. Besides this lack of coordination, major problems 
are the high number of commuting people and lagging investments in rail 
infrastructure.
In 2011, a mobility masterplan has been published as a study by an agency 
called ivm. As the task of public transport has been mentioned as one the 
tasks waiting for regional coordination in the law of 2000, the establishment 
of ivm in 2005 can be considered as a trial to organise the task of regional 
mobility planning in a more flexible way. The agency is a limited liability 
company owned by a large group of municipal shareholders and the state 
government of Hesse. The number of shareholders increased over time but 
not all municipalities of the planning region are involved. It is not a planning 
authority and has no implementation or planning powers. It is more a think 
tank that municipalities can hire for the elaboration of plans and mobility 
concepts when needed. Hence, the masterplan of 2011 was not a binding 
plan but a document giving recommendations and found limited attention.
In 2021, however, the planning authority published a mobility strategy 
as mobility has been added to the task of regional importance in 2018. 
Although the planning authority calls this document SUMP (with refer-
ence to European standards) this is not an integrated transport plan but 
a collection of measures and priority projects. For most of the suggested 
projects the authority has no competence for implementation as the state 
government declined the request to give the legal competence for a binding 
mobility master plan (Generalverkehrsplan) back to the planning author-
ity. An exception is the regional bicycle highway system. The municipalities 
delegated the coordination of this project to the planning authority. In terms 
of spatial reach, it is important to note that besides the legal members of 
the planning authority also the other municipalities of the counties Gross-
Gerau, Wetterau and Main-Kinzig-Kreis participated in the process (in total 
108 instead of 75 municipalities). The concept includes 22 measures and 
the overall goal is: a 65% share of environmentally friendly mobility in the 
regional modal split and the realisation of the so-called five minute region 
(i.e. the availability of a public mobility option within a reach of five minute 
walking distance). Many of the proposed measures are feasibility studies, 
including an expertise on the viability of more restrictive mobility policies 
(Regionalverband FRM 2021, 17).
The planning authority has no competence for busses or regional rail-
ways. This is in the competence of the counties and cities that collabo-
rate within a single-purpose association (RMV). The RMV is responsible 
for an area much bigger than the planning region and manages regional 
railway connections (S-Bahn and regional trains). The RMV covers 15 
countries and 11 cities and these counties and cities are also the stake-
holders together with the state government of Hesse. Hence, the RMV is 
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not an association of transport providers but of local governments. They 
delegated the planning, managing and financing of public transport to 
the RMV. The members order a service and the RMV coordinates the 
implementation.
Infrastructure planning is done on a case-by-case basis. For the S-Bahn, 
for instance, this is done on an inter-municipal level through the creation of 
planning agencies for each new route. Usually this is a complex process that 
takes long time. A tangential connection in the west of the region has been 
under debate for about 30 years. The planning agency (Regionaltangente 
West Planungsgesellschaft) was founded in 2008 and encountered quite a 
few problems in coordinating the municipal stakeholders. The new line will 
start operation in the late 2020s.
4.2.3.7  Energy
In 2016, the planning authority published an energy concept for the region. 
This is a voluntary initiative and service for the municipalities as the plan-
ning authority gives advice, promotes renewable energy projects and identi-
fies the sites for wind turbines in the regional land use plan.
Several of the organisations mentioned in this section are gathered in an 
umbrella organisation called “Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Dachgesellschaften” 
(Working Party of Regional Associations) which is moderated by the 
regional planning authority. This is more a voluntary forum of knowledge 
exchange and coordination, but it is the only arena where all the initiatives 
come together, though only for knowledge exchange and a minimum of 
strategic coordination. At the same time, this demonstrates that the plan-
ning authority has gained recognition as a central actor in the networked 
governance of Rhine-Main (see Table 4.3).
4.2.4  Conclusion
After years of conflicts and competing regional initiatives, there is a more 
consolidated and pragmatic approach of metropolitan governance in the 
Frankfurt/Rhine-Main region. The arrangement is still multipolar and more 
a “network of networks” with thematic overlaps and flexible geographies of 
cooperation. But it seems that all the initiatives have found a modus oper-
andi that avoids double work and concurrence. Instead, a mutual accept-
ance and task-specific division of work seems to be in place.
The last moment in time, when a more consolidated solution was a dis-
puted issue, was 2015 when the lord mayor of Frankfurt invited a wide 
range of actors on his own initiative to the Frankfurter Paulskirche to cel-
ebrate “The day of the metropolitan region”. A declaration was signed but 
not much has happened in terms of consolidated governance (Bender et al. 
2015). During this event, a treaty on the metropolitan region Rhine-Main 
between the states of Hesse, Bavaria and Rhineland-Palatinate was also dis-
cussed but never formalised.
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Even the IHK Frankfurt Rhine-Main, which was certainly a driver in the 
public debate on a potentially consolidated metropolitan government (i.e. 
the bundling of tasks in one organisation) changed its mindset and accepted 
the strategy forum. This is a soft form of collaboration between the states 
and local and economic actors (instead of a treaty), that nevertheless oper-
ates on a high political level (the state chancelleries).
Voluntary collaboration in different constellations and formats instead 
of never-ending debates about the appropriate metropolitan government 
seems to be an appropriate description of the mindset of actors. The met-
ropolitan region is better established as a territorial frame than it used to 
be ten years ago (Heinelt et al. 2011). However, due to the abstract scale 
this territorial frame does not prevent conflicts when municipalities litigate 
about a location of a commercial development area or a large retail centre. 
The strategy forum has no powers here.
As a result, the only two remaining issues are infrastructure and mobility 
and strategic territorial development (housing in particular).
 1) Mobility planning is less well coordinated. There have been attempts 
to create a regional vision in 2011 (without resonance) and there is 
an organisation addressing mobility issues for the municipalities (ivm 
GmbH). But there is no binding mobility plan or body coordinating 
Table 4.3  Networks and initiatives with participation of planning authority
Organisation / Initiative / Agency Role and relationship of planning 
authority
Since
Economic Initiative / 
Wirtschaftsinitiative
Member 2005
Association for the promotion of 
the region /
Verein zur Förderung der 
Standortentwicklung








Dachgesellschaft Share: 6,7 %
Regionalpark RheinMain Südwest 
GmbHShare: 11,76 %
Regionalpark RheinMain Taunushang 
GmbH Share: 11,11 %
Gesellschaft zur Rekultivierung der 
Kiesgrubenlandschaft Weilbach mbH 
Share: 25,0 % 
2005
Strategieforum Metropolregion Authority represents municipalities 2015
Cultural Region / Kulturregion Shareholder 2005
Standortmarketinggesellschaft
Frankfurt Rhein Main GmbH 
Share: 3%
Dierctor of planning authority is 
member of the governing board 
2005
Gigabitregion Planning authority leads the process, 




infrastructure planning. There is also no informal platform or arena 
or joint vision or commitment for coordinating the individual mobility 
strategies of cities (streets in particular). The planning authority is now 
responsible for the masterplan mobility but this seems to be only little 
more than a plan for regional bicycle lanes. However, the service in 
public transport (regional trains, local busses and trams) is coordinated 
well by the RMV. But the fact that there are so many commuters is not 
reflected in a regional mobility policy. The RMV is doing a good job 
in coordinating the service but some infrastructure projects are lagging 
behind (Extension of the S-Bahn) and there is also no link to the strate-
gic dimension of the regional land use plan (pro-active coordination of 
territorial development, housing and mobility policies). Though some 
interviewees saw the problem they don’t see the need for an author-
ity taking care of the mobility problems. Problems of coordination are 
addressed when they occur or project-based (as has been shown by 
reference to the RTW Planungsgesellschaft).
 2) Strategic territorial development. The planning authority is responsible 
for the land use plan and the landscape plan but not for the strategic 
coordination of regional development, hence the integration of trans-
port and land use planning is weak. Also other issues such as climate 
change and economic development are only seen through the land use 
plan. Hence, we cannot speak of integrated spatial or strategic planning.
In terms of ideas guiding the policies we can say that effectiveness and effi-
ciency are less relevant than in France and Italy. Economic development in 
a way is an important factor. Everybody (including the state government of 
Hesse) agrees that a successful region needs some coordination of land use 
(zoning of commercial areas). But detailed policies and projects are not on 
the agenda, this is done by the municipalities. The joint promotion of com-
mercial zones is not foreseen but this is done implicitly with the support 
of the planning authority as they have a database. Still the municipalities 
compete and practice a kind of venue hopping.
The overall evaluation of the relevance of regionalisation in the Frankfurt/
Rhine-Main for public policies is nevertheless cumbersome. Effective single 
purpose arrangements such as the RMV (public transport) and promising 
initiatives such as the Gigabit Region (digitisation) stand in contrast to com-
plex arrangements in land use planning and the regional landscape park.
4.3  Stuttgart: well established showcase example 
of metro governance?
Stuttgart, the capital of the federal state of Baden-Württemberg, is located 
in south-western Germany. Since decades, the region is renowned for its 
automotive and engineering industry. Its geographic location was how-
ever seen as being peripheral during industrialisation in the 19th century 
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(Basten 2011, 276), whereas today the region has a higher centrality and 
connectivity due to a dense highway infrastructure, European integration, 
air traffic and investments in rail infrastructure (Frank and Marsden 2016, 
259). The core city of Stuttgart is by far the dominant urban centre with 
630,000 inhabitants out of 2.8 million in the city-region. With 23%, the 
share of the regional population is however relatively low. The region, as 
defined by the regional planning authority Verband Region Stuttgart (VRS) 
comprises 3,654 km². It has a polycentric urban structure as the core city 
is surrounded by several medium-sized cities of 40,000 to 95,000 inhabit-
ants within a 25-kilometre radius (Esslingen, Böblingen, Sindelfingen and 
Leonberg, see Figure 4.8). The region is also characterised by many small 
cities and villages.
The Stuttgart Region experienced enormous population growth after 
the second world war, almost quadrupling its population between 1950 
and 1960 (Basten 2011, 276). During the 1960s up until 1998, the city 
of Stuttgart lost residents with a temporary exception of the first years 
after German unification. This trend changed at the end of the 1990s and 
population growth has accelerated since 2010. Today, the city of Stuttgart 
has reached the population it had at the beginning of the 1960s (Website 
Figure 4.8 Stuttgart Region 2021 Concept: P. Feiertag Cartography: F. Gela
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Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg 2019). The population loss 
was in part due to suburbanisation and particularly households with higher 
incomes and families leaving the city (Heeg 2003, 164). Accordingly, popu-
lation dynamics in the city-region varied with continued population growth 
until the 1970s and an overall population gain of over 500,000 inhabit-
ants between 1961 and 1998. During the last decade, both core city and 
the region as a whole have been growing, but both population growth and 
building activity in terms of new housing units have been substantially 
higher outside the city of Stuttgart. Statistical data confirms that the core 
city gained young citizens in the education phase (18–25 years), whereas 
adults in the family phase (30–50 years) moved out of the city (ILS 2019). 
Before the creation of the regional planning authority, the rapid settlement 
development was scarcely controlled and led to massive land consumption 
and increase in car traffic. Land consumption was decoupled from popula-
tion growth and the settlement area in the Stuttgart Region grew about 88% 
between 1965 and 2000 (Stark 2009, 73). Today, the settlement area is still 
expanding but growth rates have considerably slowed down despite popula-
tion growth (VRS 2016, 19).
The Stuttgart Region has a strong automotive industry, engineering and 
mechanics sector with Mercedes/Daimler, Porsche and Bosch as large, inter-
nationally known companies as well as many small and medium-sized com-
panies (Basten 2011, 273, 277). The highly export-oriented manufacturing 
industry was hit by a recession in the 1990s, leading to a job loss of over 
100,000 between 1990 and 1997 (Heeg 2003, 166). However, the economy 
recovered in the 1990s and 2000s with job loss going hand in hand with 
a massive increase of productivity. The secondary sector continues to be 
highly significant for the regional economy despite tertiarisation, also in 
terms of well-paid jobs and its contribution to the regional GDP (Basten 
2011, 277).
An essential feature of the governance arrangement in Stuttgart is its 
multi-scaled character where a strong institutional core (Verband Region 
Stuttgart) with a directly elected regional assembly and a bundle of func-
tions (regional planning, public transport, etc.) is complemented by softer 
forms of voluntary cooperation. The core is organised as public authority 
and has along with Hanover the highest degree of institutionalisation of all 
city-regions in Germany (Fricke 2020, 157). In addition, strategic decisions 
are implemented by means of network building and network management 
(Benz 2003, 509).
The following key characteristics concerning metropolitan governance 
and planning will be highlighted in this chapter:
 • Regional planning authority Verband Region Stuttgart with directly 
elected assembly created in 1994;
 • Lean administration complemented by agencies with additional share-
holders as partners;
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 • High stability of the governance arrangement, functional profile and 
spatial dimension over more than 25 years;
 • The idea to strengthen the economic competitiveness was a key driver 
during its foundation, but is no longer the central legitimation for its 
existence;
 • The wider metropolitan region (Europäische Metropolregion Stuttgart) 
has never fully materialised as an additional layer.
4.3.1  The institutional arrangement Verband Region Stuttgart
The Stuttgart region as we see it today was created during the “second golden 
age of Metropolitan Government Reforms” (Lefèvre 2001, 16) in the 1990s 
and has remained stable since. It is one of the most integrated metropolitan 
institutions in Germany (Walter-Rogg 2018, 132). Even internationally, the 
Stuttgart Region is one of the rare examples with a directly elected assem-
bly (Tomàs 2019, 35) and is acknowledged in academic contributions as a 
model for city-regional management (Priebs 2019, 263; Fricke 2020, 157; 
Frank and Marsden 2016, 248; Klinkenberg 2010, 392).
4.3.1.1  The emergence of a unique governance model 
for Stuttgart Region
The governance arrangement for Stuttgart Region is different from other 
city-regions in the federal state of Baden-Württemberg and resulted out of a 
combination of the state’s reform policy (regionalisation “from above”) and 
several political issues within the region that were pending since the 1970s 
(regionalisation “from below”). The fact that it came about was due to the 
exploitation of a favourable opportunity for reforms and the commitment 
of local actors (Benz 2003, 512).
Inter-municipal cooperation and regional planning started with volun-
tary municipal planning associations in the 1950s and included the City 
of Stuttgart since 1967 (Priebs 2019, 255). During the 1970s, territo-
rial reforms strengthened the medium-sized cities in the surroundings of 
Stuttgart by increasing their size and administrative capacity, whereas 
the core city itself was not enlarged. The federal state created compulsory 
regional planning associations in 1972 throughout the entire state, replac-
ing the voluntary municipal associations (Zimmermann 2011, 192–193). In 
addition to these large regions, six smaller neighbourhood associations were 
created in 1974 in the agglomerations of Baden-Württemberg with the task 
to elaborate inter-municipal land use plans, in case of Stuttgart for the core 
of the agglomeration (Stuttgart and the first ring). The first regional plan 
(Regionalplan) for Stuttgart came into force in 1977 and the inter-municipal 
land use plan in 1984 (Priebs 2019, 255). However, both the regional plan-
ning associations and the neighbourhood associations were limited to spa-
tial planning tasks without any competences for implementation and were 
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not able to address the bundle of problems of the metropolitan development 
in policy fields such as transport successfully (Zimmermann 2011, 193). 
Distribution conflicts between the municipalities concerning the financing 
of regional infrastructure were common (Benz 2003, 505).
At the beginning of the 1990s, the pressure to take action increased due to 
rising unemployment in Stuttgart caused by an industrial crisis, the growing 
awareness of competition between regions in the European common market 
and pending infrastructure investments of regional relevance (Basten 2011, 
279). The mayor of Stuttgart as well as CEOs from large firms called for an 
intervention and the state government accepted these queries (Zimmermann 
2011, 195; Benz 2003, 506; Priebs 2019, 256; Walter-Rogg 2018, 133). 
The former regional planning association was transformed by law (“Gesetz 
über die Errichtung des Verbands Region Stuttgart” (VRS) from 7 February 
1994) into a regional jurisdiction (Körperschaft öffentlichen Rechts). The 
main changes of the reform were a directly elected assembly with a first 
election in June 1994 and some additional tasks beyond regional planning, 
particularly concerning regional transport and economic development. 
Hence, the VRS has gained democratic legitimacy and additional possibili-
ties for implementation of the development strategy defined by the statutory 
regional plan. The latter is the main legal instrument of the VRS with the 
possibility to enforce projects of regional relevance if cooperative problem 
solving fails (Planungsgebot) and to align municipal plans to the aims of the 
regional plan. As the municipal neighbourhood associations in the Stuttgart 
Region has been dissolved when the VRS was created (Priebs 2019, 257), 
i.e. the local land use plans (Flächennutzungsplan) were since then again 
elaborated by the individual municipalities.
This strong position of the VRS increases the chances of achieving a 
negotiated solution with the municipalities (Benz 2003, 505–506). The first 
regional plan has been approved in 1998 and partially updated in 2002 with 
focus on large-scale retail (Priebs 2019, 258). The current one dates from 
2009. A regional transport plan (Regionalverkehrsplan, 2001, updated in 
2010 and 2018) as well as a landscape plan (Landschaftsrahmenplan) is 
elaborated in complementarity to the regional plan. In addition to those for-
mal plans, an informal development strategy (Leitbild für den Wirtschafts- 
und Wissenschaftsstandort Region Stuttgart) has been elaborated by a broad 
range of actors including municipalities, counties, universities, companies, 
churches, etc. under coordination of the economic development agency 
(WRS) and approved by the regional assembly in 2012.
Within the 25 years since its creation, the governance arrangement of 
today’s regional authority Verband Region Stuttgart has persisted with-
out fundamental transformation. New projects, networks and topics such 
as wind energy and digital infrastructure (high-speed internet connec-
tions) emerged and were integrated into the existing governance arrange-
ment. Additionally, the challenges have changed in character due to a good 
economic situation and demographic change. Now, a shortage of skilled 
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workforce and affordable housing are considered pressing problems. At 
the same time, most municipalities in the region provide less building land 
than needed or do not activate plots foreseen for settlement development in 
regional and local plans for various reasons (Hemberger and Kiwitt 2018, 
37). Whereas restrictive regional planning tools are well established, the 
German planning law has limited tools for pro-active settlement planning. 
The VRS is seeking to adapt by expanding soft activities such as informa-
tion and advice, financial incentives and networking (Hemberger and Kiwitt 
2018, 38–39).
Debates about extending the competencies of the regional authority 
have focussed on competencies of the counties, in particular regarding pub-
lic transport. Due to the resistance of the counties, only a minor shift has 
taken place. Since 2015, the responsibility for regional express busses and 
park-and-ride services as well as a regional traffic control centre has been 
committed to the VRS, but not the competence for the local bus systems 
that are still in the competence of the counties (Priebs 2019, 258). The dis-
pute has been settled by the federal state government with the agreement 
ÖPNV-Pakt 2025 signed by the federal state, the VRS, the counties and the 
city of Stuttgart (Beuttler-Bohn 2017, 116). The agreement fixes competen-
cies, quality standards and the repartition of revenues. The head office of 
VRS has abandoned ambitions to expand its formal functions afterwards. A 
shift of functions from the municipal level is not debated, as the intermedi-
ary county level or the cooperation of neighbouring municipalities would 
be considered as a solution first. The state government is not willing to 
devolve more competencies either. The institutional arrangement of the 
VRS has remained unique in Baden-Württemberg, as the federal state has 
not expanded the model to other regions.
4.3.1.2  Verband Region Stuttgart in the multilevel system
Baden-Württemberg is a federal state with a multilayer system that has 
remained mostly unchanged for decades despite long-lasting debates about 
the high number of layers (Wahl 1998).
The Verband Region Stuttgart represents a city-regional level that 
is situated between the governmental levels of the state government and 
the counties. The federal state, the VRS, the counties and the municipali-
ties all have a directly elected assembly or council. In addition to that, 
deconcentrated government offices of the regions of the state government 
(Regierungspräsidium) and different forms of joint administration at the 
municipal level exist such as single-purpose associations or voluntary coop-
eration (see Table 4.4). This means that the number of administrative levels 
varies between six, in the case of small municipalities, and four, in the case 
of county-exempt cities such as Stuttgart.13 The most influential levels of ter-
ritorial government are the federal state government with legislative power 



































































































































































































































































self-government varies depending on the size of the municipalities; munic-
ipalities with less than 20,000 inhabitants partially rely on the counties. 
With regard to the spatial planning system, the federal state, the regions and 
the municipalities are the three levels with statutory planning functions (see 
Table 4.6). The Stuttgart Region is not relevant in all public policies due to 
its narrow profile, e.g. not covering health care, education or social services 
and should therefore not be seen as a full-fledged level of administration, i.e. 
it is not a county (Wahl 1998, 210). This is all the more true for the other 
regional planning associations (Regionalverbände) in Baden-Württemberg 
as their functions are limited to regional planning and landscape planning.
The counties have a combined role of local self-government and multi-
purpose state administration (see 4.1). They are responsible for some ser-
vices such as waste disposal and public transport (busses) and act at the same 
time as lower state authority with supervisory functions over the munici-
palities, e.g. concerning environmental protection, emission control and in 
case of small municipalities even building permission. Five counties are con-
stituting members of the VRS. They have nevertheless limited significance in 
the daily work of the administration of the VRS. The contact is by far less 
frequent than with the municipalities because they are responsible for dif-
ferent policy fields. Collaboration is necessary when environmental issues in 
the regional plan are at stake or when the adaptation of timetables between 
busses and light rail needs to be done. Rivalries about the distribution of 
competences, in particular for public transport, had let to a chilly relation-
ship at the beginning of the 2010s, but the relationship has improved since 
the issue has been settled. In the field of regional business development, 
the development agency (Wirtschaftsförderung Region Stuttgart, WRS) 
has managed to establish close contact and information flow via a model 
of shared staff: the responsible persons for business development in each 
county (Kreiswirtschaftsförderer) are employed by the WRS but have their 
main workplace within the county administration. In addition, WRS, coun-
ties and municipalities have launched a cooperation for broadband network 
expansion (organised as Gigabit Region Stuttgart limited liability firm).
Regierungspräsidien are lower state administrations responsible for 
nature conservation, environmental policies and road construction and 
have to approve the preparatory land use plans of the cities. The role of the 
Regierungspräsidien in everyday planning business is low because prepara-
tory land use plans are only renewed every 15 years at best. They share key 
positions about land consumption, air pollution and large retail with VRS 
and can therefore potentially be supportive for the region.
The municipalities are the main partners of the VRS and the key level 
of implementation of policies. This is particularly true for the planning 
departments of cities. The planners in the head office of VRS are in fre-
quent contact with the municipal planning departments, both via bilateral 
exchange about municipal planning processes and regular network meetings 
with the heads of planning offices of the cities. Due to a large number of 
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municipalities (179), the collaboration is less intense with the small ones. 
The VRS uses a mix of regulatory tools (binding regional plan), incentives 
(co-funding), persuasion (information events), advice, and provides services 
in the field of public transport.
The federal state has a high influence on the city-region both via legislation 
and financing. Planning and financing of large infrastructure projects such 
as the trade fair, the airport or the railway project Stuttgart 21 depend on 
the federal state. Institutional reforms such as the territorial reforms of the 
1970s concerning the enlargement of municipalities and counties, the crea-
tion of VRS in 1994 and the decision about additional competences in 2015 
were enacted by the federal state. The state plan LEP defines general aims 
for spatial development with binding character for the region (Ministerium 
für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Tourismus Baden-Württemberg 2002). The LEP 
2002 had introduced the concept of a Europäische Metropolregion Stuttgart 
beyond the perimeter of the planning region (see 4.3.2 and 4.3.3). During 
the current legislative period (2016–2021) neither institutional reforms nor 
renewal of the state plan are scheduled. Instead, the federal state seeks to 
influence decision-making of the region in the devolved field of regional 
transport via financial incentives, namely concerning the frequency and 
pricing of light rail trains.
4.3.1.3  Decision-making and leadership
The governance structure of the VRS separates the political and executive 
power in a system of dual leadership. The assembly is presided over by a 
chairperson, whereas the administration is headed by a regional director. 
Both are elected by the regional assembly. The regional director is appointed 
for an eight-year term of office, thus longer than the assembly and its presi-
dent. The president chairs the committees, prepares the agenda and is the 
director’s supervisor. Throughout the history of VRS, the role of president 
has been interpreted differently. In the period from 1994 to 2008, the found-
ing director Bernd Steinacher was very influential, whereas the changing 
presidents had mainly representative functions and the role of chairperson 
of the meetings (Priebs 2019, 257). Afterwards, the president Thomas Bopp 
(re-elected in 2019 for the third time despite a change of majority in the 
assembly) became the key personality for agenda setting and future projects 
of the region. In 2013, he took both positions of regional director and presi-
dent for an interim period (Beuttler-Bohn 2017, 154).
The regional assembly meets five to six times a year. The transparency 
of the decision-making process is generated by opening the meetings to the 
public and reporting of local media. Its three committees deal with econ-
omy and administration, regional planning as well as transport and meet 
more often, especially transport as well planning with monthly meetings. 
The Christian Democrats (CDU) had the majority of seats since the assem-
bly’s foundation up to 2014, but were narrowly defeated by the Greens in 
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2019. This result is in line with the political majority in the state govern-
ment (minister-president from the Green party since 2011) and the city of 
Stuttgart (mayor from the Green party since 2013). The regional assembly 
has between 80 and 96 members (i.e. fewer than municipalities; 2014-2019: 
87 members, since May 2019: 88) and is directly elected for five years. The 
regional assembly’s work is organised along party-political lines in frac-
tions (Fricke 2020, 158). A minimum of 5% of votes is necessary to secure 
a seat and send any candidate from the party lists to the assembly. The six 
electoral districts correspond to the counties and the city of Stuttgart (repre-
sented with 18 seats). The election is held simultaneously with the European, 
county and municipal elections. It is noteworthy that the voter turnout is 
higher than for the municipal elections with 52,6% as historically lowest 
result in 2014 (Beuttler-Bohn 2017, 107) and 65.5% in 2019. These good 
voter turn out show that the region is seen as a relevant institution by the 
citizens and give a strong legitimacy to the region. Still, interviewees argue 
that the topics where the region is competent are not suitable for election 
campaigns and that the multilevel system is too complex for the ordinary 
citizen to understand who is responsible for what. Thus, the direct elec-
tion does not guarantee an identification with the city-region (Beuttler-Bohn 
2017, 212). However, Walter-Rogg (2018, 141) argues that the opportunity 
to vote for the regional assembly seems to have a positive impact on the 
citizen’s attachment to the region because of the unexpected empirical find-
ings that older people who had the opportunity to vote for several times feel 
more attached to the Stuttgart Region than younger people.
The directly elected regional assembly is unanimously regarded as effec-
tive by interviewees and in the literature (Zimmermann 2014, 188; Benz 
2003, 509; Beuttler-Bohn 2017, 108–109; Frank and Marsden 2016, 253), 
i.e. able to take a region-wide perspective and orient strategic decisions to 
it. It is seen by the municipalities as necessary counterpart to the networked 
forms of governance such as the public–private regional development agency 
(WRS), ensuring input legitimacy and democratic control (Zimmermann 
2014, 195). The quality of the debates in terms of content and commitment 
is considered high as well (see also Beuttler-Bohn 2017, 109). The VRS is 
forced to be responsive to local interests and work towards regional con-
sensus (Basten 2011, 281), but takes its decisions independently of special 
interests according to the majority principle based on parliamentary groups 
(Benz 2003, 511). Instead of government-opposition thinking, directly 
elected regional assemblies tend to be consensus-oriented; this mechanism 
can also be observed in the Stuttgart Region (Zimmermann 2014, 196; 
Kübler 2012). Local politicians can hold more than one mandate, meaning 
that some regional councillors have a double function as mayors, munici-
pal or county councillors, members of the German federal parliament or 
the federal state parliament. In the current period 2019–2024, 16 mayors 
and five former mayors are regional councillors. Many of them are mem-
bers of the parliament group of “Freie Wähler” (independent voters) which 
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explicitly acts as stakeholders of municipal interests as a whole, but not 
necessarily of their individual municipality. Interviewees argue that mayors 
are valuable members as long as their share is limited and does not domi-
nate the assembly, because most of them have much political expertise and 
professional competence.
The mayor of Stuttgart Fritz Kuhn (2013–2020) is part of the regional 
assembly and acts as vice-president. According to Stuttgart’s municipal 
administration, this double position is an important link that ensures the 
alignment of strategic decisions between Stuttgart and the Region. At the 
same time, Kuhn sees its role in cautiously strengthening regional coopera-
tion rather than being the figurehead of the Region. He could have run for 
the presidency after the Green Party won the regional elections in 2019, but 
deliberately refrained from it because he anticipated that the double man-
date of being mayor of Stuttgart and President of the assembly of VRS would 
provoke conflicts and create harm in the spheres of metropolitics (Kuhn in 
Durchdenwald and Schwarz 2019). In fact, at the beginning of the 2000s 
there have been leadership conflicts between Stuttgart’s mayor Schuster 
(1997–2013) and the regional director Steinacher as both claimed to rep-
resent the metropolitan region (Klinkenberg 2010, 394–396; Zimmermann 
and Heinelt 2012, 106; see 4.3.3).
4.3.1.4  Functions
The functions of the VRS have been either devolved from the federal state or 
upscaled from the counties. In addition to the compulsory tasks determined 
by state law,14 the VRS can render voluntary tasks in case that a majority of 
two-thirds of the assembly votes for this. This has been the case for the trade 
fair, the coordination and organisation of congresses, cultural events and 
big sport events as well as an external representation of the region and the 
co-funding of projects related to the implementation of the landscape park.
With regard to production functions, the VRS is competent in the follow-
ing policies:
 • Regional business development (via agency WRS, partly owned by the 
VRS);
 • Tourism and regional marketing (via agency Regio Stuttgart Marketing 
und Tourismus GmbH);
 • Building and management of new trade fair complex (via agencies 
Projektgesellschaft Neue Messe GmbH & Co. Kg and Projektgesellschaft 
neue Messe Verwaltungs-GmbH; since 1998);
 • Coordination and organisation of congresses, cultural events and 
big sport events with regional relevance, e.g. application to host 
the Olympic games in 2012 or IBA 2027 (via agencies for applica-
tion; associations SportRegion Stuttgart e.V. as well as KulturRegion 
Stuttgart e.V.);
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 • The external representation of the region (own office in Brussels since 
2002, together with WRS) and participation in international networks 
(e.g. Metrex, EMTA for transport).
Regarding social reproduction functions, the VRS is competent in the fol-
lowing policies:
 • Statutory Regional Planning;
 • Regional public transport (responsibility for regional light railway since 
1996 and express busses, park & ride as well as a regional traffic con-
trol centre since 2015);
 • Landscape planning (Landschaftsrahmenplan);
 • Planning and implementation of regional landscape parks (since 2006);
 • Identification of potential sites for wind energy (as part of the regional 
plan);
 • Waste management of mineral waste and toxic soils (delegated to 
agency AVL in the county Ludwigsburg).
Although enhancing the economic competitiveness of the region at European 
and international level was the main motivation justifying the creation of the 
VRS (Zimmermann 2011, 195; Heeg 2003, 163; Fricke 2020, 160; Frank 
and Marsden 2016, 253), all functions related to competitiveness have been 
outsourced to autonomous agencies. This means that the Verband Region 
Stuttgart is shareholder together with other public and private partners such 
as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (see Table 4.5). Its regional 
assembly takes strategic decisions in those policy fields, but the operational 
activities are not carried out within the administration of the VRS itself.
Regional planning, landscape planning and regional transport planning 
as well as the provision of regional light rail transit are the core tasks of the 
region. The regional-level coordination of both land use planning and trans-
port creates good conditions to foster more sustainable urban settlement 
patterns (Frank and Marsden 2016, 243). Land use planning and urban 
development projects have remained in the responsibility of the municipali-
ties, but the aims formulated in the regional plan as well as the spatial extent 
of green areas depicted in the plan are binding for local land use planning. 
This means that the region has regulative power concerning urban develop-
ment. Those formal instruments are used more stringently than in other 
planning regions in Baden-Württemberg, in particular regarding retail, green 
spaces, density and transport-oriented development along rail stations and 
enforced by court decision, if necessary (Priebs 2019, 260; Benz 2003, 506).
In terms of implementation, the VRS has more options than the other 
regional planning authorities in Baden-Württemberg but is largely reliant on 
the municipalities, counties and the federal state (in case of large infrastruc-
ture projects such as the trade fair or the central train station of Stuttgart). 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































including the contracting, and express busses. Close coordination with the 
counties and the city of Stuttgart is still needed as they are responsible for 
local public transport.
The VRS supports the municipalities with small funding programmes for 
inter-municipal industrial parks and brownfields of regional relevance (since 
1997, see Benz 2003, 50) and projects in areas designated as regional land-
scape park. The landscape park is composed of sub-regions with detailed 
implementation plans and combines measures of landscape protection (e.g. 
river renaturation) and recreation (e.g. bicycle path connections) and aims 
to enhance the quality of life in the region (Frank and Marsden 2016, 261; 
Basten 2011, 284). Since 2016, an action program for housing has been 
launched (Hemberger and Kiwitt 2018, 37). VRS has extended the co-
financing for green spaces in new housing areas with the aim to make dense, 
affordable housing forms more attractive for municipalities. Attempts to 
play a more active role in the provision of housing by supporting municipal 
land management are seen as unnecessary by the medium-sized cities with 
large professional planning departments, whereas the city of Stuttgart is in 
favour of it as it has an interest in more building activity outside its own 
territory to solve the problem of housing shortage. Small municipalities can 
benefit from information offers, e.g. from good examples meeting the den-
sity requirements of the regional plan; however they argue that it is not 
enough to support the administration, because the council and the citizens 
have to be convinced in order to raise the acceptance for other building 
typologies than single-family houses and terraced houses.
In addition to that, the VRS has become the representative of the city-
region with regard to external relations at the national and European level 
by means of lobbying, networking and participation in EU funded projects 
(Hunds 2011). Stuttgart has been the first German region to establish an 
office in Brussels and is very active in the Network of European metropoli-
tan regions and areas (METREX) (Zimmermann 2011, 202). This is still 
the case despite leadership changes: the current director of VRS Dr. Nicola 
Schelling is president of METREX, and Stuttgart hosted a METREX confer-
ence about “Modern infrastructures for growing metropolitan regions” in 
autumn 2019. Stuttgart’s European activities are exceptional compared to 
other German metropolitan regions (Fricke 2020, 37).
4.3.1.5  Administration, development agencies and additional 
networks to include private actors
The administrative core of the regional organisation is formed by a head 
office (Geschäftsstelle) with about 70 employees consisting of planners and 
technical staff. The small size is seen as a positive characteristic by repre-
sentatives of the regional assembly (VRS 2004). According to the interview-
ees from the municipalities, the head office has built up a good reputation 
as a competent and committed partner. Its resources and possibilities for 
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action are markedly higher than in the 11 other planning regions in Baden-
Württemberg; with the exception of the Rhine-Neckar region.15
According to the budget plan of the Stuttgart Region, the budget for 2020 
amounts to 442.4 M€, of which the lion’s share of 410.9 M€ is dedicated 
to public transport (light rail operation, transport association, new vehi-
cles, investments, rail project Stuttgart 21, etc.). The other budget positions 
are economic development (12.3 M€), personnel (6.1 M€), debts (4.9 M€), 
administration and IT (4.3 M€), planning (3.1 M€) as well as culture and 
sports (0.8 M€). Main revenue sources are fees for public transport, alloca-
tions from the federal state and contributions paid by the counties and the 
179 municipalities. The contribution for public transport is only paid by the 
members of the traffic association, i.e. Stuttgart and the four counties adja-
cent to it, not by the county of Göppingen. The region cannot levy taxes of 
its own and is therefore financially dependent from other territorial authori-
ties. Voluntary activities and additional investments have to be financed by 
acquisition of funding or by the municipalities, who are also the beneficiar-
ies of co-funding programs. The region has the means to kick of projects 
and initiatives via small amounts for studies, events and organisational sup-
port. It can also ensure a joint financial effort of the municipalities in case of 
large projects with regional relevance such as the trade fair. The municipal 
contribution to the budget is voted by the regional assembly and has to 
cover everything nobody else is paying for. It amounts to about 23.4 M€ 
in 2020 (thereof 1.5 M€ City of Stuttgart) and has increased between 2016 
and 2019 after several stable years. The share per municipality depends on 
their tax income. The budget of the City of Stuttgart amounts to €4.1 billion 
for 2020 according to the budget plan. Thus, the city’s contribution to the 
region’s budget only represents a minor share of the expenditures.
The head office is seeking to mobilise the potentials of the region by 
supporting self-organisation and can be seen as central node in a net-
work of cooperation (Zimmermann 2011, 203; Beuttler-Bohn 2017, 139). 
Operational tasks are carried out in public–private cooperation and via 
development agencies connected to the core organisation (Benz 2003, 508). 
These agencies function independently, but are controlled at a distance by 
the regional assembly (strategy, core projects, budget) and by the regional 
director (Benz 2003, 507–511). The most important one is the economic 
development agency Wirtschaftsförderung Region Stuttgart GmbH (WRS) 
established in 1995. It focuses on the promotion of industry and technol-
ogy networks and started cluster policies such as the regional network 
MedienInitiative Region Stuttgart already in the 1990s. The WRS regularly 
reports to the committee of the regional assembly. In addition, the regional 
director of the VRS is part of its advisory board. In terms of administra-
tion and budget, the head office of VRS and the WRS are separately organ-
ised, though being in the same building. They coordinate their actions and 
exchange information via regular meetings. Most of their tasks and fields of 
action are clearly separated. Intersections exist concerning mobility as well 
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as locations for industry and commercial use. The office in Brussels is a joint 
activity. Just like VRS, the WRS is shareholder of companies together with 
other public and private partners, meaning that the VRS as mother organi-
sation is indirect shareholder in these cases. In 2017, the VRS was direct or 
indirect shareholder of 11 companies and supported two associations finan-
cially in a substantive way, KulturRegion Stuttgart e.V. and SportRegion 
Stuttgart e.V. In addition to that, the VRS and WRS are members of about 
50 associations or networks (VRS 2018). In most of the cases, the region is 
not holding the majority of the limited liability companies (see Table 4.5); 
partners are especially the city of Stuttgart, other municipalities, counties, 
the federal state Baden-Württemberg, chambers, trade unions, transport 
companies and Stuttgart University. Which municipalities are involved 
depends on their interest in the topic and is different for each company.
Today, economic actors are mainly involved via the chambers of com-
merce and industry representing their interests. None of the large compa-
nies is a stakeholder of the WRS nor are CEOs standing for the regional 
parliament. Individual companies might contact the VRS if they feel 
affected by changes in the regional plan, but do not play a leading role in 
defining regional strategies anymore. This has been different in the 1990s 
when leading personalities of the business community have been influen-
tial in supporting regional reforms and launched a public debate about 
development perspectives of the region with stakeholders from culture, 
media, politics, social affairs, economy and science under the umbrella of 
the association Forum Region Stuttgart (Beuttler-Bohn 2017, 132–134; 
Zimmermann 2011, 199; Benz 2003, 508). The Forum existed for about 
20 years, but was dissolved in 2015 due to the lack of a clear task, active 
members and financial contributions. Its mission has been fulfilled as the 
VRS is able to launch projects of regional importance and takes care 
of economic development and marketing via its agency WRS. In addi-
tion, the economic difficulties that hit the region in the 1990s could be 
overcome.
4.3.1.6  Key projects: trade fair, Stuttgart 21, IBA 
2027, Gigabit Region
Stuttgart’s large projects with regional importance have been either infra-
structure projects or events, rather than a new city quarter or large-scale 
urban development area. The infrastructure projects depend on political 
and financial support from the state and the federal government (Basten 
2011, 282). Current new housing areas seldom exceed 50–100 units and 
are spread over the city-region. This is caused by the polycentric structure 
of the city-region with a range of urban centres with a size of 40,000 to 
95,000 inhabitants as well as the lack of available space in the core city due 
to topographic reasons, a strict political decision against outward extension 
and few remaining conversion areas. The new railway station (Stuttgart 21) 
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and the former German headquarter of IBM (Eiermann Campus) are the 
largest conversion areas under development.
One of the key projects of the founding years was the relocation of the 
trade fair in the southern part of the region next to the airport. This large 
infrastructure project was one of the triggers for a more integrated form of 
metro governance (Blatter 2008, 149; Basten 2011, 284), because it could 
not be planned and financed by one municipality alone. The regional assem-
bly voted for a financial contribution of the region in 1997 (Priebs 2019, 
257). The VRS was responsible for the planning process and is still a share-
holder of the company which manages the trade fair. The exact site of the 
new building was fixed in the regional plan and enforced by court decision; 
this was the first time the VRS actually used the legal instrument of plan-
ning obligation (Planungsgebot) (Priebs 2019, 260). The VRS was also in 
charge of mediating between the affected municipalities (Heeg 2003, 172). 
The new fair was inaugurated in 2007. The area next to the airport and 
trade fair is still a hotspot of urban development and will experience even 
more development pressure in the future because an additional train station 
will be built there, connecting it both via long distance and regional express 
trains. Land use conflicts are high in this area called Filder because it has 
very fertile soils, which still produce good yields despite climate change and 
drought.
The second key infrastructure project Stuttgart 21 concerns the transfor-
mation of Stuttgart’s central railway station from an end station to a subter-
ranean through station as well as a quicker connection to the city of Ulm 
located about 80 km southeast. This connection is part of a European high 
speed magistrale from Paris to Bratislava. This large-scale project involves 
the national government, the state government, German Railway (Deutsche 
Bahn) and the city of Stuttgart as partners (Basten 2011, 283). It clears 
an 85 hectares inner-city area from railway use and enables its redevelop-
ment into a dense mixed-use quarter with about 7,000 housing units. The 
project name Stuttgart 21 has become a synonym for citizen protest against 
megaprojects. Reasons for heated protest from environmental activists and 
civil society groups were the cost explosion, limited gain of travelling time 
compared to alternative solutions, expected environmental damage and the 
cutting down of old trees in a part of the palace park.16
Regarding events, the VRS supported an application for the Olympic 
Games 2012. The candidature was prepared at the regional level in the form 
of a public–private partnership (Benz 2003, 509). However, Stuttgart’s 
application did not pass the national selection process.
Another large project regarding an event is the international building 
exhibition (IBA) StadtRegion Stuttgart 2027. The specifically German for-
mat of an international building exhibition creates a laboratory situation for 
a limited period of time of typically ten years, has a thematic focus adapted 
to a local problematic and aims to give innovative answers to contemporary 
questions of urban development by building high-quality showcase projects 
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(Niemann et al. 2011, 314). After a preparatory phase, the IBA was offi-
cially launched in 2017 and is organised by a development agency owned by 
the city of Stuttgart, the VRS and WRS as well as the chamber of architects 
and Stuttgart University. The process was initiated by the economic devel-
opment agency of the Stuttgart Region (WRS), where the idea was born in 
search for a mobilising project for the whole region. The WRS had a key 
role in the preparatory phase as it engaged local stakeholders and took the 
risk to finance and organise a platform for a regional process of delibera-
tion. Furthermore, one of its staff members became first director of the IBA 
agency. The IBA StadtRegion Stuttgart has four thematic priorities, address-
ing architectonic quality, functional mix, new technologies and the regional 
dimension (“Region ist Stadt und Stadt ist Region”) (WRS 2016, 9). It is 
composed of many individual projects spread all over the region with high 
engagement of the middle-sized cities around Stuttgart. Contrary to other 
IBAs such as IBA Emscher Park, the federal state only gives minor financial 
support, meaning that municipalities have to finance the showcase projects 
themselves or apply for other sources of co-funding such as EU-funds. The 
IBA process triggers a competition for innovative ideas between the munici-
palities and is a stimulus for starting projects even if they might not be ready 
until 2027 or not part of the official IBA-exhibition. Even though the big 
picture of the IBA is still blurry due to the thematic diversity, the process is 
inclusive taking all interested actors on board. In that sense it can be said 
that the initial idea of a large project that brings the region together and 
gives a positive impetus after years of controversies around Stuttgart 21 is 
working.
Regarding infrastructure, the region is currently involved in the construc-
tion of a high-performance broadband network via glass fibre cable and 
5G. This is seen as precondition for digitalisation and future competitive-
ness. The Regional Assembly has decided to appoint the WRS with the task 
to launch a joint tender in order to reach a common standard and equal 
framework conditions for all municipalities in the region. The WRS and the 
counties have joined forces. Each county has established a single-purpose 
association17 together with all interested municipalities. The task of the 
single-purpose associations is to prioritise areas within the county and to 
support the municipalities with planning data, advice and help regarding 
applications for funding. In addition, the Gigabit Region Stuttgart GmbH 
(GRS) created in 2019 coordinates the processes and has concluded a con-
tract with the telecommunication firm German Telekom regarding the 
broadband expansion in May 2019. High priority is set on the connection 
of business parks and industrial zones: according to the aims agreed on by 
the region and the Telekom, all of them shall be connected to glass fibre 
cable until 2025. 90% of the private households shall be connected up to 
2030. The step-by-step expansion is fixed in yearly plans in close coordina-
tion between Telekom, GRS, the single-purpose associations and the city of 
Stuttgart.
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4.3.2  Spatial relations within the metropolitan region of Stuttgart
The institutional perimeter of the Stuttgart Region is the dominant spa-
tial definition for the city-region (Fricke 2020, 158). There is a surprising 
spatial congruence of the various regionalisations, particularly concerning 
economic actors. The chamber districts correspond to the territory of the 
VRS and even the labour union IG Metall has adapted to this by appointing 
a regional spokesperson. The term “Stuttgart Region” is seen as unambigu-
ous and linked to a distinct territory and organisation; it is therefore also 
used for regional marketing. In contrast, the term “metropolitan region” is 
fuzzy and contested in its spatial outline and potential institutionalisation 
and therefore not used by local actors.
4.3.2.1  Institutional perimeters: Stuttgart Region in 
the multilevel system
The spatial dimension of the Stuttgart Region is based on county bounda-
ries. Its territory is composed of the county-exempt city of Stuttgart and 
the additional 178 municipalities of the five counties Böblingen, Esslingen, 
Göppingen, Ludwigsburg and Rems-Murr-Kreis. These county and munici-
pality boundaries have been a result of territorial reforms in the 1970s. 
Despite the mergers, the number of municipalities is still high and about 
two-thirds of the municipalities have less than 10,000 inhabitants. The city 
of Stuttgart itself has not been enlarged at that time in a deliberate decision 
of the federal state not to strengthen Stuttgart (Priebs 2019, 255). Four 
out of five counties of Stuttgart Region border the city of Stuttgart, but also 
extend far into the hinterland (see Figure 4.8).
Stuttgart Region is one of 12 planning regions in the federal state of Baden-
Württemberg. It does not transcend administrative borders, either of the 
federal state or of its government office of the region (Regierungspräsidium 
Stuttgart) (see Figure 4.9). This spatial delimitation has been fixed by fed-
eral legislation (Regionalverbandsgesetz from July 1971) and has not been 
altered since. Neither an extension nor reduction are likely to happen in 
the future either. Some municipal councils of rural municipalities on the 
edge of the region flirt with an exit with the argument to save costs and get 
rid of restrictive regulations of the regional plan, but are not pursuing this 
as a serious option. Leaving Stuttgart Region would only be possible if a 
municipality changes the county it belongs to with the consent of the federal 
state; this is seen as an entirely hypothetical scenario by local actors. Rather 
than changing the boundaries, the functional fit of the cooperation area is 
attained by variable geometries beyond and within the boundaries if needed 
(see 4.3.3).
The perimeter of the Stuttgart Region also corresponds to one regional 
plan. It is the middle layer in the hierarchical system of planning documents 
between the federal LEP and the local land use plans (see Table 4.6). The 
preparatory land use plans partly constitutes another level of inter-municipal 
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cooperation. In particular, the smaller municipalities within the Stuttgart 
Region have an inter-municipal FNP. In total, the Stuttgart Region is cov-
ered by 79 FNP. One of the larger examples of an inter-municipal FNP 
is the Planungsverband unteres Remstal (PUR) with five municipalities, 
whereas others only cover two municipalities (e.g. Verwaltungsgemeinschaft 
Welzheim/Kaisersbach). The German planning law has also introduced the 
Figure 4.9  Stuttgart in the multilevel system of Baden-Württemberg 2021 Concept: 





























































































































































































































































option of a regional FNP (see section 4.2 Frankfurt) but this is not in use 
in Stuttgart, because as land use planning is a municipal task it would have 
been necessary to directly involve the municipalities in decision-making, 
e.g. via a second chamber composed of mayors. The regional planners in 
Stuttgart argue that a regional FNP would not bring a considerable gain in 
control compared to a consistently applied regional plan. They see instead a 
risk to create a weaker instrument, because the mayors would most likely be 
less inclined to pass a restrictive regulation limiting their own development 
possibilities than the current regional assembly.
4.3.2.2  Morphological and functional definitions
Stuttgart Region covers a vast, heterogeneous area that is much larger than 
the continuously built-up space of the region. It includes rural areas, par-
ticularly in the northeast of the region. The continuously built-up space 
expands beyond the administrative borders of the city of Stuttgart. Due 
to its location in a basin surrounded by hilly terrain with forests, the set-
tlement extension is limited in the west and also to a limited degree in the 
south. Continuity exists along the transport axes of rail, roads and rivers, 
e.g. in the south east along the river Neckar. These interrelations and green 
cuts are taken up by the regional plan in order to structure the regional 
space.
The delimitation of German regional plans is supposed to follow a func-
tional logic by reflecting the areas of interdependence of the urban nodes 
with high centrality (Priebs 2019, 255). According to the regional planners 
themselves, the territory of the region does include the functional area of 
Stuttgart. Commuter flows decrease beyond the border. Boundary prob-
lems have existed in the past as some municipalities outside the region have 
benefitted from less restrictive planning rules in neighbouring regions and 
have been growing more, but this is not the case anymore. Although the 
perimeter was established in the 1970s and has not changed since then, 
the Stuttgart Region is still large enough in functional terms. The light rail 
train under the responsibility of VRS covers large parts of the region except 
the county Göppingen (connected by regional train) and less densely popu-
lated areas such as the eastern part of the county Rems-Murr. An extension 
beyond the region is under discussion and has already been the subject of 
feasibility studies, but has not been decided yet. A considerable part of the 
budget of the VRS is dedicated to investments into the light rail network. In 
2019, the VRS decided to buy new trains to enable a switch to 15-minute 
intervals (which is an investment of about 420 M€).
Intense connections to the surrounding urban nodes do exist, in particular 
with Tübingen, but also Heilbronn. Bosch, one of the manufacturing global 
companies and major employers in the region, has its headquarter in a small 
town near Heilbronn. The cities of Tübingen/Reutlingen, Pforzheim and 
Heilbronn (see Figure 4.9) have their own area of functional interdependence, 
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though overlapping with Stuttgart. Accordingly, the LEP 2002 dis-
plays them as part of a continuous agglomeration (Verdichtungsraum). 
Verdichtungsräume are defined as large areas of municipalities with settle-
ment density well above average (minimum 120% of federal state average) 
and intense internal commuter interdependences (75% of all commuters). 
The delimitation of spatial categories in the LEP is however not purely based 
on statistical indicators. In order to avoid patchworks, planning contexts 
and spatial proximity have been taken into account and local actors have 
been heard before the final definition (Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit 
und Tourismus Baden-Württemberg 2002, B8).
4.3.2.3  The evolving spatial definition of the metropolitan region
Stuttgart is one of the 11 city-regions labelled as a “European metropolitan 
region” by the Standing Conference of Federal and State Ministers respon-
sible for Spatial Planning (MKRO) (see 4.1). As the the Verband Region 
Stuttgart had already been created, a discussion (if not dispute) started 
whether the metropolitan region would be identical with the Stuttgart 
Region or not. The cartographic representation produced at the national 
level (see Figure 4.3, section 4.1) is schematic and leaves the spatial delimita-
tion mostly to the local level. The metro regions are depicted as hexagons. 
However, some of the larger cities are included in the map, suggesting that 
the cities of Heilbronn, Tübingen and Reutlingen would be part of the metro 
region, but not Pforzheim and Karlsruhe. The state plan LEP BW 2002 
picks up this definition by specifying that the European metropolitan region 
includes the agglomerations Stuttgart, Heilbronn and Reutlingen/Tübingen 
(Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Tourismus Baden-Württemberg 
2002). This means that the federal state had the position that the metro 
region should be interpreted larger than the planning regions and based on a 
functional definition as network of urban nodes, not on existing administra-
tive boundaries. Unlike the national spatial vision, the LEP is a binding plan 
that cannot be ignored by the lower planning levels. It sets specific objectives 
for each spatial category. In the case of the Europäische Metropolregion 
Stuttgart as well as the Verdichtungsraum Karlsruhe/Pforzheim, these are 
“development tasks” (Entwicklungsaufgaben) such as a better integra-
tion into national and international transport, energy and communication 
networks.
The federal definition has been picked up and reinterpreted from the 
bottom-up perspective of regional actors (VRS et al. 2003). The outline of 
the metro region was soon extended. The regions Nordschwarzwald and 
Ostwürttemberg joined the informal cooperation of planning regions dis-
cussing how to translate the stipulations of the LEP into their regional plans. 
The five regions (see Figure 4.9) have agreed upon the interpretation that 
the LEP roughly fixes a minimum extension but leaves the exact shape by 
purpose vague and thereby avoids to oblige or exclude any municipality 
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Figure 4.10  Imaginary of the metropolitan region © Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart and 
VRS 2019
(Europäische Metropolregion Stuttgart 2008, 4). They highlight the fuzzi-
ness of the spatial delimitation as well as the voluntary and network charac-
ter of cooperation within the European metropolitan region.
The planning regions were unwilling to draw an internal boundary 
between urban spaces that would belong to the metro region and rural 
parts that would be excluded (Klinkenberg 2010, 394). They there-
fore opted for a wider cooperation space formed by the entire regions 
Neckar-Alb, Nordschwarzwald, Heilbronn-Franken, Ostwürttemberg und 
Stuttgart (Europäische Metropolregion Stuttgart 2008, 5). However, their 
own representation used as a logo for the European metropolitan region 
(see Figure 4.10) shows that it has remained a juxtaposition of the former 
planning regions. It was in the end not possible to spatially redefine and 
institutionalise the metropolitan region on the basis of functional criteria. 
The federal requirement to create a larger cooperation space was reinter-
preted by the regional associations and adapted to their existing borders. 
The resulting potential soft cooperation space is heterogeneous concerning 
population density, but also with regard to the composition of the popu-
lation in terms of level of education and of non-German residents (Pütz 
2016, 552).
4.3.2.4  Sub-regional spaces and inter-municipal cooperation: 
Kommunaler Arbeitskreis Fildern (KAF)
Due to the large size of the Stuttgart Region and the existence of many 
small municipalities, a wide range of inter-municipal collaborations below 
the VRS exists. Apart from the counties, there is no systematic subdivision 
in subspaces covering the entire region. Inter-municipal cooperation takes 
place in weakly institutionalised working structures, mostly created for a 
single purpose. Some of them have a decades-long history even older than 
the region itself. Their continuity depends very much on personal relations 
of local politicians and mayors. Those small municipalities who have man-
aged to keep their independence during territorial reforms have fought for it 
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and tend to have a strong local identity. The decision to fulfil tasks together 
with other neighbouring municipalities is mainly motivated by financial 
constraints or a lack of know-how or has served as counter-argument 
against amalgamation. These small-scale inter-municipal structures have 
not become obsolete by the establishment of a strong city-regional level 
of governance because of the functional profile of the Stuttgart region (see 
4.3.1). Service provision for the citizens as well as local land use planning 
and urban development continue to be municipal tasks covered by their 
right of local self-government.
Beyond pragmatic reasons, some inter-municipal activities have a more 
strategic dimension and are based on the idea of a shared territory related 
to the landscape. One of them is Grüne Nachbarschaft north of Stuttgart 
around the city of Ludwigsburg. The cooperation has been initiated by a 
landscape architect in the 1990s. Its activities consist of inter-municipal land-
scape planning and the implementation of over 100 projects for ecological 
landscape design, water body renaturation, local recreation as well as envi-
ronmental education. One of the six member municipalities resigned in 2019 
after 23 years of membership despite a positive assessment by the administra-
tion and the mayor as well as many implemented projects. The decision was 
made by the municipal council over the course of the budgetary discussions. 
This example shows that this kind of voluntary inter-municipal cooperation 
depends on the commitment of individuals and how volatile it can be.
The most institutionalised example is the Kommunaler Arbeitskreis 
Fildern (KAF) in the Filder area south of Stuttgart, a plain with very fer-
tile soils. The KAF has been founded in 1967 and includes the munici-
palities of Filderstadt, Leinfelden-Echterdingen, Ostfildern, Denkendorf, 
Neuhausen and Steinenbronn as well as some quarters of the cities Stuttgart 
and Esslingen. It has a semi-formal structure based on a statute, a financial 
contribution of the member municipalities, a rotating chair, a board of may-
ors for decision-making and a purely advisory assembly with representa-
tives of the municipal councils. The main topics are landscape protection, 
a network of bicycle path, flood prevention and noise protection from the 
airport Stuttgart located in that area. The original common interest behind 
the association was to join forces in defence of a planned airport expan-
sion. Recently key principles for settlement development have become a 
topic because the area is confronted with high development pressure due 
to the trade fair and a new train station next to the airport (see 4.3.1). As a 
joint basis for discussion, KAF and VRS have commissioned a well-known 
architectural firm to carry out a study (“Filderstudie”, presented in autumn 
2018) assessing the additional demand triggered by the station and make 
propositions for the future development. The outcome has been debated, 
but it is up to each municipal council to draw conclusions and eventually 
take binding decisions. Some municipalities are in favour of a joint land use 
plan, but not all of them, meaning that the KAF will not be transformed into 
a planning association.
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4.3.3  Coordination of public policies beyond the perimeter 
of the Verband Region Stuttgart
It could be shown that the perimeter of the Stuttgart Region is widely used 
as a spatial reference for public policies. It is not fuzzy. Regional actors per-
ceive it as suitable for functions such as economic development and regional 
planning. The Stuttgart Region is a hard space with an inside-outside divide 
based on the logic of joint financing within the region. Topic-specific soft 
spaces within and beyond the perimeter of the region do exist, but there is 
no comprehensive strategy for a larger metropolitan area. In many of them, 
the VRS is a key actor who has initiated and enabled them due to its capaci-
ties, e.g. via preparatory studies, application for funding or by bringing dif-
ferent actors together.
4.3.3.1  Networks with variable geometries
The governance model of the VRS with a small core for strategic decisions 
combined with more flexible networks and semi-public limited liability 
companies for operational tasks enables the Verband Region Stuttgart to 
expand cooperation within those networks beyond the boundaries of the 
Stuttgart Region itself. Despite this potential flexibility, institutions expand-
ing beyond the region are rare due to an asymmetry of competences and 
resources between the VRS and the neighbouring regional associations 
as well as issues of co-financing. The VRS and its economic development 
agency WRS are shareholders of several limited liability companies with 
partners beyond the region: the biotechnology and medical technology clus-
ter BioRegion Stern, the regional marketing agency Regio Stuttgart and a 
temporal consortium for an inter-municipal gardening exhibition in the val-
ley of the river Rems.
 • BioRegion STERN Management GmbH: BioRegion STERN is a bio-
technology and medical technology cluster promoted together with the 
neighbouring Region Neckar-Alb (Tübingen). Its origin goes back as 
early as 2001 to a successful application in a competition of the Federal 
Ministry of Research (Benz 2003, 509; Priebs 2019, 257). Shareholders 
are the regional planning association Neckar-Alb as well as the cities 
Tübingen, Reutlingen, Stuttgart and Esslingen (see Table 4.5). The long-
standing cluster operates completely autonomously; shareholders receive 
an annual report, but are not involved in the day-to-day business.
 • Regio Stuttgart Marketing- und Tourismus GmbH: Tourism and city 
marketing activities of the region are organised together with the city 
of Stuttgart and include towns outside the region. Interested munici-
palities are organised in the association Regio Stuttgart Marketing- 
und Tourismus e.V. which holds the same share as VRS and city of 
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Stuttgart (each 32.4%). The number of municipalities has gradually 
grown to 43 and is open for new members. From the tourism perspec-
tive, Stuttgart is interpreted as a larger area or network of places of 
interest. The tourism marketing presents both the core city, attrac-
tions in the region and beyond such as castles or outlet centres. This 
cooperation functions well due to common interests (Beuttler-Bohn 
2017, 130).
 • Remstal Gartenschau: The inter-municipal gardening exhibition along 
the valley of the river Rems with 80 km from the source to the mouth 
took place between May and October 2019. The federal state had 
given its approval in 2010. Gardening exhibitions nominated by the 
federal level or the states are common practice in Germany since the 
1950s, but usually only one single municipality is entitled to apply. 
An inter-municipal cooperation is therefore a novelty (Beuttler-Bohn 
2017, 115) and would not have come about without the support of the 
VRS in the application and conception phase. The VRS has provided 
support in terms of content (idea and expertise), finance (co-financing 
of projects as part of its landscape park programme) and organisa-
tion (bringing the actors from different counties together). The part-
nership involves 16 municipalities and three counties as well as the 
VRS and private partners from the professional field of gardening and 
landscaping (organised in a society for the promotion of regional gar-
den shows, Förderungsgesellschaft für die BW-Landesgartenschauen 
mbH). One of the counties, Ostalbkreis, and five municipalities are 
not part of the Stuttgart Region. Each partner holds equal shares of 
the limited liability company responsible for running the gardening 
exhibition.
These examples established at different times with different members and 
topics show the logic of variable geometry. It is possible to involve partners 
from outside the region in concrete projects with a clear common interest 
that justifies the choice of partners. Partners mainly are cities on the edge 
of the region as well as neighbouring counties or regional associations as 
umbrella for smaller municipalities or co-financer. The organisation model 
as joint limited liability company allows for shared financing and a clear 
description of tasks and responsibilities. However, those examples have an 
exceptional character, whereas the large majority of activities of WRS and 
VRS as well their network of companies and associations operate within the 
area of the Stuttgart Region.
Small-scale inter-municipal partnerships across the border of the region 
also exist without involvement of the Stuttgart Region. These concern 
municipalities on the edge of the region. One example is the single-purpose 
association for drinking water supply Zweckverband Wasserversorgung 
Menzlesmühle formed by six municipalities.
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4.3.3.2  Europäische Metropolregion Stuttgart as additional 
layer of governance?
The concept of Europäische Metropolregion was meant to create a new 
mental geography (Blotevogel and Schmitt 2006, 61). The spatial definition 
of a wider metropolitan region beyond the Stuttgart Region at a national 
and federal level (see 4.3.2) raised the question of the appropriate form 
of governance for this new cooperation space and of the role of the VRS 
within it.
Stuttgart was labelled as Europäische Metropolregion in 1995 (see 4.1), 
shortly after creation of the VRS (see 4.3.1). The existing Verband Region 
Stuttgart saw itself as a legitimate institution to represent the metropolitan 
region and became its representative in the national network of metro regions 
IKM. This interpretation was challenged by the mayor of Stuttgart at the 
time, Wolfgang Schuster. The establishment of the European Metropolitan 
Region was accompanied by leadership conflicts to the extent that some cit-
ies and counties saw an opportunity here to pursue a municipally dominated 
form of regionalisation alongside the Verband Region Stuttgart in order not 
to further strengthen it (Zimmermann and Heinelt 2012, 106; Blatter 2008, 
159). Both started attempts to put the Europäische Metropolregion into 
practice. On one hand, the regional associations met and elaborated a joint 
strategy paper including potential fields of action (VRS et al. 2003, 9–10) 
as well as a regional development concept as basis for their regional plans 
(Europäische Metropolregion Stuttgart 2008; Zimmermann 2011, 204). On 
the other hand, the Mayor of Stuttgart invited from July 2005 on repre-
sentatives of the larger cities to the so-called Steering Committee “Schuster-
Runde” (Fricke 2020, 164). Some cities within Stuttgart Region (Esslingen, 
Ludwigsburg, Sindelfingen) did not join the committee, because they did not 
wish to weaken the VRS. The informal network met quarterly and set up 
thematic working groups on “tourism and marketing”, “science and educa-
tion”, “business and innovation” and “Neckar as a connecting link”. The 
purpose was to develop concrete project proposals, but the network was 
unable to act because it lacked competences for key projects with regional 
relevance such as the trade fair or Stuttgart 21 (see 4.3.1) and was unable to 
solve distribution conflicts concerning costs (Klinkenberg 2010, 394–397).
Leadership conflicts between the mayor of Stuttgart and the director of 
the Stuttgart Region were settled in 2007 by the newly elected president of 
VRS Thomas Bopp. The result of the compromise is a coordinative com-
mittee involving both parties; it is hosted by the VRS and chaired by the 
mayor of Stuttgart. However, the involved actors had a low interest in the 
new model from the beginning and voluntary cooperation reached its lim-
its (Klinkenberg 2010, 396–398; Zimmermann 2011, 204; Zimmermann 
and Heinelt 2012, 106). The committee still exists today, but has not met 
regularly for several years (Beuttler-Bohn 2017, 98). Interviewees state 
that a joint ticket for regional transport called “Metropolticket” as its 
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only concrete output. It was introduced in January 2012 and involves nine 
transport associations (see Figure 4.11). The savings for the users are not 
huge,18 but it contributes to a metro-regional identity, because travellers 
from Tübingen or Esslingen to Heilbronn, for example, now feel that they 
are travelling “in the metropolitan region”. Yet, the area of validity is not 
entirely identical with the spatial dimension defined as metro region (see 
Figure 4.9): the north of the region Heilbronn-Franken is not included and 
it stretches more to the south beyond the border of the region Neckar-Alb. 
The current mayor of Stuttgart, Kuhn, was not pushing the cooperation in 
the early years of his tenure, but has relaunched it in 2019 by initiating a 
Figure 4.11  Area of validity of the Metropolticket © Verkehrsministerium Baden- 
Württemberg
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regional conference concerning mobility which took place in January 2019 
under the label of Europäische Metropolregion Stuttgart. Yearly metropoli-
tan conferences as forums for discussions are planned for the future.
All in all, in terms of functions, territory and governance, the Europäische 
Metropolregion has remained vague and fuzzy. The concept was not able to 
challenge the Stuttgart Region as the key player for the coordination of pub-
lic policies. The struggle about the appropriate form of governance for the 
European metro region has, however, tied up political forces of the Stuttgart 
Region for several years and therefore rather hampered its institutional 
development (Blatter 2008, 159). Single-topic cooperation beyond the core 
of Stuttgart Region exists on a case-by-case basis, though not necessarily 
under the label of the metropolitan region (see above). None of the existing 
activities exactly covers the territory of the five regions defined as coopera-
tion space (see Figure 4.8). The area is considered as being too heteroge-
neous and too big to specify common interests and projects (Interviews; 
see also Priebs 2019, 262). Another argument put forward against the 
European metropolitan region as an additional layer is that the multilevel 
system is already complex and that there are not enough topics left for yet 
another level between a strong federal state and a strong Stuttgart Region. 
A range of networks do already exist at the scale of the federal state Baden-
Württemberg such as a working group of the 12 regional planning associa-
tions (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Regionalverbände AGRV) or a network of 
planners as part of the Association of German Cities (Deutscher Städtetag). 
These are not the forums to discuss metro-regional issues, but the profes-
sional exchange and personal contacts make it easier to address the relevant 
actors if necessary.
4.4  Interpretation and conclusion: the steady relevance 
of city-regions
From a general point of view, not much has changed in the way the govern-
ance of city-regions is handled in Germany. Local government and regional 
policies are largely in the hands of the states and even in the states city-
regional governance is decentralised and context-specific, voluntary rather 
than imperative (Heinelt and Zimmermann 2016). The state governments 
intervene from time to time (Stuttgart in the 1990s and 2015, Frankfurt/
Rhine-Main in the early 2000s and 2018) but as the case of Frankfurt/Rhine-
Main demonstrates this is rather a definition of procedures and frameworks 
but not necessarily a clear functional prescription. In the case of Frankfurt/
Rhine-Main, despite the statutory planning functions, local governments 
have to fill the institutional voids that are defined in the law for so-called 
regional key tasks. In the case of Stuttgart, the state government intervened 
regarding the distribution of functions between the counties and the VRS.
On the other hand, Germany has a long tradition and rich experience with 
inter-municipal cooperation, in particular in city-regions. Inter-municipal 
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associations (Planungs- und Regionalverbände) are quite common but dif-
fer in strength and with regard to the functions. In many city-regions, they 
are an implementation instrument for the more effective and cost-efficient 
provision of public services of general interest but in some cases (such as 
Stuttgart), the regional associations are stronger in terms of organisational 
autonomy and combine different functions. These very flexible systems are 
usually under control of the member municipalities. The inter-municipal 
associations are financially as well as politically dependent. Direct election 
such as in Stuttgart Region is a rare exception and even in that case, the 
financial contribution for any additional tasks depends on the municipali-
ties. German city-regions may have own revenues in terms of fees for ser-
vice provision, but no own taxes. The core cities do have a crucial role for 
decision-making within the city-regions; however, the mayors of the core 
city are not the heads of the city-regional associations.
Economisation of city-regional governance has happened but most of 
the associations are responsible for reproduction functions and planning. 
Historically they have been created to solve coordination problems of large 
agglomerations such as congestion, sprawl, environmental problems and 
inefficient service provision. Joint external representation and international 
marketing of the city-region have gained importance, but the big cities and 
their mayors continue to be relevant players in that regard. Transport is a 
task that is usually organised separately (Verkehrsverbünde) with Stuttgart 
being an exception. Counties and county-exempt cities are still main actors, 
being responsible for the bulk of public policies. Inter-municipal coopera-
tion is widely spread, both in form of single- and multi-purpose associa-
tions, but mostly for smaller areas than the entire city-region.
A specific German phenomenon is the emergence of multi-scaled arrange-
ments (e.g. Köln/Bonn) and larger scale cooperation areas (European metro-
politan regions in Germany). This means that larger soft cooperation spaces 
have been added to persisting regional associations. Both have been identical 
only in a few regions such as Rhine-Neckar. The approach is an effort of a 
joint strategy for metropolitan regions by the ministers for spatial planning. 
This is an invitation to regional actors to find solutions, partly picked up by 
specific aims for those areas in state plans (LEP). But it does not constitute 
a specific institutional model.
Consolidation pressures do exist but city-regions are not the hotspots 
of state-modernisation or territorial and functional reforms. Nevertheless, 
reforms such as in the Ruhr may happen. The introduction of the direct 
election in the Ruhr indicates a return to the metro model. However, there 
is hardly any nationwide trend visible.
4.4.1  Comparison of Stuttgart and Frankfurt/Rhine-Main
Stuttgart and Frankfurt/Rhine-Main represent the two poles in a wide spec-
trum of city-regional governance. In both city-regions, regional planning 
254 Germany 
authorities are in a way the organisational core of a broader governance 
arrangement, but the planning authority Region Stuttgart is stronger in 
terms of functions (mobility) and legitimacy. Frankfurt displays the principle 
of variegated cooperation (different formats and actor constellations) and 
the municipalities still hesitate to hand over more functions. Nevertheless, 
over the last years trust in the planning authority has risen and the authority 
became a partner of more and more networks and initiatives. Both are by 
and large seen as satisfactory governance solutions by local actors. Thus, 
they rather represent effective metropolitan governance among German 
city-regions whereas some other regions have remained even more frag-
mented than Frankfurt/Rhine-Main with a weaker degree of integration and 
coordinated action.
In terms of institutional ideas, Stuttgart is closer to the metropolitan 
reform model. It is a multi-purpose organisation with directly elected assem-
bly and there is also a high degree of territorial coherence for most of the 
functions, though with low financial autonomy. It is also important to point 
out that it has a very lean organisational core, combined with semi-auton-
omous agencies. The planning authority Frankfurt/Rhine-Main is different 
in this regard. Opportunistic cooperation is an appropriate description. The 
law has been amended and so-called regional key functions have been added 
but the planning authority is more a moderator and shares regional policy 
with many other organisations. Over the last decade, the planning authority 
established different working relationships with these initiatives.
Also, in terms of spatial relations, the two regions differ. Frankfurt/
Rhine-Main is a large polycentric area that crosses the borders of three fed-
eral states. The territory of the planning region has been adapted in 2001 (75 
instead of 43) and in 2021 (five new municipalities) and cuts across county 
boundaries (see Figure 4.6). Stuttgart region is even larger in terms of sur-
face and population (see Table 4.1). However, its territory fits into the hier-
archy of territorial authorities in the sense that is cuts neither across county 
boundaries nor across state boundaries and is one of 12 regional planning 
regions covering the state of Baden-Württemberg. Stuttgart is by far the 
biggest city in the city-region, but is surrounded by self-confident medium-
sized cities. The number of municipalities in the region is much larger than 
in Frankfurt/Rhine-Main as municipalities in Baden-Württemberg are on 
average smaller. The spatial delimitation both of counties and planning 
regions was set by the state in the 1970s and never altered since. Stuttgart 
region has become a common spatial reference for local actors. The rigid-
ity is not seen as problematic, first because it is perceived as pertinent for 
regional planning by the regional planners themselves and second, because 
the organisational model allows to form subspaces or integrate external 
actors for specific topics and projects if necessary. Varying cooperation 
spaces are, however, the exception in Stuttgart region whereas they are the 
norm in Frankfurt/Rhine-Main due to the principle of variegated coopera-
tion. In Frankfurt/Rhine-Main, it is a question for open debate for each 
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regional task if the planning region is the suitable area and format to take 
care of it.
With regard to the second layer of European metropolitan region in 
Germany, both are similar with 14,753 km² (Frankfurt/Rhine-Main) and 
15,425 km² (Stuttgart). However, this spatial configuration is more mean-
ingful in Frankfurt/Rhine-Main because it facilitates cooperation across the 
borders of the federal states. Even though it is a very weak, voluntary mecha-
nism, the delimitation of the EMR Stuttgart is bound to pre-existing bound-
aries of counties and regional planning associations. This has prevented the 
creation of a meaningful space of action, because the EMR Stuttgart formed 
by five planning regions (see Figure 4.9) is too heterogeneous and has trou-
ble formulating common interests and priorities. The marketing activities of 
the economic development agency WRS clearly focus on Stuttgart Region 
and not on the EMR, because the region is seen as a known brand and less 
ambiguous in terms of space and institution.
In terms of functions, there are some similarities between the two 
regions. In both, spatial planning (the regional plan in case of Stuttgart and 
the regional land use plan in case of Frankfurt) and landscape planning, 
regional landscape parks, economic development and marketing, external 
representation, digitisation, wind energy and large cultural or sports events 
are regional tasks. In Stuttgart, the portfolio also includes regional pub-
lic transport, tourism and the trade fare. In Frankfurt, culture is a more 
prominent task with three complementary initiatives at the city-regional 
scale. The German city-regions are more open for economic development 
purposes and this applies for Stuttgart in particular. In Stuttgart, however, 
economic development and marketing are main tasks of a regional develop-
ment agency (WRS), not of the VRS itself, but both are closely interrelated 
and steered by the regional council. In Frankfurt, economic development is 
less concentrated in one agency but accomplished by a mix of operational 
agencies and lobby organisations.
In both cases, we find continuous and flexible adaptations of existing 
legal frameworks and institutions. Adaptations in the case of Stuttgart 
Region have been minor, mainly affecting a few additional competences 
and topics as well as projects-based initiatives (IBA). But overall, the insti-
tutional arrangement has been very stable since the creation of the VRS in 
1994. Over the last decades, the Frankfurt region was more in a flux, includ-
ing spatial adjustments.
Notes
1 Most eastern federal states reduced the number of counties in the middle of the 
1990s (Heinelt and Egner 2011, 110).
2 MORO “Überregionale Partnerschaften in grenzüberschreitende Verflec-
htungsräumen” 2008 with Lake Constance (see Harrison and Growe 2014, 36) 
and MORO IMeG 2011–2013 with four project areas.
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3 Do not exist in Schleswig-Holstein, Saarland, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Lower Saxony (abolished in 2004) as well as in the three 
city-states.
4 “Die frühe Selbstbezeichnung als Metropolregion, die erfolgreiche Etablierung 
der Metropolregion als ‘Marke’ sowie die klare Ausrichtung auf große 
Leitprojekte und eine gemeinsame Olympia-Bewerbung sind klare Indikatoren 
für eine solche Governance-Form.”
5 The Forum brings together ten chambers of commerce from Southern Hesse, 
the region of Mainz and Worms in Rhineland-Palatinate and the region of 
Aschaffenburg in Bavaria.
6 The full title of the law of 19.12.2000 (in force since 2001) is: Gesetz zur 
Stärkung der kommunalen Zusammenarbeit im Ballungsraum Frankfurt/Rhein-
Main, in short: Ballungsraumgesetz.
7 The increase by five municipalities happened only in April 2021.
8 https://strategieforum -frankfurtrheinmain .de.
9 Darüber hinaus hat er die Mitwirkungsbefugnis an der Wahrnehmung der 
Ballungsraumaufgaben nach § 1 MetropolG sowie die Möglichkeit, sich 
an regionalbedeutsamen Angelegenheiten zu beteiligen (§ 8 MetropolG), 
erhalten.
10 The strategy was adapted in 2020-21; projects supported by the fonds cover now 
a broader spectrum.
11 This economic development agency comprises 203 municipalities, 12 counties, 
five chambers of commerce, two chambers of craft, the Association of Hesse 
Enterprises (Vereinigung der hessischen Unternehmerverbände), seven research 
centres, Fraport (the company owning Frankfurt airport) and some other 
infrastructure companies in the region (http://www. region -frankfurt -rhein 
main .de/).
12 At the outset, the main aim was limited to “attracting investments and inform 
about available industrial real estate and office space in the region” (Hoyler et al. 
2006, 130).
13 Baden-Württemberg has in total nine county excempt cities, namely Baden-
Baden, Freiburg im Breisgau, Heidelberg, Heilbronn, Karlsruhe, Mannheim, 
Pforzheim, Stuttgart and Ulm. With the exception of Baden-Baden, all of them 
have more than 100,000 inhabitants.
14 Gesetz über die Errichtung des Verbands Region Stuttgart vom 7. Februar 
1994.
15 Regional planning authorities usually have about five to ten employees and their 
financial resources are strictly limited to their regional planning tasks.
16 The protest coalition organised weekly demonstrations with several thousands 
of participants starting in 2006, which escalated in September 2010 between 
police and protestors, when the north wing of the old station was torn down. 
Pictures of violence against protestants caught nationwide attention. Despite 
the vehement protests, a majority of citizens voted for the project in a state-
wide referendum held in November 2011 and obliged the Green party to con-
tinue with the megaproject notwithstanding their own opposition (Nagel and 
Satoh 2019).
17 Zweckverband Breitbandausbau Landkreis Böblingen, Zweckverband 
Breitbandversorgung Landkreis Esslingen, Zweckverband Gigabit Landkreis 
Göppingen, Zweckverband Kreisbreitband Ludwigsburg, Zweckverband 
Breitbandausbau Rems-Murr.
18 A day ticket for the metropolitan region costs 21€ compared to 24€ for regional 
transport in the entire state Baden-Württtemberg.
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5
After the presentation of six city-regional case studies and the internal com-
parison of the two cases per country in Chapters 2 to 4, we draw conclu-
sions about the drivers of reforms and the results in terms of institutions, 
functions and spatial relationships by making a cross-country comparison. 
This includes national policy frameworks in a cross-country perspective as 
well as a comparison of the six case studies.
National frameworks and administrative cultures continue to matter for 
metropolitan governance due to different state structures (federal, regional-
ised, unitary), socio-economic development paths and country-specific dis-
courses on state modernisation and spatial development policies. Besides 
the relevance of national frameworks, the empirical evidence shows regional 
differences within nation states as well as similarities across country bound-
aries, e.g. regarding the issue of the direct election of the metropolitan coun-
cil. The fact that European city-regions are well connected to each other 
via institutionalised networks, personal contacts and shared experiences 
contributes to these cross-national similarities. However, despite this travel-
ling of ideas and shared challenges of European city-regions, there are only 
weak signs of homogenisation of city-regional governance across the three 
countries and six case study regions.
5.1  Institutions
The selected case studies all have an institutionalised city-regional authority 
but only in Italy are these institutions mentioned in the constitution, because 
they substituted for an existing jurisdiction. This substitution also happened 
in Lyon as the métropole gained the status of a département. The three other 
metropolitan institutions are additional levels added to the multi-level sys-
tem without replacing the second tier of local government.
In Germany, the term “region” is used in a variety of ways and it is com-
mon to call city-regional institutions “region”, whereas the French régions 
and Italian regione are higher level governments and more comparable to 
the German state governments. Thus, “region” in the German terminology 
refers to much smaller entities (city-regions or metropolitan regions) than 
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in the European understanding (Fricke 2020a, 155; Wahl 1998, 210). In 
contrast to France and Italy, regions exist in formal terms only as statutory 
planning regions for regional planning (see Figure 4.5) and as government 
offices of the regions (Regierungsbezirke), i.e. regional branches of the state 
governments (often also referred to also as “districts”) (Zimmermann 2017, 
254). The term “region” is also used for informal formats of cooperation 
such as the agglomeration concept Cologne/Bonn producing a spatial image 
of the region or within the funding programme REGIONALE in North-
Rhine Westphalia (Reimer 2012). The terms “città metropolitana” and 
“métropole” are more clear in the sense that they refer to a distinct insti-
tutional form framed by national laws. However, the French term “métro-
pole” existed before these laws and is linked to specific connotations and 
imaginations of a city, and is not only used to signify the legal institution. To 
increase the ambiguity further, some municipal groupings without the legal 
status of a métropole use it as a name (e.g. CU Angers Loire Métropole or 
even CA Châteauroux Métropole) to underpin the relevance of the respec-
tive city-region.
Compared to the history of the modern nation states, metropolitan 
authorities are relatively recent phenomena, in particular when compared 
to the second tier of local government in France and Italy. Their raison 
d’être depends much on their performance and the need for city-regional 
solutions. In France, the métropoles have gradually evolved and are now a 
crucial institution for the provision of many public services. Thus, it is dif-
ficult to imagine that their reason for existing will be questioned again, or 
that they will be abolished and their functions redistributed to other levels 
of the state. It is more likely that more tasks from municipalities and dépar-
tements will be assigned to them and the question is rather to what extent 
the partly criticised power concentration will continue and how horizontal 
and multi-layered cooperation will be institutionalised in the future.
The two German cases, Stuttgart region and Frankfurt/Rhine-Main 
region, have stabilised and have gained a good reputation among munici-
palities and counties as useful service providers and moderators. Because of 
the performance of the current arrangements that are able to deal at least 
with some of the city-regional issues, both regional authorities are not likely 
to vanish. In the future, it may happen that they extend their role as core 
institutions and/or moderators at the city-regional level slightly, if the state 
governments or local actors assign additional tasks. However, municipali-
ties and counties defend their constitutional right of local self-government 
and give the subsidiarity principle and proximity to the citizens as reasons. 
Thus, in both cases, the regional authorities have to prove that the city-
region is the more appropriate level for problem-solving. In Italy, the CM 
are quite young compared to the other metropolitan authorities in Europe 
and are still building their reputation, mainly via strategic planning instru-
ments. Performances differ and for future development, it will be decisive 
how they fill the niche between the cities and the regions.
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The question of whether city-regions increased in relevance as institu-
tional sites of problem-solving or service provision can be answered posi-
tively for all the six case studies but there is certainly variation. They have 
some autonomy vis-à-vis higher levels of government as well as vis-à-vis 
local authorities, and partly meet the criteria of adequate financial (and 
human) resources and significant powers to intervene in metropolitan 
affairs (Demazière and Sykes 2020b, 199). Financial autonomy is highest 
in the case of the French métropoles with a share of direct tax income (see 
Table 5.1). Political legitimacy by direct election has been established only 
in Stuttgart Region (since 1994) and the Métropole de Lyon (since 2020). 
Both are exceptions in their national contexts and became possible due to 
a window of opportunity. With regard to leadership, three out of six presi-
dents of metropolitan authorities are mayors of the core city (in Italy pre-
scribed by national law). The reason for this double position is on one hand 
to synchronise the policy of the core city and the metropolitan authority and 
on the other hand to have a powerful leader who is able to defend the inter-
ests of the city-region, e.g. in negotiations with higher levels. In Italy, this is 
also a measure to save expenditure as the position of the head of the second 
tier (former province) no longer exists. In France, being mayor of a large city 
used to be the foundation of many national political careers (see 2.2.1). In 
Germany, the argument to avoid the coupling of the position as president 
of a regional authority and mayor is that it would harm the role as neutral 
moderator within the region by accentuating the dominance of the core city. 
In the case of the Frankfurt/Rhine-Main region, the current director of the 
planning authority is a former mayor of a medium-sized town adjacent to 
Frankfurt/ Main.
Regarding budget and staff, Table 5.1 shows striking contrasts. As the 
city-regional authorities have different sources of income (including tem-
porary funding) and assets, these global numbers have to be interpreted 
with caution to avoid misunderstandings and can only be compared in a 
differentiated way by looking in detail into the budgets and staff schemes. 
The lion’s share of the budget of Stuttgart region for example is dedicated 
to public transport (90%, including the purchase of new light rail trains, 
see 4.3.1); after subtracting this budget position, the difference between the 
budgets of Stuttgart and Frankfurt/Rhine-Main region appears less signifi-
cant. Still, the figures give an impression of the strength and performance of 
the city-regional authorities and the rough indication of whether a hundred 
(or less) or several thousand employees work for an organisation gives a 
clue to the functional relevance of a city-regional institution. Some explana-
tions are related to the distribution of functions (see 5.2). The huge discrep-
ancy points to the role of the institution, meaning if it is mainly strategic 
and coordinative and therefore less cost-intensive or also operational and 
managerial. This difference determines the budget and influences what kind 
of staff are needed to fulfil these functions. To give an example, the seven 
pôles de proximité of Nantes Métropole have about 200 employees each 
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and deal e.g. with the maintenance of municipal streets, and include the 
construction teams that repair potholes (see 2.2.1). The provinces and città 
metropolitane in Italy had to make a significant contribution to the fiscal 
consolidation of the Italian public sector in 2015, 2016 and 2017 and this 
hampered the start the of città metropolitane as strategic planning agencies 
(Corte dei Conti 2020).
The human resources also point to the position in the multilayer sys-
tem. The CMs are former provinces and kept part of their staff along with 
the tasks (provincial streets, schools and planning in particular). French 
métropoles have taken on staff from the municipalities or even merged both 
administrations in the case of Nantes. The administration of Lyon is ever 
larger, because it includes a substantial number of employees transferred 
from the Département Rhône (see 2.3.1). In Stuttgart region and the region 
Frankfurt/Rhein-Main, this kind of transfer has not taken place. Rather 
than partly replacing counties and municipalities, these regional associa-
tions fulfil additional strategic tasks with the aim of increasing coordina-
tion of public policies and public-private initiatives. Both organisations are 
in principle planning authorities, a public policy that is less cost-intensive 
compared to social housing, urban regeneration, public transport or main-
tenance of school buildings. The balance between county-exempt cities and 
regional authorities in Germany in terms of functions, territory and finances 
is completely different than that between French core cities and métropoles: 
as an example, Frankfurt/Rhine-Main region has less than 1% of the budget 
and staff of the city of Frankfurt/Main, whereas the budget of the city of 
Lyon is less than one-quarter that of the métropole and it has slightly less 
staff (Demazière et al. 2022). In order to give a more balanced picture of the 
weakness of German regional authorities in terms of staff and budget (see 
Table 5.1) we need to take into consideration that German county-exempt 
cities (such as Frankfurt, Stuttgart) are bigger in terms of territory (due to 
annexations that happened decades ago) than their Italian and French coun-
ter parts. Hence, the French métropoles are in a way a functional equivalent 
of German county-exempt cities.
These numbers also point to different ways to organise the functions. 
Stuttgart region can be seen as prototype of a lean organisation with the 
core task of regional planning. Many other tasks, including economic devel-
opment or tourism, are organised in limited liability companies (GmbH) 
and the regional authority is a significant shareholder. The directly elected 
regional assembly supervises these partnerships and takes strategic deci-
sions, but they operate autonomously at arm’s length distance and also have 
their own budget (see 4.3.1). In Bologna, the administrations of the CM and 
the core city collaborate closely (joined offices), although not as closely as 
in Nantes, where mergers took place. This is primarily done for reasons of 
cost-efficiency. This phenomenon of close administrative ties between the 
regional authority and the core city is not observable in Germany, where the 
two bodies keep a distance.
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Looking at the evolution of city-regional policies in the six city-regional 
cases and three countries, we rather see context-specific institutional solu-
tions how to organise metropolitan governance than convergence towards 
a unified model. Recent changes in France are not path-breaking changes 
but show a pattern of management of adaptations. This applies also to 
Italy although the introduction of the città metropolitana changed much 
in terms of legitimacy and territorial political representation of the second 
tier of local government. France shows a sequence of adaptations and com-
plementary measures with regard to the creation of new city-regions, their 
size and functional portfolio. In Germany, we see a decentralised and non-
uniform way of dealing with problems of metropolitan development. The 
governance arrangements that emerged in different city-regions at different 
moments in time are specific to the local context, but are also influenced by 
the respective Zeitgeist.
5.2  Functions
The repartition of functions in the multi-level system differs among the fed-
eral state of Germany, the regionalised state of Italy and the unitary state 
of France. The German city-regions Stuttgart and Frankfurt/Rhine-Main 
have a rather narrow functional profile compared to the responsibilities of 
the local governments and the Länder and therefore cannot be regarded 
as representing a full-fledged level of public administration. This is differ-
ent in Lyon and Nantes, where the métropoles have broader tasks. French 
métropoles are as powerful as régions and have gained problem-solving 
capacities at the expense of départements and municipalities in the last dec-
ade. The Italian CM Bologna and Florence are somehow in an intermediate 
position between a hollowed-out province and a city-regional agency for 
strategic planning. Compared to the former province, expectations are high 
with regard to strategic coordination of socio-economic development. Note 
that in France, the definition of functions and roles for the métropole was 
negotiated by the municipalities, the existing CU and the départements. In 
Italy the functional profile of the CM was rather decided top down by the 
regional governments.
In many policy fields, the city-regional institutions in all three countries 
do not have exclusive functions, but share them with other levels, in particu-
lar with the local governments. Therefore, close coordination is needed. The 
German regions represent a specific case as they use a range of collaborative 
arrangements with public and private actors and this makes them appear 
larger than they are.
Across our six cases, there are some policy fields addressed by all city-
regions. All regions are meant to coordinate the spatial development 
through different kinds of strategic and statutory spatial plans. The CMs 
Firenze and Bologna are responsible for the Piano Strategico Metropolitano, 
the Piano Territoriale Metropolitano and a city-regional mobility plan. The 
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métropoles Lyon and Nantes have established the inter-municipal land use 
plan PLUi and have approved the strategic SCoT. Stuttgart Region has the 
responsibility for the statutory regional plan and Frankfurt/Rhine-Main 
region for a regional land use plan (regionaler FNP), the latter replacing 
the regional plan and municipal preparatory land use plans. Both authori-
ties are also responsible for landscape plans. In contrast to the French 
métropoles and Frankfurt/Rhine-Main region, local land use planning has 
remained a municipal task in Stuttgart and the Italian cases. However, in 
both city-regions, Florence and Bologna, inter-municipal land use plans are 
getting more and more relevant. Inter-municipal land use planning is pos-
sible according to national law in Germany as well, but rarely takes place 
for more than two or three municipalities. All six city-regions accomplish 
mobility planning (though to different degrees with the mobility concept of 
Frankfurt/Rhein-Main being the document with the lowest binding quality). 
Stuttgart region is also responsible for intermodal mobility and regional 
trains (S-Bahn), whereas in France this is a task accomplished by the région. 
In the Italian city-regions, mobility is a pressing issue but the task is shared 
among the CM, the regions, the municipalities and transport providers. 
Compared to the former province, the sustainable mobility concept has 
gained more weight and this finds repercussions in national regulations that 
make city-regional sustainable mobility plans (SUMPs) more or less obliga-
tory. This is not the case in the German city-regions. The case of Bologna 
demonstrates how the combination of strategic planning, sustainable mobil-
ity policy and national funding dominates the agenda.
All city-regions plan or manage some infrastructure of city-regional 
importance, e.g. the trade fair in the case of Stuttgart region and, as a more 
recent phenomenon, they are in charge of the expansion of digital infra-
structure, broadband access in particular (Frankfurt, Stuttgart). The French 
métropoles and German regional authorities also carry out functions related 
to competitiveness, such as tourism and city-regional marketing as well as 
economic development. In Italy, coordination of socio-economic develop-
ment is the core task as defined by the law but remains vague in operational 
terms. The Métropole de Lyon and Stuttgart Region are particularly active 
regarding external representation and marketing, including a European liai-
son office in Brussels. The planning authority Frankfurt/Rhein-Main has 
a liaison office in Brussels which is still part of the planning authority but 
serves the whole metropolitan region. Bologna participated in a high num-
ber of European projects (URBACT, ESPON, Partnerships of the EU Urban 
Agenda).
Along with strategic planning and functions related to competitiveness, 
the city-regional level is also relevant for reproduction functions. French 
métropoles provide a broad range of services of general interest including 
electricity, heating networks, gas, waste management, water distribution 
and wastewater treatment, cemeteries and crematoria, slaughterhouses and 
wholesale markets, fire brigade and charging devices for electric vehicles. 
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These services are usually not implemented at the city-regional level in 
Germany but are the responsibilities of the county-exempt cities and coun-
ties or delivered by inter-municipal single-purpose associations for a few 
neighbouring municipalities. This difference can be explained by the small 
size of French municipalities. In Italy, the picture is more mixed and even-
tually the general hollowing out of the provincial level is more relevant in 
this regard. The purpose of the CM, according to the law, is one of strategic 
planning and coordination of territorial development and not one of provi-
sion of technical infrastructure and services for water or energy supply. Still, 
the CM are responsible for provincial streets (and some regional streets) and 
secondary schools.
No or very limited functions related to social policy, education and 
health are carried out by the studied CM, regional authorities in Germany 
or Nantes Métropole. The Métropole de Lyon is an exception in this regard, 
also compared to all other French métropoles, because its status as a dépar-
tement includes various functions related to social policy as well as for 
the secondary schools for grades 6–9 (collèges). In all cases, culture and 
sports are only targeted when related to festivalisation, i.e. large events as 
well as sites of regional or even national importance (stadiums). To name 
a few examples, Stuttgart Region applied to host the Olympic Games 2012 
(without success) and Nantes Métropole is responsible for the football sta-
dium (one of the arenas for the world championship 1998) and the opera 
house. These activities contribute in a way to city-regional competitiveness, 
whereas infrastructure for local neighbourhoods, such as sports fields, are 
built and maintained by the municipalities in all six cases. Cooperation in 
cultural policies is a specific development in the Frankfurt/Rhine-Main area 
and is much more pronounced than in the other city-regions.
A difference between Germany on the one side and France and Italy on 
the other is the openness to a combination of different forms of city-regional 
cooperation in different sectors. There is not just one organisation, but a 
mix of different organisational forms and in the case of Frankfurt these sec-
tor-specific organisational forms also refer to different spatial scales. That 
is to say, place-based and sectoral principles compete in Frankfurt more 
strongly than in the other regions.
In our six case study regions, we can observe that more functions have 
been shifted to the city-regional level and that the fields of activity have 
become broader. This is most pronounced in France. The shift of responsibili-
ties from municipalities to the inter-municipal level is a decades-long process 
that has not ended yet. More recently, some (Nantes) or all (Lyon) functions 
of the départements have been shifted to métropoles as well, further increas-
ing the relevance of this level of the state. In Bologna and Florence, the CM 
have gained strategic planning functions. However, the CM have also lost 
substantial functions, in particular environmental planning. In Stuttgart, the 
repartition of functions between counties and region was an issue at the 
beginning of 2010. As an outcome, Stuttgart Region has gained additional 
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functions regarding public transport (express busses). However, the counties 
as such were not put into question and in contrast to the French départe-
ments or the Italian provinces it is unlikely that this will happen in the near 
future. The regional assembly of Stuttgart Region has also adopted an action 
programme for housing, without having formal responsibility in the field. 
Frankfurt/Rhine-Main region adopted additional tasks in 2018 including an 
energy concept and a digitalisation strategy for the region.
The shift of functions to the city-regional level can take place in a top-
down manner by national or in the case of the federal state Germany by 
state law, or in a bottom-up manner by voluntary transfer of member 
municipalities. In case of the two Italian city-regions Bologna and Florence, 
all responsibilities have been defined by regional law, within the framework 
of a national law. In the French city-regions Nantes and Lyon, the bundle 
of functions is the result of a combination of the minimum requirements for 
all métropoles defined by the national law and additional responsibilities 
transferred by member municipalities. The same principle of a mix of top-
down and bottom-up definition of tasks also applies for Stuttgart region. 
However, there is no national framework law, but instead a federal law 
of the state Baden-Württemberg regarding the creation of Stuttgart region. 
In the case of Frankfurt/Rhine-Main, the state sets tasks that have to be 
addressed regionally, either by the planning authority or another volun-
tary arrangement. This represents the most flexible approach, as local actors 
negotiate about the most suitable arrangements regarding institutional form 
and spatial dimensions.
We can observe a heterogeneity of functions within the city-regions in one 
country, meaning that functions can be adapted to local needs. The diversity 
is most pronounced in Germany due to a lack of a national framework for 
all German city-regions. But also in the unitary state France, there are vari-
ations between the functions of the métropoles, even more than between the 
città metropolitane in the regionalised state of Italy. This can be explained 
by the long trajectory of inter-municipal groupings in France before the 
transformation into métropoles took place, which was strongly shaped by 
the local context. In Italy on the other hand, CM are transformed prov-
inces with a defined set of uniform functions defined by national law. The 
regions, however, have the legal responsibility to add functions and estab-
lish a variety of institutional relationships with the new entity. In Nantes, 
the administration of the métropole is becoming more and more interwoven 
with the administration of the City of Nantes. In addition to the formal 
responsibilities, the métropole and interested municipalities conclude indi-
vidual arrangements for the pooling of municipal tasks. This means that 
some heterogeneity can also arise within the city-region. The latter happens 
to a limited degree also in Bologna where CM and core city collaborate 
through joined offices.
Overall, we can trace ongoing debates and constant adaptations of the 
distribution of functions in the multi-level systems. In Germany, this is 
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particularly true for the balance between national level and state govern-
ments. In France, territorial reforms have touched all levels of the state and 
have aimed to reduce overlapping responsibilities. In Italy, the long-envi-
sioned creation of metropolitan cities was made possible as a result of the 
fiscal crisis and this has had an influence on the reform agenda. At the same 
time, we would say that even in France and Italy, city-regions are not at the 
centre of debates on state modernisation, but with regard to their functions 
we can nevertheless observe an increase in the relevance of city-regions as 
institutional sites of problem-solving in France. Despite institutional dif-
ferences, some functions are carried out at the city-regional level in all six 
cases, including regional planning. The question of whether the respective 
métropole, CM or regional authority is the appropriate level for problem-
solving, or either too small due to functional interrelations or too large due 
to reasons of subsidiarity and proximity also greatly relates to their spatial 
dimensions.
5.3  Ideas
City-regions are considered as relevant sites for innovation and economic 
growth in the urban age, and are crucial for the global competitiveness of 
national economies (Rodríguez-Pose 2009). This way of thinking is vis-
ible in the rhetoric of policy documents in the three European countries 
Germany, France and Italy, and is used as justification for metropolitan 
policies. However, the competitiveness of city-regions has not been the 
key driver for territorial reforms in any of the three countries. Territorial 
reforms were justified by an improvement in the multi-level system of public 
policy-making and a shift to the intermediary level. Regarding the rhetoric 
of the reform, key words were simplification, efficiency and effectiveness in 
the public sector as well as decentralisation and regionalisation.
The idea of competitiveness has been most prominently mobilised in the 
German discourse around “European metropolitan regions in Germany”. 
This joined initiative of the federal states was meant to compensate for the 
lack of a global city such as London or Paris, and highlights the polycen-
tric character of the German urban system. The label was used for net-
working and international marketing, but did not result in any territorial 
or functional reform that would have attributed more formal responsi-
bilities, tax share, direct representation or the like to those metropolitan 
regions. In addition, the rhetoric of highlighting the metropolitan regions 
provoked resistance from rural areas and towns and the national spatial 
vision from 2006 attempted to reconcile both principles of competitiveness 
and equal living conditions with the concepts of urban–rural partnerships 
and large-scale communities of responsibility (Fricke 2020b, 173). Since 
the mid-2010s, the national attention to metropolitan regions in reports on 
spatial development, model projects and applied research founded by the 
ministry (Ressortforschung) has become lower. None of the federal states 
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has strengthened their metropolitan regions considerably but in the case 
of Frankfurt/Rhein-Main the initiative facilitated a continuous dialogue 
among four federal state governments and a range of local actors.
In Italy and France, territorial reforms did take place, but the competi-
tiveness of city-regions was not the key driver behind them. In Italy, reforms 
were mostly driven by austerity measures (Longo and Mobilio 2016; 
Bolgherini and Lippi 2016). The creation of the CM, however, also opened 
the door for sustainable transport policy (SUMPs) and urban regeneration 
(in particular in Bologna) but this differs from region to region. In general, 
we can say that there is still a lack of territorial coherence (see below).
In France, the main idea was to make the complex multi-level system 
more efficient, which is a long-standing theme for French governments 
(Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014). City-regions and their position in the 
multi-level system have not been the main concern in the state modernisa-
tion process. However, the creation of métropoles along with the enlarge-
ment of régions symbolises neoliberal, growth-oriented thinking in the eyes 
of critical voices. There is a growing criticism of metropolitan systems illus-
trated by titles such as “les métropoles barbares” (Faburel 2018). Faburel 
criticises both the French territorial reforms aiming to create larger competi-
tive regions as well as urban development policies based on the touristifica-
tion of city centres through the “guggenheimisation” of cultural facilities 
and the festivalisation of public spaces as neoliberal strategies leading to 
social and environmental damage (Faburel 2020). Others see a causal link 
to the yellow vest movement due to the feeling of the withdrawal of the state 
from peripheral or rural territories (Bourdin and Torre 2020). The criticism 
does not go into detail regarding the reform of inter-municipal groupings 
and the creation of stronger groupings of municipalities (CC or CA) in less 
urbanised areas. Just as in Germany, the current national policy focuses 
much more on small and medium-sized cities in decline and the proximity 
of public services (Demaizière and Sykes 2020a). However, in France, met-
ropolitan cities are criticised for being a symbol of power concentration and 
for producing leftover territories, underlining conflicts and opposing the 
categories of space to each other rather than emphasising their functional 
interrelation and interdependence as part of a networked space.
Democracy and citizen participation had a weak influence in the debates 
in all three countries. In Italy, the fact the mayor of the core city is automati-
cally the political and administrative head of the CM has raised concerns 
about legitimacy and territorial representation. The direct election of the 
council of the CM has been considered in the national law but as the neces-
sary legislative steps are pending the realisation is not very likely. At least 
the statutes of the largest three CM (Rome, Milan, Naples) indicate that 
the direct election of the council would be introduced once the national law 
allows this. A direct election of the metropolitan assembly was introduced 
in Lyon, one of the six city-regional case studies. This strengthens the demo-
cratic legitimacy of the Métropole de Lyon. Having said this, we need to 
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point out that it was a by-product of the change of status, taking the overall 
responsibilities of the département in its territory and therefore having a 
directly elected representation like all départements. Thus, the driver was the 
aspiration of the mayor of Lyon of that time to strengthen Lyon in line with 
the idea of competitiveness. Some French scholars such as Demazière (2018) 
favour expanding the direct election to other French métropoles, arguing 
that broadening the functions of the métropole has further increased the 
democratic deficit. In Stuttgart, the direct election of the regional assembly 
was an essential element of the reform in 1994, strengthening the implemen-
tation power of the regional planning authority. The principle of territorial 
representation is much stronger France and in Germany than in Italy.
5.4  Spatial relationships
Functional urban regions have become a category for spatial observation, 
both in academia as well as national and European statistics. Statistical defi-
nitions of urban regions seek to grasp functional interrelations and the set-
tlement pattern. The spatial delimitation results from a statistical rule and 
is reviewed from time to time. It is necessarily dynamic and the functional 
descriptions of urban regions have become ever larger. In France, there is a 
nationwide statistical definition of functional urban areas defined by com-
muter relations (aire urbaine) and urban agglomeration (unité urbaine) based 
on settlement patterns. In Germany, the federal institute BBSR has estab-
lished different kinds of functional regional definitions for purposes of spa-
tial observation such as large city-regions (Großstadtregionen), urban rural 
regions (Stadt-Land-Regionen) based on commuter patterns and accessibil-
ity as well as labour market regions and housing market regions. The state 
plans combine statistical definitions (such as density) and other considera-
tions to define agglomerations (Verdichtungsräume). These are target areas 
of specific aims and planning principles (see 4.3.2 for Baden-Württemberg). 
In Italy, the notion of aree vaste (wider areas) is used to describe larger 
cooperation areas for public policies that would reach beyond the bounda-
ries of the CM. In addition, the Atlas of Post-Metropolitan Territories pro-
duced by nine universities used squares of 100 x 100 km to create regional 
profiles of Italy’s largest cities and to provide an alternative view on contem-
porary urban patterns as polynucleated, networked city-regions (Balducci 
et al. 2017).
The spatial delimitation of city-regions is multi-faceted and ambiguous 
all three countries. The six city-regions under study in this book all have to 
face the mismatch between jurisdictional boundaries and functional urban 
regions that are much more relational, polycentric and fluid. The relational 
spatial dimension of city-regions did not play any role in the territorial 
reforms in either Italy or France.
In contrast to functional descriptions, the institutional boundaries 
have been remarkably stable in our case study regions. From our six case 
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study regions, the Métropole de Lyon has the narrowest spatial delimita-
tion as compared to its area of influence. Thus, a balancing of interests 
between urban and rural areas cannot be solved within the strong institu-
tion Métropole de Lyon but has to be negotiated in voluntary agreements 
between the métropole and much smaller municipal groupings within the 
wider metropolitan area. In the Italian CM Firenze and Bologna, the bound-
aries are inherited from the former provinces and have not been altered at 
all. In France, the boundaries of métropoles are flexible in theory as they can 
be defined and expanded at the local level. In practice, they have been very 
stable in the cases of both Lyon and Nantes. In Lyon, minor extension of the 
municipal grouping took place: four small municipalities have joined since 
1964. In the case of Nantes, the territory has been stable since the creation 
of the CU in 2001. The same applies for Stuttgart region. Its perimeter has 
not been altered since 1971. Frankfurt/Rhine-Main region shows more flex-
ibility and tendencies to expand. First, the catchment area of the planning 
authority is much wider than its predecessor UVF (it has increased from 
43 to 80 municipalities since 2001), even if this geographic extension went 
hand in hand with less powers. Second, accession is possible for municipali-
ties that share a border with the planning region. This took place for the first 
time in 2021, when five municipalities joined the region.
The concept of flexible geographies of cooperation has been followed in 
the Frankfurt/Rhine-Main region very strongly since the beginning of the 
2000s due to the preferences of the state government. The desire for flex-
ible geographies, i.e. juxtaposition of larger and smaller scales and a prefer-
ence for sectoral rather than place-based approaches is also shared among 
municipalities and the private sector. Today, the region shows a pragmatic 
approach of metropolitan governance with voluntary collaboration in dif-
ferent constellations and formats, depending on the task. This contrasts 
with the approach of the French territorial reform, aiming to regroup single-
purpose associations within municipal groupings with a broad portfolio of 
tasks with the argument of simplicity. Task-specific voluntary cooperation 
beyond the métropole does exist, but is weakly institutionalised. In Nantes, 
local actors have established the metropolitan region of Nantes-Saint Nazaire 
as a second scale for strategic decisions and joint action. In Stuttgart, the 
regional planning authority has a central role and most city-regional tasks 
are addressed within the same space of action. However, the region uses an 
organisation model as a joint limited liability company for many tasks and 
this allows the involvement of both private partners as well as municipalities 
and counties outside the region, e.g. for touristic marketing.
There is a greater offer of flexible instruments for territorial coopera-
tion in Germany and in France, and these follow the idea of multi-scaled 
arrangements. Still, the métropole in France is certainly the institutional 
core with significant legal power and financial resources. In France, the gov-
ernment preferred the métropole as a hard institution from the beginning 
in order to consolidate local governments, but due to resistance of the local 
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actors the French government also offered softer forms city-regional col-
laboration. As the latter was not very successful, the central government 
made the métropole obligatory.
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6
6.1  The three countries in a European context
City-regionalism is a global phenomenon. Most states and subnational 
governments still struggle to find appropriate governance mechanisms to 
solve issues of sprawl, overstrained mobility infrastructure, protection of 
green spaces, management of climate-related risks and spatial allocation of 
affordable housing (Rosan 2016; Zimmermann 2018; Miller et al. 2018). 
As our empirical study is bound to three western European states, this sec-
tion seeks to put our results into an international context. Are the trends 
that we observed also recognisable in other parts of the world? With regard 
to the coverage of this section, time, language and the page limit of this 
book are the restrictions.
The countries and cases chosen for this section are Portugal, Spain, the 
Netherlands, the UK, Poland, Denmark and Norway. This selection presents 
a requisite variety of ways of dealing with city-regional problems in federal, 
non-federal and regionalised states as well as in small states and large states 
with and without national policy frames for metropolitan governance. We 
also considered those states where novel ways of dealing with city-regions 
emerged, i.e. the combined authorities in England and the use of contract-
ing in Norway. Still, the exceptionality of France, Italy and Germany stands 
out as there are only a few states where there is a critical mass of cases of 
city-regional governance. In many states only a few exceptional cases exist, 
usually the capital city-regions or the largest agglomeration.
6.1.1  The Netherlands
Specific governance arrangements for city-regions used to be an ongoing 
topic in the Netherlands but a more stable establishment of city-regions suf-
fered from the unclear – if not competitive – relationship of eventual city-
regional institutions with the provinces. In the city-regions of the country, the 
Randstad Regio in particular, forms of cooperation experienced some draw-
backs and during the 1990s, continuous efforts were made to address the gov-
ernance issues at the metropolitan level by the state (Janssen-Jansen 2011). 
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In the mid-1990s, attempts to establish city-provinces as formal, legal enti-
ties to replace individual city administrations (i.e. to turn adjacent cities into 
one singular administrative body) failed due to the resistance of citizens and 
local governments (failed referendum in Rotterdam). In 2006, a national law 
came into force and introduced eight weaker city-regions that were defined 
as WRG-plus regions (partly called Stadsregios) (Spaans et al. 2019). Thus 
in 2006, the cooperative arrangements in major Dutch urban areas received 
permanent juridical status “as obligatory cooperation associations between 
the core cities and their immediate periphery” (Janssen-Jansen 2011, 264). 
These city-regions were supposed to act as a fourth layer of government 
and were important actors in the area of public transport for which they 
received a considerable budget from the national government. Most of the 
WRG-plus regions covered only parts of provinces in terms of territory but 
represented large parts of the population and economic power. Later on, the 
city-regions were also responsible in the areas of spatial planning, economic 
affairs and environment (Janssen-Jansen 2011). The responsibility for the 
binding structure plans did not last very long as the Dutch Spatial Planning 
Act of 2008 took away the planning responsibilities (Janssen-Jansen 2011, 
Spaans et al. 2019). There was also criticism because of a lack of legitimacy 
since the WRG-plus regions were managerial bodies without elected councils. 
As a result, in January 2015 the eight WRG-plus regions were abolished and 
the responsibilities shared between the municipalities and the provinces. The 
central government hoped this would increase flexibility in the lower tiers 
of governance because the municipalities would be able to opt for the best 
form of cooperation. So in terms of governance, city-regions as administra-
tive bodies ceased to exist in the Netherlands but exceptions were made for 
two provinces: South Holland and North Holland. In South Holland the for-
mer WRG-plus city-regions Rotterdam and The Hague merged and the new 
city-regional body Metropolitan Region Rotterdam The Hague (MRDH) 
came into being. MRDH has two main functions: public transport and eco-
nomic development, the former being more relevant (not least in terms of the 
budget). The MRDH was the result of a political power play between the 
province of South Holland on the one hand and the cities of Rotterdam and 
The Hague on the other hand. The mayors of Rotterdam and The Hague 
wanted to keep control of the funding for public transport tasks. The new law 
only stated that the transport authority should cover the geographical area of 
the metropolitan region Rotterdam and The Hague and the exact details were 
left to the municipalities and the provinces. Twenty-four municipalities are 
members of the MRDH.
In the Amsterdam area, the arrangement took a different shape (Schipper 
and Gerrits 2015). After the dissolution of the WRG-plus region, a spe-
cial purpose body took over the function of the transport authority (TAA). 
TAA covers parts of the province (15 municipalities). In addition, in a more 
voluntary and informal manner and as a follow-up of the North Wing 
Conference, the Metropoolregio Amsterdam came into being in 2017. This 
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is an association of 32 municipalities, two provinces and the TAA, largely 
being a platform for consultation on issues such as economic development.
Metropolitan government has lost its appeal in the Netherlands. Instead, 
there is a preference (and need) for flexible, project-based and sectoral 
cooperation. This is not to say that inter-municipal cooperation is not well 
established in the Netherlands. Like in Germany or France, inter-municipal 
cooperation is the preferred solution for efficient and effective provision of 
public services on a smaller territorial scale. According to Klok et al. (2018) 
who identified 779 IMCs in the Netherlands, these forms of cooperation 
have developed organically and on average have 16 member municipalities.
6.1.2  Portugal
Portugal experienced a number of reforms changing the status of local gov-
ernment and the inter-institutional relationships of cities, regions and cen-
tral government (Teles 2016). Fiscal consolidation pressures, amalgamation 
of local governments and inter-municipal cooperation as well as decentrali-
sation are high on the agenda. The largest metropolitan areas, Lisbon and 
Porto, received special treatment but these attempts have been evaluated as 
inconsequential (Rayle and Zegras 2013).
In 1991, the Portuguese national government created an intermedi-
ate scale for metropolitan governance (law 44/1991). This law defined 
the metropolitan areas in terms of their size and legal status (Pereira and 
Nunes da Silva 2008, 115; Rayle and Zegras 2013, 872). Apart from the 
capital city of Lisbon, which is embedded into a metropolitan area (Área 
Metropolitana de Lisboa = AML), also the second largest city of Portugal, 
Oporto, is part of a larger metropolitan region (Área Metropolitana do 
Porto = AMP). Since its foundation, the legal framework has been adjusted 
and changed several times (Oliveira and Breda-Vázquez 2015, 15). In 
2008, law 46/2008 introduced some significant changes, again only target-
ing AML and AMP. The new law defined these two metropolitan areas 
as obligatory entities, territorially congruent with the European NUTS III 
regions (AML 2016, 20; Oliveira and Breda-Vázquez 2011, 72). In the case 
of Lisbon, the AML consisted and still consists of the two NUTS III regions 
Grande Lisboa and Península de Setúbal (cf. ibid.). The AMP on the other 
side was made up of Grande Porto and Entre Douro e Vouga region and 
parts of Tâmega until 2015 and now corresponds with the eponymous 
NUTS III region AMP.
The AML is composed of 18 municipalities of the Lisbon and Tagus 
Valley Region and had a population of about 3 million inhabitants in 2014 
(Balsas 2017, 85). The AMP initially only consisted of nine municipalities in 
the urban core of the Greater Oporto region (Law 44/1991). Over time sev-
eral neighbouring entities have joined the metropolitan area (Balsas 2020). 
Today the AMP integrates 17 municipalities in the north-western part of 
mainland Portugal (Website AMP I; Balsas 2017, 85). All in all, it includes 
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an area of about 2,040 km² with ca. 2 million inhabitants in 2014 (Website 
AMP II; Balsas 2017, 89).
With regard to the institutional set-up, from 1991 until 2013 there was a 
dual structure in place: a council, indirectly elected by the councillors of the 
municipalities (18 in Lisbon, 17 in Porto) and an executive body, composed 
of the mayors. This arrangement changed in 2013 when the executive body 
of mayors became the council while it was decided that the new metropoli-
tan executive commission would be elected by the councillors. The candi-
dates, however, are proposed by the mayors. So, this new arrangement is 
under strong local leadership. The direct election of the metropolitan coun-
cils has been under discussion for a longer period but has been postponed 
several times due to tactical reasons and constitutional concerns.
In terms of functions, the metropolitan bodies would be responsible for 
a range of supra-municipal services and central government investments 
(including EU funds) but the mayors of the constituent municipalities have 
refused so far to delegate these functions. The most recent change happened 
in the course of the introduction of a law on public finances in 2018. This 
law implemented a decentralisation strategy that also encourages inter-
municipal cooperation and the consolidation of the two metropolitan areas 
in the functional realm of social services, tourism and public transport. This 
law made a great difference and led to more integrated metropolitan policy-
making. Hence, the responsibility for the EU funds and transport changed 
the situation greatly. There is now also a consultative body composed of 
public and private actors.
6.1.3  Spain
Much of the academic work on Metropolitan Governance in Spain focuses 
on the Barcelona metropolitan area and in fact the governance arrange-
ment of this region is the one with the highest degree of institutionalisa-
tion, though having experienced turbulent times (Tomàs 2017b). There are, 
however, other cases such as Valencia and Vigo that are worth consider-
ing. In principle, the possibility to create Áreas Metropolitanas has been 
included in the national law since 1985. However, according to the law the 
regional governments are “responsible for creating, modifying and abol-
ishing metropolitan areas by their own Statutes of Autonomy” (Tomàs 
2017b, 246) and these regions have been very reluctant to give power to 
city-regions, especially so soon after gaining their status of autonomy. On 
the contrary, the regions have used their responsibility regarding metropoli-
tan governance to abolish former metropolitan institutions (Corporaciones 
metropolitanas) inherited from the Franco regime in the case of Madrid, 
Bilbao, Barcelona and Valencia, and have replaced them with several 
sectoral agencies covering different spaces (Barcelona, Bilbao, Valencia) 
or assumed by the regional government in case of Madrid (Hildenbrand 
Scheid 2017, 71; Tomàs 2017b). The former metropolitan governments 
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were mostly abolished in the 1980s (Corporation of Greater Bilbao 1980, 
Commission for Planning and Coordination of the Madrid metropolitan 
area 1983, Barcelona Metropolitan Corporation 1987). In the case of 
Valencia, a multi-purpose metropolitan authority persisted as the Gran 
Valencia Metropolitan Corporation was first transformed into the Consell 
Metropolità de l’Horta responsible for transport and spatial planning, 
water and sewage in 1986 and was only abolished in 1999 (Tomàs 2017b, 
248). The capital region Madrid is a specific case, because (a) the city was 
enlarged via annexations (between 1948 and 1954) to a size equivalent to 
the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, and (b) because the regional govern-
ment of Madrid does not have supra-municipal entities (neither disputa-
tiones provinciales nor comarcas) and its spatial outline is similar to the 
city-region (Tomàs 2017b, 248).
There is no national policy of metropolitan reforms and the central gov-
ernment has not given any incentives to create metropolitan governments 
either (Medir et al. 2018, 137). However, austerity measures support the 
amalgamation of local government and inter-municipal cooperation in 
general.
Barcelona searched for a long time for an appropriate arrangement. In the 
1980s, the existing metropolitan government was weakened due to politi-
cal conflicts between the regional government and the local governments 
of the Barcelona city-region (1987). Key functions (metropolitan transport, 
waste management) were organised in single-purpose associations. During 
the 2000s, however, the metropolitan initiative experienced a revival and 
as a result of a strategic planning process a new inter-municipal consortium 
was founded in 2009.
In addition to the strategic plan, the municipalities of the metropoli-
tan area decided voluntarily in 2009 to create the Consortium of the 
Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, which joined together the three exist-
ing metropolitan entities so as to prepare the institutional transition to 
the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona. (Tomàs 2017a, 325)
The Área Metropolitana de Barcelona (AMB) was established in 2011 and 
has a broad portfolio of functions, both in terms of strategic functions and 
of joint service provision. Its functions include territorial planning and 
urbanism, public transport and mobility, housing policies, environment, 
economic development and social cohesion as well as international rela-
tions (Tomàs 2017b, 247; Gerőházi und Tosics 2018, 13). However, the 
metropolitan authority shares its implementation powers with local and 
regional governments. Social reproduction functions such as social hous-
ing, education and culture have remained the responsibility of the region 
and the municipalities (Tomàs 2017a, 331). On the other hand, production 
functions such as economic development strategies or strategic projects have 
so far been handled by the City of Barcelona, voluntary mechanisms of 
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inter-municipal cooperation or the regional government of Catalonia rather 
than by the metropolitan authority (Tomàs 2017a, 329–330).
Still, the AMB is the metropolitan institution with the greatest degree of 
institutionalisation in Spain. It can be classified as a metropolitan govern-
ment, but does not fully correspond to the ideal model of the metropolitan 
reform school, because “it is indirectly elected, has little fiscal autonomy and 
its responsibilities are not exclusive but shared both by local and regional 
governments” (Tomàs 2017b, 247).
The definition of the city-region of Barcelona is elastic, meaning that 
three different definitions of what is considered the Barcelona urban region 
coexist: (1) the province of Barcelona (7,728 km²), (2) the metropolitan 
region (3,239 km²) and (3) the metropolitan area (634 km²). Each of them 
corresponds to a different conception of the territory, is formed by differ-
ent institutions and supported by different actors (Tomàs 2017a, 320–327).
In Vigo, the process of installing a metropolitan authority came to a 
standstill. In Valencia, a recent initiative launched a discussion process on 
the future constitution of the city-region in autumn 2020. Currently, ser-
vice provision at a metropolitan scale takes place in the form of three sec-
toral agencies with variable geometries: the Metropolitan Water Services 
(formed by 51 municipalities), Metropolitan Waste Treatment (formed by 
45 municipalities) and the Public Metropolitan Transport Association (60 
municipalities). The latter entity has developed the Metropolitan Plan of 
Transport of Valencia, including integrated fare management and adminis-
trative services. It collaborates with other transport agencies (Railways of 
the Generalitat Valenciana and Municipal Transport Companies) and the 
Valencian Metropolitan Mobility Authority. The three agencies are gov-
erned by indirectly elected representatives of the municipalities, according 
to their population. The current situation is summed up in the following 
quote:
In short, today the metropolitan area of Valencia is institutionally organ-
ised by sectoral agencies covering a different number of municipalities. 
The metropolitan dimension is recognised and metropolitan agencies 
manage some essential metropolitan services (transport, waste, water). 
However, a common understanding of the metropolitan reality does 
not exist, since each agency covers a different territory. Moreover, the 
relationship between the City of Valencia and some of the metropolitan 
municipalities has been characterised by political conflicts, which has 
not helped to build a shared metropolitan vision. (Tomàs 2017b, 248)
6.1.4  The UK (England)
The most recent change with regard to metropolitan policies in England 
was the introduction of the option of combined authorities in 2011 (Shaw 
and Tewdwr-Jones 2017; Sykes and Nurse 2021). Metropolitan councils 
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existed in the larger agglomerations (Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, 
Greater London, etc.) until they were abolished by central government in 
1986. They were replaced by sector-specific collaboration for policies such 
as public transport, sewage, waste management and metropolitan police. 
The city-regional scale has not been addressed since then as either larger (the 
regions until 2011) or smaller scales were at stake (i.e. the Local Economic 
Partnerships post-2011, which were much smaller and limited to inter-
municipal cooperation for economic development).
The growth strategy for the north (the Northern Way) included some 
prescriptions for city-regions but the resonance was rather weak (Sykes and 
Nurse 2021). This void has been partly filled by voluntary collaboration, and 
the Manchester city-region is a much discussed case in this regard (AGMA – 
Association of greater Manchester Authorities). In fact, the Manchester case 
is seen as a role model for what followed when central government intro-
duced the combined authorities.
The combined authorities are a new type of intervention, a sort of place-
specific central–local arrangement. In terms of territory, the existing com-
bined authorities differ in size and do not necessarily cover a functional urban 
region, as the composition of municipalities is the result of political negotia-
tions and opportunities. As a result of negotiations between central govern-
ment and the municipalities involved, the portfolio of tasks differs and as a 
legal entity they are responsible for tasks such as public transport, economic 
development, health and urban regeneration.1 The negotiations between cen-
tral government and the combined authorities were in part problematic as 
the government rejected proposals of some combined authorities. So, there is 
great difference between Manchester where local leaders were able to design 
the process in a very favourable way and the others where this was less the 
case. The establishment of a combined authority implies additional funding. 
At the same time local governments had to face large budget cuts in many 
other areas (Sykes and Nurse 2021). Hence, the combined authorities are seen 
by many observers as part of a national austerity agenda (Hambleton 2016; 
Shaw and Tewdwr-Jones 2017; Sykes and Nurse 2021). The implementa-
tion differs greatly between the city-regions (see Lowndes and Lempriere 
2018 for the West Midlands and Greater Manchester; see Sykes and Nurse 
2021 for Liverpool). There are currently ten combined authorities in place. 
They were established in 2011 (Greater Manchester), 2014 (Liverpool, 
North East Combined Authority, West Yorkshire, Sheffield City-Region), 
2016 (West Midlands/Birmingham, Tees Valley), 2017 (West of England, 
Cambridgeshire and Peterborough) and one more in 2018 (North of Tyne).
Combined authorities – as a result of the so-called devolution deals 
in 2016 – usually have a directly elected metropolitan mayor but these 
were elected stepwise (2017: Manchester, Liverpool, Tees Valley, West of 
England, West Midlands; Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 




The debate on city-regions in Norway largely focuses on the Oslo met-
ropolitan area (Hanssen 2021a; ESPON Spima 2018). There are some 
inter-municipal arrangements in place and one innovative and facilitating 
instrument was contracting between central government and local govern-
ments in order to give incentives for collaboration. These contracts were 
initially made in the field of public transport in the 1980s but were subse-
quently used for other policies as well (Hanssen 2021a, 138–139). Today, 
they are formulated in a more comprehensive way and are called Urban 
Growth Agreements.
In Norway, it was the need to coordinate the efforts and investments 
in metropolitan areas that spurred the emergence of a new multi-level-
governance contractual management tool. These are called “Urban 
Growth Agreements”, and they coordinate the land use measures of 
the local government with the large transport investments of regional 
and national authorities. These contracts/agreements are now one of 
the main incentive arrangements for multi-level coordination between 
national, county and municipal authorities on transport and land use 
policies for the larger urban regions.
(Hanssen 2021a, 138)
In the Oslo city-region, collaboration largely affects the core city of Oslo, 
the county municipality of Oslo and the county of Akershus. In fact an 
amalgamation was debated in the late 1990s but never accomplished. As a 
result, a number of multi-level collaborative arrangements exist but a cer-
tain degree of fragmentation is still in place as most of these arrangements 
are sector-specific.
In 2004, a voluntary arrangement of Oslo and Akershus emerged (The 
Oslo Region Alliance). Today the alliance consists of five county munici-
palities and 78 municipalities and its main purpose is marketing and 
competitiveness.
6.1.6  Denmark
As in Norway, the metropolitan governance discourse in Denmark primar-
ily concerns the capital city-region: the Greater Copenhagen Area (region 
Hovedstaden). Despite the widely recognised need for metropolitan govern-
ance, metropolitan authorities in the Greater Copenhagen Area never had a 
stable position because of a lack of acceptance both by local authorities and 
the central government (Andersen et al. 2002, 43). On one hand, the afflu-
ent suburban districts in the north and north-west with conservative majori-
ties rejected a metropolitan reform that would reduce their independence 
from socio-democratic Copenhagen. On the other hand, central government 
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and the counties did not support a strong metropolitan government due to 
the dominant political and economic power of such a unit (Andersen et al. 
2002, 48).
The Greater Copenhagen Council (Hovedstadsrådet 1974–1989) was the 
first formalised attempt to coordinate activities at the metropolitan level, 
but had limited powers (Galland und Enemark 2015, 346; Andersen et al. 
2002, 43). Its construction was similar to the pre-existing voluntary plan-
ning association Regional Planning Council (Egnsplanrådet), but with a for-
mal status (Andersen et al. 2002, 48). In addition, it gained responsibilities 
beyond regional planning, notably public transport, environmental issues 
and public hospitals. The council was composed of mayors as well as repre-
sentatives of the counties. It was financially dependent on contributions of 
the counties and municipalities (Andersen et al. 2002, 49). Due to the lack 
of direct elections and of its own financial resources, it remained a weak 
institution limited to consensus finding between the local authorities. As 
a second element, a special equalisation scheme for the metropolitan area 
was introduced on top of the already existing financial equalisation mech-
anisms for the whole of Denmark. However, the new council-controlled 
public transport company for Greater Copenhagen greatly improved pub-
lic transport. The council also had greater regional planning powers than 
its predecessor and could put some pressure on local planning (Andersen 
et al. 2002, 49). Despite these successes, the council was abolished in 1989. 
Its responsibilities were transferred to the counties or to independent sin-
gle-purpose organisations (the Regional Statistic Office and the Regional 
Transport Company, Hovedstadens trafikselskab) (Andersen et al. 2002, 
49). The abolition of Greater Copenhagen Council led to the creation of a 
multitude of organisational forms, some of which covered the same area as 
the former Greater Copenhagen Council (Andersen et al. 2002, 50).
The next wave of formalised city-regional governance came rather late 
compared to other European countries due to a lack of consensus both at 
the national and the local levels. Debates about the best form of metro-
politan governance took place throughout the 1990s but remained fruitless 
(Mouritzen 2011, 58; Andersen et al. 2002, 51). During that time, three 
counties, together with Copenhagen and Frederiksberg municipalities, 
continued their collaboration on regional planning (Gerőházi und Tosics 
2018, 39).
A new metropolitan authority was then created in July 2000, the 
Metropolitan Council of Greater Copenhagen (Hovedstadens Udviklingsråd, 
HUR). It had different objectives than the former Greater Copenhagen 
Council, with much more emphasis on competitiveness and economic devel-
opment instead of services of general interest (Andersen et al. 2002, 44). Part 
of the motivation to create this new body was “to manage the complex coor-
dination and development challenges faced by the Øresund area during and 
after the opening of the Øresund Bridge in July 2000” (Gerőházi und Tosics 
2018, 37). Its tasks were regional planning, transport planning, the operation 
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of busses and of some local train lines, the coordination of economic devel-
opment, tourism and culture (mostly theatres2) as well as cooperation across 
the Øresund (Andersen et al. 2002, 51). The HUR did have five members: the 
counties of Copenhagen, Frederiksborg and Roskilde and the municipalities 
of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg. Decision-making took place in a board of 
11 politicians appointed by the members (Andersen et al. 2002, 51). Just like 
the preceding bodies, it was a rather weak metropolitan authority without 
its own financial resources or direct democratic legitimation. It was abol-
ished in 2007 in the course of a wider local government reform in Denmark. 
Although the reform established regions as formal jurisdictions, this step did 
not result in a strong institution at the metropolitan level. Quite the opposite, 
it led to splitting up of functions due to the inadequate size of the region for 
regional planning, regional transport and economic development.
Regional planning had been carried out at the metropolitan level by the 
Metropolitan Council of Greater Copenhagen up to 2007, when responsi-
bility for the regional plan covering the capital region shifted to the national 
level. The newly created five regions do not have responsibility for a binding 
regional plan in other parts of Denmark either, only for economic devel-
opment plans. The responsibility for Greater Copenhagen’s regional plan 
was first assigned to the Ministry of the Environment and moved to the 
Ministry of Economy after the 2015 election (Gerőházi und Tosics 2018, 
39). Since then, three versions of the fingerplan have been adopted: in 2007, 
2013 (both by the Ministry of Environment) and 2019 (by the Ministry of 
Economy). Since the introduction of the Planning act of 2012, the plan has 
become a national planning directive, thus strengthening its legal power 
(Gerőházi und Tosics 2018, 39).
Apart from this, social reproduction functions are the responsibility of 
the municipalities. Inter-municipal cooperation for technical services such 
as fire protection, waste disposal, water supply, energy, electricity and gas 
and for schools and culture as well as specialised social services does exist 
in Denmark. Single-purpose associations (kommunalt fællesskab) for these 
purposes were frequently formed in the 1990s (Henning 2001, 37), but were 
much reduced by municipal mergers in 2007.
Public transport is operated on a regional level and jointly steered by 
the municipalities, the regions and the state. The Greater Copenhagen Area 
does not have a strong metropolitan authority that bundles functions and 
power. The region has a jurisdictional status with a directly elected council, 
but with very limited functions. A range of other organisations carries out 
tasks of city-regional coordination at the same scale or beyond. In addition, 
the central state intervenes in the capital region due to its high relevance.
6.1.7  Poland
In Poland, there was no clear national priority to enforce metropolitan gov-
ernance for quite a long time. Some weaker and largely voluntary forms of 
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cooperation exist in several city-regions, the more established ones being 
Upper Silesia (Katowice), Poznan, Szczecin and the so-called Tri-City 
(Gdansk, Sopot, Gdynia) on the Baltic coast (Krukowska and Lackowska 
2017). All these came into being in the 2000s (Katowice in 2007) but were 
not very powerful.
On a national level, the Act on Metropolitan Associations (2015) gave 
a legal framework for metropolitan initiatives but there was no obligation 
to use the format of metropolitan associations in that period. At least the 
existing law made clear that inter-municipal cooperation in city-regions was 
possible and that there were legal formats for this. Nevertheless, in Upper 
Silesia, Poznan and to a slightly lesser degree in the Szczecin agglomera-
tion, bottom-up initiatives emerged in the period 2000–2010. The Poznan 
Metropolis Association has been active since 2011 (from 2007 to 2011 the 
name of the organisation was Poznan Agglomeration Council) (Mikuła and 
Kaczmarek (2017). Szczecin Metropolitan Area Association, founded on 
the basis of the Local Governments Association for Regional Cooperation 
operating in 2005–2009, has been active since 2009.
The Katowice city-region is an outstanding case because of its stronger 
institutionalisation. Katowice established a Metropolitan Joint Committee 
in 2007 but the major change came about in 2017 when the Metropolitan 
Association of Upper Silesia and Dąbrowa Basin, shortened to “Metropolis 
GZM” (MGZM) was founded based on the Metropolitan Act approved by 
the state government. It is an association of several cities and towns (41) 
with 2.3 million inhabitants (50% of the Voivodship). MGZM has a certain 
degree of operational autonomy and financing and manages a solidarity 
fund. Its main responsibilities are public transport, waste management, eco-
nomic development, voluntary master plans and IT services.
City-regional cooperation in the Tri-City area was more cumbersome, 
mainly because of the competitive orientations of local leaders of the three 
cities. The Metropolitan Council of the Gdansk Bay came into being in 
2003. It is an informal forum of mayors and local leaders, with the three 
cities Gdansk, Sopot and Gdynia being the main actors. On the initiative 
of the Council, the Metropolitan Association of Gdansk Bay was estab-
lished in 2006. In 2011, however, two new organisations were established: 
the Gdansk Metropolitan Area Association founded by Gdansk, and the 
Metropolitan Forum of Mayors NORDA founded by Gdynia.
The situation changed in the EU funding period 2014–2020 when the 
Polish government made the use of Integrated Territorial Investment (ITI) 
obligatory in the 17 city-regions of the capital cities of voivodships. Though 
being an episode bound to the ERDF funding period, it caused a vivid 
period of metropolitan cooperation with diverse outcomes (Krukowska 
and Lackowska 2017). It was more successful in those city-regions with 
some previous experience of inter-municipal collaboration but in some 
city-regions the ITI co-existed next to established city-regional bodies (i.e. 
Katowice). In terms of size, the national government made a suggestion 
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(varying between five and 50 municipalities in the case of Warsaw), but in 
the course of ITI implementation the boundaries were changed due to local 
initiatives (usually they got larger).
In the Tri-City region, the obligatory use of ITI had a major institu-
tional impact but did not result in a territorially coherent arrangement. In 
2015, a new institution for the implementation of ITI Integrated Territorial 
Investment was created: the Metropolitan Area Gdansk-Gdynia-Sopot 
incorporated the former Gdansk Metropolitan Area, whereas NORDA 
remained a separate body.
6.2  City-regions and the consolidation state: what drives 
reforms and what are the results in terms of institutions, 
spatial relationships and functions?
In a contribution to a book entitled “The Future of Regional Policy”, 
Andrés Rodrigues-Pose critically discusses the question whether we observe 
a rise of the city-region as a relevant political and/or economic scale or not 
(Rodríguez-Pose 2009). There are in fact good reasons for the establishment 
of city-regions as cross-municipal cooperation promises higher effective-
ness of public policies, innovative solutions for all kinds of problems and 
supports economic agglomeration effects. Institutionalised city-regions may 
also have a balancing effect with regard to social and territorial dispari-
ties as well as fiscal imbalances between municipalities (Kübler and Rochat 
2018). Parochial attitudes of local governments or “defensive localism” 
(Barron and Frug 2005) instead are rather seen as costly and dysfunctional.
According to the empirical results of this book, the assumption of the 
rise of city-regions as political or economic scale is half true and half wrong. 
In any case, we can state that the rise of city-regions as it is described in a 
number of publications is not backed by our results. In the recent period 
we have seen a number of reforms targeting the city-regional level in many 
states – not only in Europe – but this does not constitute a new wave of 
metropolitan reforms following a coherent set of ideas. At least if we con-
sider the conventional wisdom of periodisation that argues that the rise of 
metropolitan governments in the late 1960s/early 1970s was followed by a 
cross-national trend of abolishing metropolitan councils in the mid 1980s 
and the new regionalism in the 1990s, the current situation is more diverse. 
Although some examples mentioned in this book may indicate a revival of 
the metropolitan reform model (France, Italy, to a limited degree Spain), the 
broader picture shows a collection of disparate and opportunistic practices. 
Interventions of national governments are sometimes half-hearted, and 
sometimes clearly show centralistic patterns.
In France and Italy, but also in Poland and Portugal, there were clear 
attempts of the national governments to support city-regions, although the 
initiatives in many states are fragile (if not temporary) or concentrate on the 
biggest agglomeration of the country (Portugal). In England, the evaluation 
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of the combined authorities is rather difficult as the whole process is charac-
terised as “disorganised” (Shaw and Tewdwr-Jones 2017) and driven by a 
mixed-motive of austerity measures and a pro-development agenda. The use 
of the notion city-region is less common in England and there are great dif-
ferences between the realised combined authorities (Lowndes and Lempriere 
2018; Sykes and Nurse 2021). In fact, the practice of city-regional govern-
ance in some states requires new notions.
Institutionalised city-regions or regional authorities do perform functions 
related to the international competitiveness of the city-region and engage 
in the external representation and marketing of the city-region in partner-
ship with the (still important) core city. In France, economic development 
and competitiveness is relevant – in particular for the local leaders who 
try to implement flagship projects and infrastructures and use city-regional 
institutions as a vehicle to promote this. The joint external representation 
of the core city and the city-region is either secured by a double leadership 
of the mayor of the core city (Bologna) or with joint shareholdings such as 
in the case of the agency for tourism and regional marketing in Stuttgart. 
However, city-regional agendas are much broader and range from climate 
change and affordable housing to sustainable mobility issues, digitisation 
and urban regeneration. In principle, we see a greater concern for public 
policies, services of general interest (such as planning, sustainable trans-
port) and the recognition of peripheries. On the national level the agenda 
is more balanced: effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector and fiscal 
consolidation go hand in hand with other motives such as the relaunch of 
the economy following a recession. In particular, the reforms in Italy and 
France are mostly driven by austerity goals and the quest for higher effi-
ciency in the public sector and less by the idea of turning the city-regions 
into engines of the economy (the latter is in particular true for Italy). The 
consolidation state (Streeck 2017) may open windows of opportunity for 
the stronger political and institutional integration of city-regions in terms 
of governance. Austerity policies may initiate reforms but leave the new 
entities more or less alone. Hence, the results differ: in Italy the city-regional 
level has been hollowed out and equipped with a questionable system of 
political representation. In France, métropoles such as Lyon are definitely a 
highly relevant layer for public policies but are limited in terms of territory. 
In the majority of states, city-regions are the weakest level in the multi-level 
system of governance.
Greater territorial coherence still is an issue in most of the European city-
regions but often this is not the core driver for reforms. In France, the city-
regions are a genuine layer of public policies but they are on average too small. 
The management of territorial interdependencies is difficult and unsolved in 
Lyon. Territorial fragmentation continues to exist beyond the boundaries of 
the métropole and in some cases this is a cause for conflicts. As contempo-
rary metropolisation processes concern vast territories (Cardoso and Meijers 
2021), the metropolitan scale is well above the scale of municipalities, meaning 
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that their amalgamation cannot solve the metropolitan question anymore (in 
contrast to the beginning of the 20th century, e.g. Groß-Berlin). The creation 
of a metropolitan government either means to add one more level to the multi-
level system (as the planned Dutch city-provinces in the 1990s) or to suppress 
another one (as the provinces in Italy or the counties in Denmark). Thus, the 
metropolitan reforms are related to the fate of the second tier of local govern-
ment, i.e. provinces, counties, départements or Landkreise. Abolishing the 
second tier of local government has been discussed in several European coun-
tries. The main argument is that these entities – created in the 19th century 
(French départements, Spanish provinces, Italian provinces, Denmark) – are 
seen as outdated due to their limited spatial dimension. The Napoleonic logic 
of uniform administrative subunits of the state that are of similar size does 
not correspond to contemporary patterns of mobility and metropolisation. 
However, putting the second tier of local government into question causes 
much resistance (Italy, France). In Spain, the region of Catalunya would like 
to replace the provinces by veguerias, but there is disagreement of the cen-
tral state wishing to preserve a similar administrative structure in all regions. 
Denmark is one of the rare examples where the second tier of local govern-
ment has been entirely eliminated. The new regions in Denmark are much 
larger but less relevant in terms of functions. This was politically possible due 
to the consent of local authorities and their umbrella organisations; it was 
secured with the argument to increase local autonomy as part of the func-
tions of the counties was shifted to the enlarged municipalities. The following 
quote gives an appropriate summary:
Elements that are more intangible, related to political culture and to 
the attitudes and values of local representatives towards metropolitan 
governance, influence the final model. For example, in some countries 
there is a greater tradition of institutionalizing metropolitan coopera-
tion through the creation of new structures (such as in France), whilst in 
others reforms move towards the reduction of the number of structures 
(such as in Denmark).
(Tomàs 2017b, 245)
Coping with existing administrative boundaries and institutional fragmen-
tation in city-regions is still a major challenge. In more theoretical terms we 
see the two competing principles for the design of institutional solutions:
 a) higher effectiveness of sectoral cooperation (single-purpose organisa-
tions or issue-based cooperation); and
 b) territorial integration and representation (multi-purpose organisations 
for one territory).
The latter one seems still to be very present in the mindsets of the actors 
involved in metropolitan reform processes. Our results show, however, that 
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this institutional idea does not work well in any case. The much-appraised 
combination of variable geometry of governance and multi-scaled arrange-
ments is a compromise that combines an organisational core with additional 
issue-based forms cooperation on different territorial scales. Though being 
an appealing idea, these kinds of arrangements are rare. The two German 
cases represented in this book are in a way following this idea with Stuttgart 
being a case of stronger territorial integration and Frankfurt representing 
the second principle of a variety of sectoral cooperation on different scales. 
Some are stronger attached to the core region (i.e. the planning authority 
FrankfurtRheinMain), others less and the board of the region is seen as the 
integrating mechanism.
A new pattern is certainly the close cooperation of core cities and city-
regional authorities observable in France (Nantes) and Italy (Bologna). The 
emergence of territorial subunits within city-regions such as the pôles de 
proximité, zone omogenee, unioni di comuni is a specific pattern for France 
and Italy.
A striking insight is the neglect of addressing issues of territorial repre-
sentation in many cases. The introduction of the direct election of regional 
councils is usually justified by referring to the bundle of functions. As soon 
as a critical mass of (local government) functions is transferred to a city-
regional authority, the direct election of the regional council is inevitable. 
The introduction of the directly elected metropolitan mayor follows the 
argument of greater visibility and leadership. Both arguments tend to miss 
the role of citizens and city-regional citizenship for metropolitan governance 
(Lidström and Schaap 2018; Strebel and Kübler 2021). The body of work 
on city-regional citizenship is still small but at least indicates that citizens do 
not necessarily think local or ignore what is happening beyond the border 
of their jurisdiction.
6.2.1  The impact of national role models
National role models for metropolitan reforms have a considerable influ-
ence and this is visible in England (Greater Manchester), France (Lyon) 
and – to a lesser degree – in Spain (Barcelona). Sometimes the institutional 
design of these role models is the result of direct negotiations between local 
political leaders and central government. In Italy, it’s less appropriate to 
speak of a national role model although Bologna is a widely considered case. 
France and Italy are the two states that implemented nationwide reforms 
that more or less prescribed a uniform solution and both states clearly show 
the fallacies of implementing nationwide institutional models. During the 
implementation adjustments were made in order to meet the requirements 
of a variety of local contexts. In Germany, the heterogeneity of models is 
high and depends on local conditions and preferences of the state govern-
ments at the time of creation. Stuttgart Region is one of the cases that is 
much cited internationally as a role model for metropolitan governance. 
292 Conclusion 
But within Germany, it is not necessarily the blueprint for other regional 
authorities.
Only some of the European states actually have a critical mass of cases 
of city-regional governance. This applies to France, Italy and Germany 
and also to England and Poland. Whether there is more than one institu-
tionalised city-region depends on the urban system and on the area, but 
also on the historic evolution of the intermediary territorial authorities. 
In Spain, there is a high number of functional city-regions. Nevertheless, 
due to historic reasons related to the autonomy of regions after the Franco 
regime, there is so far only one fully developed metropolitan authority. 
In the Nordic countries, the capitals are by far the dominant city-regions 
and receive a specific treatment. To strengthen their role and autonomy is 
ambivalent from a national perspective. On one hand, they are the main 
engines for the national economy. On the other hand, internal migration 
towards the capital region threatens territorial cohesion within the coun-
try. Thus, Finland currently seeks to support a network of the largest fin-
ish cities (the six cities strategy Aika 6, an open innovation platform for 
Helsinki, Oulu, Espoo, Tampere, Turku, Vantaa) rather than creating a 
powerful metropolitan authority for Helsinki region (Anttiroiko 2016; 
Raunio et al. 2016).
6.2.2  Asymmetric treatment
In countries where strengthening of city-regions is part of a national reform, 
the debate about what power shall be given to city-regions is related to the 
fundamental question of the equal treatment of territories. City-regions 
gaining more autonomy and access to more resources than rural regions and 
small and medium sized towns may cause distribution conflicts and trigger 
the wish of adjacent municipalities to become part of the city-region in 
institutional terms (as has happened in Frankfurt-Rhein Main in 2021 and 
was suggested by one municipality in Florence). The dominant justification 
to strengthen metropolitan governments has recently been global economic 
competitiveness both of the city-regions and of the national economy. This 
triggers conflicts, including the accusation of pursuing neoliberal policy 
and to neglect the aims of equal living conditions and cohesion. The ques-
tion behind is: are strong metropolitan governments only an advantage 
for the city-region or for the entire country? These conflicts are visible in 
France (Faburel 2018; Bourdin and Torre 2020) and, to a lesser degree, in 
Germany (European Metropolitan Regions). In reaction, the political atten-
tion turned towards the fate of small and medium sized cities. There are 
distributional conflicts within city-region as well as between city-regions 
and left-over spaces. In Italy, the budgets of the remaining provinces have 
been cut considerably due to austerity measures and have therefore much 
less possibilities to act than the CM.
 Conclusion 293
6.2.3  Institutional models
With regard to institutional trends there are certainly no uniform models 
observable but we can identify basically two trends. In some European 
states there is a very flexible way of dealing with city-regions, i.e. mak-
ing place-specific deals or giving specific treatment to some city-regions but 
not all (Netherlands, England, Portugal, Spain). Multi-level contracts for 
project financing between the state and city-regional authorities are used as 
steering mechanism in Norway (Hanssen 2021b), but also in France (includ-
ing the région) and England. This steering mechanism is absent in Germany. 
These place-specific deals and arrangements are not in line with the new 
regionalism but rather represent a mix of more control of city-regions by 
upper-level governments and flexible cooperation. Certainly, these arrange-
ments are easier to abolish if no longer wanted.
In other states, the metropolitan reform idea is still prevalent but imple-
mented in a light way. The metropolitan reform model implies a strong 
metropolitan authority with its own competences, direct election of a coun-
cil and own taxes. This model is not fully realised but still seen as an ideal 
in France, Italy and recent initiatives in Spain. However, the organisational 
autonomy (in terms of politics and financing) is not as high as the ideal 
model prescribes.
There are also differences between regional, unitary and federal states. 
In many states laws creating (or abolishing) city-regional authorities have 
to pass the national parliament (France, Denmark), the federal states level 
(Germany) or the government of regions (Spain) (the latter with a high degree 
of autonomy). In Italy, the national framework law required a concretisa-
tion by the regional governments which explains some of the variation. In 
Germany, only small changes and incremental adjustments happened over 
the last decade. In contrast we see much more dynamic in centralised and 
non-federal European countries. Still, each country has its own specific tra-
jectory, and national framework conditions seem to matter a lot regarding 
the power and shape of metropolitan governance arrangements. The success 
of metropolitan governance and sometimes also the opportunity to create a 
strong institution depends on a consensus of local actors and the support of 
a shared strategy for territorial development as visible in often cited cases 
such as Barcelona. However, purely voluntary inter-municipal agreements 
have their limitations.
Notes
1 https://www .local .gov .uk /topics /devolution /devolution -online -hub /devolution - 
explained /devolution -register (7 June 2021)
2 The Copenhagen Theatre Cooperation (Det Storkøbenhavnske Teaterfællesskab) 
was financed by the five members of the HUR as well as the central state (Henning 
2001, 38). It was abolished in 2005.
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Expert interviews for the case Nantes
 Institution Position Date





2 Nantes Métropole Head of department 18.4.2018
3 Pôle Métropolitain Nantes 
Saint-Nazaire 
Director 23.5.2018 (via 
phone)
4 Pôle Métropolitain Nantes 
Saint-Nazaire 
Project manager 23.5.2018 (via 
phone)





Conseil de Développement 
of Nantes Métropole and 
Conseil de Développement of 
a municipality
Head of a working 
group, President
19.4.2018
7 Société d’Aménagement de la 
Métropole Ouest Atlantique 
(SAMOA)
Director 20.4.2018
8 Agence d’Urbanisme de Nantes 
(AURAN)
Head of division 18.4.2018
9 Région Pays de la Loire Head of division 20.4.2018




11 Institut de Géographie et 
d’Aménagement Régional 







Expert interviews for the case Lyon
 Institution Position Date
1 Métropole Lyon and Ville de 
Lyon
Vice-president of métropole, 
member of city council 
17.10.2018
2 Métropole Lyon and 
municipality
Vice-president of métropole, 
mayor
16.10.2018
3 Planning association SEPAL Director 16.10.2018
4 Pôle Métropolitain Director 17.10.2018
5 Conseil de Développement of 
Métropole
Vice-president 16.10.2018
6 Agence d’Urbanisme UrbaLyon Project manager 18.10.2018
7 Région Auvergne Rhône-Alpes Head of division 18.10.2018
8 Institut d’Urbanisme de Lyon, 
Université Lyon 2
Academic 17.10.2018
Expert interviews for the case Stuttgart
 Institution Position Date
1 Region Stuttgart Head of planning 
department
09.07.2019
2 Wirtschaftsförderung Region 
Stuttgart GmbH
Head of division 13.09.2019
3 Regionalverband Neckar- Alb Regional planner 18.09.2019 (via 
phone)
4 City of Stuttgart Head of planning 
department
13.09.2019
5 City of Stuttgart Head of division 13.09.2019
6 City of Remseck am Neckar Head of planning 
department
29.10.2019
7 City of Welzheim Mayor and member or 
regional council
30.10.2019
8 City of Leinfelden-Echterdingen 
and County of Esslingen
Head of Department, 
County Councilor, 
General secretary of KAF
21.11.2019 (via 
phone)
Expert interviews for the case Frankfurt/Rhine-Main
 Institution Position Date
1 Regionalverband Head of planning department 11.03.2020
2 Regionalverband Head of department regional 
development
10.06.2020
3 City of Frankfurt am Main Head of planning department 07.05.2020
4 City of Bad Homburg Head of planning department 08.10.2020
5 Municipality of Raunheim Mayor 02.11.2020
(Continued)
 Annex 299
 Institution Position Date
6 Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry Frankfurt am Main




7 City of Erlensee Mayor 26.01.2021
Expert interviews for the case Florence
 Institution Position Date
1 Municipality San Giovanni 
Valdarno
Mayor 08.10.2018
2 Regional government of 
Tuscany
Two regional planners 10.10.2018
3 City of Florence / Città 
Metropolitana of Florence
Segretario Generale 09.10.2018
4 Municipal union Mugello Planner 19.02.2019
5 City of Scandicci Mayor, head of planning 
department, staff member
09.10.2018
6 City of Sesto Fiorentino Head of planning department 19.02.2019
7 Città Metropolitana of 
Florence
Head of planning department 18.02.2019




9 Università di Firenze Prof. for public law 21.06.2021
Expert interviews for the case Bologna
 Institution Position Date
1 Municipality of Minerbio Former mayor and city-
regional Councilor 
27.06.2019
2 Regional government of Emilia 
Romagna
Head of regional 
planning unit
27.06.2019
3 City of Bologna Head of planning department 26.03.2019
4 City of Casalecchio di Reno Head of planning department 28.06.2019
5 Città Metropolitana of Bologna Head of planning department 26.03.2019
6 University of Bologna Prof. for law and public 
administration
25.03.2019
7 University of Bologna Prof. for law and public 
administration
14.11.2019
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